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Introduction 
 
The manual on philosophy contains the necessary material for preparing for 
the exam on philosophy. The manual is written on the basis of a typical program 
in this discipline. The training manual contains recommendations for writing es-
says, information on the main stages of preparation for the exam, methodologi-
cal recommendations on the use of additional educational literature, work with 
primary sources. 
The manual on philosophy was developed based on the specifics of socio-
economic and engineering specialists. Issues that are in the center of attention of 
modern philosophy are considered. From the perspective of the methodology, 
key aspects of innovation are considered. Issues related to the methodology of 
discipline-oriented science and engineering are presented. 
The textbook on philosophy solves the problem of organizing the inde-
pendent work of students. Philosophy solves the problem of acquainting future 
specialists with the features of research and innovation and innovation. The 
completeness of objective knowledge about the world, a person, is a necessary 
basis for future specialists to realize the value status of the reality with which 
they will deal. On this basis, the axiological, ecological, humanistic, spiritual 
culture of a specialist is formed. Co-evolutionism, the sustainable development 
of society, security, tolerance, modernization, identity and mobility are the key 
concepts of a methodological approach to activities. 
 
1. Subject of philosophy 
 
Philosophy is the art of thinking. The aim is to train one's judgment through 
analysis, critique, and self-critique, to pay attention to distinctions and to see 
underlying patterns, and to see the whole beyond the parts. Philosophy is a sys-
tematic reflection on reason and reality; studies in philosophy will provide a 
good foundation for studying any other discipline, as well as for professions that 
requires analytical skills and a creative intellect. Branch of the philosophy: met-
aphysics, anthropology, philosophy of mind, epistemology, philosophe of sci-
ence, philosophe of history, ethics, aesthetics, logic, philosophe of religion. 
Philosophy from Greek φιλοσοφία, philosophia, literally love of wisdom is 
the study of general and fundamental problems concerning matters such as ex-
istence, knowledge, values, reason, mind, and language. The term was probably 
coined by Pythagoras. Philosophical methods include questioning, critical dis-
cussion, rational argument and systematic presentation. Classic philosophical 
questions include: Is it possible to know anything and to prove it? What is most 
real? However, philosophers might also pose more practical and concrete ques-
tions such as: Is there a best way to live? Is it better to be just or unjust (if one 
can get away with it)? Do humans have free will?  
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Historically, philosophy encompassed any body of knowledge. From the 
time of Ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle to the 19th century, natural philos-
ophy encompassed astronomy, medicine and physics. For example, Newton's 
1687 Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy later became classified as a 
book of physics. In the 19th century, the growth of modern research universi-
ties led academic philosophy and other disciplines to professionalize and spe-
cialize. In the modern era, some investigations that were traditionally part of 
philosophy became separate academic disciplines, including psychology, sociol-
ogy, linguistics and economics. 
Other investigations closely related to art, science, politics, or other pur-
suits remained part of philosophy. For example, is beauty objective or subjec-
tive? Are there many scientific methods or just one? Is political utopia a hopeful 
dream or hopeless fantasy? Major sub-fields of academic philosophy in-
clude metaphysics concerned with the fundamental nature of reality and being, 
epistemology about the "nature and grounds of knowledge and its limits and va-
lidity, ethics, aesthetics, political philosophy, logic, philosophy of science and 
the history of Western philosophy. Since the 20th century, profession-
al philosophers contribute to society primarily as professors, researchers and 
writers. However, many of those who study philosophy in undergraduate or 
graduate programs contribute in the fields of law, journalism, politics, religion, 
science, business and various art and entertainment activities. 
 
2. Philosophy as world view  
 
At first glance the term "world-view" suggests a general view of the 
world—and no more. But the appearance of the word does not reveal the full 
meaning of this complex intellectual phenomenon. A world-view, as we under-
stand it, is a system of generalised views of the surrounding world and man's 
place in it, of man's relationship to the world and himself, and also the basic po-
sitions that people derive from this general picture of the world, their beliefs, so-
cio-political, moral and aesthetic ideals, the principles by which they know and 
appraise material and spiritual events. 
While it possesses a relatively independent existence in the sphere of social 
consciousness, the world-view also functions as something individual. A person 
becomes an individual when he forms a definite world-view. This process of 
formation indicates the maturity not only of an individual but also of any given 
social group, social class or its party. The concept of world-view, which was 
first encountered among the Greek sceptics, is substantially broader in meaning 
than the concept of philosophy; moreover it has several different meanings. 
We speak of the philosophical, the socio-political, the natural-scientific, the 
artistic, the religious, and even the ordinary man's world-view. And this is quite 
natural. If we picture the various types of world-view in the geometrical form of 
circles, the central position should be given to the circle of the philosophical 
world-view. And this circle will intersect with all the others and form their nu-
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cleus. In this way we find that the meaning people and social groups attach to 
the term "world-view" is extremely diverse. But despite this diversity, every 
world-view reveals a certain unity in the sense that it embraces a certain range of 
questions. For example, what is the world that exists outside us? What is the re-
lationship between spirit and matter? What is man? What is his place in the uni-
versal interconnection of phenomena? How does man come to know reality? 
What are good and evil? What is beautiful in life and in art? What laws guide 
the development of society? The totality of the natural sciences forms a natural-
scientific picture of the world, and that of the social sciences yields a socio-
historical picture of reality. What is a picture of the world? It is a picture of how 
matter moves and how in the shape of the human being it feels, thinks and poses 
goals. The creation of a general picture of the world is the task of all fields of 
knowledge, including philosophy. In compressed form, general pictures of the 
world are presented in universal encyclopaedias compiled at various historical 
stages to reflect the intellectual achievements of mankind. 
The world-view is by no means all the views and notions of the surround-
ing world it is not simply a picture of the world taken in its integral form. Not a 
single specific science can be identified with a world-view, although each sci-
ence does contain a world-view principle. For example, Darwin discovered the 
laws of the origin of species. This caused a revolution in biology and evoked 
universal interest. Did these laws evoke such interest because they were merely 
biological laws?  
They awakened such interest because they helped us to understand various 
philosophical questions, the question of purpose in living nature, the origin of 
man, and so on. The name of Einstein was made immortal by his discovery. But 
was this discovery purely physical, a solution to some particular scientific prob-
lem? No, Einstein's theory provided a key to the philosophical problem of the 
essence of space and time, their unity with matter. Why did the ideas of Seche-
nov on cerebral reflexes create such a furore among intellectuals? Not because 
they were merely physiological ideas, but because they solved certain philo-
sophical problems of the relationship between consciousness and the brain. We 
know what a broad impact the principles of cybernetics have had. But cybernet-
ics is not just a specific scientific theory. Cybernetics, and also genetics and 
raise profound philosophical problems. 
The world-view contains something more than scientific information. It is a 
crucial regulative principle of all the vital relationships between man and social 
groups in their historical development. With its roots in the whole system of the 
individual and society's spiritual needs and interests, determined by human prac-
tice, by all man's accumulated experience, the world-view in its turn exerts a 
tremendous influence on the life of society and the individual. The world-view, 
on the other hand, is oriented on the world as a whole, on the "man-universe" 
system. The world-view may exist on the ordinary, everyday level generated by 
the empirical conditions of life and experience handed down from generation to 
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generation. It may also be scientific, integrating the achievements of modern 
science concerning nature, society and humanity itself. 
The world-view is not only the content, but also the mode of thinking about 
reality, and also the principles of life itself. An important component of the 
world-view is the ideals, the cherished and decisive aims of life. The character 
of a person's notion of the world, his world-view, facilitates the posing of certain 
goals which, when generalised, form a broad plan of life, ideals, notions of 
wellbeing, good and evil, beauty, and progress, which give the world-view tre-
mendous power to inspire action. Knowledge becomes a world-view when it ac-
quires the character of conviction, of complete and unshakable confidence in the 
rightness of certain ideas, views, principles, ideals, which take command of a 
person's soul, subordinate his actions, and rule his conscience or, in other words, 
form bonds that cannot be escaped without betraying oneself, set free "demons" 
that a person can conquer only by submitting to them and acting in accordance 
with their overwhelming power. The world-view influences standards of behav-
iour, a person's attitude to his work, to other people, the character of his aspira-
tions in life, his everyday existence, tastes and interests. It is a kind of spiritual 
prism through which everything around us is perceived, felt and transformed. 
 
3. Historical type of the philosophical world-views 
 
No matter from what direction the thinker is preceding along the "philo-
sophical road", he must cross the bridge known as "the basic question of philos-
ophy". As he does so he must, whether he likes it or not, decide on which side of 
the river of philosophical thought he will remain—the materialist or the idealist 
side. But he may find himself in mid-stream, in the position of dualism, that is to 
say, recognition of two equal and independent substances in the universe—
material and spiritual. The basic question of philosophy is that of the relation-
ship of thinking to being. It presupposes acknowledgement of the existence of 
an objective, i.e., independent of human consciousness, reality and a subjective, 
spiritual reality—representations, thoughts, ideas—and a certain relationship be-
tween them. Which comes first—matter or consciousness? Which generates 
which? Does matter at a certain stage of development generate its finest flow-
er—the reason? Or does the world spirit create the material world? Or perhaps 
they have coexisted eternally as equal substances in their own right and are in 
some way interacting? 
Such is the first aspect of the basic question of philosophy. Its second as-
pect comes down to the following. Can man and mankind in general know the 
objective laws of the world by the power of their own consciousness? Or is the 
world unknowable? In examining the first aspect implied in the basic question of 
philosophy the thinker inevitably finds himself in one of two camps, materialism 
or idealism (or dualism), while in examining the second aspect of the question 
he takes a stand either in favour of the fundamental possibility of knowing the 
world or in favour of agnosticism, that is, denial of this possibility. 
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Why is the question of the relation of thinking to being - a seemingly very 
abstract question - considered to be the basic philosophical question? Because 
from the nature of the answer we give, as from the source of a great river, there 
flow not only directly contrasting interpretations of all other philosophical prob-
lems but also the general theoretical, world-view questions posed by any sci-
ence, moral phenomena, standards of law and responsibility, phenomena of art, 
political events, problems of education, and so on. 
We cannot consider any philosophical question unless we first solve the 
basic question of philosophy. To illustrate, let us take the example of the con-
cept of causality. Materialism presumes that this concept reflects an objective, 
i.e., independent of human consciousness, process of generation of some phe-
nomena by others. But Hume, for example, denied the existence of causality in 
nature. He believed that it was habit that taught people to see certain phenomena 
as the causes of others, for instance, the blow of an axe and the falling of a tree. 
We have indeed become accustomed to see the result follow the action that 
causes it. But this habit is based on the continuous consideration of the objective 
connection of phenomena and did not arise by itself.  
According to the materialist principle, all authentically proved concepts, 
categories, propositions, inferences, laws and theories have a substantially ob-
jective character and do not depend on the whim of man. Idealism, on the other 
hand, is inclined to regard them merely as mental constructions. For example, 
the materialist scholar of literature studying the work of Shakespeare begins by 
sorting out what objective social conditions predetermined the character and in-
spiration of the dramatist's work. The idealists, on the other hand, are inclined to 
attribute his work to the depth of the individual spirit of this genius and ignore 
the social conditions in which he lived and wrote. If one takes the moral sphere, 
it is immediately obvious how contrasting the solutions to the basic question of 
philosophy may be.  
Are man's moral qualities innate or given by God, or are they formed by 
life, by upbringing. As applied to history, the basic question of philosophy ap-
pears as a relationship between social being and social consciousness. On how 
this relationship is interpreted the answer to the question: what determines man's 
destiny, what guides history - ideas, the rational powers of historic individuals, 
or the material production carried on by the people of a given society and the 
economic relationships that arise from this process. Consequently, the basic 
question of philosophy is not simply the question of the relation between think-
ing and being in general, but more specifically, that of the relation between so-
cial consciousness and social being, that is to say, the objective relations be-
tween people formed on the basis of their production of material goods. The ma-
terialist understanding of the basic question of philosophy as applied to history 
is expressed fully and simply: social being ultimately determines social con-
sciousness and social consciousness, derivatively, has an active influence on this 
being. 
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Consideration of the basic question shows that the real processes of life 
from their interpretation in various theories, the material driving forces of socie-
ty from the ideal motivations, the material interests of people, social groups 
from their reflections in the mind. Materialism teaches our thinking to see in our 
mental constructions, in our artistic, political and other ideas and images the ob-
jective content determined by the external world, by life. Idealism, on the other 
hand, hypertrophies the spiritual principle, treats it as absolute. In politics, for 
example, this attitude may have dangerous consequences for the people; ideal-
ism sometimes results in political adventurism. This happens when a politician 
ignores the objective laws of history, the will of the masses, the existing eco-
nomic relations, and tries by the power of his own volition to impose his own 
ideas, which run counter to the real, law-governed current of events. 
Materialism understands the world as it is in fact, without attributing to it 
any supernatural qualities and principles. Explanation of the world from the 
world itself is the methodological principle of materialism. It maintains that the 
connections between ideas in people's heads reflect and transform the connec-
tions between phenomena in the world. To the extent that people in living their 
lives cannot help considering the fact of the objective existence of the world, so 
they act as materialists: some spontaneously, others consciously, on a philosoph-
ical basis. Certain scientists sometimes dissociate themselves from materialism 
while spontaneously working on its principles. On the other hand, the supporters 
of philosophically conscious materialism not only consistently advocate such a 
solution of the basic question of philosophy but also substantiate and uphold it. 
Idealism is in general related to the desire to elevate the spirit to the maxi-
mum degree. In speaking with such veneration of the spiritual, of the idea, Hegel 
assumed that even the criminal thought of the evil-doer was greater and more to 
be marvelled at than all the wonders of the world. In the ordinary sense idealism 
is associated with remoteness from earthly interests, constant immersion in pure 
thought, and dedication to unrealisable dreams. Such "practical idealism" is con-
trasted to "practical materialism", which its opponents, wishing to belittle it, pre-
sent as a greedy desire for material goods, avarice, acquisitiveness, and so on. 
Idealism is divided into two basic forms: objective and subjective. The ob-
jective idealists, beginning from the ancients and ending with those of the pre-
sent day, recognise the existence of a real world outside man, but believe that 
the world is based on reason, that it is ruled by certain omnipotent ideas which 
guide everything. Consciousness is hypertrophied, separated from man, from 
matter, and converted into a supra-individual, all-embracing reality. Reality is 
considered to be rational and the reason is interpreted as the substance, the basis 
of the universe.  
All things and processes are thus spiritualised. Such a notion of the super-
human and supernatural spiritual essence, the world reason, the world will, the 
absolute idea, is essentially a religious notion. For example, in Hegel the "abso-
lute idea" is quite often called simply god, an impersonal, objective, logical pro-
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cess, while nature and the history of society are its guided other-being. Reason is 
the soul of the world. It resides in the universe and it is its immanent essence. 
From the standpoint of subjective idealism it is only through inadequate 
knowledge that we take the world as we see it to be the actually existing world. 
According to this conception, the world does not exist apart from us, apart from 
our sense perceptions: to exist is to exist in perception! And what we consider to 
be different from our sensations and existing apart from them is composed of the 
diversity of our subjective sensuality: colour, sound, forms and other qualities 
are only sensations and sets of such sensations form things. This implies that the 
world is, so to speak, woven out of the same subjective material of which human 
dreams are composed. 
To the subjective idealists it appears that our efforts to reach beyond con-
sciousness are futile and it is therefore impossible to acknowledge the existence 
of any external world that is independent of consciousness. It is a fact that we 
know the world only as it is given to man, to the extent to which it is reflected in 
our consciousness through sensations. But this certainly does not mean that the 
world when reflected in consciousness somehow dissolves in it like sugar in wa-
ter. The reader may legitimately ask: have there really been any philosophers 
who maintain such a strange philosophy as subjective idealism, a philosophy 
that for so many centuries was subjected not merely to criticism but to sarcastic 
ridicule? On the ordinary empirical level, surely it is only madmen, and only a 
few of them, who can deny the independent existence of the world. In practice, 
the subjective idealists (Berkeley, Fichte and Mach) probably did not behave as 
if they believed there was no external world. These ideas were strictly reserved 
for the sphere of theoretical thought. 
The objective idealists elevate human thought and its products—concepts, 
ideas and culture in general—to the status of the absolute. In ancient times peo-
ple measured their actions according to the unwritten rules of their ancestors that 
had been retained in the memory and handed down from generation to genera-
tion. The individual consciousness grew accustomed to being dominated by cer-
tain supra-individual ideas, social standards retained in human memory and in 
the form of the "social memory", in language. This relative independence of the 
spiritual life of society was elevated by imagination into something absolutely 
independent, into Reason divorced not only from living and thinking people but 
also from society, from matter in general, so that thinking and its products were 
elevated to a special spiritual realm, the immanent essence of the universe. And 
this was objective idealism. Its epistemological roots go down deep into history, 
when the progress of cognitive activity and the penetration of reason into the es-
sence of things triggered the process of formation of abstract concepts.  
The problem arose of relating the universal and the particular, the essence 
and its manifestations. It was not easy for man to understand how the universal 
reflected in, for example, the concept of beauty was related to the individual 
form of its existence in a given individual. A beautiful person lives and dies but 
the idea of beauty survive him and prove to be indestructible. A wise man de-
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parts this life but wisdom, as something universal, common to all wise men who 
ever lived, live or will live in the future, survives in the system of culture as 
something existing above the individual. This universal, reflected in the con-
cepts (beauty, wisdom, reason, law and so on), came to be identified with the 
concept itself. The universal features in things and the concept of the universal 
became merged in the consciousness, forming an objective-idealist alloy, in 
which the universal was divorced from its individual existence, apart from 
which it could not exist at all, and acquired the status of an independent essence. 
Objective idealism begins when the idea of a thing is conceived not as a reflec-
tion of the thing but as something eternally existing before the thing, embodied 
in the thing and determining the thing in its structure, properties and relation-
ships and continuing to exist after the destruction of the thing.  
Thus Pythagoras thought of numbers as independent essences ruling the 
world, and Plato regarded general concepts as a special realm of pure thought 
and beauty that had engendered the world of visible reality. The idea of a thing 
created by man precedes the existence of the thing itself. The thing in its given 
form is derived from the aim, the intention of its creator, let us say, a carpenter. 
The greater part of the things that surround us are the result of man's creative ac-
tivity, they are something created by man. The idea of creation has become for 
man a kind of prism through which he regards the whole world. This idea is so 
deeply rooted that he does not find it easy to set it aside and think of the world 
as something not created by anybody and existing eternally.  
The idea of the eternity of existence contradicts all the facts of our life, in 
which nearly everything is created, one might say, before our very eyes. So the 
eternal, uncreated existence of the world simply did not fit into people's heads 
and still does not fit in with many people's thinking. The level of science was 
very low and this gave rise to the assumption that there must be some universal 
creator and lord of all things. This idea was strengthened also by the fact that so 
much in the world was strikingly harmonious and purposeful. 
Idealism is linked with religion and, directly or indirectly, provides its theo-
retical expression and substantiation. Over idealism there always hovers the idea 
of a god. Subjective idealism, compelled to be inconsistent in defending its prin-
ciples, allows the objective existence of a god. The universal reason of the ob-
jective idealists is essentially a philosophical pseudonym for god: the supreme 
reason conceives itself in its creations. At the same time it would be a vulgarisa-
tion to identify idealism with religion. Philosophical idealism is not a religion 
but the road to religion through one of the forms of the complex process of hu-
man knowledge. They are different ways of being aware of the world and form-
ing an attitude to it. 
 
4. Philosophy of the ancient East 
Eastern Philosophy refers very broadly to the various philosophies of Asia. 
Among these are philosophical tradition of the India, philosophical tradition of 
the China and Arabic philosophy. 
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The term sometimes also includes Middle Eastern traditions of philosophi-
cal thought. In many cases, the philosophical schools are indistinguishable from 
the various religions which gave rise to them (or vice versa). 
F. Schlegel saw the revival of Europe on the basis of Eastern wisdom. 
These ideas created the phenomenon of the Eastern Renaissance. Oriental stud-
ies have a rigorous scientific foundation in the form of linguistics, archeology, 
history, source studies, ethnography, historical geography, and practical oriental 
studies. Orientalism has been integrated with the diplomatic activity of Europe-
an states in the East. There was an increased interest in the Ottoman Empire, 
Central Asia, and Transcaucasia. At universities in Eastern Europe, much atten-
tion was paid to building students' interest in the East. An important role was 
played by the lectures of Gottfried Ernst Groddek, which he read at the Univer-
sity of Vilnius. He was educated at the University of Gottingen. Since 1804, he 
worked at the Department of Classical Philology of the University of Vilnius. 
He taught ancient Greek and Latin languages, ancient literature. In lectures, he 
advised students to study oriental culture. Position G.E. Groddek was in tune 
with the pan-European trend in linguistics. 
Thus, the discoverer of the sanctuary, W. Jones, considered it important to 
search for a single source of Indo-European wisdom. F. Schlegel adhered to a 
similar position, writing about the language and wisdom of the Brahmins. A. 
Duperron adhered to it. He translated the Upanishads from Persian into Latin. 
Comparative Linguistics G.E. Groddek has formed an interest in the east-
ern culture of a native of Belarus O.I. Senkovsky. He was educated at the Minsk 
Jesuit College and at the University of Vilna. After moving to St. Petersburg, he 
became the first Arabist professor in the Russian Empire. In lectures, he used the 
results of trips to the Middle East. Under the influence of the lectures of the pro-
fessor were O. Kovalevsky, Y. Kopatsky, A. Mukhlinsky, A. Rafalovich, A. 
Golynsky, B. Grambchevsky, I. Chersky, M. Vronchenko, E. Pekarsky, I. Te-
tersky. Among the university students in Vilna was also OM Kovalevsky, exiled 
to Kazan and assigned to a local university to study Oriental languages. He mas-
tered the Turkic, Mongolian, Manchu, Chinese, Tibetan languages. He explored 
Tibet, Mongolia and China. He is the founder of the school of Mongolian stud-
ies. As a result of his stay in Tibet, he brought to Kazan a large collection of 
manuscripts. He wrote original scientific works on Buddhist cosmology. 
To study the territory of Turkestan, the Russian authorities equipped geo-
graphic, military and diplomatic expeditions. Negotiation strategies, combined 
with a military presence, allowed the integration of the Zhuli of East Turkestan, 
the khans of Khiva, Bukhara and Kokand into the diplomatic space of the Rus-
sian Empire. An important role in creating a dialogue between the Turkic peo-
ples and the authorities of the Russian Empire was played by the participants in 
the uprisings in Tobolsk and Ishim on the territory of the former Grand Duchy 
of Lithuania. Among them were natives of Belarus. They studied the nature of 
Turkestan, the culture of the Kazakhs, provided the local national intelligentsia 
with information about European culture and its representatives. During the 
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work of the diplomatic mission of the Russian Empire in the south of Turkestan, 
the exiled from Belarus A. Yanushkevich and the father of Abai Kunanbaev 
met. They constantly talked. A. Yanushkevich in the process of communication 
held in his hands the one-year-old Abay. 
A. Yanushkevich was from Central Belarus, from Nesvizh. He represented 
the region that traditionally supplied applicants to the university in Vilna. Here, 
students from Belarus met, made friends, were engaged in literary creation, phi-
losophy. Since they adhered to the idea of restoring the Grand Duchy of Lithua-
nia, they combined their studies with participation in organizations and became 
participants in the uprisings. A. Yanushkevich appreciated the friendship with 
A. Mickiewicz. He told Abay Kunanbayev’s father about this poet, as well as 
about other European poets. 
European orientalist was A. Khodzko-Boreyko. He was born on August 30, 
1804 in the estate of Krivichi (now Myadel district of the Minsk region) in the 
family of a prominent public figure and writer Jan Khodzko in Lithuania and 
Belarus. A. Khodzko received good home education, studied several foreign 
languages, and since 1816 he studied in Vilna, in a gymnasium, under the guid-
ance of teacher Tomasz Zan. After graduating from high school in 1820, A. 
Khodzko entered the faculty of verbal sciences and free (or fine) arts of Vilnius 
University. The lectures of I. Lelevel, G. Grodek, I. Danilovich had a great in-
fluence on him. 
A. Khodzko was introduced into the circle of close associates of T. Zahn in 
semi-legal societies and took an active part in their activities. He became secre-
tary of the Blue (Philological) Union of Filarets. Forty-two Societies were de-
feated by Russian authorities. A. Khodzko, like their other members (including 
his friend Adam Mitskevich), was under investigation in custody, but was ac-
quitted. April 16, 1825 he graduated from the university.  
A. Khodzko showed interest in the culture of the peoples of the East. He 
gained fame as a poet who propagated ideals and romanticism among literary 
youth, which was reflected in his attraction to oriental motives. The poets of the 
romantic school were also interested in folk art. 
In order to study the culture of the East more deeply, A. Khodzko decided 
to move to Petersburg, where the best oriental forces of Russia were concentrat-
ed. January 7, 1827 Khodzko entered the Education Department of Living Lan-
guages at the Asian Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in St. Peters-
burg. The department trained translators of oriental languages for Russian mis-
sions in Iran and Turkey. His teacher was Mirza Jafar Topchibashev. 
In 1829, a collection of poems and translations by A. Khodzko was pub-
lished in Polish. The collection showed a poet's interest in the East. Along with 
translations of the poems by A. S. Pushkin and V. A. Zhukovsky and songs from 
the collection “Guzla” by P. Merime, the anthology included new Greek, Per-
sian, Bashkir, Azerbaijani songs. The book ended with the poem by A. Khodzko 
"Derar" for Arabic motives. The book was also reflected in the well-known A. 
Khodzko by his ethnic environment in his native places, Belarusian and Lithua-
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nian folklore. Several songs are based on the plots of Belarusian and Lithuanian 
folk art. 
The collection was reprinted in Poznan in 1833. Literary Newspaper, pub-
lished by A. A. Delvig with the active participation of A. Pushkin, responded to 
the publication of the collection in 1829. The poem "Derar" was translated into 
Russian and published in 1839. In 1830, Khodzko was identified as a translator 
for the Russian mission in Iran. He arrived at his destination, having traveled 
from Petersburg through Astrakhan and Baku. 
Six travel essays by Khodzko were published in the St. Petersburg newspa-
per Tygodnik Petersburski in 1830-1831 and 1833. and in the Literary Newspa-
per of 1830–1831. A. Khodzko held the position of translator at the Russian 
consulate in Tabriz from March 26, 1832, as well as the consul in Rasht, which 
was the administrative center of the province of Gilyan. Continuing the folklore 
and ethnographic traditions that distinguished Vilnius societies, the researcher 
studied the country, its history, way of life, languages, and the culture of its in-
habitants. April 29, 1841 A. Khodzko went on vacation for treatment to Europe 
and spent it in Greece and Italy. 
In 1842, he quit his diplomatic service and settled in Paris. Here A. Kho-
dzko renewed his friendship with A. Mickiewicz and helped him in 1849 to pub-
lish the newspaper “La Tribune des Peuples”, around which emigrants from var-
ious countries united. A. Khodzko did not lose ties with Iran. In 1857, the Irani-
an government, on the recommendation of the politician Farrukhan Amin al-
Daul, under whom A. Khodzko was a consultant during a visit to France by Far-
rukh Khan in 1857, instructed A. Khodzko to control 42 Iranian youths studying 
in Paris. The orientalist carried out this observation until 1868. He published his 
works in English and French. 
In 1857, A. Khodzko tried in vain to take a vacant place as a teacher of the 
Persian language at the Paris School of Oriental Languages, but received only a 
professor at the Slavic languages and literature course at the College de France 
University. A. Khodzko’s interests included problems of philology, folklore, 
ethnography, religion, and theater of the peoples of the Caspian regions. A. 
Khodzko widely used the method of field observations when describing the life 
of the peoples of the Caspian coast, which was reflected in the article “Persian 
music” and in the preface to the book “Samples of Persian folk poetry in the ad-
ventures and improvisations of Ker-oglu ...”. The collection of materials was fa-
cilitated by official and scientific trips of the researcher in the regions of Iran. 
The materials were published in German and translated by J. Sand in French. He 
visited A. Khodzko, distant from the provincial capital, Mazanderan (1836) and 
Khorasan (1833, 1834). 
The manuscripts collected by A. Khodzko and the records he made locally 
formed the basis of most of his later scientific publications, among which the 
most interesting are works on linguistics, folklore, ethnography, theater, reli-
gion, as well as complex descriptions of individual territories. A. Khodzko was 
the first to draw the attention of researchers to the languages of the Iranian group 
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that had not been studied before: Talysh, Gilan, Mazanderan, and the Suleymani 
dialect of the Kurdish language. A special place was occupied by the central re-
gion of Persia. 
The Grammar of the Persian Language, compiled by an orientalist, has sur-
vived two editions - in 1852 and 1883. The collection A. Specimens of the 
Popular Poetry of Persia (L., 1842) received great fame. It consists of the fol-
lowing sections: 
1. Foreword. 
2. Introduction to the “Koroglu”. 
3. Adventures and improvisations of Koroglu. 
4. Folk songs of the Astrakhan Tatars. 
5. Three songs of Kalmyks. 
6. Turkmen songs. 
7. Songs of Persian Turks. 
8. Persian songs. 
9. Songs of Gilyans. 
10. The same Rudbar Highlanders. 
11. The same Talysh. 
12. The same ma 
13. Samples of texts. 
14. Nine Persian songs. 
The songs placed in the 14th section (“Koroglu”, “Azerbaijan Air") are ac-
companied by notes. In the collection, A. Khodzko published his notes on the 
folk art of Azerbaijanis, Turkmens, Nogais, Talysh, Iranians, Gilyans, Ma-
zanderans and Kalmyks. Koroglu is a Turkmen singer from the Teke family, a 
hero of the legends of more than a dozen Turkic-speaking peoples of Asia. Ori-
entalists studied mainly court written literature. A. Khodzko was one of the first 
orientalists to introduce the folklore of the above-mentioned peoples into the 
circle of scientific research. 
The knowledge of A. Khodzko of the Turkic and Iranian languages, close 
communication with the inhabitants of Iran contributed to the researcher making 
adequate translations of Turkmen, Azerbaijani, Persian and other types of poetry 
into European languages. Most of the folklore texts in the London collection 
have been republished in other languages. “The Adventures and Improvisations 
of Keroglu” were twice translated into French by Georges Sand and Adolphe 
Breliè. They came out as a separate edition in German, translated by O. Wolf, 
and also in the Russian translation by S. Penn. 
All this contributed to the popularization of oral works of the peoples of the 
Caspian coast in Europe. A significant part of the London collection of A. Kho-
dzko was composed by him in the Adventures and Improvisations of Koroglu 
recorded by him in Iranian Azerbaijan. A. Khodzko’s romantic interests were 
manifested both in his love of folk songs, which he translated, and in their sub-
ject. In the image of Koroglu, the researcher saw the embodiment of the struggle 
for the rights of the people against the oppressors. The fact that folk legends per-
17 
 
sisted about Koroglu, A. Khodzko found extra evidence of the aspirations of the 
peoples of the East to social justice. 
Less well-known in the literature are records of texts of Turkmen songs and 
poems made by A. Khodzko in Nardin (North Khorasan) in 1833. The first two 
texts, “Victory of the Turkmen Teke” and “Song of the Emir-Guna-khan after 
the defeat near Moyun,” are devoted to the defeat of the Kurds by the Turkmens 
in 1782. The following three texts belong to the poet Karajaoglan. The sixth text 
contains a song about the campaign of the Iranian shah Aga-Mohammed Khan 
in 1796 against the leader of the Kurds Memish Khan. The following three texts 
A. Khodzko entitled “Three songs of the Turkmen Makhtumkuli” 
(“Makhtumkuli - to his mother”, “Wise opinions” and “Winte memories”). They 
are followed by the “Serjam Song”, “Tips of Kemine” and “Song of Adyna 
Daragazi”. 
A. Khodzko attached particular importance to the creativity of the classic 
of Turkmen poetry of the 18th century Makhtumkuli. The researcher called him 
the most popular poet not only in Turkmenistan, but also in Khorasan. A. Kho-
dzko gave a short biography of Makhtum-kuli and emphasized that the poet de-
voted most of his time to philosophy and poetry. 
The value of this publication lies in the fact that it appeared twelve years 
after the first publication of the poet’s legacy in the European language in gen-
eral and twenty years earlier than the first known publication of Makhtumkuli’s 
poems in Russian translation by F. Bakulin. Thanks to the work of A. Khodzko, 
not only Western European, but also Russian readers could familiarize them-
selves with the poetic heritage of the great Turkmen poet long before it was cus-
tomary to consider. 
A. Khodzko’s translations drew attention to Turkmen poetry even when 
Turkmenistan was separated from Russia and other European countries by terri-
tories not sufficiently involved in the orbit of wide cultural exchange between 
Europe and Asia. When information about the rich spiritual potential of the 
Turkmen people often came from hostile circles and contained incorrect infor-
mation about him. Peru A. Khodzko also owns a detailed historical and geo-
graphical description of the province of Gilan, on the southern coast of the Cas-
pian Sea, published in French and translated into Russian. This work is distin-
guished by an integrated approach to the study of Gilan. 
Among the materials collected by A. Khodzko were manuscripts covering 
certain aspects of the religious life of the Iranian population. In 1839, the re-
searcher handed I. Blaramberg a rare manuscript translated from the Persian 
language into French, “Kulsun - nene, or How Persian women interpret the Ko-
ran.” In 1848, A. Khodzko published the Persian text (with French translation 
and commentary) of the note by the Iranian ambassador to France Mirza Mo-
hammed Ali Khan, “Monotheism [sects] of the Wahhabis, explained by them 
themselves”. Four years later, the researcher published the article “Desatir, the 
religious code of the [sect] of the Mahabadis”, and then the article “Hassan Seb-
bah and his supporters - Iranian Legitimists”. 
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One of the first researchers A. Khodzko drew attention to the Persian theat-
rical performances “Theasie” and published five texts of these plays. Most of the 
works of A. Khodzko are rich in primary material collected by the researcher at 
the places of his long stay as a result of his constant contacts with the local pop-
ulation. This is the main value of the work of an orientalist. 
A. Khodzko is characterized by an interest in the life, customs and every-
day life of the Caspian peoples. The rudiments of an ethnographic approach to 
the study of these peoples were manifested in his works. Long communication 
with them allowed the researcher to leave, in particular, an impressive picture of 
the life of the Gilyans. Among his observations, there are interesting ethno-
graphic sketches that help to recreate the life image of the peoples of the Caspi-
an coast in the first half of the 19th century. A. Khodzko’s works on the Caspian 
region contain a lot of information that has not lost its cognitive significance. 
The researcher draws attention to changes in the spiritual and material life of the 
peoples of this region under the influence of objective living conditions. He 
gives examples of the constant interaction of cultures in the process of coexist-
ence of different peoples. 
Understanding that humanity is one, A. Khodzko showed respect for the 
culture of individual peoples, drew attention to socio-historical factors that re-
strained progress. The activities of A. Khodzko contributed to the formation of 
contemporares humane ideas about the peoples of the Middle East. His work 
contributed to the development of folklore and ethnography of the peoples of the 
Caspian region. He became a popularizer of the work of the outstanding Azer-
baijani writer Mirza Fatali Akhundov. 
A.O. Mukhlinsky is from the Belarusian Tatars. His research interests in-
cluded the history of Islam within the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania . A.O. 
Mukhlinsky is the founder of scientific Turkology at St. Petersburg University. 
He was the founder of a specialized department of Turkish, later Turkish-Tatar, 
literature (literature of the Volga and Crimean Tatars). I taught students courses 
in Arabic and Turkish languages, as well as the history and geography of the 
East, and the history of the Ottoman Empire. 
From 1832 to 1836 he was sent to the Ottoman Empire; interned in Otto-
man Egypt, at the famous university at the Cairo mosque al-Azhar, founded in 
972, from where he took out several manuscripts, including the work of the Per-
sian mathematician and astronomer Ahmad al-Katib. A.O. Mukhlinsky actively 
published in the "Library for Reading" by an Arabist, writer and publicist O.I. 
Senkovsky, in the "Encyclopedic Dictionary" of 1861 
A researcher of the Middle East within the framework of the spiritual pre-
cepts of the Vatican was a native of Grodno province M. Rylo. After the closure 
of the Jesuit Academy in Polotsk and the ban on the activities of the Jesuit Or-
der, he went to the Vatican, where he was delegated the authority to represent 
the Catholic Church in the regions of the Middle East and North Africa. M. Rylo 
was among the first Europeans to visit and describe Babylon. He opened schools 
for Christians in the Middle East. His subsequent spiritual activities took place 
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in Sudan. K. Kossovich came from Polotsk, who became a famous Sanskritolo-
gist, Iranianist, and Semitologist. He was fluent in Greek, Arabic and Hebrew. 
In the years 1845-1847 was a teacher at the Lazarev Institute of Oriental Lan-
guages. His brother, I. Kossovich, studied the Avestan language and translated 
the Avesta into Latin. He worked at the University of St. Petersburg. The subject 
of his interests included Greek and Roman literature. 
A.O. Makovelsky is from the Belarusian city of Grodno. At the beginning 
of the twentieth century, he was sent by the University of Kazan to Berlin to 
study sources on ancient philosophy. The subject of his scientific research was 
pre-Socratics. In Berlin, he spoke with representatives of German philosophy. 
At the beginning of World War I, he returned to Russia. After the establishment 
of Soviet power on the territory of the Russian Empire in 1920, he accepted the 
proposal to move to Baku, where he contributed to the formation of Orientalism 
of the twentieth century. The subject of his research was Hellenic philosophy, 
taking into account its combination with the philosophical traditions of Trans-
caucasia and Persia. On this basis, he conducted research on Azerbaijani culture 
and philosophy. Thus, researchers from Belarus made a significant contribution 
to the development of European Orientalism. They explored the vast territories 
of Asia, the culture of local peoples, languages, and philosophy. 
Orientalism as an object field in the XIV-XIX centuries had eastern cul-
tures, including the vast territories of the Moscow state and the Russian Empire. 
In the XVII century, the war between the Commonwealth and the Moscow state 
took place on the territory of Belarus. Part of the Belarusian Orthodox popula-
tion, fearing the Counter-Reformation, came under the jurisdiction of the Mos-
cow state. The other part - the Catholic religion - was in military service in the 
army of the Commonwealth. Captivity meant for them a link to the remote east-
ern regions of the Moscow state. They monitored the life of the local Siberian 
peoples, as well as the features of their interaction with the Russian population. 
One of the first among Belarusian researchers in the culture of Ugra is Adam 
Kaminsky-Dluzhik. 
In 1660, during the war of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the 
Moscow State, A. Kamensky-Dluzhik was captured in the area of the city of 
Mogilev and was sent to Moscow. From there he was sent to Yakutia. The road 
took a lot of time. She ran through different regions, including through Ugra. 
Travel time A. Kaminsky-Dluzhik devoted observations of the cultural charac-
teristics of cities, local people. 
Mansi is characterized by him as hunters and fishers. They have their own 
faith, the infrastructure of which they carefully guard. They have a language. 
The researcher made one of the first attempts to compare it with European lan-
guages. It was an attempt to discover a common linguistic group of peoples. But 
since in the XVII century this topic did not have a strictly scientific study, the 
researcher limited himself when comparing the Zyryan language with the lan-
guages of the peoples inhabiting the Commonwealth. 
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The researcher noted that Mansi's spiritual faith focuses on dialogue with 
local nature. He described in detail the peculiarities of hunting zyryans for a 
bear. They consisted in the fact that the hunter accompanied the extraction of the 
bear with a special ceremonial of communication with his clan. This dialogue 
was conducted through the skull of an animal. A. Kaminsky-Dluzhik was lim-
ited in time, so his information about Yugra did not have a detailed description. 
He presented his observations about the local peoples of Siberia in a special es-
say, which became the subject of analysis of modern ethnographers. The essay 
described Mansi. 
In the XVIII century as a result of captivity in Western Siberia was Ludwik 
Senitsky. The book he wrote contains a description of the Khanty. Since, like A. 
Kamensky-Dluzhik, he was transported to Yakutia, the description of Ugra does 
not take up much space in his memoirs. His impressions of the Khanty and 
Mansi were formed upon his stay in Perm, Solikamsk, Verkhoturye, Tobolsk, 
Surgut and Narym. In cities, the indigenous population was a minority. There-
fore, the main source of information about the indigenous peoples of Ugra L. 
Senitsky was given travels through the taiga. 
E. Felinskaya presented more extensive information about the spiritual cul-
ture of the Khanty and Mansi in her memoirs. It comes from the German Wen-
dorff family. Her ancestors settled within Belarus. She received the surname 
“Felinskaya” upon her marriage. The family did not form because of the immi-
nent death of her husband. The love of S. Konarsky was followed by participa-
tion in democratic organizations. The arrest was developed in the form of exile 
in the Tobolsk province. The main city of location was Berezov. 
E. Felinskaya devoted most of her time to the study of the ethnographic 
characteristics of local peoples. The information was provided by the convenient 
location of the city. Representatives of the main local peoples visited him on 
business. In this intercultural dialogue, processes were born that determined 
their joint economic evolution. Reindeer husbandry has become a factor in eco-
nomic integration and cooperation of the peoples of Ugra. He was perfectly 
owned by the Nenets. This was a progressive activity, as it provided the popula-
tion with food, goods, and necessary resources. 
In “Memories of a Journey to Siberia and Stay in Berezovo,” E. Felinskaya 
described the features of the material life of the Nenets and Khanty who lived in 
the neighborhood. The common basis of their life was reindeer herding. Im-
portant processes of the formation of large herd of reindeer herding were com-
pleted. The bearers of this culture were the tundra Nenets. They led a mobile ter-
ritorial lifestyle, which involved active contacts on an intercultural basis. In the 
XVII century, on the basis of the Khanty, the Tundra Nenets formed genera, 
which began to play an important role in the spread of their influence. 
The tundra Nenets found economic forms of interaction in the lower reach-
es of Pechora with the Komi people. At the same time, the tundra Nenets and 
Khanty retained their linguistic features, since they represented different linguis-
tic families. Intermediary functions were performed by the Russian language. E. 
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Felinskaya recorded the differences between tundra reindeer husbandry and 
economic activity in forest areas. 
Southern Khanty and Mansi during the studies of E. Felinsky, lived on the 
banks of the Irtysh. They were in an active intercultural dialogue with the Rus-
sians and Tatars. Taiga in the south bordered the steppe. The Khanty, who came 
from the south to the lower reaches of the Ob, called themselves "the people of 
the Ob." They were engaged in fishing, hunting, reindeer husbandry. The spir-
itual life of these tribes was based on the traditions of shamanism, and with the 
adoption of Christianity - on Orthodoxy. E. Felinskaya reflected in her memoirs 
the details of clothes, hairstyles of men and women of the Khanty people. What 
was common in hairstyles was that people braided their hair in braids. They 
wore beads around their necks. The Khanty dressed in long shirts made of deer 
skins called "Maltsa". Wool twisted inside. A “park” with a hood was worn over 
the shirt. The hood had the shape of a deer head. The set of clothes included mit-
tens. In cold weather, the third layer of clothing formed the “goose”. Legs insu-
lated stockings made of deer skin called "siskins". Thermal comfort was com-
plemented by boots - “pima”. They were tied to the belt with straps. On holi-
days, the Khanty wore elegant shirts with a black collar. They were embroidered 
with multi-colored beads and plaques. Boots made of colored cloth. Women 
wore skirts and caftans. A shawl covered their faces, because his father-in-law 
and husband's elder brother could not see him. Tattoos were applied to the bod-
ies. E. Felinskaya paid special attention to the Khanty dwellings and set forth 
her observations in detail in her memoirs.  
In the summer, the Khanty lived in the plague. Deer skins lay on the floor. 
In winter, the Khanty lived in wooden houses dug in the ground. A wooden roof 
was insulated from above by earth. A chimney came out through the roof. Light-
ing at home was provided by half-open doors. Mosquitoes drove away the 
smoke of the outbreak. The interior walls of the house housed sun loungers and 
seats. These were hewn logs covered in skins. Boxes were used to store the be-
longings. Household functions were performed by birch bark buckets, scoops, 
cups, and spoons. Window frames were drawn in transparent fish skin. It had 
lower thermal conductivity compared to glass. Khanty moved on reindeer har-
nessed to sledges, as well as dog sledding. 
The religious culture of the Khanty religiously combined Orthodoxy and 
local beliefs. The Orthodox Church baptized the indigenous population. But the 
same population retained local beliefs. Copper crosses were used to decorate 
clothes. E. Felinskaya described the spiritual culture of the Khanty and in terms 
of their wedding ceremonies. There was a custom of ransom for the bride. He 
was paid to her family by the groom. This showed respect for the bride and her 
parents. In return, the bride’s parents gave her daughter deer and furs in the form 
of a dowry. From the observations of E. Felinskaya regarding religion, it follows 
that in the beliefs the Khanty preferred the traditional institution of shamanism, 
the cult of the bear. She described in detail the bear hunt and the cult associated 
with it. According to this description, the Khanty went to the bear with one 
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knife. The beast was hunted in equal fight. The hunter asked for forgiveness 
from the killed bear.  
He placed the paws of the slain beast in the house next to the attributes of 
the local gods. Group Por, considered a bear as their ancestor. Felinskaya stud-
ied the features of the folk art of the Khanty people. She recorded two tales. She 
asked for a dance for her. He gives a pantomime image of the hunt. The re-
searcher drew attention to the features of the inner world of the Khanty and 
Mansi associated with honesty. Local peoples were not prone to deception. They 
regularly paid taxes in the form of taxes and fur tribute. They were honest in 
trading with Russian merchants. Debts were returned if at least one member of 
the family survived. The criterion of justice was the basis of the movement of 
local peoples led by Vauli. An analysis of the reasons for this uprising, E. Felin-
skaya devoted a lot of space in her memoirs. 
After long troubles, E. Felinskaya received permission to return to the for-
mer Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. She published the collected materials in 
the Athenaeum magazine and in separate books. The screen translated them into 
English. In London, the diaries stood three editions. A translation was also made 
into Danish. In the second half of the 19th century, the function of studying Si-
beria was introduced into the responsibility of the highest Siberian administra-
tion with the aim of integrating the region into the Russian economy. Military 
threats were also taken into account. Before the opening of the Tomsk Imperial 
University in 1878, Kazan University solved the main research problems in the 
eastern part of the Russian Empire. A school of historical and comparative lin-
guistics functioned here. Natives of Belarus took an active part in its work. 
The main interests of the school were concentrated on the eastern periphery 
of the Russian Empire, bordering China, Mongolia, Tibet, Dzungaria, Central 
Asia. An important role was played by overseas Orthodox missions, which col-
lected unique material about the culture of China. One of these missions was at-
tended by a native of Belarus, the Orthodox priest A.I. Goshkevich. In a short 
time mastered Chinese and Japanese. He played an important role in establishing 
diplomatic relations between the Russian Empire and Japan. 
Against the background of Asian studies, the regions of Siberia and the Far 
East that became part of the Russian Empire remained little studied. Research on 
geography, geodesy, geology, demography, archeology, linguistics, and biology 
of the region came to the fore. Inaccessible territories became the subject of 
study of a native of Belarus Ivan Chersky. They mainly focused on mountain 
ranges. One of them is named after the scientist. Western Siberia, bordering the 
Urals, had no mountains, but was even more impassable due to swamps, rivers, 
and sparsely populated taiga. 
A native of the Slonim district of the Grodno province of Belarus A.A. be-
came a researcher of the peoples and nature of the impassable territories of 
Western Siberia. Dunin-Gorkavich. He was born in 1854. He received his edu-
cation in Grodno in the classical gymnasium and school, after graduating from 
which he was awarded the qualification of a forestry technician and the title of 
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forest conductor. Practical work with the forest followed. He served in the Tsar-
skoye Selo forestry, in the forests of the Samara and Nizhny Novgorod provinc-
es, and the Ryazan. Work was interrupted by participation in the Russian-
Turkish war, where he proved himself, for which he was awarded. 
A.A. Dunin-Gorkavich became the first highly educated Belarusian who 
connected his life with Siberia of his own free will, without any coercion. Like 
every Belarusian, he loved the forest, and he sought to realize this love in new 
opportunities. Such opportunities were created by the proposal to head the Sa-
mara forestry of the Tobolsk province. The appointment was given by A.A. 
Dunin-Gorkavic. His interests included linguistic topics and folklore of the in-
digenous population of Ugra, since contacts with the local population required 
an analysis of the differences and similarities in the linguistic communication of 
the population. He formulated many problems of forestry. 
A.A. Dunin-Gorkavich became a famous local historian. He traveled fifty 
thousand kilometers. Under his leadership, a detailed map of a huge region with 
the features of nature and culture of the local population was compiled. Geo-
graphic maps of the region have become a unique source of information about 
settlements, fishing grounds, reindeer husbandry and waterways. They were 
highly appreciated by the Imperial Russian Geographical Society, which award-
ed AA Dunin-Gorkavich Small Gold Medal. 
The research results were presented by A.A. Dunin-Gorkavich in the fun-
damental scientific work "Tobolsk North." It consists of three volumes. One of 
the central places in it is occupied by a description of the ethnographic features 
of the peoples of Ugra. The information basis for the analysis of ethnographic 
material was the census. A.A. Dunin-Gorkavich was one of the active partici-
pants in the census in the Surgut district. As a result of this great work, he was 
awarded the Bronze Medal "For the Works of the First General Census of the 
Population in 1897". 
A.A. Dunin-Gorkavich collected unique ethnographic material on the cul-
ture of the Ostyaks (Khanty), Voguls (Mansi), Samoyeds (Nenets), Zyryans 
(Komi). He knew the languages of the Khanty and Nenets. This allowed him to 
carry out a unique publication in 1910 of the “Russian-Ostyak-Samoyed Dic-
tionary”. A.A. Dunin-Gorkavich wrote about seventy scientific works on the 
history, geography, economics, and ethnography of North-Western Siberia. 
They are accompanied by cartographic materials, sets of photographs, drawings 
and drawings. They are stored in the Tobolsk State Historical and Architectural 
Museum-Reserve. 
Scientific works did not go unnoticed by the Imperial Russian Geograph-
ical Society. Their author was awarded the Big Silver Medal named after N.M. 
Przhevalsky, awarded with diplomas and certificates of honor of the All-Russian 
agricultural, commercial and industrial and artisan exhibitions. The Presidium of 
the USSR Academy of Sciences enrolled A.A. Dunin-Gorkavich in the category 
of scientists of national importance and established a lifetime personal pension. 
Died A.A. Dunin-Gorkavich in Tobolsk in 1927 
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The reasonableness and fundamental nature of the main scientific work of 
A.A. Dunin-Gorkavich "Tobolsk North: a general overview of the country, its 
natural wealth and industrial activities of the population." When describing the 
Ugric-Finnish peoples, the Khanty, Mansi, Komi, the scientist uses statistical 
and geographical data on the population according to the criteria of general 
characteristics, living conditions, activity, separation of horse and reindeer, lan-
guage, religious beliefs, superstitions, rituals. Part III of the work is devoted to 
the ethnographic composition and life of the population of the Tobolsk North. 
The third part of the scientific work is fragmented into chapters. The sec-
ond chapter, dedicated to the Ostyaks, describes in detail the demographic and 
ethnographic characteristics of the people. In economic activity, the criterion of 
dividing the Khanty into equine and reindeer is particularly emphasized. The 
classification of Ostyak groups is given. One of the criteria is the Khanty lan-
guage. It is represented by the dialects Irtysh, Surgut, Berez and Nizhneob. 
The spiritual culture of the Khanty is described in detail. Particularly high-
lighted are the views on the bear. It is shown that this forest beast plays an im-
portant role even in justice. Khanty will not dare to lie before the image of a 
bear in the form of his head or paw. Hunting for a bear involves a special spir-
itual contact with him. The same contact occurs with the carcass of a bear or a 
dipper. The essence of the measures is not to bring consequences to the hunter 
and those who eat the carcass of the beast. As a result, the ritual before fishing 
occupies one of the central places in the spiritual life of the Khanty. 
Important Khanty rites include the burial of the deceased and sacrifice. As 
a result of these rites, the Khanty appear as idolaters. Officially, they are consid-
ered Orthodox. In fact, they are only listed as such. These characteristics are 
Khanty A.A. Dunin-Gorkavich recorded on the border of the XIX-XX centuries. 
In the special chapters of scientific work, the Mansi and Komi peoples 
were subjected to Dunin-Gorkavich. Tobolsk North is considered as a single ge-
ographical territorial complex, therefore a special chapter is devoted to intercul-
tural influences of Russian and foreign cultures. 
In the fourth part of the scientific work when considering the crafts A.A. 
Dunin-Gorkavich returns to ethnographic descriptions of the clothing of the 
peoples of the region, the peculiarities of their life and economic activity. He 
devotes much attention to the ecosocial methodology, which forms the features 
of the daily life of the Khanty, Mansi, and Komi. The ecosocial space of local 
peoples is formed by rivers, taiga, climatic zones, and animal migration. The re-
searcher pays much attention to the adaptation features of local peoples. He 
draws attention to their physical condition, especially the treatment. It shows the 
important role of places of trade in intercultural exchange, and also draws the 
reader's attention to the features of language communication of the Khanty, 
Mansi, Komi, Nenets and Russians. The key factors are language borrowing, 
multilingualism. 
Research A.A. Dunin-Gorkavich in the Tobolsk region of the North turned 
out to be relevant in the conditions of industrialization of Western Siberia. Sovi-
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et engineers had to master new forms of environmental engineering, based on 
the features of industrial activity in the conditions of permafrost, reindeer migra-
tions and herd of reindeer herding. With the influx of the population, the risks of 
pollution of the taiga, tundra, and the spread of viruses grew. Not only people 
who found themselves in the extreme conditions of the North, but also the indig-
enous peoples of the region, as well as populations of wild animals and herd of 
reindeer, suffered. These factors have led to increased interest in local cultures 
and their ecological potential. 
Thus, over the course of several centuries, the tradition of the participation 
of researchers from Belarus in the study of the peculiarities of the peoples of Si-
beria was formed. These studies formed the practical basis for deciding on the 
creation of the Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug as part of the Russian 
Federation. Natives of Belarus described the original spiritual culture of the 
Khanty and Mansi. The research results were presented to the European public 
in the languages available to it. 
As a result of this theoretical transformer- originated synthesis of Eurasian 
ideology and philosophy of law. Concludes Existence in the philosophy of law 
and the provisions of the conclusions that are relevant to modern legal philoso-
phy, they deal with issues of universal and relativity of different legal cultures in 
the history and modernity. In this regard, of particular interest is the question of 
the specificity of Russian philosophy of law in the context of the Eurasian para-
digm.  
It will be attended by heads of diplomatic missions of the CIS countries and 
a number of other states, employees of state administration, specialists in the 
humanities, representing the National academy of sciences of Belarus and higher 
educational institutions of the country. Among the speakers – ambassadors and 
embassy staff from Kazakhstan, Russia, China, the Commissioner for Religious 
and Ethnic Affairs of the Republic of Belarus, prominent domestic and foreign 
scholars.   
The participants of the conference are expected to develop a coordinated 
approach to promote the ideas of ethnic harmony and tolerance in Eurasia in the 
interests of peaceful coexistence, socio-economic development and integration. 
The special importance of these ideas is emphasized by the entry into force of 
the Eurasian Economic Union from 1 January 2015.  
Particular attention will be paid to the problems of organizing national dia-
logue during the transition period, the role of state leaders in this process. Partic-
ipants will raise issues of economic, scientific, educational, humanitarian and 
cultural cooperation in the post-Soviet space, as well as the role the Assembly of 
Peoples of Kazakhstan, the prospects for economic, social and cultural integra-
tion within the EAEU. 
 
5. Philosophical tradition of the India 
Indian Philosophy (or, in Sankrit, Darshanas), refers to any of several tradi-
tions of philosophical thought that originated in the Indian subcontinent, includ-
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ing Hindu philosophy, Buddhist philosophy, and Jain philosophy (see below for 
brief introductions to these schools). It is considered by Indian thinkers to be a 
practical discipline, and its goal should always be to improve human life. 
The main Hindu orthodox (astika) schools of Indian philosophy are those 
codified during the medieval period of Brahmanic-Sanskritic scholasticism, and 
they take the ancient Vedas (the oldest sacred texts of Hinduism) as their source 
and scriptural authority: 
Samkhya is the oldest of the orthodox philosophical systems, and it postu-
lates that everything in reality stems from purusha (self or soul or mind) 
and prakriti (matter, creative agency and energy). It is a dualist philosophy, alt-
hough between the self and matter rather than between mind and body as in the 
Western dualist tradition, and liberation occurs with the realization that the soul 
and the dispositions of matter (steadiness, activity and dullness) are different. 
The Yoga school, as expounded by Patanjali in his 2nd Century B.C. Yoga 
Sutras, accepts the Samkhya psychology and metaphysics, but is more theistic, 
with the addition of a divine entity to Samkhya's twenty-five elements of reality. 
The relatively brief Yoga Sutras are divided into eight ashtanga (limbs), remi-
niscent of Buddhism's Noble Eightfold Path, the goal being to quiet one's mind 
and achieve kaivalya (solitariness or detachment). 
The Nyaya is based on the Nyaya Sutras, written by Aksapada Gautama in 
the 2nd Century B.C. Its methodology is based on a system of logic that has 
subsequently been adopted by the majority of the Indian schools, in much the 
same way as Aristotelian logic has influenced Western philosophy. Its followers 
believe that obtaining valid knowledge (the four sources of which 
are perception, inference, comparison and testimony) is the only way to gain re-
lease from suffering. Nyaya developed several criteria by which the knowledge 
thus obtained was to be considered valid or invalid (equivalent in some ways to 
Western analytic philosophy). 
The Vaisheshika was founded by Kanada in the 6th Century B.C., and it 
is atomist and pluralist in nature. The basis of the school's philosophy is that all 
objects in the physical universe are reducible to a finite number of atoms, 
and Brahman is regarded as the fundamental force that causes consciousness in 
these atoms. The Vaisheshika and Nyaya schools eventually merged because of 
their closely related metaphysical theories (although Vaisheshika only accepted 
perception and inference as sources of valid knowledge). 
The main objective of the Purva Mimamsa is to interpret and establish the 
authority of the Vedas. It requires unquestionable faith in the Vedas and the reg-
ular performance of the Vedic fire-sacrifices to sustain all the activity of the 
universe. Although in general the Mimamsa accept the logical and philosophical 
teachings of the other schools, they insist that salvation can only be attained by 
acting in accordance with the prescriptions of the Vedas. The school later shifted 
its views and began to teach the doctrines of Brahman and freedom, allowing for 
the release or escape of the soul from its constraints through enlightened activi-
ty. 
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The Vedanta, or Uttara Mimamsa, school concentrates on the philosophical 
teachings of the Upanishads (mystic or spiritual contemplations within the Ve-
das), rather than the Brahmanas (instructions for ritual and sacrifice). Due to the 
rather cryptic and poetic nature of the Vedanta sutras, the school separated in-
to six sub-schools, each interpreting the texts in its own way and producing its 
own series of sub-commentaries: Advaita (the best-known, which holds that the 
soul and Brahman are one and the same), Visishtadvaita (which teaches that the 
Supreme Being has a definite form, name - Vishnu - and attributes), Dvaita 
(which espouses a belief in three separate realities: Vishnu, and eternal soul and 
matter), Dvaitadvaita(which holds that Brahman exists independently, while 
soul and matter are dependent), Shuddhadvaita (which believes that Krishna is 
the absolute form of Brahman) and Acintya Bheda Abheda (which combines 
monism and dualism by stating that the soul is both distinct and non-distinct 
from Krishna, or God). 
The main heterodox (nastika) schools, which do not accept the authority of 
the Vedas, include: Also known as Lokayata, Carvaka is a materialistic, scepti-
cal and atheistic school of thought. Its founder was Carvaka, author of the Bar-
haspatya Sutras in the final centuries B.C., although the original texts have 
been lost and our understanding of them is based largely on criticism of the ide-
as by other schools. As early as the 5th Century, Saddanitiand Buddhaghosa 
connected the Lokayatas with the Vitandas (or Sophists), and the term Carvaka 
was first recorded in the 7th Century by the philosopher Purandara, and in the 
8th Century by Kamalasila and Haribhadra. As a vital philosophical school, 
Carvara appears to have died out some time in the 15th Century. 
Buddhism is a non-theistic system of beliefs based on the teachings of Sid-
dhartha Gautama, an Indian prince later known as the Buddha, in the 5th Centu-
ry B.C. The question of God is largely irrelevant in Buddhism, and it is mainly 
founded on the rejection of certain orthodox Hindu philosophical con-
cepts (althought it does share some philosophical views with Hinduism, such as 
belief in karma). Buddhism advocates a Noble Eightfold Path to end suffering, 
and its philosophical principles are known as the Four Noble Truths (the Nature 
of Suffering, the Origin of Suffering, the Cessation of Suffering, and the Path 
Leading to the Cessation of Suffering). Buddhist philosophy deals extensively 
with problems in metaphysics, phenomenology, ethics and epistemology. 
The central tenets of Jain philosophy were established by Mahavira in 
the 6th Century B.C., although Jainism as a religion is much older. A basic prin-
ciple is anekantavada, the idea that reality is perceived differently from different 
points of view, and that no single point of view is completely true (similar to the 
Western philosophical doctrine of Subjectivism). According to Jainism, on-
ly Kevalis, those who have infinite knowledge, can know the true answer, and 
that all others would only know a part of the answer. It stresses spiritual inde-
pendence and the equality of all life, with particular emphasis on non-violence, 
and posits self-control as vital for attaining the realization of the soul's true na-
ture. 
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The Arthashastra, attributed to the Mauryan minister Chanakya in the 4th 
Century B.C., is one of the earliest Indian texts devoted to political philosophy, 
and it discusses ideas of statecraft and economic policy. During the Indian 
struggle for independence in the early 20th Century, Mahatma Gandhi popular-
ized the philosophies of ahimsa (non-violence) and satyagraha (non-violent re-
sistance), which were influenced by the teachings of the Hindu Bhagavad Gita, 
as well as Jesus, Tolstoy, Thoreau and Ruskin. 
 
6. Philosophical tradition of the China 
 
Chinese Philosophy refers to any of several schools of philosophical 
thought in the Chinese tradition, including Confucianism, Taoism, Legalism, 
Buddhism and Mohism (see below for brief introductions to these schools). It 
has a long history of several thousand years. 
In about 500 B.C., the classic period of Chinese philosophy (known as 
the Contention of a Hundred Schools of Thought) flourished, and the four most 
influential schools (Confucianism, Taoism, Mohism and Legalism) were estab-
lished. During the Qin Dynasty (also know as the Imperial Era), after the unifi-
cation of China in 221 B.C., Legalism became ascendant at the expense of the 
Mohist and Confucianist schools, although the Han Dynasty (206 B.C. -
 A.D. 220) adopted Taoism and later Confucianism as official doctrine. Along 
with the gradual parallel introduction of Buddhism, these two schools have re-
mained the determining forces of Chinese thought up until the 20th Century. 
Neo-Confucianism (a variant of Confucianism, incorporating elements of 
Buddhism, Taoism and Legalism) was introduced during the Song Dynas-
ty (A.D. 960 - 1279) and popularized during the Ming Dynasty (1368 - 1644). 
During the Industrial and Modern Ages, Chinese philosophy also began to 
integrate concepts of Western philosophy. Sun Yat-Sen (1866 - 1925) attempted 
to incorporate elements of democracy, republicanism and industrialism at the 
beginning of the 20th century, while Mao Zedong (1893 - 1976) later add-
ed Marxism and oth.The main schools of Chinese philosophy are. 
Confucianism: was developed from the teachings of the sage Confucius 
(551 - 479 B.C.), and collected in the Analects of Confucius. It is a system of 
moral, social, political, and quasi-religious thought, whose influence also spread 
to Korea and Japan. The major Confucian concepts include ren (humanity or 
humaneness), zhengming (similar to the concept of the Mandate of Heav-
en), zhong (loyalty), xiao (filial piety), and li (ritual). It introduced the Golden 
Rule (essentially, treat others as you would like to be treated), the concept 
of Yin and Yang (two opposing forces that are permanently in conflict with each 
other, leading to perpetual contradiction and change), the idea of meritocracy, 
and of reconciling opposites in order to arrive at some middle ground combining 
the best of both. Confucianism is not necessarily regarded as a religion, allowing 
one to be a Taoist, Christian, Muslim, Shintoist or Buddhist and still profess 
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Confucianist beliefs. Arguably the most famous Confucian after Confucius him-
self was Meng Tzu (or Mencius) (372 – 289 B.C.) 
Sometimes also written Daoism, Taoism is a philosophy which later also 
developed into a religion. Tao literally means "path" or "way", athough it more 
often used as a meta-physical term that describes the flow of the universe, or the 
force behind the natural order. The Three Jewels of the Tao are compassion, 
moderation, and humility. Taoist thought focuses on wu wei ("non-action"), 
spontaneity, humanism, relativism, emptiness and the strength of softness (or 
flexibility). Nature and ancestor spirits are common in popular Taoism, although 
typically there is also a pantheon of gods, often headed by the Jade Emperor. 
The most influential Taoist text is the "Tao Te Ching" (or "Daodejing") written 
around the 6th Century B.C. by Lao Tzu (or Laozi), and a secondary text is the 
4th Century B.C. "Zhuangzi", named after its author. The Yin and Yang symbol 
is important in Taoist symbology (as in Confucianism), as are the Eight Tri-
grams, and a zigzag with seven stars which represents the Big Dipper star con-
stellation. Legalism is a pragmatic political philosophy, whose main motto is 
"set clear strict laws, or deliver harsh punishment", and its essential principle is 
one of jurisprudence. According to Legalism, a ruler should govern his subjects 
accordoing to Fa (law or principle), Shu (method, tactic, art, or statecraft) 
and Shi (legitimacy, power, or charisma). Under Li Si in the 3rd century B.C., a 
form of Legalism essentially became a totalitarian ideology in China, which in 
part led to its subsequent decline. 
Buddhism is a religion, a practical philosophy and arguably a psychology, 
focusing on the teachings of Buddha (Siddhartha Gautama), who lived in India 
from the mid-6th to the early 5th Century B.C. It was introduced to China 
from India, probably some time during the 1st Century B.C. Chinese tradition 
focuses on ethics rather than metaphysics, and it developed several schools dis-
tinct from the originating Indian schools, and in the process integrated the ideas 
of Confucianism, Taoism and other indigenous philosophical systems into itself. 
The most prominent Chinese Buddhist schools are Sanlun, Tiantai, Huayan and 
Chán (known as Zen in Japan). 
Mohism was founded by Mozi (c. 470 - 390 B.C.) It promotes universal 
love with the aim of mutual benefit such that everyone must love each other 
equally and impartially to avoid conflict and war. Mozi was strongly against 
Confucian ritual, instead emphasizing pragmatic survival through farming, forti-
fication and statecraft. In some ways, his philosophy parallels West-
ern utilitarianism. Although popular during the latter part of the Zhou Dynasty, 
many Mohist texts were destroyed during the succeeding Qin Dynasty, and it 
was finally supplanted completely by Confucianism during the Han Dynasty. 
 
7. Ancient philosophy 
 
Thales of Miletus, regarded by Aristotle as the first philosopher, held that 
all things arise from water.  He gave a naturalistic explanation of the cosmos and 
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supported it with reasons. According to tradition, Thales was able to predict 
an eclipse and taught the Egyptians how to measure the height of the pyramids. 
Thales inspired the Milesian school of philosophy and was followed 
by Anaximander, who argued that the substratum or archecould not be water or 
any of the classical elements but was instead something "unlimited" or "indefi-
nite" (in Greek, the apeiron). He began from the observation that the world 
seems to consist of opposites (e.g., hot and cold), yet a thing can become its op-
posite .Therefore, they cannot truly be opposites but rather must both be mani-
festations of some underlying unity that is neither. This underlying unity (sub-
stratum, arche) could not be any of the classical elements, since they were one 
extreme or another. For example, water is wet, the opposite of dry, while fire is 
dry. Anaximenes in turn held that the arche was air, although John Burnet ar-
gues that by this he meant that it was a transparent mist, the aether.  
Xenophanes was born in Ionia, where the Milesian school was at its most 
powerful, and may have picked up some of the Milesians' cosmological theories 
as a result W
]
hat is known is that he argued that each of the phenomena had a 
natural rather than divine explanation in a manner reminiscent of Anaximander's 
theories and that there was only one god, the world as a whole, and that he ridi-
culed the anthropomorphism of the Greek religion by claiming that cattle would 
claim that the gods looked like cattle, horses like horses, and lions like lions, just 
as the Ethiopians claimed that the gods were snubnosed and black and the Thra-
cians claimed they were pale and red-haired. 
Burnet says that Xenophanes was not, however, a scientific man, with 
many of his "naturalistic" explanations having no further support than that they 
render the Homeric gods superfluous or foolish. He has been claimed as an in-
fluence on Eleatic philosophy, although that is disputed, and a precursor 
to Epicurus, a representative of a total break between science and religion
.
 
Pythagoras lived at roughly the same time that Xenophanes did and, in con-
trast to the latter, the school that he founded sought to reconcile religious belief 
and reason. Little is known about his life with any reliability, however, and no 
writings of his survive, so it is possible that he was simply a mystic whose suc-
cessors introduced rationalism into Pythagoreanism, that he was simply 
a rationalist whose successors are responsible for the mysticism in Pythagorean-
ism, or that he was actually the author of the doctrine; there is no way to know 
for certain. Pythagoras is said to have been a disciple of Anaximandar and to 
have imbibed the cosmological concerns of the Ionians, including the idea that 
the cosmos is constructed of spheres, the importance of the infinite, and that air 
or aether is the archeof everything. Pythagoreanism also incorporated ascetic 
ideals, emphasizing purgation, metempsychosis, and consequently a respect for 
all animal life; much was made of the correspondence between mathematics and 
the cosmos in a musical harmony
.
 
Heraclitus must have lived after Xenophanes and Pythagoras, as he con-
demns them along with Homer as proving that much learning cannot teach a 
man to think; since Parmenides refers to him in the past tense, this would place 
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him in the 5th century BCE. Contrary to the Milesian school, who would have 
one stable element at the root of all, Heraclitus taught that "everything flows" or 
"everything is in flux," the closest element to this flux being fire; he also extend-
ed the teaching that seeming opposites in fact are manifestations of a common 
substrate to good and evil itself. 
Parmenides of Elea cast his philosophy against those who held "it is and is 
not the same, and all things travel in opposite directions,"—presumably refer-
ring to Heraclitus and those who followed him. Whereas the doctrines of the Mi-
lesian school, in suggesting that the substratum could appear in a variety of dif-
ferent guises, implied that everything that exists is corpuscular,  
Parmenides argued that the first principle of being was One, indivisible, 
and unchanging
]
 Being, he argued, by definition implies eternality, while only 
that which is can be thought; a thing which is, moreover, cannot be more or less, 
and so the rarefaction and condensation of the Milesians is impossible regarding 
Being; lastly, as movement requires that something exist apart from the thing 
moving (viz. the space into which it moves), the One or Being cannot move, 
since this would require that "space" both exist and not exist. While this doctrine 
is at odds with ordinary sensory experience, where things do indeed change and 
move, the Eleatic school followed Parmenides in denying that sense phenomena 
revealed the world as it actually was; instead, the only thing with Being was 
thought, or the question of whether something exists or not is one of whether it 
can be thought. 
In support of this, Parmenides' pupil Zeno of Elea attempted to prove that 
the concept of motion was absurd and as such motion did not exist. He also at-
tacked the subsequent development of pluralism, arguing that it was incompati-
ble with being. His arguments are known as Zeno's paradoxes. 
The power of Parmenides' logic was such that some subsequent philoso-
phers abandoned the monism of the Milesians, Xenophanes, Heraclitus, and 
Parmenides, where one thing was the arche, and adopted pluralism, such 
as Empedocles and Anaxagoras. There were, they said, multiple elements which 
were not reducible to one another and these were set in motion by love and strife 
(as in Empedocles) or by Mind (as in Anaxagoras).  
Agreeing with Parmenides that there is no coming into being or passing 
away, genesis or decay, they said that things appear to come into being and pass 
away because the elements out of which they are composed assemble or disas-
semble while themselves being unchanging.
 
Leucippus also proposed an onto-
logical pluralism with a cosmogony based on two main elements: the vacuum 
and atoms. These, by means of their inherent movement, are crossing the void 
and creating the real material bodies. His theories were not well known by the 
time of Plato, however, and they were ultimately incorporated into the work of 
his student, Democritus.  
Sophistry arose from the juxtaposition of physis (nature) and nomos (law). 
John Burnet posits its origin in the scientific progress of the previous centuries 
which suggested that Being was radically different from what was experienced 
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by the senses and, if comprehensible at all, was not comprehensible in terms of 
order; the world in which men lived, on the other hand, was one of law and or-
der, albeit of humankind's own making. At the same time, nature was constant, 
while what was by law differed from one place to another and could be changed. 
The first man to call himself a sophist, according to Plato, was Protagoras, 
whom he presents as teaching that all virtue is conventional. It was Protagoras 
who claimed that "man is the measure of all things, of the things that are, that 
they are, and of the things that are not, that they are not," which Plato interprets 
as a radical perspectivism, where some things seem to be one way for one per-
son (and so actually are that way) and another way for another person (and so 
actually are that way as well); the conclusion being that one cannot look to na-
ture for guidance regarding how to live one's life.  
Protagoras and subsequent sophists tended to teach rhetoric as their prima-
ry vocation. Prodicus, Gorgias, Hippias, and Thrasymachus appear in vari-
ous dialogues, sometimes explicitly teaching that while nature provides no ethi-
cal guidance, the guidance that the laws provide is worthless, or that nature fa-
vors those who act against the laws. 
Socrates, born in Athens in the 5th century BCE, marks a watershed in an-
cient Greek philosophy. Athens was a center of learning, with sophists and phi-
losophers traveling from across Greece to teach rhetoric, astronomy, cosmology, 
geometry, and the like. The great statesman Pericles was closely associated with 
this new learning and a friend of Anaxagoras, however, and his political oppo-
nents struck at him by taking advantage of a conservative reaction against the 
philosophers; it became a crime to investigate the things above the heavens or 
below the earth, subjects considered impious. Anaxagoras is said to have been 
charged and to have fled into exile when Socrates was about twenty years of 
age. There is a story that Protagoras, too, was forced to flee and that the Atheni-
ans burned his books. Socrates, however, is the only subject recorded as charged 
under this law, convicted, and sentenced to death in 399 BCE (see Trial of Soc-
rates).  
In the version of his defense speech presented by Plato, he claims that it is 
the envy he arouses on account of his being a philosopher that will convict him. 
While philosophy was an established pursuit prior to Socrates, Cicero credits 
him as "the first who brought philosophy down from the heavens, placed it in 
cities, introduced it into families, and obliged it to examine into life and morals, 
and good and evil." By this account he would be considered the founder 
of political philosophy. The reasons for this turn toward political and ethical 
subjects remain the object of much study.  
The fact that many conversations involving Socrates (as recounted by Plato 
and Xenophon) end without having reached a firm conclusion, 
or aporetically, has stimulated debate over the meaning of the Socratic meth-
ods. Socrates is said to have pursued this probing question-and-answer style of 
examination on a number of topics, usually attempting to arrive at a defensible 
and attractive definition of a virtue. 
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While Socrates' recorded conversations rarely provide a definite answer to 
the question under examination, several maxims or paradoxes for which he has 
become known recur. Socrates taught that no one desires what is bad, and so if 
anyone does something that truly is bad, it must be unwillingly or out of igno-
rance; consequently, all virtue is knowledge. He frequently remarks on his own 
ignorance (claiming that he does not know what courage is, for exam-
ple). Plato presents him as distinguishing himself from the common run of man-
kind by the fact that, while they know nothing noble and good, they do 
not know that they do not know, whereas Socrates knows and acknowledges that 
he knows nothing noble and good.  
Plato was an Athenian of the generation after Socrates. Ancient tradition 
ascribes thirty-six dialogues and thirteen letters to him, although of these only 
twenty-four of the dialogues are now universally recognized as authentic; most 
modern scholars believe that at least twenty-eight dialogues and two of the let-
ters were in fact written by Plato, although all of the thirty-six dialogues have 
some defenders. A further nine dialogues are ascribed to Plato but were consid-
ered spurious even in antiquity.  
Plato's dialogues feature Socrates, although not always as the leader of the 
conversation. (One dialogue, the Laws, instead contains an "Athenian 
Stranger.") Along with Xenophon, Plato is the primary source of information 
about Socrates' life and beliefs and it is not always easy to distinguish between 
the two. While the Socrates presented in the dialogues is often taken to be Pla-
to's mouthpiece, Socrates' reputation for irony, his caginess regarding his own 
opinions in the dialogues, and his occasional absence from or minor role in the 
conversation serve to conceal Plato's doctrines. Much of what is said about his 
doctrines is derived from what Aristotle reports about them. 
The political doctrine ascribed to Plato is derived from the Republic, 
the Laws, and the Statesman. The first of these contains the suggestion that there 
will not be justice in cities unless they are ruled by philosopher kings; those re-
sponsible for enforcing the laws are compelled to hold their women, children, 
and property in common; and the individual is taught to pursue the common 
good through noble lies; the Republic says that such a city is likely impossible, 
however, generally assuming that philosophers would refuse to rule and the 
people would refuse to compel them to do so.  
Whereas the Republic is premised on a distinction between the sort of 
knowledge possessed by the philosopher and that possessed by the king or polit-
ical man, Socrates explores only the character of the philosopher; in 
the Statesman, on the other hand, a participant referred to as the Eleatic Stranger 
discusses the sort of knowledge possessed by the political man, while Socrates 
listens quietly. Although rule by a wise man would be preferable to rule by law, 
the wise cannot help but be judged by the unwise, and so in practice, rule by law 
is deemed necessary. 
Both the Republic and the Statesman reveal the limitations of politics, rais-
ing the question of what political order would be best given those constraints; 
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that question is addressed in the Laws, a dialogue that does not take place in 
Athens and from which Socrates is absent. The character of the society de-
scribed there is eminently conservative, a corrected or liberalized timocracy on 
the Spartan or Cretan model or that of pre-democratic Athens.  
Plato's dialogues also have metaphysical themes, the most famous of which 
is his theory of forms. It holds that non-material abstract (but substantial) forms 
(or ideas), and not the material world of change known to us through our physi-
cal senses, possess the highest and most fundamental kind of reality. 
Aristotle moved to Athens from his native Stageira in 367 BCE and began 
to study philosophy (perhaps even rhetoric, under Isocrates), eventually enrol-
ling at Plato's Academy. He left Athens approximately twenty years later to 
study botany and zoology, became a tutor of Alexander the Great, and ultimately 
returned to Athens a decade later to establish his own school: the Lyceum. At 
least twenty-nine of his treatises have survived, known as the corpus Aristoteli-
cum, and address a variety of subjects including logic, physics, optics, meta-
physics, ethics, rhetoric, politics, poetry, botany, and zoology. 
Aristotle is often portrayed as disagreeing with his teacher Plato. He criti-
cizes the regimes described in Plato's Republic and Laws, and refers to 
the theory of forms as "empty words and poetic metaphors."He is generally pre-
sented as giving greater weight to empirical observation and practical concerns. 
Aristotle's fame was not great during the Hellenistic period, when Stoic 
logic was in vogue, but later peripatetic commentators popularized his work, 
which eventually contributed heavily to Islamic, Jewish, and medieval Christian 
philosophy. His influence was such that Avicenna referred to him simply as "the 
Master"; Maimonides, Alfarabi, Averroes, and Aquinas as "the Philosopher." 
During the Hellenistic and Roman periods, many different schools of 
thought developed in the Hellenistic world and then the Greco-Roman world. 
There were Greeks, Romans, Egyptians, Syrians and Arabs who contributed to 
the development of Hellenistic philosophy. Elements of Persian philoso-
phy and Indian philosophy also had an influence. The most notable schools of 
Hellenistic philosophy were: 
 Neoplatonism: Plotinus (Egyptian), Ammonius Saccas, Porphyry (Syri-
an), Zethos (Arab), Iamblichus (Syrian), Proclus 
 Academic Skepticism: Arcesilaus, Carneades, Cicero (Roman) 
 Pyrrhonian Skepticism: Pyrrho, Sextus Empiricus 
 Cynicism: Antisthenes, Diogenes of Sinope, Crates of Thebes (taught Ze-
no of Citium, founder of Stoicism) 
 Stoicism: Zeno of Citium, Cleanthes, Chrysippus, Crates of Mallus 
(brought Stoicism to Rome c. 170 BCE), Panaetius, Posidonius, Seneca (Ro-
man), Epictetus (Greek/Roman), Marcus Aurelius (Roman) 
 Epicureanism: Epicurus (Greek) and Lucretius (Roman) 
 Eclecticism: Cicero (Roman) 
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8. Philosophy of the Middle age 
 
Early Christian thought, in particular in the patristic period, tends to be in-
tuitional and mystical, and is less reliant on reason and logical argument. It also 
places more emphasis on the sometimes-mystical doctrines of Plato, and less 
upon the systematic thinking of Aristotle. Much of the work of Aristotle was 
unknown in the West in this period. Scholars relied on translations 
by Boethius into Latin of Aristotle's Categories, the logical work On Interpreta-
tion, and his Latin translation of Porphyry's Isagoge, a commentary on Aristo-
tle's Categories. 
Two Roman philosophers had a great influence on the development of me-
dieval philosophy: Augustine and Boethius. Augustine is regarded as the great-
est of the Church Fathers. He is primarily a theologian and a devotional writer, 
but much of his writing is philosophical. His themes are truth, God, the hu-
man soul, the meaning of history, the state, sin, and salvation. For over a thou-
sand years, there was hardly a Latin work of theology or philosophy that did not 
quote his writing, or invoke his authority. Some of his writing had an influence 
on the development of early modern philosophy.  
Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius (480 c.–524) was a Christian philoso-
pher born in Rome to an ancient and influential family. He became consul in 
510 in the kingdom of the Ostrogoths. His influence on the early medieval peri-
od was also marked (so much so that it is sometimes called the Boethian period). 
He intended to translate all the works of Aristotle and Plato from the origi-
nal Greek into Latin, and translated many of Aristotle’s logical works, such 
as On Interpretation, and the Categories. He wrote commentaries on these 
works, and on the Isagoge by Porphyry (a commentary on the Categories). This 
introduced the problem of universals to the medieval world. 
The first significant renewal of learning in the West came 
when Charlemagne, advised by Peter of Pisa and Alcuin of York, attracted the 
scholars of England and Ireland, and by imperial decree in 787 AD established 
schools in every abbey in his empire. These schools, from which the 
name Scholasticism is derived, became centres of medieval learning.  
Johannes Scotus Eriugena (c. 815 - 877), successor of Alcuin of York as 
head of the Palace School, was an Irish theologian and Neoplatonic philosopher. 
He is notable for having translated and made commentaries upon the work 
of Pseudo-Dionysius, initially thought to be from the apostolic age. Around this 
period several doctrinal controversies emerged, such as the question of whether 
God had predestined some for salvation and some for damnation. Eriugena was 
called in to settle this dispute. At the same time, Paschasius Radbertus raised an 
important question about the real presence of Christ at the Eucharist. Is 
the host the same as Christ's historical body? How can it be present at many 
places and many times? Radbertus argued that Christ's real body is present, 
veiled by the appearance of bread and wine, and is present at all places and all 
times, by means of God's incomprehensible power. 
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This period also witnessed a revival of scholarship. At Fleury, Theodul-
phus, bishop of Orléans, established a school for young noblemen recommended 
there by Charlemagne. By the mid-ninth century, its library was one of the most 
comprehensive ever assembled in the West, and scholars such as Lupus of Fer-
rières (d. 862) traveled there to consult its texts. Later, under St. Abbo of Fleury 
(abbot 988-1004), head of the reformed abbey school, Fleury enjoyed a second 
golden age. Remigius of Auxerre, at the beginning of the tenth century, pro-
duced glosses or commentaries on the classical texts of Donatus, Priscian, Boe-
thius, and Martianus Capella.  
The Carolingian period was followed by a small dark age that was followed 
by a lasting revival of learning in the eleventh century, which owed much to the 
rediscovery of Greek thought from Arabic translations and Muslim contribu-
tions such as Avicenna's on the soul. 
The period from the middle of the eleventh century to the middle of the 
fourteenth century is known as the 'High medieval' or 'scholastic' period. It is 
generally agreed to begin with Saint Anselm of Canterbury (1033–1109) 
an Italian philosopher, theologian, and church official who is famous as the orig-
inator of the ontological argument for the existence of God. 
The 13th and early 14th centuries are generally regarded as the high period 
of scholasticism. The early 13th century witnessed the culmination of the recov-
ery of Greek philosophy. Schools of translation grew up in Italy and Sicily, and 
eventually in the rest of Europe. Scholars such as Adelard of Bath travelled to 
Sicily and the Arab world, translating works on astronomy and mathematics, in-
cluding the first complete translation of Euclid’s Elements. Powerful Norman 
kings gathered men of knowledge from Italy and other areas into their courts as 
a sign of their prestige. William of Moerbeke's translations and editions of 
Greek philosophical texts in the middle half of the thirteenth century helped in 
forming a clearer picture of Greek philosophy, and in particular of Aristotle, 
than was given by the Arabic versions they had previously relied on, which had 
distorted or obscured the relation between Platonic and Aristotelian systems of 
philosophy. His work formed the basis of the major commentaries that followed. 
The universities developed in the large cities of Europe during this period, 
and rival clerical orders within the Church began to battle for political and intel-
lectual control over these centers of educational life. The two main orders 
founded in this period were the Franciscans and the Dominicans. The Francis-
cans were founded by Francis of Assisi in 1209. Their leader in the middle of 
the century was Bonaventure, a traditionalist who defended the theology 
of Augustine and the philosophy of Plato, incorporating only a little of Aristotle 
in with the more neoplatonist elements. Following Anselm, Bonaventure sup-
posed that reason can discover truth only when philosophy is illuminated by re-
ligious faith. Other important Franciscan writers were Duns Scotus, Peter Au-
riol, and William of Ockham.  
By contrast, the Dominican order, founded by St Dominic in 1215 placed 
more emphasis on the use of reason and made extensive use of the new Aristote-
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lian sources derived from the East, and Moorish Spain. The great representatives 
of Dominican thinking in this period were Albertus Magnus and (especial-
ly) Thomas Aquinas, whose artful synthesis of Greek rationalism and Christian 
doctrine eventually came to define Catholic philosophy. Aquinas placed more 
emphasis on reason and argumentation, and was one of the first to use the new 
translation of Aristotle's metaphysical and epistemological writing. This was a 
significant departure from the Neoplatonic and Augustinian thinking that had 
dominated much of early Scholasticism. Aquinas showed how it was possible to 
incorporate much of the philosophy of Aristotle without falling into the "errors" 
of the Commentator Averroes. 
 
9. Philosophy of Renaissance 
 
The Renaissance, that is, the period that extends roughly from the middle 
of the fourteenth century to the beginning of the seventeen century, was a time 
of intense, all-encompassing, and, in many ways, distinctive philosophical activ-
ity. A fundamental assumption of the Renaissance movement was that the re-
mains of classical antiquity constituted an invaluable source of excellence to 
which debased and decadent modern times could turn in order to repair the dam-
age brought about since the fall of the Roman Empire. It was often assumed that 
God had given a single unified truth to humanity and that the works of ancient 
philosophers had preserved part of this original deposit of divine wisdom.  
This idea not only laid the foundation for a scholarly culture that was cen-
tered on ancient texts and their interpretation, but also fostered an approach to 
textual interpretation that strove to harmonize and reconcile divergent philo-
sophical accounts. Stimulated by newly available texts, one of the most im-
portant hallmarks of Renaissance philosophy is the increased interest in primary 
sources of Greek and Roman thought, which were previously unknown or little 
read. The renewed study of Neoplatonism, Stoicism, Epicureanism, and Skepti-
cism eroded faith in the universal truth of Aristotelian philosophy and widened 
the philosophical horizon, providing a rich seedbed from which modern science 
and modern philosophy gradually emerged. 
Improved access to a great deal of previously unknown literature from an-
cient Greece and Rome was an important aspect of Renaissance philosophy. The 
renewed study of Aristotle, however, was not so much because of the rediscov-
ery of unknown texts, but because of a renewed interest in texts long translated 
into Latin but little studied, such as the Poetics, and especially because of novel 
approaches to well-known texts. From the early fifteenth century onwards, hu-
manists devoted considerable time and energy to making Aristotelian texts 
clearer and more precise. In order to rediscover the meaning of Aristotle’s 
thought, they updated the Scholastic translations of his works, read them in the 
original Greek, and analyzed them with philological techniques.  
The availability of these new interpretative tools had a great impact on the 
philosophical debate. Moreover, in the four decades after 1490, the Aristotelian 
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interpretations of Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius, Ammonius, Phi-
loponus, Simplicius, and other Greek commentators were added to the views of 
Arabic and medieval commentators, stimulating new solutions to Aristotelian 
problems and leading to a wide variety of interpretations of Aristotle in the Re-
naissance period. 
The most powerful tradition, at least in Italy, was that which took Aver-
roes’s works as the best key for determining the true mind of Aristotle. Aver-
roes’s name was primarily associated with the doctrine of the unity of the intel-
lect. Among the defenders of his theory that there is only one intellect for all 
human beings, we find Paul of Venice (d. 1429), who is regarded as the found-
ing figure of Renaissance Averroism, and Alessandro Achillini (1463–1512), as 
well as the Jewish philosopher Elijah del Medigo (1458–1493).  
Two other Renaissance Aristotelians who expended much of their philo-
sophical energies on explicating the texts of Averroes are Nicoletto Vernia (d. 
1499) and Agostino Nifo (c. 1469–1538). They are noteworthy characters in the 
Renaissance controversy about the immortality of the soul mainly because of the 
remarkable shift that can be discerned in their thought. Initially they were de-
fenders of Averroes’s theory of the unity of the intellect, but from loyal follow-
ers of Averroes as a guide to Aristotle, they became careful students of the 
Greek commentators, and in their late thought both Vernia and Nifo attacked 
Averroes as a misleading interpreter of Aristotle, believing that personal immor-
tality could be philosophically demonstrated. 
Many Renaissance Aristotelians read Aristotle for scientific or secular rea-
sons, with no direct interest in religious or theological questions. Pietro Pom-
ponazzi (1462–1525), one of the most important and influential Aristotelian phi-
losophers of the Renaissance, developed his views entirely within the frame-
work of natural philosophy. In De immortalitate animae (Treatise on the 
Immortality of the Soul, 1516), arguing from the Aristotelian text, Pomponazzi 
maintained that proof of the intellect’s ability to survive the death of the body 
must be found in an activity of the intellect that functions without any depend-
ence on the body. In his view, no such activity can be found because the highest 
activity of the intellect, the attainment of universals in cognition, is always me-
diated by sense impression. Therefore, based solely on philosophical premises 
and Aristotelian principles, the conclusion is that the entire soul dies with the 
body.  
Pomponazzi’s treatise aroused violent opposition and led to a spate of 
books being written against him. In 1520, he completed De naturalium effectu-
um causis sive de incantationibus (On the Causes of Natural Effects or On In-
cantations), whose main target was the popular belief that miracles are produced 
by angels and demons. He excluded supernatural explanations from the domain 
of nature by establishing that it is possible to explain those extraordinary events 
commonly regarded as miracles in terms of a concatenation of natural causes. 
Another substantial work is De fato, de libero arbitrio et de praedestina-
tione (Five Books on Fate, Free Will and Predestination), which is regarded as 
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one of the most important works on the problems of freedom and determinism in 
the Renaissance. Pomponazzi considers whether the human will can be free, and 
he considers the conflicting points of view of philosophical determinism and 
Christian theology. 
Another philosopher who tried to keep Aristotle’s authority independent of 
theology and subject to rational criticism is Jacopo Zabarella (1533–1589), who 
produced an extensive body of work on the nature of logic and scientific meth-
od. His goal was the retrieval of the genuine Aristotelian concepts of science and 
scientific method, which he understood as the indisputable demonstration of the 
nature and constitutive principles of natural beings. He developed the method 
of regressus,a combination of the deductive procedures of composition and the 
inductive procedures of resolution that came to be regarded as the proper meth-
od for obtaining knowledge in the theoretical sciences. Among his main works 
are the collected logical works Opera logica (1578), which are mainly devoted 
to the theory of demonstration, and his major work on natural philosophy, De 
rebus naturalibus (1590). Zabarella’s work was instrumental in a renewal of nat-
ural philosophy, methodology, and theory of knowledge. 
There were also forms of Aristotelian philosophy with strong confessional 
ties, such as the branch of Scholasticism that developed on the Iberian Peninsula 
during the sixteenth century. This current of Hispanic Scholastic philosophy be-
gan with the Dominican School founded in Salamanca by Francisco de Vitoria 
(1492–1546) and continued with the philosophy of the newly founded Society of 
Jesus, among whose defining authorities were Pedro da Fonseca (1528–1599), 
Francisco de Toledo (1533–1596), and Francisco Suárez (1548–1617). Their 
most important writings were in the areas of metaphysics and philosophy of law.  
They played a key role in the elaboration of the law of nations (jus genti-
um) and the theory of just war, a debate that began with Vitoria’s Relectio de 
iure belli (A Re-lecture of the Right of War, 1539) and continued with the writ-
ings of Domingo de Soto (1494–1560), Suárez, and many others. In the field of 
metaphysics, the most important work is Suárez’ Disputationes metaphysi-
cae (Metaphysical Disputations, 1597), a systematic presentation of philoso-
phy—against the background of Christian principles—that set the standard for 
philosophical and theological teaching for almost two centuries. 
The humanist movement did not eliminate older approaches to philosophy, 
but contributed to change them in important ways, providing new information 
and new methods to the field. Humanists called for a radical change of philoso-
phy and uncovered older texts that multiplied and hardened current philosophi-
cal discord. Some of the most salient features of humanist reform are the accu-
rate study of texts in the original languages, the preference for ancient authors 
and commentators over medieval ones, and the avoidance of technical language 
in the interest of moral suasion and accessibility. Humanists stressed moral phi-
losophy as the branch of philosophical studies that best met their needs. They 
addressed a general audience in an accessible manner and aimed to bring about 
an increase in public and private virtue. Regarding philosophy as a discipline al-
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lied to history, rhetoric, and philology, they expressed little interest in metaphys-
ical or epistemological questions. Logic was subordinated to rhetoric and re-
shaped to serve the purposes of persuasion. 
One of the seminal figures of the humanist movement was Francesco Pet-
rarca (1304–1374). On His Own Ignorance and That of Many Others, he elabo-
rated what was to become the standard critique of Scholastic philosophy. One of 
his main objections to Scholastic Aristotelianism is that it is useless and ineffec-
tive in achieving the good life. Moreover, to cling to a single authority when all 
authorities are unreliable is simply foolish. He especially attacked, as opponents 
of Christianity, Aristotle’s commentator Averroes and contemporary Aristoteli-
ans that agreed with him. Petrarca returned to a conception of philosophy rooted 
in the classical tradition, and from his time onward, when professional human-
ists took interest in philosophy, they nearly always concerned themselves with 
ethical questions. Among those he influenced were Coluccio Salutati (1331–
1406), Leonardo Bruni (c.1370–1444) and Poggio Bracciolini (1380–1459), all 
of whom promoted humanistic learning in distinctive ways. 
One of the most original and important humanists of the Quattrocento was 
Lorenzo Valla (1406–1457). His most influential writing was Elegantiae linguae 
Latinae (Elegances of the Latin Language), a handbook of Latin language and 
style. He is also famous for having demonstrated, on the basis of linguistic and 
historical evidence, that the so-called Donation of Constantine, on which the 
secular rule of the papacy was based, was an early medieval forgery. His main 
philosophical work is Reploughing of Dialectic and Philosophy, an attack on 
major tenets of Aristotelian philosophy. The first book deals with the criticism 
of fundamental notions of metaphysics, ethics, and natural philosophy, while the 
remaining two books are devoted to dialectics. 
Throughout the fifteenth and early sixteenth century, humanists were unan-
imous in their condemnation of university education and their contempt for 
Scholastic logic. Humanists such as Valla and Rudolph Agricola (1443–1485), 
whose main work is De inventione dialectica (On Dialectical Invention, 1479), 
set about to replace the Scholastic curriculum, based on syllogism and disputa-
tion, with a treatment of logic oriented toward the use of persuasion and topics, a 
technique of verbal association aiming at the invention and organization of ma-
terial for arguments. According to Valla and Agricola, language is primarily a 
vehicle for communication and debate, and consequently arguments should be 
evaluated in terms of how effective and useful they are rather than in terms of 
formal validity. Accordingly, they subsumed the study of the Aristotelian theory 
of inference under a broader range of forms of argumentation. This approach 
was taken up and developed in various directions by later humanists, such as 
Mario Nizolio (1488–1567), Juan Luis Vives (1493–1540), and Petrus Ramus 
(1515–1572). 
Vives was a Spanish-born humanist who spent the greater part of his life in 
the Low Countries. He aspired to replace the Scholastic tradition in all fields of 
learning with a humanist curriculum inspired by education in the classics. In 
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1519, he published In Pseudodialecticos (Against the Pseudodialecticians), a sa-
tirical diatribe against Scholastic logic in which he voices his opposition on sev-
eral counts. A detailed criticism can be found in De disciplinis (On the Disci-
plines, 1531), an encyclopedic work divided into three parts: De causis cor-
ruptarum artium (On the Causes of the Corruption of the Arts), a collection of 
seven books devoted to a thorough critique of the foundations of contemporary 
education; De tradendis disciplinis (On Handing Down the Disciplines), five 
books where Vives’s educational reform is outlined; and De artibus (On the 
Arts), five shorter treatises that deal mainly with logic and metaphysics. Another 
area in which Vives enjoyed considerable success was psychology. His reflec-
tions on the human soul are mainly concentrated in De anima et vita (On the 
Soul and Life, 1538), a study of the soul and its interaction with the body, which 
also contains a penetrating analysis of the emotions. 
Ramus was another humanist who criticized the shortcomings of contem-
porary teaching and advocated a humanist reform of the arts curriculum. His 
textbooks were the best sellers of their day and were very influential in 
Protestant universities. In 1543, he published Dialecticae partitiones (The Struc-
ture of Dialectic), which in its second edition was called Dialecticae institu-
tiones (Training in Dialectic), and Aristotelicae animadversions (Remarks on 
Aristotle). These works gained him a reputation as a virulent opponent of Aris-
totelian philosophy. He considered his own dialectics, consisting of invention 
and judgment, to be applicable to all areas of knowledge, and he emphasised the 
need for learning to be comprehensible and useful, with a particular stress on the 
practical aspects of mathematics. His own reformed system of logic reached its 
definitive form with the publication of the third edition of Dialectique (1555). 
Humanism also supported Christian reform. The most important Christian 
humanist was the Dutch scholar Desiderius Erasmus. He was hostile to Scholas-
ticism, which he did not consider a proper basis for Christian life, and put his 
erudition at the service of religion by promoting learned piety (docta pietas). In 
1503, he published Enchiridion militis christiani (Handbook of the Christian 
Soldier), a guide to the Christian life addressed to laymen in need of spiritual 
guidance, in which he developed the concept of a philosophia Christi.  
His most famous work is Moriae encomium (The Praise of Folly), a satiri-
cal monologue first published in 1511 that touches upon a variety of social, po-
litical, intellectual, and religious issues. In 1524, he published De libero arbit-
rio (On Free Will), an open attack a one central doctrine of Martin Luther’s the-
ology: that the human will is enslaved by sin. Erasmus’s analysis hinges on the 
interpretation of relevant biblical and patristic passages and reaches the conclu-
sion that the human will is extremely weak, but able, with the help of divine 
grace, to choose the path of salvation. 
Humanism also had an impact of overwhelming importance on the devel-
opment of political thought. With Institutio principis christiani (The Education 
of a Christian Prince, 1516), Erasmus contributed to the popular genre of hu-
manist advice books for princes. These manuals dealt with the proper ends of 
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government and how best to attain them. Among humanists of the fourteenth 
century, the most usual proposal was that a strong monarchy should be the best 
form of government. Petrarca, in his account of princely government that was 
written in 1373 and took the form of a letter to Francesco da Carrara, argued that 
cities ought to be governed by princes who accept their office reluctantly and 
who pursue glory through virtuous actions. His views were repeated in quite a 
few of the numerous “mirror for princes” (speculum principis) composed during 
the course of the fifteenth century, such as Giovanni Pontano’s De principe (On 
the Prince, 1468) and Bartolomeo Sacchi’s De principe (On the Prince, 1471). 
Several authors exploited the tensions within the genre of “mirror for 
princes” in order to defend popular regimes. In Laudatio florentinae Urbis (Pan-
egyric of the City of Florence), Bruni maintained that justice can only be assured 
by a republican constitution. In his view, cities must be governed according to 
justice if they are to become glorious, and justice is impossible without liberty. 
The most important text to challenge the assumptions of princely human-
ism, however, was The Prince, written by the Florentine Niccolò Machiavelli 
(1469–1527) in 1513, but not published until 1532. A fundamental belief among 
the humanists was that a ruler needs to cultivate a number of qualities, such as 
justice and other moral values, in order to acquire honour, glory, and fame. 
Machiavelli deviated from this view claiming that justice has no decisive place 
in politics. It is the ruler’s prerogative to decide when to dispense violence and 
practice deception, no matter how wicked or immoral, as long as the peace of 
the city is maintained and his share of glory maximized. Machiavelli did not 
hold that princely regimes were superior to all others. In his less famous, but 
equally influential, Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio (Discourses on the 
First Ten Books of Titus Livy, 1531), he offers a defense of popular liberty and 
republican government that takes the ancient republic of Rome as its model. 
During the Renaissance, it gradually became possible to take a broader 
view of philosophy than the traditional Peripatetic framework permitted. No an-
cient revival had more impact on the history of philosophy than the recovery of 
Platonism. The rich doctrinal content and formal elegance of Platonism made it 
a plausible competitor of the Peripatetic tradition. Renaissance Platonism was a 
product of humanism and marked a sharper break with medieval philosophy. 
Many Christians found Platonic philosophy safer and more attractive than Aris-
totelianism. The Neoplatonic conception of philosophy as a way toward union 
with God supplied many Renaissance Platonists with some of their richest inspi-
ration. The Platonic dialogues were not seen as profane texts to be understood 
literally, but as sacred mysteries to be deciphered. 
Platonism was brought to Italy by the Byzantine scholar George Gemistos 
Plethon (c.1360–1454), who, during the Council of Florence in 1439, gave a se-
ries of lectures that he later reshaped as De differentiis Aristotelis et Plato-
nis (The Differences between Aristotle and Plato). This work, which compared 
the doctrines of the two philosophers to Aristotle’s great disadvantage, initiated 
a controversy regarding the relative superiority of Plato and Aristotle. In the 
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treatise In calumniatorem Platonis (Against the Calumniator of Plato), Cardinal 
Bessarion (1403–1472) defended Plethon against the charge levelled against his 
philosophy by the Aristotelian George of Trebizond (1396–1472), who 
in Comparatio philosophorum Aristotelis et Platonis (A Comparison of the Phi-
losophers Aristotle and Plato) had maintained that Platonism was unchristian 
and actually a new religion. 
The most important Renaissance Platonist was Marsilio Ficino (1433–
1499), who translated Plato’s works into Latin and wrote commentaries on sev-
eral of them. He also translated and commented on Plotinus’s Enneads and 
translated treatises and commentaries by Porphyry, Iamblichus, Proclus, Synesi-
us, and other Neoplatonists. He considered Plato as part of a long tradition of 
ancient theology (prisca theologia) that was inaugurated by Hermes and Zoroas-
ter, culminated with Plato, and continued with Plotinus and the other Neopla-
tonists. Like the ancient Neoplatonists, Ficino assimilated Aristotelian physics 
and metaphysics and adapted them to Platonic purposes. In his main philosophi-
cal treatise, Theologia Platonica de immortalitate animorum (Platonic Theology 
on the Immortality of Souls, 1482), he put forward his synthesis of Platonism 
and Christianity as a new theology and metaphysics, which, unlike that of many 
Scholastics, was explicitly opposed to Averroist secularism. Another work that 
became very popular was De vita libri tres (Three Books on Life, 1489) by Fici-
no; it deals with the health of professional scholars and presents a philosophical 
theory of natural magic. 
One of Ficino’s most distinguished associates was Giovanni Pico della Mi-
randola (1463–1494). He is best known as the author of the celebrated Oratio de 
hominis dignitate (Oration on the Dignity of Man), which is often regarded as 
the manifesto of the new Renaissance thinking, but he also wrote several other 
prominent works. They include Disputationes adversus astrologiam divinatri-
cem (Disputations against Divinatory Astrology), an influential diatribe 
against astrology; De ente et uno (On Being and the One), a short treatise at-
tempting to reconcile Platonic and Aristotelian metaphysical views; as well 
as Heptaplus (Seven Days of Creation), a mystical interpretation of the Genesis 
creation myth. He was not a devout Neoplatonist like Ficino, but rather an Aris-
totelian by training and in many ways an eclectic by conviction. He wanted to 
combine Greek, Hebrew, Muslim, and Christian thought into a great synthesis, 
which he spelled out in nine hundred theses published as Conclusiones in 1486. 
He planned to defend them publicly in Rome, but three were found heretical and 
ten others suspect. He defended them in Apologia which provoked the condem-
nation of the whole work by Pope Innocent VIII. Pico’s consistent aim in his 
writings was to exalt the powers of human nature. To this end he defended the 
use of magic, which he described as the noblest part of natural science, and 
Kabbalah, a Jewish form of mysticism that was probably of Neoplatonic origin. 
Platonic themes were also central to the thought of Nicholas of Cusa 
(1401–1464), who linked his philosophical activity to the Neoplatonic tradition 
and authors such as Proclus and Pseudo-Dionysius. The main problem that runs 
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through his works is how humans, as finite created beings, can think about the 
infinite and transcendent God. His best-known work is De docta ignorantia(On 
Learned Ignorance, 1440), which gives expression to his view that the human 
mind needs to realize its own necessary ignorance of what God is like, an igno-
rance that results from the ontological and cognitive disproportion between God 
and the finite human knower.  
Correlated to the doctrine of learned ignorance is that of the coincidence of 
opposites in God. All things coincide in God in the sense that God, as undiffer-
entiated being, is beyond all opposition. Two other works that are closely con-
nected to De docta ignorantia are De coniecturis (On Conjectures), in which he 
denies the possibility of exact knowledge, maintaining that all human 
knowledge is conjectural, and Apologia docta ignorantiae (A Defense of 
Learned Ignorance, 1449). In the latter, he makes clear that the doctrine of 
learned ignorance is not intended to deny knowledge of the existence of God, 
but only to deny all knowledge of God’s nature. 
One of the most serious obstacles to the reception and adoption of Plato-
nism in the early fifteenth century was the theory of Platonic love. Many schol-
ars were simply unable to accept Plato’s explicit treatment of homosexuality. 
Yet by the middle of the sixteenth century this doctrine had become one of the 
most popular elements of Platonic philosophy. The transformation of Platonic 
love from an immoral and offensive liability into a valuable asset represents an 
important episode in the history of Plato’s re-emergence during the Renaissance 
as a major influence on Western thought. Bessarion and Ficino did not deny that 
Platonic love was essentially homosexual in outlook, but they insisted that it was 
entirely honourable and chaste.  
To reinforce this point, they associated Platonic discussions of love with 
those found in the Bible. Another way in which Ficino made Platonic love more 
palatable to his contemporaries was to emphasise its place within an elaborate 
system of Neoplatonic metaphysics. But Ficino’s efforts to accommodate the 
theory to the values of a fifteenth-century audience did not include concealing or 
denying that Platonic love was homoerotic. Ficino completely accepted the idea 
that Platonic love involved a chaste relationship between men and endorsed the 
belief that the soul’s spiritual ascent to ultimate beauty was fuelled by love be-
tween men.  
In Gli Asolani (1505), the humanist Pietro Bembo (1470–1547) appropriat-
ed the language of Platonic love to describe some aspects of the romance be-
tween a man and a woman. In this work, love was presented as unequivocally 
heterosexual. Most of the ideas set out by Ficino are echoed by Bembo. Howev-
er, Ficino had separated physical love, which had women as its object, from 
spiritual love, which was shared between men. Bembo’s version of Platonic 
love, on the other hand, dealt with the relationship between a man and a woman 
which gradually progresses from a sexual to a spiritual level. The view of Pla-
tonic love formulated by Bembo reached its largest audience with the humanist 
Baldesar Castiglione’s (1478–1529) Il libro del cortegiano (The Courtier, 1528).  
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Castiglione carried on the trend, initiated by Bessarion, of giving Platonic 
love a strongly religious coloring, and most of the philosophical content is taken 
from Ficino. One of the most popular Renaissance treatises on love Dialogues of 
Love, (1535), was written by the Jewish philosopher Judah ben Isaac Abravanel, 
also known as Leone Ebreo (c.1460/5–c.1520/5). The work consists of three 
conversations on love, which he conceives of as the animating principle of the 
universe and the cause of all existence, divine as well as material. The first dia-
logue discusses the relation between love and desire; the second the universality 
of love; and the third, which provides the longest and most sustained philosoph-
ical discussion, the origin of love. He draws upon Platonic and Neoplatonic 
sources, as well as on the cosmology and metaphysics of Jewish and Arabic 
thinkers, which are combined with Aristotelian sources in order to produce a 
synthesis of Aristotelian and Platonic views. 
Stoicism, Epicureanism, and Skepticism underwent a revival over the 
course of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries as part of the ongoing recovery of 
ancient literature and thought. The revival of Stoicism began with Petrarca, 
whose renewal of Stoicism moved along two paths. The first one was inspired 
by Seneca and consisted in the presentation, in works such as De vita solita-
ria (The Life of Solitude) and De otio religioso (On Religious Leisure), of a way 
of life in which the cultivation of the scholarly work and ethical perfection are 
one. The second was his elaboration of Stoic therapy against emotional distress 
in De secreto conflictu curarum mearum (On the Secret Conflict of My Wor-
ries), an inner dialogue of the sort prescribed by Cicero and Seneca, and in De 
remediis utriusque fortunae (Remedies for Good and Bad Fortune, 1366), a huge 
compendium based on a short apocryphal tract attributed at the time to Seneca. 
While many humanists shared Petrarca’s esteem for Stoic moral philoso-
phy, others called its stern prescriptions into question. They accused the Stoics 
of suppressing all emotions and criticized their view for its inhuman rigidity. In 
contrast to the extreme ethical stance of the Stoics, they preferred the more 
moderate Peripatetic position, arguing that it provides a more realistic basis for 
morality, since it places the acquisition of virtue within the reach of normal hu-
man capacities. Another Stoic doctrine that was often criticized on religious 
grounds was the conviction that the wise man is entirely responsible for his own 
happiness and has no need of divine assistance. 
The most important exponent of Stoicism during the Renaissance was the 
Flemish humanist Justus Lipsius (1547–1606), who worked hard to brighten the 
appeal of Stoicism to Christians. His first Neostoic work was De constantia (On 
Constancy, 1584), in which he promoted Stoic moral philosophy as a refuge 
from the horrors of the civil and religious wars that ravaged the continent at the 
time. His main accounts of Stoicism were Physiologia Stoicorum (Physical The-
ory of the Stoics) and Manuductio ad stoicam philosophiam (Guide to Stoic Phi-
losophy), both published in 1604. Together they constituted the most learned ac-
count of Stoic philosophy produced since antiquity. 
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During the middle Ages, Epicureanism was associated with contemptible 
atheism and hedonist dissipation. In 1417, Bracciolini found Lucretius’s po-
em De rerum natura, the most informative source on Epicurean teaching, which, 
together with Ambrogio Traversari’s translation of Diogenes Laertius’s Life of 
Epicurus into Latin, contributed to a more discriminating appraisal of Epicurean 
doctrine and a repudiation of the traditional prejudice against the person of Epi-
curus himself. In a letter written in 1428, Francesco Filelfo (1398–1481) insisted 
that, contrary to popular opinion, Epicurus was not “addicted to pleasure, lewd 
and lascivious,” but rather “sober, learned and venerable.” In the epistolary trea-
tise Defensio Epicuri contra Stoicos, Academicos et Peripateticos (Defense of 
Epicurus against Stoics, Academics and Peripatetics), Cosma Raimondi (d. 
1436) vigorously defended Epicurus and the view that the supreme good con-
sists in pleasure both of the mind and the body.  
He argued that pleasure, according to Epicurus, is not opposed to virtue, 
but both guided and produced by it. Some humanists tried to harmonize Epicu-
rean with Christian doctrine. In his dialogue De voluptate (On Pleasure, 1431), 
which was two years later reworked as De vero falsoque bono (On the True and 
False Good), Valla examined Stoic, Epicurean, and Christian conceptions of the 
true good. To the ultimate good of the Stoics, that is, virtue practiced for its own 
sake, Valla opposed that of the Epicureans, represented by pleasure, on the 
grounds that pleasure comes closer to Christian happiness, which is superior to 
either pagan ideal. 
The revival of ancient philosophy was particularly dramatic in the case of 
Skepticism, whose revitalisation grew out of many of the currents of Renais-
sance thought and contributed to make the problem of knowledge crucial for 
early modern philosophy. The major ancient texts stating the Skeptical argu-
ments were slightly known in the middle Ages. It was in the fifteenth and six-
teenth century that Sextus Empiricus’s Outlines of Pyrrhonism and Against the 
Mathematicians, Cicero’s Academica, and Diogenes Laertius’s Life of Pyr-
rho started to receive serious philosophical consideration. 
The most significant and influential figure in the development of Renais-
sance Skepticism is Michel de Montaigne (1533–1592). The most thorough 
presentation of his Skeptical views occurs in Apologie de Raimond 
Sebond (Apology for Raymond Sebond), the longest and most philosophical of 
his essays. In it, he developed in a gradual manner the many kinds of problems 
that make people doubt the reliability of human reason. He considered in detail 
the ancient Skeptical arguments about the unreliability of information gained by 
the senses or by reason, about the inability of human beings to find a satisfactory 
criterion of knowledge, and about the relativity of moral opinions. He concluded 
that people should suspend judgment on all matters and follow customs and tra-
ditions. He combined these conclusions with fideism. 
Many Renaissance appropriators of Academic and Pyrrhonian Skeptical 
arguments did not see any intrinsic value in Skepticism, but rather used it to at-
tack Aristotelianism and disparage the claims of human science. They chal-
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lenged the intellectual foundations of medieval Scholastic learning by raising 
serious questions about the nature of truth and about the ability of humans to 
discover it. In Examen vanitatis doctrinae gentium et veritatis Christianae disci-
plinae (Examination of the Vanity of Pagan Doctrine and of the Truth of Chris-
tian Teaching, 1520), Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola (1469–1533) set out 
to prove the futility of pagan doctrine and the truth of Christianity.  
He regarded Skepticism as ideally suited to his campaign, since it chal-
lenged the possibility of attaining certain knowledge by means of the senses or 
by reason, but left the scriptures, grounded in divine revelation, untouched. In 
the first part of the work, he used the Skeptical arguments contained in the 
works of Sextus Empiricus against the various schools of ancient philosophy; 
and in the second part he turned Skepticism against Aristotle and the Peripatetic 
tradition. His aim was not to call everything into doubt, but rather to discredit 
every source of knowledge except scripture and condemn all attempts to find 
truth elsewhere as vain. 
In a similar way, Agrippa von Nettesheim (1486–1535), whose real name 
was Heinrich Cornelius, demonstrated in De incertitudine et vanitate scientiarum 
atque artium (On the Uncertainty and Vanity of the Arts and Sciences, 1530) the 
contradictions of scientific doctrines. With stylistic brilliance, he described the 
controversies of the established academic community and dismissed all academ-
ic endeavors in view of the finitude of human experience, which in his view 
comes to rest only in faith. 
The fame of the Portuguese philosopher and medical writer Francisco 
Sanches (1551–1623) rests mainly on Quod nihil scitur (That Nothing Is 
Known, 1581), one of the best systematic expositions of philosophical Skepti-
cism produced during the sixteenth century. The treatise contains a radical criti-
cism of the Aristotelian notion of science, but beside its critical aim, it had a 
constructive objective, which posterity has tended to neglect, consisting in 
Sanches’s quest for a new method of philosophical and scientific inquiry that 
could be universally applied. This method was supposed to be expounded in an-
other book that was either lost, remained unpublished, or was not written at all. 
In 1543, Nicolaus Copernicus (1473–1543) published De revolutionibus 
orbium coelestium (On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres), which pro-
posed a new calculus of planetary motion based on several new hypotheses, 
such as heliocentrism and the motion of the earth. The first generation of readers 
underestimated the revolutionary character of the work and regarded the hypoth-
eses of the work only as useful mathematical fictions. The result was that as-
tronomers appreciated and adopted some of Copernicus’s mathematical models 
but rejected his cosmology. Yet, the Aristotelian representation of the universe 
did not remain unchallenged and new visions of nature, its principles, and its 
mode of operation started to emerge. 
During the sixteenth century, there were many philosophers of nature who 
felt that Aristotle’s system could no longer regulate honest inquiry into nature. 
Therefore, they stopped trying to adjust the Aristotelian system and turned their 
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backs on it altogether. It is hard to imagine how early modern philosophers, such 
as Francis Bacon (1561–1626), Pierre Gassendi (1592–1655,) and René Des-
cartes (1596–1650), could have cleared the ground for the scientific revolution 
without the work of novatores such as Bernardino Telesio (1509–1588), Fran-
cesco Patrizi (1529–1597), Giordano Bruno (1548–1600), and Tommaso Cam-
panella (1568–1639). 
Telesio grounded his system on a form of empiricism, which maintained 
that nature can only be understood through sense perception and empirical re-
search. In 1586, two years before his death, he published the definitive version 
of his work De rerum natura iuxta propria principia (On the Nature of Things 
according to their Own Principles). The book is a frontal assault on the founda-
tions of Peripatetic philosophy, accompanied by a proposal for replacing Aristo-
telianism with a system more faithful to nature and experience. According to 
Telesio, the only things that must be presupposed are passive matter and the two 
principles of heat and cold, which are in perpetual struggle to occupy matter and 
exclude their opposite. These principles were meant to replace the Aristotelian 
metaphysical principles of matter and form. Some of Telesio’s innovations were 
seen as theologically dangerous and his philosophy became the object of vigor-
ous attacks. De rerum natura iuxta propria princip was included on the Index of 
Prohibited Books published in Rome in 1596. 
Through the reading of Telesio’s work, Campanella developed a profound 
distaste for Aristotelian philosophy and embraced the idea that nature should be 
explained through its own principles. He rejected the fundamental Aristotelian 
principle of hylomorphism and adopted instead Telesio’s understand of reality in 
terms of the principles of matter, heat, and cold, which he combined with Neo-
platonic ideas derived from Ficino. His first published work was Philosophia 
sensibus demonstrata (Philosophy as Demonstrated by the Senses, 1591), an an-
ti-Peripatetic polemic in defense of Telesio’s system of natural philosophy. 
Thereafter, he was censured, tortured, and repeatedly imprisoned for his here-
sies.  
During the years of his incarceration, he composed many of his most fa-
mous works, such as De sensu rerum et magia (On the Sense of Things and On 
Magic, 1620), which sets out his vision of the natural world as a living organism 
and displays his keen interest in natural magic; Ateismus triomphatus (Atheism 
Conquered), a polemic against both reason of state and Machiavelli’s conception 
of religion as a political invention; and Apologia pro Galileo (Defense of Gali-
leo), a defense of the freedom of thought (libertas philosophandi) of Galileo and 
of Christian scientists in general. Campanella’s most ambitious work is Meta-
physica(1638), which constitutes the most comprehensive presentation of his 
philosophy and whose aim is to produce a new foundation for the entire ency-
clopedia of knowledge. His most celebrated work is the utopian treatise The 
City of the Sun, which describes an ideal model of society that, in contrast to the 
violence and disorder of the real world, is in harmony with nature.  
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In contrast to Telesio, who was a fervent critic of metaphysics and insisted 
on a purely empiricist approach in natural philosophy, Patrizi developed a pro-
gram in which natural philosophy and cosmology were connected with their 
metaphysical and theological foundations. His Discussiones peripateti-
cae (Peripatetic Discussions) provides a close comparison of the views of Aris-
totle and Plato on a wide range of philosophical issues, arguing that Plato’s 
views are preferable on all counts. Inspired by such Platonic predecessors as 
Proclus and Ficino, Patrizi elaborated his own philosophical system in Nova de 
universalis philosophia (The New Universal Philosophy, 1591), which is divided 
in four parts: Panaugia, Panarchia, Pampsychia, and Pancosmia.  
He saw light as the basic metaphysical principle and interpreted the uni-
verse in terms of the diffusion of light. The fourth and last part of the work, in 
which he expounded his cosmology showing how the physical world derives its 
existence from God, is by far the most original and important. In it, he replaced 
the four Aristotelian elements with his own alternatives: space, light, heat, and 
humidity. Gassendi and Henry More (1614–1687) adopted his concept of space, 
which indirectly came to influence Newton. 
A more radical cosmology was proposed by Bruno, who was an extremely 
prolific writer. His most significant works include those on the art of memory 
and the combinatory method of Ramon Llull, as well as the moral dialogues 
Spaccio de la bestia trionfante (The Expulsion of the Triumphant Beast, 1584), 
Cabala del cavallo pegaseo (The Kabbalah of the Pegasean Horse, 1585) and De 
gl’heroici furori (The Heroic Frenzies, 1585). Much of his fame rests on three 
cosmological dialogues published in 1584: La cena de le ceneri (The Ash 
Wednesday Supper), De la causa, principio et uno (On the Cause, the Principle 
and the One) and De l’infinito, universo et mondi (On the Infinite, the Universe 
and the Worlds). In these, with inspiration from Lucretius, the Neoplatonists, 
and, above all, Nicholas of Cusa, he elaborates a coherent and strongly articulat-
ed ontological monism. Individual beings are conceived as accidents or modes 
of a unique substance, that is, the universe, which he describes as an animate 
and infinitely extended unity containing innumerable worlds. Bruno adhered to 
Copernicus’s cosmology but transformed it, postulating an infinite universe. 
Although an first to locate a heliocentric system in infinite space. In 1600, he 
was burned at the stake by the Inquisition for his heretical teachings. 
In Belarus, within the framework of Christianity, not only Orthodox, Cath-
olics, but also various Protestant communities began to adjoin. One of these 
communities was created by supporters of M. Luther. It was influenced by the 
trading communities of German merchants, as well as the fact that Belarusian 
youth were educated at German universities. In 1544, the University of 
Koenigsberg began to function. One of the first preachers of Lutheranism in the 
Grand Duchy of Lithuania was S. Rafalovich. The church was called Augsburg. 
Her residence was in Riga. 
The spread and growth of the influence of Protestant communities in the 
territory of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was facilitated by factors of state au-
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thority. This circumstance played a role in the spread of Calvinism in Belarus. J. 
Calvin actively corresponded with the head of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania Si-
gismund II Augustus. He dedicated his interpretation of Paul to the Jews. M. Lu-
ther also dedicated to the head of state his translation of the Bible. The final ac-
cents in the choice of the head of state of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania were in-
fluenced by N. Radziwill Cherny, who corresponded with J. Calvin. As a result, 
with his financial support, Calvinist communities were widespread. Prayer 
houses were built, educational institutions and printing houses opened. Repre-
sentatives of intellectual culture were involved in community activities. 
Among these representatives was S. Budny. At the invitation of N. 
Radziwill Black, he organized a printing house in Nesvizh, where he began to 
publish the texts of Biboia in Belarusian and Polish. Supporters of Calvinism 
were Sapegi, Guts, Khodkevichi and Tishkevichi. Calvinist communities formed 
in Brest, Zaslavl, Dumpling, Nesvizh and Orsha. Schools were opened in Vilna, 
Ivye, Kletsk, Nesvizh, Slutsk, Lyubche and Losk. In addition to theology, histo-
ry, mathematics, rhetoric, and ancient poetry were taught. 
In 1557, the Synod of Representatives of the Gospel Church of the Grand 
Duchy of Lithuania was created. S. Zatsius was elected the head. In 1565, the 
Calvinists of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania received equal rights with Catholics 
and Orthodox. In 1573, the right to choose a religion was legislated. The corre-
sponding article was spelled out in the Statute of the Grand Duchy of 1588. 
Calvinist initiatives in the field of state law of the Grand Duchy of Lithua-
nia created not only guarantees of equal rights for them, but also went beyond 
the interests of their community. In Belarus, other Protestant communities began 
to use the law of tolerance. Polemic discussions arose between representatives of 
these communities. In the course of these discussions, some of the community 
members evolved to views that went beyond the boundaries of the identity of 
these communities. The controversy was conducted peacefully. It did not lead, 
as in France, to the confrontation of religious communities. 
L. Sapega used the right to choose a religion. Throughout his life he was an 
Orthodox, Calvinist and Catholic. The original intellectual evolution within the 
framework of the right to choose religion was S. Budny. While studying at the 
University of Basel, he became acquainted with the teachings of J. Calvin and 
became his supporter. In Belarus, he enjoyed the support of N. Radziwill Black. 
He gave him the opportunity to engage in publishing in Nesvizh. Here was pub-
lished the Catechism. 
As the spiritual evolution of S. Budny continued, he was influenced by an-
ti-Trinitarians, the teachings of F. Sotsyn. He was forced to leave Nesvizh and 
moved to Losk, where there was a printing house and a training center. A work 
written by S. Budny “On the Most Important Theses of the Christian Faith” cre-
ated his written polemic with Peter from Gonenz, J. Wisniewski, I. Zanhus, S. 
Farnovsky, M. Chekhovets, P. Skarga, G. Bulinger, J. Simmler. 
S. Budny used actively the European intellectual space for correspondence 
with representatives of the Protestant communities of Europe. Contacts were fa-
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cilitated by his education received at the universities of Krakow and Basel. G. 
Buhlinger and J. Simmler represented the Protestant community of Zurich, cre-
ated by the efforts of W. Zwingli. J. Simmler criticized S. Budnyi for allowing 
free interpretations of the Bible. Since 1532, Geneva became the center of the 
Protestant movement in Switzerland thanks to the efforts of G. Farel. Here set-
tled J. Calvin. In 1549 a Zurich agreement was reached between the Protestant 
communities of Zurich and Geneva. On its basis, educational institutions were 
opened. S. Budny used the educational services of one of them. The references 
in his publications to Aristotle, Plato, Demosthenes, Cicero, Virgil, Horace, Ti-
tus Livius, Pliny the Elder testify to the level of his education, 
Through the means of the British merchant S. Budny, in 1574 he handed 
over a letter to J. Fox. It is stored in the library of the University of Oxford. Li-
brary archives became the basis for research by British scientists G. Picardo, E. 
Henderson, J. Townley. It was they who established the obvious presence in the 
history of the printing of England of natives of Eastern Europe.  
They also carried out a systematic analysis of the publications of Y. Litvin, 
F. Skorina and S. Budny. The polemic-related polemic initiated by S. Budny 
continued for several decades within the framework of the Grand Duchy of 
Lithuania. Its members became well-known polemic authors. S. Ostrovsky and 
M. Smigletsky joined them.  
In the framework of the polemic S. Budny wrote the work “Refutation of 
Chekhovets, who believes that a Christian should not hold a public position”. 
Yakub from Kalinovka, Peter from Gonenz and Y. Nemaevsky, Pavel from 
Vizny reacted to his work. In 1581, a verbal discussion took several hours at the 
Protestant Synod in Losk. The discussion continued in 1582 in Lubche. It took 
several days. The discussions revealed the talent of many participants for the 
practical implementation of the ideas expressed about the role of religion in so-
ciety. Among them was A. Volovich. He converted from Orthodoxy to Protes-
tantism. He served as Chancellor of the ON. He participated in the development 
of the Statute of the Grand Duchy of 1566. Books of S. Budny and A. Bulinger 
were published with his money. He identified Calvinism as the distinctive reli-
gion of ON.  
Therefore, he conducted a decisive polemic with supporters of the Union of 
Lublin, which implied the close integration of the GDL with Catholic Poland. A 
similar position was held by J. Abramovich, who held high government posts in 
the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Under the influence of his wife, who belonged to 
the Orthodox Church, he supported tolerance and religious tolerance. He had di-
verse interests in science and literature. One of his works is entitled “The 
Thoughts of a Litsvin on the Acquisition of Cheap Grain and its Sale at a Higher 
Price” (1595). He motivated J. Radwan to write the poem Radziviliada. He sup-
ported the publishing activities of S. Sudrovsky. 
The head of the city authorities in Minsk, Y. Glebovich, contributed to the 
development of the city and Protestant communities. On his initiative, the Trini-
ty and Castle suburbs were built. A large community of Calvinists has formed. 
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A temple was built. The temple was also built for Calvinists in Zaslavl. A print-
ing house was opened, in which books were published by D. Lenchitsky and S. 
Budny. J. Glebovich contributed to the adoption of the Statute of the Grand 
Duchy of 1588. Y. Namyslovsky played an important role in the formation of 
Aryan schools in Ivye, Novogrudok. He supported the activities of S. Budny. 
He became famous for the polemic with M. Smigletsky, a prominent repre-
sentative of the second scholasticism within the GDL. The discussion took place 
in 1594. Following the discussion, Y. Namyslovsky published the books "Anat-
omy and Harmony of a Christian Man", "A Textbook for Mastering the Doctrine 
of Aristotle." They were published in 1596. F. Unius, a theologian from the 
Netherlands, reacted to these works. 
S. Zatsius accepted Calvinism and became one of the participants in dis-
cussions with S. Budny. In the printing house of N. Radziwill Black in Brest, he 
published the texts of the Bible. 
After the adoption of Calvinism in 1553, the Italian theologian J. Blandrata 
participated in discussions with S. Budny. He received university education in 
Bologna. A high level of polemic with opponents was demonstrated by A. Vo-
lan. He was a supporter of Calvinism. He was the secretary of the kings of Si-
gismund Augustus, S. Batory. His works are devoted to issues of state law. In 
matters of religion, he led a polemic with a supporter of the second scholasti-
cism P. Skargoy. M. Kavechinsky was educated at the University of Wittenberg. 
He adopted Calvinism.  
Together with S. Budny, L. Kshishkovsky opened a printing house in Nes-
vizh. He was a member of the publication in the Belarusian language "Cate-
chism". Protestants of Belarus had a tolerant relationship with the Orthodox. 
There were no conflicts between the Protestant communities and the Orthodox 
fraternities. Tolerance was fostered by mixed religious marriages. 
 
10. Philosophy 17th- and 18th century 
 
Philosophy in the 17th- and 18th-centuries can be characterized by an in-
creased concern with questions relating to epistemology, human subjectivity, the 
foundations of natural science, and the Counter-Reformation.  Likewise, there 
arose a tradition in moral and political philosophy that sought to understand hu-
man behavior and the origins of states and institutions naturalistically.  In short, 
there was a strong movement in this period to analyze anew a human being's ca-
pacity to know and to act ethically and to reconceptualize the physical and the 
social worlds without appeal to a providential God or to teleology. 
Even though these new philosophies of nature anticipated some of the de-
fining features of early modern thought, many of their methodological character-
istics appeared to be inadequate in the face of new scientific developments. The 
methodology of Galileo Galilei (1564–1642) and of the other pioneers of the 
new science was essentially mathematical. Moreover, the development of the 
new science took place by means of methodical observations and experiments, 
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such as Galileo’s telescopic discoveries and his experiments on inclined planes. 
The critique of Aristotle’s teaching formulated by natural philosophers such as 
Telesio, Campanella, Patrizi, and Bruno undoubtedly helped to weaken it, but it 
was the new philosophy of the early seventeenth century that sealed the fate of 
the Aristotelian worldview and set the tone for a new age. 
The philosophers most responsible for the break from medieval and renais-
sance traditions of thought are Bacon, Descartes, and Hobbes.  Responding to 
these self-described 'moderns' were the second and third generations of philoso-
phers: Spinoza, Malebranche, Locke and Leibniz, who further developed Baco-
nian and Hobbesian empiricism, the Cartesian 'way of ideas' and Cartesian dual-
ism, and the Hobbesian account of the origin of the state.  Their thought in turn 
acts as the foil for the continued philosophical reflection of Berkeley, Wolff, 
Hume and Condillac. Finally, in the standard telling of the history of philoso-
phy, Immanuel Kant revolutionized modern philosophy. 
The relations between the Protestants and the Vatican, which did not want 
to put up with the growing influence of Calvinism on Belarus, were more com-
plicated. The Vatican adhered to a rather tough position regarding Orthodox fra-
ternities. When the Vatican’s patience was exhausted, he proceeded to imple-
ment the Counter-Reformation strategy, which was to create the conditions for 
the transition of the upper layers of the Belarusian society to Catholicism. It was 
supposed to subordinate the Orthodox brotherhoods on the territory of Belarus 
and Ukraine to the Vatican, which was done in 1595 following the conclusion of 
a church union. But there were Orthodox brotherhoods who did not accept the 
model of the Greek Catholic Church. 
They began to focus on the Moscow Orthodox Patriarchate, which was 
considered by the authorities of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of 
Lithuania as an instrument of influence of the Moscow state on the Orthodox 
population for political purposes. Under these conditions, it was difficult for rep-
resentatives of the intellectual part of the Bravo Orthodox fraternities to avoid 
suspicions of espionage and undermining state security of the Confederation of 
the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. It was in a similar 
situation of suspicion that A. Filippovich found himself. S. Polotsky left the 
borders of Belarus and continued his intellectual activity in the Moscow state. 
As the Counter-Reformation intensified, the boundaries of Belarus were 
left by representatives of intellectual thought who adhered to Calvinism. After 
the transition of the influential families of Belarus to the Catholic faith, printing 
houses ceased to be accessible to these people. They headed to the Netherlands. 
Among them were K. Semyanovich and I. Kopievich. In the Netherlands, K. 
Semyanovich became the author of the work entitled "The Great Art of Artil-
lery." In interpreting the results of experimental studies, he referred to the works 
of Aristotle, Plato, Seneca, Euclid and Archimedes. I. Kopievich opened a print-
ing house in Amsterdam, where, at the request of Peter I, he translated into Rus-
sian and published books on maritime affairs and the natural sciences. 
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The counter-reformation in Belarus was not accompanied by religious 
wars. It was transformed into the phenomenon of the second scholasticism. The 
Catholic orders, including the Jesuits, adhered to the strategy of creating authori-
ty in civil society not by violence, but by forming educational and cultural envi-
ronments in the competitive Calvinist communities and Orthodox brotherhoods 
in Belarus. The infrastructure of this environment included collegiums, school 
theaters, which formed the specifics of the Baroque era in Belarus. 
The intellectual tradition of the second scholasticism was formed on the 
territory of Spain and Portugal at the universities of Coimbra, Salamanca. An 
important role was played by the Gregorian University (Roman College). This 
tradition includes Catholic philosophical teachings associated with the first 
scholasticism, Aristotelianism, Thomism and incorporating elements of systems 
of late scholasticism and Renaissance humanistic teachings into their structure. 
The second scholasticism became the theory of internal reform of Catholi-
cism and the rationale for the Counter-Reformation movement. She gave an-
swers to the religious, social, moral, metaphysical questions posed by the New 
Time. The second scholasticism remained relevant in the XVI - XVII centuries. 
The beginning of the second scholasticism in Western Europe is connected with 
the intellectual activity of the founder of the Salamanca school of the Dominican 
Francisco de Vitoria (the 30s of the XVI century). The end of the era of the sec-
ond scholasticism in Western Europe is associated with the death in 1617 of the 
Jesuit philosopher Francisco Suarez. On the territory of Belarus, Lithuania, Po-
land, the second gathering maintained its position in the education system until 
the beginning of the 19th century. 
The counter-reformation movement aimed at strengthening the Vatican’s 
position in Europe, not only by intimidating believers through the institution of 
the Inquisition, but also through the intellectual resources of education. These 
tasks were formulated at the Council of Trent (1545-1563). The intellectual part 
of the problems was solved by the philosophers of Spain and Portugal. Their 
study was completed in the writings of F. Suarez. These works influenced the 
further development of Catholic theology and philosophy had a significant im-
pact on the Protestant scholasticism of the XVI-XVII centuries. 
F. Suarez systematized the problems of Aristotelian philosophy in new his-
torical conditions, gave impetus to the development of metaphysical problems in 
the structure of the emerging philosophy of the New Age, established the divi-
sion of philosophy into subject parts, which became traditional for European 
philosophers, up to I. Kant. 
Philosophical rationalism is imbued with the theology of F. Suarez. He im-
plemented a program of philosophical and theological synthesis of the 
knowledge system, the basis of which is metaphysics. The focus of F. Suarez is 
a real being. The most important thing for him is a systematic study of the main 
metaphysical concepts and questions. He analyzes and compares the opinions of 
Aristotle contained in different books, chapters and fragments, analyzes the 
opinions of medieval authors. He writes "A Detailed Index to Aristotle's Meta-
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physics." Thus, he creates a mechanism of continuity within the framework of 
the Aristotelian intellectual tradition. In the education system of the second 
scholasticism this tradition will be represented thanks to the efforts of M. Smig-
letsky subject area of logic. It is born in Ukraine.  
In Rome he entered the Order of the Jesuits. He studied philosophy and 
theology under the leadership of F. Suarez and R. Bellarmino. Since he was born 
within the framework of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, he returned to it and be-
gan to teach at the Jesuit Academy in Vilna. Then his theological activities took 
place in Poland. He led an active polemic with intellectuals of the Protestant 
communities of Belarus. On the basis of the lectures given by him in Vilna, he 
wrote a two-volume treatise, Logic. The subject of its consideration was the 
"Logic" of Aristotle. The book was famous; has become a popular textbook of 
logic in Western Europe. In England, the book was used until the middle of the 
XIX century. “Logic” was reprinted three times in Oxford in 1634.163838.1658. 
The Jesuits and other Catholic orders, in contrast to the system of educa-
tional institutions that existed on the territory of Belarus, created their own sys-
tem of collegial education. They had strict discipline and at the same time a high 
level of study of subjects. In addition to theology, mathematics, ancient litera-
ture, logic, rhetoric, Latin and Greek, and ethics were studied. The structure of 
the collegiums included libraries and school theaters. There were 14 school thea-
ters in Belarus. Scripts for the productions were written by teachers of the Jesuit 
colleges. Teachers were trained by the Jesuit Academy of Vilna. It included the-
ological and law faculties. The Jesuit colleges in Belarus were taught by immi-
grants from European countries - V. Bergof, A. Mistalt and J. Preusgof. Of the 
local teachers, A. Alizarovsky, L. Zalussky, M. Karsky, A. Koyalovich, S. 
Lauksmin, N. Lenchitsky, M. Sarbevsky, V. Tylkovsky gained fame. 
The collegiums functioned in almost all the cities of Belarus - in Polotsk 
(since 1581), Nesvizh (since 1584), Brest, Orsha, Grodno and Pinsk. In total, 20 
Jesuit colleges functioned. Public relations collegiums were opened in Schuchin, 
Voronovo, Zelva, Mogilev, Drogichin and Polotsk. Due to the transition of the 
main part of the upper classes of Belarus to spoken and written Polish, teaching 
was conducted not only in Latin, but also in Polish. Printing was carried out in 
these languages. An important role in the activities of the Jesuits was played by 
Polotsk. This was due to its geographical location. 
In 1773, the pope dismissed the Jesuit Order. But after the accession of the 
territory of Belarus to the Russian Empire in 1775, the order received an oppor-
tunity for activities within Belarus. Catherine II sought to use the Jesuit Order 
for political interests. She granted them the right to educational activities. The 
center of this activity was Polotsk. A similar position was held by Alexander II. 
He hoped for their support in the war with Napaleon. On January 12, 1812, he 
signed a decree on giving the Polotsk Jesuit College the status of an academy on 
a university basis. All Jesuit schools were subordinate to the academy. A faculty 
of languages was opened at a higher educational institution. Poetry, rhetoric, 
moral philosophy, logic and metaphysics, general, private and experimental 
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physics, chemistry, mathematics, pure and applied, civil and military architec-
ture, natural law, private law and Roman civil law were taught at the faculty of 
free arts - philosophical natural and civil sciences. At the faculty of theology and 
other sciences, dogmatic theology, moral theology, scripture, canonical law, sa-
cred history were taught. Departments elected deans for a certain time by an ac-
ademic training meeting. Elections to academic posts were made by majority 
vote at the full meeting of the Academy and were submitted for approval to the 
General, and through him to the Minister of Education. 
The Academy had its own notary public, which issued certificates for de-
grees. The opening of the Academy took place in June 1812. Dogmatic theology 
was taught by professors M. Lesnevsky and F. Dzerozhinsky. M. Lesnevsky, 
Doctor of Theology and Church Law, Dean of the Faculty of Philosophy, pro-
ceeded from the work of the Jesuit Sardagn, "A Treatise on God and His Christ." 
F. Dzerozhinsky, a professor of theology, also proceeded from the work of 
Sardagna. Church law was read by the Dean of the Faculty of Languages and 
Literature, Professor of Theology and Church Law, D. Richardot. Moral theolo-
gy was taught by the dean of the theological faculty A. Rusnati. The holy letter 
was taught by Professor of Holy Writ, Church History and Hebrew M. Molinari. 
The subject of the study was the Bible. He lectured on church history and hier-
archical geography. 
In the first year, logic, dialectics and metaphysics were studied; ethics, sta-
tistics and political economy; geometry and solidometry; zoology. The subject 
sections of philosophy were taught by the professor of logic, dialectics, meta-
physics and mathematics K. Hlasko. He relied on the works of philosophers of 
antiquity, the middle Ages and modern times. 
Ethics was taught by Professor S. Ragosa. He was also a professor of polit-
ical economy, statistics and zoology. He promoted the views of Cicero. Classes 
in geometry and solidometry were conducted by K. Hlasko. Zoology was taught 
by Professor S. Ragosa. He adhered to the classification of fauna C. Linney. 
In the second year, general and private physics, chemistry, experimental 
physics, plane and spherical trigonometry, and mineralogy were studied. Lec-
tures in physics were given by professor of higher mathematics S. Petrovich. 
Lectures in chemistry were given by professor of chemistry and mineralogy Yu. 
Tsitovich. The main discipline in the third year of the Academy was applied 
mathematics. It was taught by professor of mathematics J. Kondrau. He read as-
tronomy. Professor J. Pirling taught classes in civil and military architecture. 
Lectures on botany read, P. Lange. He used the classification of C. Linney. 
In the fourth year, ecclesiastical eloquence, general, private Russian legis-
lation, and general history were studied. The poetry course was taught by pro-
fessor of eloquence I. Ivitsky. We studied the works of Fedra, Catullus, Tibul-
lius, Properia, Ovid, Horace, Plaut's comedy The Prisoners, some of the trage-
dies of Sophocles and Euripides, The Iliad and Odyssey of Homer, Aeneid by 
Virgil, and a collection of oratory speeches by Cicero. 
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Lectures on civil law and diplomacy were delivered by Professor K. Pe-
trovsky. He focused on Roman law and the law of the Russian Empire. General 
History was taught by Professor D. Richardardot, Doctor of Theology and 
Church Law, Dean of the Faculty of Languages. 
Hebrew literature was taught by Professor M. Molinari. The Bible and fa-
bles of Rabbi Barahiash Nikdan were used. Classes in Arabic and Syriac lan-
guages and literature were conducted by Bonaventure Villaum. He taught in a 
methodology developed by Sylvester de Sac. Professor P. Gavrilovich taught 
students Greek language and literature. Students translated individual works of 
Xenophon, Demosthenes, Herodotus, Homer. Professor I. Ivitsky lectured on 
Latin and Polish literature. 
Professor I. Zalesky lectured on Russian literature. Professor D. Richardot 
taught French literature. He introduced students to the fables of La Fontaine and 
Gresset, the pastors of Malherb, the dramatic works of Cornell (Zinn and Po-
lievkt), Racine, Moliere (The Mean and the Imaginary Sick). Professor J. Pirling 
taught students German language and literature. He used the work of Rabener, 
Gellert, Kleist, Hagedorn and Lessing. 
A significant contribution to the activities of the Academy was made by A. 
Lustig, L.Ya. Rozaven, Y. Yurdan, M. Lesnevsky, K. Petrovsky, M. Molinari, F. 
Dzerozhinsky, S. Petrovich, K. Balandret, S. Ragosa, Y. Pirling and I. Zalesky. 
They formed science schools. The research results of these schools were pub-
lished in the Polotsk Monthly. The scientific journal was founded by Professor 
V. Buchinsky, and the physics editor was Professor of Physics Yu. The maga-
zine included six departments: literature and free sciences, moral philosophy, 
physical and mathematical, historical, criticism and literary news. The journal 
has been published since 1818. Three volumes were published (four issues made 
up one volume). In 1819 the magazine was not published. In 1820, two issues 
were published. 
The Polotsk Academy trained doctors, masters. For five master's degrees, 
123 were awarded to her graduates. 17 people received doctors of theology and 
canon law; 43 doctors of civil law; 13 masters of theology; 2 masters of free sci-
ences; 5 people were nominated as candidates for theology, 27 as candidates of 
philosophy, 1 candidats of free sciences, 3 people as candidates of jurispru-
dence. For the Polotsk Academy of students, educational institutions of Belarus-
ian cities were preparing. 
In 1817, 550 students studied at secondary schools of the Jesuit Order in 
Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev and Mstislavl. In 1818, 540 students studied at educa-
tional institutions. The first class taught the beginnings of the Latin language, 
the catechism, the sacred history before the birth of Christ, the geography of the 
four parts of the world, the four rules of prime and named numbers, the initial 
foundations of the Russian language. In the second grade, grammar of the Latin 
language, Christian teaching, the history of the Assyrian monarchy and geogra-
phy were studied. 
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Four rules of simple and decimal fractions, as well as Russian, French and 
German, were studied in arithmetic. In the third grade, the syntax of the Latin 
language, Christian teaching, the history of the Persian monarchy and geogra-
phy, as well as Russian, French and German, were subject to study. As the 
above documents testify, the trend of combining the second and third grades has 
spread in educational practice. In them, students finished studying the grammar 
of the Latin language. The students were engaged in translations from the works 
of Cornelius Nepot, the fables of Fedor, the selected letters of Cicero, the works 
of Sallust. 
In the third grade ovide elegy were translated with an analysis of the basic 
rules of higher Latin grammar, events from Assyrian and Persian history were 
covered. We studied basic geographical information about Europe, Asia, Africa 
and America, accompanied by a map showing the largest cities, seas, islands, 
peninsulas, rivers. From arithmetic, actions with fractions were explained. In the 
Laws of God class, the Jesuits spoke of the sacraments, focusing on two of them 
- repentance, as well as the body and blood of Christ. In the fourth grade, Chris-
tian moralizing, Greek history with geography, algebra, Russian, French and 
German were studied. In the fifth grade, eloquence, Christian moralizing, Ro-
man history with ancient geography, and the history of the Russian state were 
taught. In mathematics, students studied theoretical and practical geometry, Rus-
sian, French and German. 
Pupils of the combined fourth and fifth grades translated individual works 
of Ovid, Catullius and Tibullius, studied the history of the Roman state, from the 
founding of Rome to the end of the reign of Constantine. In geometry, students 
received knowledge of the lines of straight, vertical, parallel, inclined, intersect-
ing; about the properties of the line that closes the area; about the circle, its sec-
tion, the lines that are in it; about corners, their names and properties; fifth, on 
the names of surface shapes. Students were taught to use a measuring cord, a 
pair of compasses, reported information about the scale and its application, 
formed the skills of measuring the distances between two places, among which 
there was an obstacle, the distance between two objects, of which one or both 
were inaccessible, accessible or inaccessible heights using a measuring table, 
geometry or stick. 
The educational process of the Polotsk Academy was provided by the Main 
Library, a library of Polish publications, a student library, a library of the Acad-
emy’s office, a library of a store, a printing house library, a musical bursa li-
brary, a church library. The main and Polish libraries were intended only for 
professors. The Main Library housed books in European and Oriental languages. 
Libraries had approximately the same list of books. V. Bogushevich, J. 
Kattenbrig, A. Abramsperg, F. Anjiolini and his younger brother Luigi Anjiolini 
made a great contribution to the work of the libraries. The library of the Slutsk 
College had 2995 books, Grodno - 2373, Brest - 1732, Novogrudok - 982, Nes-
vizh House of the third probation - 964, Bobruisk Residence - 363 titles. In the 
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libraries of the Polotsk Academy, there were 15,926 books; of these 13490 
books were in the Main Library and 2436 books in the Polish Library. 
Over many years of activity, the Jesuit colleges created at the higher estates 
of Belarus a need for a wide cultural activity related to the creation of private 
libraries and theaters. Books from these libraries were donated to educational 
institutions. So, a member of the Society of Jesus, J. Sadowski, donated his per-
sonal library to the Polotsk College. The collection of books on architecture G. 
Lenkevich transferred to the ownership of the college. 
In the libraries were the works of Aristotle, F. Aquinas, theological and 
philosophical works of the leaders of the order. The Novogrudok Jesuits owned 
the “Catechism”, owned by R. Bellarmini. Slutsk Jesuits owned several works of 
Martin Luther. Among them were the New Testament and the Psalter. The li-
brary catalog contains biographies of Ignatius Loyola, Francis Xavier, Francis 
Borgia, Balthazar Alvar, Adalbert Mentsinsky and Aloysius Gonzaga. There 
was a book by Thomas Kempinski “On the imitation of Christ” known in West-
ern Europe since 1418. This book has long enjoyed and is extremely popular 
among a wide range of intellectuals, including many prominent figures of world 
culture. She was read by P. Kornel, G.V. Leibniz. The libraries had works by 
Cicero, Ovid, Virgil, Aesop, Horace, Seneca, Libya, Tacitus, and Demosthenes. 
In the library of the Slut Jesuits there was a collection of works of Teretsy 
in twelve volumes, as well as a separate edition of his “Comedies”. The books 
containing the speeches of the famous Roman orator and politician Cicero, there 
were several copies of various publications. The work of Virgil was represented 
by the book “Poems”, as well as the works of Juvenal “Satire”, Ovid “Fast” and 
“Metamorphoses”, Seneca “Tragedies”, Demosthenes “Speech”. In the same li-
brary were presented books on military affairs: “School of War”, “Military 
Horse and Pedestrian Weapons”, “Use of Artillery”, “On Military Exercises”, 
“Infantry Exercises”. There were also books on military law and military econ-
omy. A significant part of the books in the collection of the Slutsk College was 
published in German and Dutch publishing houses. 
The richest collection of books on medicine was in the Slutsk library. There 
were 51 works, including the world-famous monument of the early Middle Ages 
- “Salernaya medicine”, “Skillful anatomy”, “Exercises in anatomy”, “Human 
diseases”, “Surgery”, “Anatomy” by G. Scott, “History of medicine "P. Borelli," 
History of Medicine "by V. Pison. There was a three-volume collection of Para-
celsus' works. In 1822, the library of the Polotsk Academy passed into the juris-
diction of the higher school of public relations, which the Russian government 
invited to Polotsk from Vitebsk, instructing them to take up the education of lo-
cal youth. In 1830 it was abolished. 
The Jesuits of the Polotsk College reacted to the development of science in 
Western Europe. In 1788, G. Gruber opened a physical and mechanical muse-
um. He was the author of the project of the building, its construction and decora-
tion with frescoes. He personally made several mechanisms and tools for him. 
Among the brothers of the order, G. Gruber prepared several mechanics, who 
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helped him in equipping the museum. F.K. Schopfer, C. Schmidt, J. Sommerer. 
F.K. Schopfer hails from the Bavarian city of Mirbach. He entered the order on 
July 1, 1789 in Polotsk. Subsequently, he became a famous mechanic, skilled 
craftsman and watchmaker. He built mechanical mills, invented a machine for 
cutting cloth, which was first successfully used at the Jesuit factory in Polotsk. 
A skilled smith was a German by nationality K. Smichdt, who became a 
Jesuit on July 29, 1781 in Polotsk. He made various cars for the museum. J. 
Sommerer is a native of the Tyrolean city of Sexten. He was a wonderful car-
penter and sculptor. One of the most honorable places is occupied by the Italian 
Frantisek Rikka, a graduate of Pavian University, who had encyclopedic 
knowledge in various sciences. The main sources of replenishment of the muse-
um's collections were the manufacture of various machines for providing physi-
cal and mechanical training, research work, and donation of exhibits by Jesuits 
from Western European countries: Italy, Germany and France. 
The museum had the richest collections. In the office of natural history, in 
jars of alcohol, there were freaks of people and animals. There were some 
stuffed animals and birds. The Cabinet of Natural Sciences had the richest col-
lections of earth metals, precious and other rare stones, and marble. There were 
samples of electric machines and other physical devices, mechanical, optical, 
astronomical instruments, in particular, a large telescope. There was a prototype 
machine with which piles were driven into the ground. Models of buildings of 
all architectural styles of the era of antiquity and the middle Ages were present-
ed: Doric, Ionic, Corinthian, Romanesque and Gothic, as well as details of indi-
vidual orders, in particular, Ionic and Corinthian capitals. 
The Polotsk collegium had an art gallery. She was in the building of the 
college, on the walls of the corridors of which, diverging in different directions, 
hunge paintings depicting saints. The Jesuits were carriers of the Baroque cul-
ture. 
After the Polotsk Academy was closed in 1820, a significant part of the 
members of the order ended up in Tarnopol. One of them was Swiss J. Kondrau. 
In Polotsk, he taught mathematics, mechanics, physics and botany, using muse-
um exhibits. The fate of M. Rylo is indicative. This native of Belarus, after the 
closure of the Polotsk Academy, went to the Vatican, from where he was sent on 
a spiritual mission to the Middle East. He accompanied spiritual affairs with sci-
entific research. He was one of the first to describe the ruins of Babylon. He 
opened an educational institution in Beirut. He spent many years in Sudan. 
In Belarus, the Jesuits adhered to theology and at the same time were 
forced to get acquainted with the works of Voltaire, Montesquieu, Russo and 
Didro. Higher Jesuit schools functioned in Vitebsk and Mogilev. Secondary 
schools existed in Mstislavl and Orsha. Many natives of Belarus were educated 
in Vilnius. Here they became professors. Among them, J. Pochobut-Odlyanitsky 
was particularly distinguished. He was a member of the academic scientific 
communities in London and Paris. He achieved the greatest scientific successes 
in astronomy. The era of the second scholasticism ended in Belarus in the first 
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half of the nineteenth century. With it ended the tradition of university Western 
European education within Belarus. The absence of universities limited the 
presence of Belarus in the intellectual space of Europe. One of the mechanisms 
for maintaining this presence was migration. 
 
11. German classical philosophy 
 
German thinkers of this period tried to characterize the essence of the per-
son.They have developed a systematic philosophy as "the science of the spirit", 
defined its main categories and highlighted the industry. And as the main meth-
od of thinking, most of them recognize the dialectic. 
Most historians believe Immanuel Kant founder of a significant phenome-
non in the history of the human mind, which is the classical German philoso-
phy.About his work is divided into two periods.The first one is traditionally con-
sidered subcritical.There Kant showed himself as a naturalist and even hypothe-
sized about how our solar system originated.Second, a critical period in the 
works of the philosopher, devoted to the problems of epistemology, dialectics, 
ethics and aesthetics.First of all, he tried to solve the dilemma that arose be-
tween empiricism and rationalism: what is the source of knowledge - reason and 
experience?He considered that this debate is largely artificial.Feelings give us 
material for research, but the mind gives it shape.Experience also allows you to 
balance all of this check.If feelings are ephemeral and impermanent, the forms 
of reason - birth and a priori.They appeared before the experience.Thanks to 
them, we can express the facts and phenomena in the surrounding concepts.But 
to understand the essence of the world and the universe in such a way we can 
not.This is the "thing in itself", the understanding of which is beyond the experi-
ence, it is transcendental. 
Kant has put the main problems, which are then solved all subsequent 
German classical philosophy.Briefly (philosopher Kant very difficult, but try to 
simplify its circuit) it sounds like.What and how can a man know how to oper-
ate, what to expect, and indeed, that he is?To answer the first question, the phi-
losopher considers the stages of thinking and their functions.Feelings operate a 
priori forms (for example, space and time), reason - categories (quantity, quali-
ty).Facts drawn from experience with them converted into ideas.A mind with 
them builds a priori synthetic judgments.So there is a process of cognition.But 
the mind contains the idea of unconditional and even - for the unity of the world, 
the soul, of God. 
They represent the ideal pattern, but rationally deduced from their experi-
ence or prove impossible.Any attempt to do so generates the insoluble contradic-
tions - antinomy.They point out that there is reason to stop and give way to 
faith.Criticizing theoretical thinking, Kant proceeds to the practical, that is, to 
morals.Its foundation is considered a philosopher, a priori categorical imperative 
- performance of moral duty, not personal desires and inclinations.Kant antici-
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pated many features of classical German philosophy.Let us briefly and its other 
representatives. 
Fichte, unlike Kant denied that the surrounding does not depend on our 
consciousness.He believed that the subject and object - just a different manifes-
tation of the divine "I".In the normal course of business and learning actually 
takes place reliance.This means that the first "I" conscious of (creating) yourself 
and then objects.They start work on the subject and become obstacles for 
him.To overcome them, "I" develops.The highest stage of this process is to un-
derstand the identity of subject and object.Then opposites destroyed, and there is 
an absolute "I".In addition, subject to the understanding of Fichte is theoretical 
and practical.The first defines the second implements.The absolute "I", in terms 
of Fichte, exists only in potency.Its prototype is a collective "we" or God. 
Fichte Grabbing ideas about the unity of subject and object, the thinker 
thought both of these categories real.Nature is not material for the realization of 
the "I".It is an independent entity with a potency unconscious appearance of the 
subject.Stir in it comes from the opposites and, at the same time represents the 
development of the world Soul.The subject is born of nature, but he creates his 
own world, separate from the "I" - the science, art, religion.The logic is present 
not only in the mind, but also in nature. 
But most important will that makes us grow, and the world.In order to per-
ceive the unity of man and nature, the understanding is not enough, we need in-
tellectual intuition.She have a philosophy and the arts.Therefore, the system of 
thought, according to Schelling, must consist of three parts.This is the philoso-
phy of nature, then epistemology (which studied a priori forms of the mind).But 
the crowning glory of all is the comprehension of unity of subject and ob-
ject.This apogee Schelling called philosophy of identity.She believes the pres-
ence of the Absolute Mind, in which the spirit and nature of the other polarity 
match. 
Most famous thinker, which is associated with the German classical philos-
ophy - Hegel.Briefly describe the system and its basic principles.Schelling, He-
gel accepts the doctrine of the identity and Kant concluded that the matter 
should not be put out of consciousness, and vice versa.But he believed the basic 
philosophical principles of unity and struggle of opposites.At the heart of the 
world is the identity of being and thinking, absolute idea.But it concealed con-
tradictions.When this unity becomes aware of itself, it alienates and creates the 
world of objects (matter, nature).But this otherness is still developing according 
to the laws of thought.In "Science of Logic" Hegel regards these rules.He finds 
that such concepts as they are formed and what characterized the differences be-
tween formal and dialectical logic, what are the laws of the latter.These process-
es are the same for thinking, and for Nature, because the world is logical and 
reasonable.The main method to Hegel's dialectic became the basic categories 
and laws which he brought up and secured. 
Another two important works of German philosopher is "Philosophy of Na-
ture" and "Phenomenology of Spirit".In them he explores the development of the 
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absolute otherness ideas and return it to myself, but at a different stage of devel-
opment.The lowest form of existence in the world - the mechanics, followed by 
physics, and finally organic.Upon completion of this triad spirit comes out of na-
ture and develops in man and society.At first, he realizes himself.At this stage, it 
is a subjective spirit.Then he appears in public forms - of morality, law and the 
state.Human history ends with the emergence of the absolute spirit.He also has 
three forms of development - is an art, religion and philosophy. 
But Hegel's system does not end with the German classical philoso-
phy.Feuerbach (we briefly characterize his teaching below) is considered to be 
its last representative.He has also been the most ardent critic of Hegel.At last he 
borrowed the idea of alienation.Almost all his life he has devoted to, to find out 
what his forms and types.He was trying to create a theory of overcoming the al-
ienation and criticism of religion from the standpoint of materialism.In his work 
on the history of the Christian religion, he said that this man created God.This 
was the ideal alienation from the people.And this has led to the fact that his crea-
tion man made the subject of worship. Should be sent to the aspirations of peo-
ple for what they really deserve - to themselves. 
We see that all these different philosophers have tried to explore the man, 
his essence and purpose. Kant believed that the key to people's morality is, Fich-
te - that active and intelligent, Schelling - that the identity of subject and object, 
Hegel - logic and Feuerbach - love. In determining the meaning of philosophy, 
they also occupied different, although often similar positions. Kant focuses the 
importance of theory of knowledge and ethics, Schelling - natural philosophy, 
Fichte - political disciplines, Hegel - panlogism. Feuerbach considering all these 
problems in a complex .As for dialectics, all recognized its importance, but each 
of them has put forward its own version of the theory of universal communica-
tion. These are the main problems, which are considered the German classical 
philosophy. General characteristics (briefly described above us) of this phenom-
enon in the history of human thought, according to popular belief, is that it is 
one of the most significant cultural achievements of Western Europe. 
From the moment the Teutonic and Livonian orders arrived until 1945, 
Belarus directly bordered on Prussia, which played an important role in involv-
ing Belarusian cities in the economic space of the civilization of the Medieval 
West through the activities of Hansa, Magdeburg Law, Reformation, and Haska-
lu. During the Renaissance and the Reformation, a meeting of M. Luther and F. 
Skorina took place. The initiator of the Reformation wanted to collaborate with 
a Belarusian book publisher. Young people from Belarus began to receive edu-
cation at universities in Prussia. Educational migration especially intensified af-
ter the university was opened in Koenigsberg in 1544. The territory of Germany 
has become a translator of European legal culture to Belarus. 
Jewish communities moved from Prussia to Belarus. In their midst, a 
mechanism for dialogue with brethren in European cities was created. By the 
17th century, Jews were drawn into the intellectual space of Europe. This in-
volvement was expressed in the phenomenon of Jewish Enlightenment (Haska-
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lu). Berlin became the center of this movement, where the talent of M. Mendels-
sohn and his supporter D. Friedlander manifested. A movement in tune with the 
Enlightenment also emerged among the Jewish communities of Belarus. Its rep-
resentatives were Boruch Schick and Solomon Maimon. 
Borukh Shik was born in Shklov in a family of rabbis. His maternal grand-
father was one of the most prominent rabbis of the 18th century. Boruch re-
ceived his primary rabbinical education from his father, a former rabbi of 
Shklov, for about 20 years. In 1764, he became a rabbi. The pursuit of 
knowledge prompted him to go to England and become a doctor. Then he came 
to Berlin, where he met with the founders of the Haskala movement - M. Men-
delssohn, D. Friedlander and N. G. Wessel (Wiesel). These people supported his 
enlightenment publishing, in the framework of which he published manuscripts 
on medicine, astronomy. However, he remained an Orthodox Jew. In his books, 
there is a criticism of A. de Rossi for not following exactly the ideas of the Sag-
es of the Talmud about nature. In 1778, B. Schick left Berlin. He returned to his 
homeland. The reason for leaving was criticism from the participants of the Ber-
lin Haskala. It consisted in the fact that B. Shik did not use material on the cows 
circulation of W. Harvey in publications, nor did he give a description of the 
system of N. Copernicus. 
B. Shik took advantage of cooperation with the merchant and scientist I. 
Tseytlin, who created a scientific institution with laboratories in his estate of 
Ustye near the city of Cherikov. Subsequently, B. Schick devoted himself to the 
service of the Radziwills in Slutsk. Such a native of Belarus as Solomon Hyman 
took part in the Haskala movement. He was born and raised in Belarus. His 
grandfather and father were hereditary tenants of the estate in the Radziwill es-
tates. His father was a rabbi. S. Hyman described his childhood years in an au-
tobiographical work. Maimon he became impressed by the philosophy of Mai-
monides. S. Maimon began his studies at the age of six with the book of Gene-
sis, the Talmud followed. In addition to religious literature, he secretly studied 
in Hebrew the writings of Josephus Flavius, the book of David Hans, "Tsemah 
David." He learned about the existence of mathematics and astronomy.  
Under the influence of the book he read, he constructed the armillary 
sphere. Memories of S. Maimon about the school of this city are not the best. 
Then there was a study at a Jewish school in the city of Ivenets. The study was 
successful. By the age of eleven, S. Maimon had a reputation as an outstanding 
Talmudist. He soon became a married man. He had a family. He was a rabbi. 
But he wanted to have versatile knowledge. To do this, one should study the 
languages that provided access to scientific publications. He noted that some 
books have pagination in both Hebrew and Latin letters. It was a way to learn 
German. 
In parallel, S. Maimon studied Kabbalistic books taken from a neighbor. 
He read Maimonides' Guide to the Perplexed. As a result, I came to the conclu-
sion that the Kabbalistic descriptions of the Creation of the World do not imply 
a temporal sequence, but a chain of causes and effects. This gave reason to S. 
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Maimon to interpret Kabbalah as an expanded Spinozism. Ten Sefirot S. Mai-
mon identified with ten categories of Aristotle. 
Within Belarus, S. Maimon found a rabbi, a native of Germany, who had 
German books. He gave him several books, of which the most important was a 
book on optics. In 1776, S. Maimon arrived in Koenigsberg. He was recom-
mended to go to Berlin. The trip took five weeks. But he was expelled from Ber-
lin. In 1780 he again arrived in Berlin. He enlisted the support of M. Mendels-
sohn. But it was not enough because of the conflicting behavior of S. Maimon 
himself. He leaves Berlin and leaves for the Netherlands. In Amsterdam, his be-
havior was not the best because of drunkenness. He left the Netherlands and re-
turned to Germany to Hamburg. He studied at a local gymnasium in 1783-1785. 
After returning to Berlin, he lost the support of M. Mendelssohn. He died in 
1786. Kantian Lazarus Bendavid introduced S. Maimon to a local philanthropist. 
The philosophical position of S. Maimon was formed by Spinozism. The mate-
rial support of the representatives of Berlin Haskala allowed him to rent an 
apartment and to study Immanuel Kant's “Critique of Pure Reason”. He wrote a 
paper on transcendental philosophy. 
He accompanied the critical analysis of the book with a letter from Marcus 
Hertz. I. Kant praised the work of S. Maimon and sent him a letter. Subsequent 
correspondence did not take place. The philosopher from Koenigsberg did not 
want to discuss his own work anymore. In 1791, the intellectual community of 
Germany got the opportunity to get acquainted with a number of works by S. 
Maimon. In the years 1793-1794 he wrote books: “On progress in philosophy”, 
“Research on the new logic and theory of thinking”, three comments on the 
work of Aristotle, Bacon, an annotated translation of Pemberton's book on New-
tonian physics. 
“An essay on transcendental philosophy with an introduction to symbolic 
knowledge and notes” is S. Maimon's main philosophical work. It was on the 
basis of this work that G. Fichte became established. The continuation of this 
work was "Critical studies of the human spirit or the highest ability of 
knowledge and will." Criton expounds the thoughts of Kant and Reingold, and 
Philalet Maimon. An important step was the "Philosophical Dictionary, or the 
coverage of the most important subjects of philosophy in alphabetical order." It 
gives precise definitions of philosophical concepts in alphabetical order. The 
work was written in Berlin in 1791. The controversy with K.L. Reinhold S. 
Maimon outlined his philosophical position briefly and clearly in his work “Ar-
istotle's Categories, Interpreted in the Notes and Outlined as Propaedeutics to a 
New Theory of Thinking”. The book was published in Berlin in 1794. 
S. Maimon also continued to write in Hebrew. In 1791 he wrote a commen-
tary on Maimonides' Guide to the Perplexed. The book makes an attempt to in-
troduce into the Jewish philosophical tradition the themes of new European phi-
losophy. In this context, the medieval views of Maimonides are considered from 
the point of view of Newtonian physics and the critical philosophy of Kant, the 
Copernican system. This is the first Hebrew book on a new philosophy. The 
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book includes a radical Aristotelian commentary by Moshe Narboni not yet 
printed. The book was reprinted three times in the 19th century. The book "De-
sire of Solomon" It was written by S. Maimon in 1778. It consists of five sepa-
rate parts. A 300-page manuscript is kept in Jerusalem. Three parts include 
comments on medieval authors: Rabbeinu Nissim, Abraham Ibn Ezra, Bahia ibn 
Pekuda. The book includes a textbook of algebra and a text on the possibility of 
combining Kabbalah with the philosophy of Maimonides [40]. Another book, 
“Secrets of Wisdom,” was written by S. Maimon in 1786. This is a Hebrew trea-
tise on Newtonian physics. 
Under the influence of B. Spinoza S. Maimon distanced himself from the 
practical commandments of the Jewish religion. He refused to support prejudice. 
S. Maimon was well acquainted with the philosophical works of B. Spinoza, D. 
Hume and G. Leibniz. He saw his task in creating an integrated philosophical 
theory based on already created philosophical systems. This integrated theory 
reflects the position of critical skepticism. It combines the systems of I. Kant 
and D. Hume. Regarding the thing-in-itself, S. Maimon had the opinion that it 
does not exist.  
He proposed a theory according to which the knowable object is in con-
sciousness from the very beginning as an indefinite consciousness, and when 
cognized, it passes into a certain consciousness. As a result, cognition becomes 
rational. It has stages similar to the sum of series of infinitesimal quantities. S. 
Maimon coined the term "differential of a certain consciousness." He used an 
analogy with the terms of differential calculus. He uses the analogue of the 
summation of a series, through which one can come to full knowledge infinitely 
close, as an irrational number. Knowing objects outside of consciousness will 
always be fundamentally incomplete. Moreover, the difference between full and 
partial consciousness is not fundamental. 
S. Maimon proceeds from the fact that formal logic is connected with met-
aphysics and objects of the world. Transcendental logic creates knowledge of 
the subject. S. Maimon calls such thinking activity real thinking. Only in a priori 
thinking are synthetic judgments possible. In their semiotic space there is a uni-
fication of heterogeneous elements into one object of consciousness, when one 
element can be thought without the other, but not vice versa. A line and a 
straight line relate to each other in a similar way. Their relation is the relation of 
definable and definition. As a result of thinking, it is dominated by the principle 
of certainty. 
Space and time are not created by human consciousness. They are given to 
him a priori. They can only be definable, but not a definition. It was important to 
reconstruct the processes of applicability of reasonable forms of cognition to da-
ta in feelings of objects. S. Maimon formulated an epistemological form of 
mind-body problem. As part of the solution to this problem, he argues that sen-
sory cognition and intellectual cognition differ only in degree. Despite the quan-
titative differences, they are characterized by unity.  
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This illustrates an example of studying a mathematical object. At first, the 
object is represented in the sensual imagination as a figure bounded by three 
lines. The mind realizes that three angles follow from this. Turning to the lan-
guage of theology, S. Maimon uses the interpretation of bible verses by Mai-
monides. In his opinion, the verse that God stands at the top of Jacob’s ladder 
means that human knowledge seeks infinite knowledge. The similarity of God to 
man according to Genesis 1:26 mean that human knowledge is similar to Divine, 
adjusted for finiteness. Reasonable forms, understand themselves. Intelligence, 
which is the cause of these forms, coincides with knowledge. The operation of 
knowledge is the knowledge of oneself. 
S. Maimon recognized not only the a priori status of space and time, but al-
so their subject status. In this position, he is close to G. Leibniz. S. Maimon used 
mathematical concepts to illustrate philosophical reflections. I was impressed by 
reading the works of Leonard Euler. As you progress in the knowledge of a 
mathematical object, intuition and concepts come closer. Man attains infinite 
knowledge when synthetic judgments turn into analytical judgments. S. Maimon 
had a position in the subject area of ethics. The subject of his criticism was the 
views of I. Kant. In his opinion, the categorical imperative is only a compulsion, 
but not a moral obligation. Instead of the imperative, he proposed another relia-
ble foundation of morality. This is the universal desire of people for truth, 
which, in turn, is based on the desire to verify human ideas. 
The criterion of the truth of the act is universal agreement. The mind de-
termines how to perform this action. In this context, the death penalty will be 
morally permissible only if the convict himself agrees with its necessity. The 
target cause is eudemony, achieved by acquiring true knowledge. S. Maimon 
devoted a special work “On Symbolic Knowledge and Philosophical Language” 
to the substantiation of the thesis that philosophy is a science of the structure of 
language. S. Maimon, despite the complex nature and lack of university educa-
tion, has become part of the philosophical tradition of Germany and Europe. He 
was admired by G. Fichte.  
The influence of S. Maimon was discovered in the works of Hegel. There 
was a period when his philosophy was forgotten. Interest revived in her in the 
XIX century. The merit belongs to I. Erdman, V. Dilthey and K. Fischer. S. 
Feiminger, E. Cassirer, H. Bergman, G. Cohen, T. Adorno, F. Roszweig, H. Ar-
endt, M. Frank addressed the philosophy of S. Maimon. 
In the United Kingdom, his work was studied by Shadworth Hodgson. He 
wrote about this in the book Philosophy of Reflection. Of the Jewish scholars, 
Rabbi Yosef Dov Soloveichik quotes S. Maimon’s comments about Maimoni-
des, and also mentions S. Maimon and G. Cohen in the notes to his work, “The 
Man of Halacha”. He included his commentary in the list of literature that must 
be read for students of the course on the “Guide of the Perplexed”. 
Halaxi became an important phenomenon that integrated Belarus into the 
intellectual space of Europe and created a stable tradition of the influence of I. 
Kant's philosophy on the intellectuals of Eastern Europe. 
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In the distribution of Kantianism through students is I.G. Abicht. He taught 
in Vilnius from 1814. Before arriving in Vilnius, he had a fairly high status as a 
researcher and a post of professor at Erlangen University. The Berlin Academy 
of Sciences praised his work, "The Progress of Metaphysics from Leibniz to 
Wolf." Under the influence of lectures I.G. Abicht advocated the philosophy of 
I. Kant became K. Schirm, L. Rozvadovsky, J. Bobrovsky and M. Massonius. 
Kantianism adhered to Yu.U. Bykhovets, who, while studying at the University 
of Koenigsberg, listened to I. Kant's lectures. 
Under the influence of the philosophy of the German philosopher, the 
views of the native of Belarus professor of philosophy A. Dovgird were formed. 
He argued with the German philosopher on the basis of theology and sensualism 
of Locke, the Scottish school. In the fundamental work, A Treatise on the Rules 
inherent in Thinking, or Theoretical and Practical Logic, published in Polotsk in 
1828, he carried out a thorough analysis of I. Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. 
The subject of discussion was transcendental analytics, transcendental dialectics 
and transcendental aesthetics. 
 
12. Philosophy of the Marxism 
 
Marx summarized the materialistic aspect of his theory of history, other-
wise known as historical materialism (this term was coined by Engels and popu-
larised by Karl Kautsky and Georgi Plekhanov), in the 1859 preface to «A Con-
tribution to the Critique of Political Economy». 
In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into defi-
nite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of produc-
tion appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of 
production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic 
structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political su-
perstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. 
The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, 
political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines 
their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness. 
In this brief popularization of his ideas, Marx emphasized that social de-
velopment sprang from the inherent contradictions within material life and the 
social superstructure. This notion is often understood as a simple historical nar-
rative: primitive communism had developed into slave states. Slave states had 
developed into feudal societies. Those societies in turn became capitalist states, 
and those states would be overthrown by the self-conscious portion of their 
working-class, or proletariat, creating the conditions for socialism and, ultimate-
ly, a higher form of communism than that with which the whole process began. 
Marx illustrated his ideas most prominently by the development of capitalism 
from feudalism, and by the prediction of the development of socialism 
from capitalism. 
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The base-superstructure and stadialist formulations in the 1859 preface 
took on canonical status in the subsequent development of orthodox Marxism, in 
particular in dialectical materialism . They also gave way to a vulgar Marxism as 
plain economic determinism (economism), which has been criticized by vari-
ous Marxist theorists. The position of positivism with elements of Marxism was 
adhered to by A.A. Malinovsky. He published books under the pseudonym 
"Bogdanov." He represented one of the directions of Marxist thought, which 
sought to supplement the philosophy of Marxism with the provisions of empirio-
criticism developed by the Swiss philosopher R. Avenarius and the Austrian 
physicist E. Mach. 
A. Bogdanov was born in the family of a public teacher. He graduated with 
a gold medal from the classical gymnasium in Tula. In 1892 he entered the natu-
ral department of Moscow University. In 1894 he was expelled from the univer-
sity, for participating in a revolutionary organization. During his deportation to 
Tula, he conducts classes with Tula workers in the political economy of K. 
Marx, in the work of Capital. In 1897, he published The Short Course in Eco-
nomics, reprinted in 1899. In 1899, A. Bogdanov graduated from the medical 
faculty of Kharkov University. In 1901, his book “Cognition from a Historical 
Point of View” was published. The author was exiled to Vologda, where N. A. 
Berdyaev, A. V. Lunacharsky, B. V. Savinkov, B. A. Kistyakovsky were in ex-
ile subsequently one of the authors of the collection "Milestones". 
In 1904 A. Bogdanov left for Switzerland. In the main philosophical work 
of A. Bogdanov “Empiriomonism". He was sharply criticized by G. Plekhanov 
and V. Lenin in the book «Materialism and Empirio-criticism. Critical notes on 
one reactionary philosophy» A. Bogdanov, despite criticism, sought to update 
philosophical terminology, taking into account the achievements of modern sci-
ence and philosophy. 
Bogdanov can be considered the forerunner of organizational science, ex-
ploring social conditioning, mechanisms and functions of various types of hu-
man activity. The theses of this science are also formulated in “Tectology” - 
“General Organizational Science”, developed on the basis of the philosophy of 
empiriomonism. The first volume of General Organizational Science (Tectolo-
gy) was published at the beginning of 1912. In 1922, three parts of Tectology 
were published in Russian in Berlin in Russian. In 1926 and 1928 two volumes 
of Tectology are published in German. Tectology A. Bogdanov compared with 
mathematics.In parallel with Marxism and neo-Kantianism became widespread 
within Belarus. 
"Vulgar Marxism" was seen as little other than a variety of economic de-
terminism, with the alleged determination of the ideological superstructure by 
the economical infrastructure. However, this positivist reading, which mostly 
based itself on Engels' latter writings in an attempt to theorize scientific social-
ism (an expression coined by Engels) has been challenged by Marxist theorists, 
such as Antonio Gramsci or Althusser. 
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Some believe that Marx regarded them merely as a shorthand summary of 
his huge ongoing work-in-progress. These sprawling, voluminous notebooks 
that Marx put together for his research on political economy, particularly those 
materials associated with the study of "primitive communism" and pre-capitalist 
communal production, in fact, show a more radical turning "Hegel on his head" 
than heretofore acknowledged by most mainstream Marxists and Marxiologists. 
In lieu of the Enlightenment belief in historical progress and stages es-
poused by Hegel, Marx pursues in these research notes a decidedly empirical 
approach to analyzing historical changes and different modes of production, 
emphasizing without forcing them into a teleological paradigm the rich varieties 
of communal productions throughout the world and the critical importance of 
collective working-class antagonism in the development of capitalism. 
Moreover, Marx's rejection of the necessity of bourgeois revolution and 
appreciation of the obschina, the communal land system, in Russia in his letter 
to Vera Zasulich; respect for the egalitarian culture of North African Muslim 
commoners found in his letters from Algeria; and sympathetic and searching in-
vestigation of the global commons and indigenous cultures and practices in his 
notebooks, including the Ethnological Notebooks that he kept during his last 
years, all point to a historical Marx who was continuously developing his ideas 
until his deathbed and does not fit into any pre-existing ideological straitjacket. 
Some varieties of Marxist philosophy are strongly influenced by Hegel, 
emphasizing totality and even teleology: for example, the work of Georg Lu-
kács, whose influence extends to contemporary thinkers like Fredric Jameson. 
Others consider "totality" merely another version of Hegel's "spirit," and thus 
condemn it as a crippling, secret idealism. 
Theodor Adorno, a leading philosopher of the Frankfurt School, who was 
strongly influenced by Hegel, tried to take a middle path between these ex-
tremes: Adorno contradicted Hegel's motto "the true is the whole" with his new 
version, "the whole is the false," but he wished to preserve critical theory as a 
negative, oppositional version of the utopia described by Hegel's spirit. Adorno 
believed in totality and human potential as ends to be striven for, but not as cer-
tainties. 
 
13. Neo-classical philosophy end 19 th-century 
 
Existentialism as a philosophical movement is properly a 20 th-
century movement, but its major antecedents, Søren Kierkegaard and Friedrich 
Nietzsche wrote long before the rise of existentialism. In the 1840s, academic 
philosophy in Europe, following Hegel, was almost completely divorced from 
the concerns of individual human life, in favour of pursuing abstract metaphysi-
cal systems. Kierkegaard sought to reintroduce to philosophy, in the spirit 
of Socrates: subjectivity, commitment, faith, and passion, all of which are a part 
of the human condition. 
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Like Kierkegaard, Nietzsche saw the moral values of 19 th-century Europe 
disintegrating into nihilism (Kierkegaard called it the leveling process). Nie-
tzsche attempted to undermine traditional moral values by exposing its founda-
tions. To that end, he distinguished between master and slave moralities, and 
claimed that man must turn from the meekness and humility of Europe's slave-
morality. Both philosophers are precursors to existentialism, among other ideas, 
for their importance on the "great man" against the age. Kierkegaard wrote of 
19th-century Europe, "Each age has its own characteristic depravity. Ours is 
perhaps not pleasure or indulgence or sensuality, but rather a dissolute pantheis-
tic contempt for the individual man." 
Auguste Comte, the self-professed founder of modern sociology, put for-
ward the view that the rigorous ordering of confirmable observations alone 
ought to constitute the realm of human knowledge. He had hoped to order the 
sciences in increasing degrees of complexity from mathematics, astronomy, 
physics, chemistry, biology, and a new discipline called "sociology", which is 
the study of the "dynamics and statics of society". 
The American philosophers Charles Sanders Peirce and William James de-
veloped the pragmatist philosophy in the late 19th century. The twilight years of 
the 19th century in Britain saw the rise of British idealism, a revival of interest 
in the works of Kant and Hegel. 
Transcendentalism was rooted in Immanuel Kant's transcendence and 
German idealism, led by Ralph Waldo Emerson and Henry David Thoreau. The 
main belief was in an ideal spiritual state that 'transcends' the physical and em-
pirical and is only realized through the individual's intuition, rather than through 
the doctrines of established religions. 
Sigismund Freud; was an Austrian neurologist and the founder of psychoa-
nalysis, a clinical method for treating psychopathology through dialogue be-
tween a patient and a psychoanalyst. Freud was born to Galician Jewish parents 
in the Moravian town of Freiberg, in the Austrian Empire. He qualified as a doc-
tor of medicine in 1881 at the University of Vienna. Upon completing 
his habilitation in 1885, he was appointed a docent in neuropathology and be-
came an affiliated professor in 1902. Freud lived and worked in Vienna, having 
set up his clinical practice there in 1886. In 1938 Freud left Austria to escape 
the Nazis. He died in exile in the United Kingdom in 1939. 
In creating psychoanalysis, Freud developed therapeutic techniques such as 
the use of free association and discovered transference, establishing its central 
role in the analytic process. Freud's redefinition of sexuality to include its infan-
tile forms led him to formulate the Oedipus complex as the central tenet of psy-
choanalytical theory. His analysis of dreams as wish-fulfillments provided him 
with models for the clinical analysis of symptom formation and the underlying 
mechanisms of repression. On this basis Freud elaborated his theory of 
the unconscious and went on to develop a model of psychic structure compris-
ing id, ego and super-ego. Freud postulated the existence of libido, an energy 
with which mental processes and structures are invested and which generates 
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erotic attachments, and a death drive, the source of compulsive repetition, hate, 
aggression and neurotic guilt. In his later work Freud developed a wide-ranging 
interpretation and critique of religion and culture. 
As such, it continues to generate extensive and highly contested debate 
with regard to its therapeutic efficacy, its scientific status, and whether it ad-
vances or is detrimental to the feminist cause. Nonetheless, Freud's work has 
suffused contemporary Western thought and popular culture. 
 
14. Philosophy of the postmodernism 
 
The most influential early postmodern philosophers were Jean 
Baudrillard, Jean-François Lyotard, and Jacques Derrida. Michel Foucault is al-
so often cited as an early postmodernist although he personally rejected that la-
bel. Following Nietzsche, Foucault argued that knowledge is produced through 
the operations of power, and changes fundamentally in different historical peri-
ods.  
The writings of Lyotard were largely concerned with the role of narrative 
in human culture, and particularly how that role has changed as we have left 
modernity and entered a "postindustrial" or postmodern condition. He argued 
that modern philosophies legitimized their truth-claims not (as they themselves 
claimed) on logical or empirical grounds, but rather on the grounds of accepted 
stories (or "metanarratives") about knowledge and the world—comparing these 
with Wittgenstein's concept of language-games.  
He further argued that in our postmodern condition, these metanarratives 
no longer work to legitimize truth-claims. He suggested that in the wake of the 
collapse of modern metanarratives, people are developing a new "language-
game"—one that does not make claims to absolute truth but rather celebrates a 
world of ever-changing relationships (among people and between people and the 
world). 
Derrida, the father of deconstruction, practiced philosophy as a form of tex-
tual criticism. He criticized Western philosophy as privileging the concept of 
presence and logos, as opposed to absence and markings or writings. 
In America, the most famous pragmatist and self-proclaimed postmodernist 
was Richard Rorty. An analytic philosopher, Rorty believed that combin-
ing Willard Van Orman Quine's criticism of the analytic-synthetic distinction 
with Wilfrid Sellars's critique of the "Myth of the Given" allowed for an aban-
donment of the view of the thought or language as a mirror of a reality or exter-
nal world.  
Further, drawing upon Donald Davidson's criticism of the dualism between 
conceptual scheme and empirical content, he challenges the sense of questioning 
whether our particular concepts are related to the world in an appropriate way, 
whether we can justify our ways of describing the world as compared with other 
ways. He argued that truth was not about getting it right or representing reality, 
but was part of a social practice and language was what served our purposes in a 
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particular time; ancient languages are sometimes untranslatable into modern 
ones because they possess a different vocabulary and are unuseful today. Donald 
Davidson is not usually considered a postmodernist, although he and Rorty have 
both acknowledged that there are few differences between their philosophies. 
 
15. Analytical philosophy 
 
The school of analytic philosophy has dominated academic philosophy in 
various regions, most notably Great Britain and the United States, since the early 
twentieth century. It originated around the turn of the twentieth century as G. E. 
Moore and Bertrand Russell broke away from what was then the dominant 
school in the British universities, Absolute Idealism. Many would also in-
clude Gottlob Frege as a founder of analytic philosophy in the late 19th century, 
and this controversial issue is discussed in section 2c. When Moore and Russell 
articulated their alternative to Idealism, they used a linguistic idiom, frequently 
basing their arguments on the “meanings” of terms and propositions.  
Additionally, Russell believed that the grammar of natural language often 
is philosophically misleading, and that the way to dispel the illusion is to re-
express propositions in the ideal formal language of symbolic logic, thereby re-
vealing their true logical form. Because of this emphasis on language, analytic 
philosophy was widely, though perhaps mistakenly, taken to involve a turn to-
ward language as the subject matter of philosophy, and it was taken to involve 
an accompanying methodological turn toward linguistic analysis. Thus, on the 
traditional view, analytic philosophy was born in this linguistic turn. The lin-
guistic conception of philosophy was rightly seen as novel in the history of phi-
losophy. For this reason analytic philosophy is reputed to have originated in a 
philosophical revolution on the grand scale—not merely in a revolt against Brit-
ish Idealism, but against traditional philosophy on the whole. 
Analytic philosophy underwent several internal micro-revolutions that di-
vide its history into five phases. The first phase runs approximately from 1900 to 
1910. It is characterized by the quasi-Platonic form of realism initially endorsed 
by Moore and Russell as an alternative to Idealism. Their realism was expressed 
and defended in the idiom of “propositions” and “meanings,” so it was taken to 
involve a turn toward language. But its other significant feature is its turn away 
from the method of doing philosophy by proposing grand systems or broad syn-
theses and its turn toward the method of offering narrowly focused discussions 
that probe a specific, isolated issue with precision and attention to detail. By 
1910, both Moore and Russell had abandoned their propositional realism - 
Moore in favor of a realistic philosophy of common sense, Russell in favor of a 
view he developed with Ludwig Wittgenstein called logical atomism.  
The turn to logical atomism and to ideal-language analysis characterizes 
the second phase of analytic philosophy, approximately 1910-1930. The third 
phase, approximately 1930-1945, is characterized by the rise of logical positiv-
ism, a view developed by the members of the Vienna Circle and popularized by 
74 
 
the British philosopher A. J. Ayer. The fourth phase, approximately 1945-1965, 
is characterized by the turn to ordinary-language analysis, developed in various 
ways by the Cambridge philosophers Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Wisdom, 
and the Oxford philosophers Gilbert Ryle, John Austin, Peter Strawson, and 
Paul Grice. 
During the 1960s, criticism from within and without caused the analytic 
movement to abandon its linguistic form. Linguistic philosophy gave way to the 
philosophy of language, the philosophy of language gave way to metaphysics, 
and this gave way to a variety of philosophical sub-disciplines. Thus the fifth 
phase, beginning in the mid 1960s and continuing beyond the end of the twenti-
eth century, is characterized by eclecticism or pluralism. This post-linguistic an-
alytic philosophy cannot be defined in terms of a common set of philosophical 
views or interests, but it can be loosely characterized in terms of its style, which 
tends to emphasize precision and thoroughness about a narrow topic and to 
deemphasize the imprecise or cavalier discussion of broad topics. 
Even in its earlier phases, analytic philosophy was difficult to define in 
terms of its intrinsic features or fundamental philosophical commitments. Con-
sequently, it has always relied on contrasts with other approaches to philoso-
phy—especially approaches to which it found itself fundamentally opposed—to 
help clarify its own nature. Initially, it was opposed to British Idealism, and then 
to "traditional philosophy" at large. Later, it found itself opposed both to classi-
cal Phenomenology (for example, Husserl) and its offspring, such as Existential-
ism (Sartre, Camus, and so forth) and also "Continental"’ or "Postmodern" phi-
losophy (Heidegger, Foucault and Derrida). Though classical Pragmatism bears 
some similarity to early analytic philosophy, especially in the work of C. S. 
Peirce and C. I. Lewis, the pragmatists are usually understood as constituting a 
separate tradition or school. 
Nikolai Rozhin taught at the Belarusian State University. He was in the 
subject area of the history of philosophy. Thanks to his knowledge of history, he 
was able to see continuity in the intellectual tradition of analytical philosophy. 
The monograph “The Problem of Objective Reliability of Knowledge in Euro-
pean Philosophy (from R. Descartes to L. Wittgenstein)” became fundamental. 
The monograph focuses on the fact that human consciousness is determined by 
cultural practices and that, despite its modern content, analytical philosophy 
continues the Kantian tradition of constructing knowledge based on a priori cat-
egorial structures. 
W. Sellers in the 60s of the twentieth century gave rise to the consideration 
of a very important conflict for analytical philosophy. It lies in the discrepancy 
between our usual understanding as subjects with an internal dimension, states 
and desires, and a scientific understanding of the world. It explains everything in 
terms of causal relationships, discrete processes, and universal mathematical 
science. Analytical philosophy found itself in the subject field of cognitive sci-
ences, in particular, neurophilosophy. It follows from this science that recent ad-
vances show that the emerging intellectual tradition is inadequate and needs a 
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scientific explanation that will provide a true picture of reality. Philosophers 
Paul and Patricia Churchland and Thomas Metzinger say that the true reality is 
neurobiological and that the cognizing subject is the brain that comprehends the 
world instead of me. The enactivism program partially resolves this contradic-
tion. 
Francisco Vareloi, Evan Thompson and Eleanor Roche within this direc-
tion, consciousness is explained from the perspective of the subject. Enactivism 
indicates that consciousness has a bodily character, is included in external inter-
actions and is the product of events beyond its control. As a result, the subject, 
understood as a reflective self-consciousness with internal space and events, is 
the result of processes of an immune, somatic and vegetative nature. Catherine 
Malaba holds the same position despite the fact that she does not consider her-
self an activist. 
K. Malabu offers neurobiological alterglobalism, which is based on an un-
derstanding of the brain associated with the connectionist program of neurosci-
ence. She sees the brain not as a command center, but as a network of processes 
distributed across a network. Such an understanding of neurobiology leads to the 
fact that we must not become flexible, but plastic, which provides the possibility 
of emancipation. The brain ceases to be an adaptable object, becoming an ac-
tively transforming subject. 
Plasticity is integrated with the concept of hardness, implying definiteness 
of form and imposing very strict restrictions on the ability to deform or change. 
Plasticity offers a more effective ability to transform in the form of movement 
from one certainty to another certainty. 
 
16. Philosophy of communication 
 
Philosophy of communication combines two ambiguous disciplines, phi-
losophy and communication. Communication is commonly said to be at the 
crossroads of many disciplines. Marshall McLuhan is taken for granted by many 
communication scholars, but he was a professor of English literature. What 
should one—or a theory—be or do to be said to fall within the communication 
umbrella? Tackling philosophy is not any easier. Many sociologists, anthropolo-
gists, semioticians, and linguists, as well as communication theorists, have been 
philosophers at some point in their career. For example, Ferdinand de Saussure’s 
contribution to semiotics is no lesser than C. S. Peirce’s, and yet the latter is 
called a philosopher while the first is a linguist.  
Should we, in this entry on the philosophy of communication include 
Peirce and leave aside Saussure? With so many ambiguities regarding commu-
nication and philosophy separately, how can one decide, then, what philosophy 
of communication should be? When reading communication studies articles, 
philosophical references range from Aristotle and Arendt to Kierkegaard or 
Levinas, along with some more obviously communication or language thinkers 
such as Habermas or Wittgenstein. There is therefore an important element of 
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decision on our part in assessing the contributions of some authors to the study 
of communication and in deciding whether it is philosophical in nature.  
We chose to look at where communication studies literature has drawn the 
line between what constitutes philosophy or not. Furthermore, there are few 
journals devoted to philosophy of communication proper, perhaps with the ex-
ception of Empedocles: European Journal for the Philosophy of Communication 
and the International Communication Association’s Communication, Culture & 
Critique. This scarcity makes it harder to identify a well-established set of inter-
ests, theories, and methods. That is why this article is divided mainly according 
to the types of works discussed, rather than attempting to find coherence where 
there is in fact little.  
Philosophy of communication is fragmented among different streams, some 
focusing on language, others on communication proper, and yet some others on 
a relatively new effort to formalize a “philosophy of information.” Regarding 
this last trend, Adriaans and van Benthem 2008 acknowledges, much like Floridi 
2004, that philosophy of information is still a nascent discipline and that, there-
fore, the essays collected aim not so much at describing an established field as to 
establish it performatively, especially by distinguishing it from its immediate 
neighbors, such as philosophy of language. Arneson 2007, for its part, is a good 
representation of the work being currently done in philosophy of communication 
as such.  
The word “concise” in the title of the encyclopedia Barber and Stainton 
2010 is misleading: its 836 pages cover everything one needs to know in the phi-
losophy of linguistics, from “A Priori Knowledge” to “Verificationism”, and in-
cludes entries as varied as “Description and Prescription” (G. Nelson), “Presup-
position” (P. A. M. Seuren), and “Systematicity” (P. Robbins). Giving a broader 
perspective, Chang and Butchart 2012 answers an important demand in teaching 
philosophy of communication: the editors put together some of the most im-
portant foundational texts of the field in a single book. As the editors remark in 
their introduction, some people may feel that the volume’s title, Philosophy of 
Communication, projects a coherence in what is in fact a collection of unrelated 
texts - how would, for example, Deleuze feel to be included in a communication 
anthology?  
As discussed in the Introduction, choosing what constitutes communica-
tion, philosophy, and a fortiori is no easy task. The genius of Chang and 
Butchart lies in having made the exercise explicit, and the very selection of texts 
reflects the variety of takes at the issue. Mangion 2011 also offers a compelling 
review of the major authors of philosophy of communication, and each author’s 
core concepts are explicated within his or her thought (for example, Peirce’s ex-
istential graphs are well situated within his logic and semiotics). 
The Theory of Communicative Action  is a two-volume 1981 book 
by Jürgen Habermas, in which Habermas continues his project of finding a way 
to ground "the social sciences in a theory of language", which had been set out 
in On the Logic of the Social Sciences(1967). The two volumes are Reason and 
77 
 
the Rationalization of Society (Handlungsrationalität und gesellschaftliche Ra-
tionalisierung), in which Habermas establishes a concept of communicative ra-
tionality, and Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason (Zur 
Kritik der funktionalistischen Vernunft), in which Habermas creates the two 
level concept of society and lays out the critical theory for modernity. 
 After writing «The Theory of Communicative Action», Habermas expand-
ed upon the theory of communicative action by using it as the basis of his theory 
of morality, democracy, and law. The work has inspired many responses by so-
cial theorists and philosophers, and in 1998 was listed by the International Soci-
ological Association as the eighth most important sociological book of the 20th 
century. 
 
17. Synergetic 
 
New science of complexity, i.e. synergetics, is in the process of becoming 
widely appreciated now. Synergetics deals with cognition and explanation of 
complex structures, principles of their self-organization, generation of order 
from chaos, evolution and co-evolution. Synergetics as an interdisciplinary re-
search field has far going applications to understanding of human being and de-
velopment of social systems. 
New science of complexity, i.e. synergetics, is in the process of becoming 
widely appreciated now. Synergetics deals with cognition and explanation of 
complex structures, principles of their self-organization, generation of order 
from chaos, evolution and co-evolution. Synergetics as an interdisciplinary re-
search field has far going applications to understanding of human being and de-
velopment of social systems. 
Synergetics as a field of scientific research has existed for over thirty years 
already. The term «synergetics» was introduced by the German scholar, Prof. 
H.Haken. It is widely used, but still not generally accepted. Instead, «theory of 
self-organization» is used as a more traditional term. In the last years two other 
terms «studies in complexity» and «theory of chaos» became widely circulated. 
Sometimes they are used as identical with the former two, and sometimes only 
partly overlap with them. 
Synergetics can be considered as a modern stage of development within the 
traditions of cybernetics (N.Wiener, W.R.Ashby) and system-structural analysis 
(attempts to elaborate the general theory of systems). However, many elements 
of the latter have undergone further essential reformation. While cybernetics in-
vestigates the functioning of complex systems using an abstract model of «black 
box», synergetics studies some physical mechanisms of the complex structures 
formation, i.e. it tries to look into the «black box». While cybernetics elaborates 
algorithms and methods of control of systems, synergetics investigates the pro-
cesses of self-controlling and self-organization of complex systems in the world. 
The focus of synergetic research program is to reveal some general laws of 
self-organization and evolution which are common to processes of quite differ-
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ent nature: physical, chemical, biological, psychological, social. As such syner-
getics contains an open trend towards universalization and directly borders on 
philosophy whose aim is to deal with the ultimate features and laws of reality. 
General line of synergetic research consists mostly of two elements: from a con-
crete, but fundamental model of processes to interdisciplinary generalizations 
and back to concrete subject with its rectified theoretical understanding. Accord-
ingly, synergetics functions as applied synergetics and synergetics proper. 
The whole history of development of the theory of self-organization shows 
that significant theoretical generalizations appeared from rather narrow, but fun-
damental scientific results. The non-equilibrium thermodynamics and the theory 
of dissipative structures developed by the Brussels school of the Nobel prize 
winner (1977) I.Prigogine had its background in investigation of processes in 
physical chemistry. The development of the theory of cooperative behaviour, 
made by H.Haken and called synergetics proper, originated from the investiga-
tions of the coherent radiation of lasers. Lasers became a paradigmatic example 
of synergetics. H.Haken is an editor of a Springer series of books on synergetics 
(already more than 60 volumes) presenting a whole spectrum of synergetic de-
velopments in the world. 
As one of other examples of natural science stating point of for further gen-
eralizations up to a worldview one can mention the investigation of nonlinear 
auto-waves as early as in the 1930′s by the Russian school of L.I.Mandelshtam 
and A.Andronov. 
Some astonishing results have been obtained recently by the Moscow syn-
ergetic school at the Keldysh Institute of Applied Mathematics (Russian Acad-
emy of Sciences) led by S.P.Kurdyumov with whom I have been collaborating 
for more then 10 years. The basic model is here a certain class of nonlinear 
equations describing evolutionary processes of burning in very fast, so-called 
blow-up and regimes in dissipative media. The model implies a profound sense. 
Some general features of the complex systems behaviour are being revealed, 
namely: mechanisms of localization processes (structures formation) in open 
dissipative media, spectra of structure-attractors as the most stable formations 
which evolutionary processes in such media go to; methods of resonant excita-
tion of structure-attractors; way of a complex whole construction from parts 
(structures) developing with different speeds. 
It’s worth mentioning some other trends in the studies of complexity, chaos 
and self-organization. E.Laszlo, President of the International Society for the 
Systems Sciences and a Member of the Club of Rome, is involved in finding 
ways of a transdisciplinary unified theory construction. The American scholar 
B.Mandelbrot elaborates the so-called theory of deterministic chaos, various 
scenarios of transition to chaos and back. The Chilian biologists H.Maturana and 
F.Varela introduced the notion of autopoiesis which, in their opinion, describes a 
fundamental ability of living beings to permanently maintain their organization 
and to develop.  
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F.Varela is working now in Paris and develops the theory of autopoiesis 
and its application to the human brain activities. The other scholar working in 
Paris E.Morin, a founder of Association of Complex Thinking (Association de la 
Pensee Complexe), has undertaken profound analyses of the very language of 
complexity and chaos. There are many other researchers fruitfully working in 
the fields. All these trends are coloured in specific tones of the original disci-
plines, e.g. mathematics, physics, chemistry or biology. 
Synergetics reveals the creative role of chaos in the process of origin of 
complex structures and their evolution. Chaos and fluctuations on micro-level 
play an essential role in determining actual trends, «aims» of processes at a mac-
ro-level. Chaos manifests itself as a mechanism underlying an exit to one of evo-
lutionary structure-attractors. The macro-organization evolves from a disorder, 
chaos on micro-level. Dissipative processes, which are a macroscopic revelation 
of micro-chaos, act in the same way as a sculptor’s chisel shapes a statue from a 
block of marble. One of the most essential questions is that of the trends of evo-
lution: where do evolutionary processes go to? How does history flow on?  
The future states of complex systems escape our control and prediction. 
The future is open, not unequivocal. But at the same time, the spectra of «pur-
poses» of development are available in open nonlinear systems. If we choose an 
arbitrary way of evolution, we have to be aware that the way may be not feasible 
in a given system. Only a definite set of evolutionary ways, evolutionary struc-
ture-attractors can develop. Figuratively speaking, there is «a tacit knowledge» 
of the system itself. The spectra are determined exclusively by the inner proper-
ties of open nonlinear systems. Thus, the future is open in the form of spectra of 
pre-determined possibilities. 
Complexity is closely connected with speed (tempo) of evolution. A com-
plex structure is an integration of structures of «different ages», i.e. structures at 
different evolutionary stages of development. The principles of integration of 
such structures of «different ages» into an evolutionary whole structure are be-
ing revealed in synergetics. The integration of relatively simple structures into a 
more complex one occurs through the establishment of a common tempo of de-
velopment in all unified parts (fragments, simple structures). Structures of «dif-
ferent ages» start to co-exist in one and the same ‘tempo-world’. The term ‘tem-
po-world’ proposed here signifies ‘a world having a certain rate (tempo) of de-
velopment’. Rate of development is the most important characteristic in the 
process of assembling of a complex evolutionary whole. 
Synergetics goes beyond the framework of strict mathematical models and 
narrow applications. Scholars are trying now to apply synergetics not only to 
new fields of natural sciences, but also to the humanities. There are some at-
tempts to use synergetic models in understanding human artistic and scientific 
creativity, cognition, health, education, communication, humankind develop-
ment, etc. Although it is very difficult to use synergetic models here in a quanti-
tative way, a general qualitative synergetic view allow us to reveal some unusual 
features of the human individual and his collective life. 
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Synergetics is optimistic in its essence. In the modern situation of acceler-
ated and unstable development of the world, synergetics brings us new hopes. It 
is an optimistic attempt to understand the principles of co-evolution of the com-
plex social systems, to reveal causes of evolutionary crises, instability and chaos 
and to master the methods of nonlinear management of complex systems in un-
stable states. How to manage a complex system without harsh management is 
the major problem. How can we push the system in a favourable (for the sub-
ject) evolutionary path with a small resonant influence? How can we provide a 
self-maintaining and sustainable development? Synergetics can serve as a heu-
ristic instrument in searches of answers to the questions. 
The synergetic approach to a human being is a new approach to individual 
and collective health (socio-therapy). Healing acquires a metaphorical image of 
«self-opening», «returning to self». It is a kind of «synergetic adventure» of a 
human being when the latent attitudes (structures-attractors) to a favourable and 
healthy future are being revealed in the human. It is discovering some self-
maintaining paths and inner forces to follow them. From a synergetic point of 
view it is possible to discuss the following questions: Is it healthy to be chaotic? 
What are the causes of the efficiency of weak influences such as homeopathic or 
acupunctural? Is it possible to be psychically healthy and to have simultaneously 
a somatic disease? 
The synergetic approach to education, synergetics of education, can be 
characterized as a gestalt-education. The procedure of education, a way of con-
nection between a teacher and a pupil, is not a transfer of knowledge from one 
head to another. It is neither an enlightenment nor rendering of some already 
discovered truths. This is a nonlinear situation of an open dialogue with an in-
termediate feedback, a joint educational adventure. This is falling — in course 
of solving some problems — into one and the same self-concordant tempo-
world. The latter means that due to common activity the teacher and the pupil 
begin to develop with the same rate. 
The educational procedure consists simply in awakening of the forces and 
abilities of a given pupil and in stimulating progress on his or her own paths of 
development. The gestalt-education is an initiating education, reopening of our-
selves, collaboration with ourselves and with other people. It is a way to discov-
er the reality as well as to search paths into the future. 
 
18. Philosophical traditions of the Belarus 
 
The intellectual tradition of Belarus was formed by the logistics factors of 
the Great Silk Road in the framework of the dialogue between the West and the 
East. This logistics has created the practice of interaction between the intellectu-
al elite of Belarus and the centers of ancient philosophy located on the territory 
of the Byzantine Empire. The eastern part of the Roman Empire existed until 
1453. Its ideology was formed by the Christianity of the eastern rite. From west 
to east, she connected Italy and China through trade routes. From north to south 
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in Constantinople passed the logistics of the trade route from the Baltic Sea re-
gion. Part of this logistics was Belarus. 
The route from Scandinavia to Constantinople on the territory of Belarus 
had several transit logistics. Along the Pripyat and Bug rivers, the Dnieper river 
logistics was connected with the Vistula river logistics with access to the Baltic 
Sea. This integrated logistics with dragging elements was used to transport am-
ber from the coast of the Baltic Sea towards the Mediterranean. The river logis-
tics along the Pripyat rive with the subsequent exit to the Neman River and the 
Baltic Sea was subordinated to the tasks of the amber road. 
Another trade route ran along the rivers Pripyat, Sluch, Goryn and Dnie-
ster. He ensured the delivery of amber to the shores of the Black Sea. The con-
trol over the trade routes of the logistics of the Great Silk Road, concentrated in 
Constantinople, in Belarus was carried out by the Turov and Polotsk principali-
ties. In the capitals of these principalities, on the basis of the influence of the 
Greek thought of the Romey (Byzantine) empire, the intellectual tradition of 
Belarus was formed. Intellectual and spiritual borrowing fell on a bright period 
in the development of Greek thought in the Byzantine Empire, associated with 
the functioning of the school of the University of Constantinople. The main role 
in the formation of this school was played by Mikhail Psel and his follower John 
Ital. The school was represented by Eustratius of Nice, Nikolai Methonsky. 
Within the framework of the school, a synthesis of Aristotelian logic and Platon-
ic metaphysics was carried out. 
Representative communities of Greeks were in the capitals of the Belarus-
ian principalities. There was no exception Turov. Here the formation of K. 
Turovsky took place. In Polotsk, the intellectual tradition was formed by E. 
Polotskaya. Their predecessor was K. Smolyatich. While in Kiev at the episco-
pal service, he had direct contact with representatives of the large diaspora of the 
Greeks of Byzantine Christian rationalism (humanism). 
This direction was formed on the basis of the activities of the Alexandrian 
and Antioch theological schools thanks to the works of Justin the Philosopher 
(Martyr), Athenagoras, Tatian, John Chrysostom. The Cappadocians (Basil the 
Great of Caesarea, Gregory of Nyssa) integrated the ancient intellectual tradition 
of education into Christian rationalism. The Areopagite used philosophical cate-
gories to uncover the essence of divine revelation. In the same context, the 
works of I. Damaskin wrote. Thanks to the efforts of Gregory Palamas, Chris-
tian rationalism was transformed into Christian Orthodox humanism. In this 
form, it was perceived in the middle Ages in Belarus. 
The first philosophical texts of Belarusian thinkers correspond to the genre 
of theological discourse. This discourse was developed in Alexandria. Here a 
synthesis of Jewish and Christian traditions with ancient philosophy took place. 
In Alexandria there was a significant Jewish community, a rich intellectual tradi-
tion of translating works into Greek. Since Christianity was based on the author-
ity of texts, the result was the Bible, as well as the understanding that theology 
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and philosophy should be connected. Christianity was positioned as a religion of 
an educated society. 
Aristotle's philosophy was most consistent with this thesis. Its adoption was 
preceded by preparatory work related to the synthesis of theological and philo-
sophical discourses. This synthesis occurred within the Roman Empire. In its 
western part, the Latin language prevailed. Changes in understanding the content 
of theological discourse were introduced by A. M. S. Boethius. He justified the 
idea that the knowledge of free sciences contributes to the understanding of 
scripture. The first group of free sciences includes grammar, rhetoric, dialectics 
(trivium). The second group of free sciences included arithmetic, geometry, as-
tronomy, music (quadrivium). They were more relevant to the natural sciences. 
In the eastern part of the Roman Empire, theological discourse was devel-
oped in Greek. An exceptional role was played by the works of D. Areopogit. 
They were presented in 532 at the Church of Constantinople. They examined the 
concepts of God, faith, Christ, the Trinity, the One, predetermination, the heav-
enly hierarchy, the church hierarchy, the divine name, the knowledge of God, 
emotion. I. Damaskin in the works “Holy Parallels”, “On the Nature of Man”, 
“Three Words against Denying Icons”, “Source of Knowledge” substantiated the 
aesthetic theory of visual perception of the Christian cult. Painting, artistic im-
ages exist to display the essential side of theological premises. 
The high level of literacy of the population of Belarus led to the choice in 
favor of a model of Christian rationalism. Textual resources were viewed in the 
broad context of deep meanings that needed to be found through the Bible. For 
this reason, an important role was given to the interpretation of the texts of the 
Bible in the genres of allegory, parables, prayers, teachings. Such forms created 
an opportunity to expand the text space of the Bible. Most clearly K. Smolyatich 
coped with this task. He became one of the first creators of the theological cul-
ture of educated rationalism. 
K. Smolyatich was born in Eastern Belarus. He lived at the turn of the XI – 
XII centuries. He held the post of Metropolitan of Kiev. Several of his works 
have been preserved. They focus on the text of the Bible. Particular emphasis is 
placed on the discovery of underlying deep content that is not directly readable. 
The mystical and theological emphasis is connected with the consideration of 
the principle of predestination and its role in solving the problem of sinfulness 
and salvation. 
Ethical topics are investigated. She focuses on condemning the abuse of 
material interests. Wealth should not dominate as the goal of life. Moreover, 
wealth should not be confused with fame. The believer has the right to it. This 
reasoning was focused on the educated part of society, which needed to under-
stand the relationship between modesty and social activity. 
K. Smolyatich considers it possible, during Christian reflection, to appeal 
to ancient wisdom, since there one can find content acceptable for Christianity. 
This justification was promoted by the principle of divine predestination. It fol-
lowed that everything existing in the world is expedient, including ancient wis-
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dom. K. Smolyatich developed the concept of biblical studies, according to 
which the advantage when working with scripture texts should be given to the 
figurative and symbolic method. This method allows the use of biblical stories 
in order to detect the meanings hidden in them. The text must not only be able to 
read, but also used to enrich your own spiritual world. In such circumstances, 
the mind gets an opportunity for intellectual work. Ethical aspects of human life 
are associated with faith, love, patience, mercy. A person should not sacrifice 
the body. Asceticism should be combined with the physical existence of the in-
dividual in the social space. 
In his thoughts K. Smolyatich refers to the works of Aristotle and Plato. 
Preference is given to Aristotle. The key concept of the Epistle to St. Thomas is 
God, because everything in the world is supported by divine power. God sees 
everything, wisely leads people, directs them and gives a guarantee of salvation. 
A believer, as K. Smolyatich shows, can recognize a being of the highest depth 
of Scripture through metaphorical comparisons, stories. 
Mental abilities play a large role in strengthening faith. They need to be 
developed recognizing the world created by God. Through the results of divine 
creative works, God himself is known. Feelings are related to faith. Their task is 
not cognitive. Thanks to the mind that cognizes the world, the essence of man 
masters the toponymy of being on Earth. 
The essence of life is hidden in this place name. It is visible to righteous 
believers and they adhere to it. It is visible to some, but they are not able to ad-
here to it. The problem lies in their ability not only to feel the presence of God, 
but also to use the freedom that God has given them. Christ gave people the op-
portunity to choose Grace through understanding the life path on Earth. Theo-
logical discourse is displayed in the space of anthropological topics. The believ-
er knows why he needs faith. 
Simultaneously with the activity of K. Smolyatich, the activity of K. 
Turovsky (1130-1193) took place. He was born in Turov, which was the center 
of the principality. There was a developed economy, education, and an extensive 
infrastructure of monasteries. The city had an intense relationship with Byzanti-
um. Cyril was born into a wealthy family. But he gave preference to spiritual ac-
tivity. He held high spiritual positions. Numerous of his works have survived to 
our time. Their source is the Bible. The works are written in the genres of leg-
ends, parables, messages, prayers, canons. The works are well preserved due to 
the fact that they were included in their publications by well-known publishers. 
At the end of the 19th century, the bishop of Turovsky published a complete col-
lection of the works of K. Turovsky. The thinker is dominated by the concepts 
of God, the Trinity, Christ, Holy Scripture, and faith. 
K. Turovsky wrote works in the genre of a person who had a dialogue with 
opponents. Based on the views of I. Chrysostom, V. the Great, K. Turovsky 
gave preference to the mystical components of theology in the understanding of 
God. He believes that God is not knowable in terms of rational understanding. 
He is cognizable only through the surrounding world created by him. Thus, ob-
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serving the spring awakening of nature means observing the world created by 
God. The creator of the text can demonstrate the same power of divine design. It 
should be dominated by the power of the word. The symbolic interpretation of 
the Bible in the form of a parable makes it possible to reveal the content of faith, 
body, soul, spirit, knowledge, man. An entity arises as soon as a layman under-
stands the difference between good and evil. He begins to understand the differ-
ence between a situation of sin that is not based on knowledge and sinful action. 
K. Turovsky gives believers advice on what books to read in order to 
strengthen their inner spiritual world. He uses the dialectics of the material and 
the spiritual, bodily and conscious. The body is given to man as a test. If he does 
not cope with this test, then he falls into the trap of pleasure. Prayers can help in 
this test, which create an atmosphere of dialogue with God. Parables give be-
lievers a picture of the world’s smoke, which includes the life of the individual. 
They are instructive. So, “The Parable of the Human Soul and Body” shows that 
all the elements of the Universe have synergy according to God's plan. Without 
it, individually, they demonstrate situations of problematic human behavior with 
elements of great sin in the form of theft and murder. 
The imperfection of human behavior does not mean a lack of hope for be-
lievers to attain divine grace. An important role is played by outreach. The ser-
mons of K. Turovsky have the subject of the Easter cycle of Sundays and holi-
days. Each of them pursues an educational goal. In his opinion, it is impossible 
to mix everyday and real Christianity, coming from patristics. At the same time, 
one must be tolerant of authentic Christianity. It synthesizes the folk tradition 
and the intellectual tradition of the ancient Greeks. Educated people are required 
to educate those nearby. The main thing is not to fall into the trap of pride. 
Those who fall into this trap, God deprives intellectual abilities. 
K. Turovsky assigned an important role to priests, their education, so that 
they corresponded to an educated society, because even the rulers, in his words, 
strive for knowledge. Education requires mastery of the word, accessible writ-
ing, clear mind. The main thing is to get rid of the rudeness of the language, the 
uncertainty of the mind. Dialogue with people is facilitated by modesty and re-
pentance, spiritual work and good deeds arising from a spiritual lifestyle. The 
main thing is to convince believers to abandon sinful acts and indecent behavior 
in the form of drunkenness, overeating, adultery, envy, slander, usury. A right-
eous lifestyle requires restraint, mercy, respect for people, fasting. The content 
of sin includes slander, insults, condemnation, anger, quarrels, fights, jealousy, 
enmity, evil designs, binges, theft, robbery, robbery, murders, sorcerers, adul-
tery. An alternative to evil is represented by good morals, care for orphans. 
Scholasticism was embodied in Belarus in the activities of E. Polotskaya. 
She was born in 1101 in Polotsk, came from a princely family. At the age of 
twelve, she received monastic tonsure. In the monasteries of Polotsk there were 
many manuscripts in Greek. E. Polotskaya used them as the basis of educational 
activity. In her practical activity, the great influence of Aristotelianism is felt. 
She wrote teachings, prayers, made translations. The goal of this activity was 
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Christian humanism. She wanted believers to have a good heart, to avoid envy, 
evil passions, so that their goal was good. 
Christian humanism was possible only on the basis of education. To this 
end, E. Polotskaya founded a convent for women and men. They created hand-
written books. In church schools, children studied Greek. As subjects were rhet-
oric, medicine, history and poetics. E. Polotskaya contributed to the heyday of 
the Polotsk architectural school. With her participation, John built a temple, 
which became known in her honor. With her organizational participation, L. 
Bogsha made a cross, which became the national relics of Belarus. 
She sought to get to the Holy places. For this, at the end of her life, she 
went to the Middle East, to Jerusalem. E. Polotskaya became the first woman to 
be canonized by the Orthodox Church. This event occurred in 1547. 
Greek representatives of Christian Orthodoxy were engaged in Greek phi-
losophy in Belarus. After the fall of Constantinople, communication with the 
Greek world was broken, and the Belarusians had to re-build a dialogue with 
Europe in the face of the civilization of the medieval West. 
After the transfer of the capital of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, which in-
cluded the territory of Belarus, to the lands of the Baltic tribes, the question 
arose of how to integrate them into the civilization space of the medieval West. 
In this way, in the light of the continued territorial expansion of the Teutonic 
and Livonian orders, the dynastic marriage of the Prince of the Grand Duchy of 
Lithuania Jagiello with the Queen of Poland Jadwiga in 1380 became. 
The Kingdom of Population was Catholic and had a direct dialogue with 
the Vatican. One of the conditions of a dynastic marriage was the adoption by 
the Lithuanian tribes of Christianity in the Western rite, which was done. Dynas-
tic marriage marked the beginning of the formation of the confederation of the 
Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Kingdom of Poland. 
Efforts have been made to integrate into the intellectual space of Western 
Europe. This should have been facilitated by the opening of a university in Kra-
kow, in which a special dormitory for Belarusians and representatives of the 
Baltic tribes functioned. A phenomenon in the Europeanization of the Belarus-
ian intellectual tradition was poetry in Latin. Its spokesman was N. Gusovsky. In 
the poem “Song of the European Bison”, he presented to Europeans a systemic 
image of Belarus through its nature, features of public administration, law, and 
the characterization of civil society. The Italians pushed him to write a poem. He 
told about the presence of buffalo in the forests of Belarus during his time on the 
local bullfight. Belarus was part of the diplomatic mission at the Vatican. 
In the XV century, the intellectual culture of Belarus was integrated into 
European processes related to the institutional crisis of the Catholic Church. 
There was a search for modernization of this church. They were initiated by pro-
fessors from universities in England, in particular, professor of Cambridge Uni-
versity, J. Wycliffe. At this university, natives of Slavic states, who were under 
the pressure of the Crusades studied. Among them were natives of the Czech 
Republic and Belarus. The influence of J. Wycliffe in the Czech Republic was 
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expressed in the sermons of J. Hus, whose execution laid the foundation for the 
Hussite wars. His colleague I. Prague visited the territory of Belarus and 
preached the teachings of the Hussites. The doctrine found support from Vytau-
tas, whom the Hussites elected king. He did not take this opportunity, but in 
support of the Hussites he sent a five thousandth army, which helped them repel 
the four crusades. The support was motivated by the fact that the Hussite de-
tachment participated in the battle of Grunwald on the side of Vytautas and con-
tributed to the victory over the Teutonic Order. 
Of the natives of Belarus in London, Y. Litvin proved himself. He opened a 
printing house in 1480, in which he published not only religious texts, but also 
the works of Aristotle. Among the books published by him are “Reflections on 
the XII Books of Metaphysics of Aristotle”. Coming from Germany, S. Feol 
showed interest in publishing the Bible books in Cyrillic in Krakow. The pub-
lisher was targeted at a significant Orthodox audience, primarily Orthodox stu-
dents who were educated at the University of Krakow. It is possible that S. Fiol 
was in close intellectual contact with the German humanist K. Celtis. He was in 
1489-1491 lived in Krakow. Polish researchers do not support such a hypothe-
sis, but E. Nemirovsky does not exclude it. As a result, the beginning of the 
functioning of printing houses with different fonts and literature was laid. 
In the XIV-XVI centuries, a model of university education of Belarusian 
youth was formed. Undergraduate graduated from the University of Cracow. An 
important source of information on the intellectual migration of the natives of 
Belarus within the civilization of the medieval West is typography. It has be-
come a meeting place for representatives of European cultures. Belarusians 
opened printing houses in different cities of Europe. Their publications have be-
come the main documents of their identification. An analysis of the printing ac-
tivities of the natives of Belarus showed that they published books in close con-
tact with German, Czech, Italian, British masters. An example of such intercul-
tural activity was given by F. Skorin. He was educated at the universities of 
Krakow and Padua. He worked in many cities in Europe, in particular in Prague. 
A study of his publishing activities formed in science an independent historio-
graphical direction called «Scoriniana». 
The intellectual migration of the natives of Belarus within Europe was 
promoted by the special status of cities, which had the institutional basis of 
Magdeburg Law. Canon law gave way to natural law. Based on the ideology of 
the Renaissance, a return to the legacy of the legal culture of the Roman Empire 
took place. Continuity was provided by the Latin language. Humanism has be-
come an important foundation of natural law in the categories of Roman juris-
prudence. Through these categories, the socio-political teachings of the thinkers 
of antiquity about society and the state were primarily references were made to 
Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Marcus Aurelius. 
Magdeburg law came to Eastern Europe with German merchants in the 
XIII-XIV centuries. It was a city law, which provided guarantees of self-
government to large settlements. The place of its formation was Saxony. A sys-
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tem of law called the Saxon Mirror was developed here. There were charters at 
the city level. The charter of the city of Magdeburg gave rise to Magdeburg 
Law. This right is widespread thanks to the principles of self-organization of lo-
cal structures formulated in it. 
At the same time, the city government, represented by the magistrates, got 
the opportunity not only to form, but also to realize their own interest groups. 
These interest groups were created by merchants and guild structures. Cities 
were guided by the law arising from their special status. They were responsible 
for the safety of citizens, ensuring order, protecting the interests of the city. 
Magdeburg Law provided unique opportunities for urban growth through 
trade. This opportunity was realized by German cities in the form of a trade un-
ion called the Hansa. It included dozens of cities that established trade relations 
with each other. Among them were Veliky Novgorod, Vitebsk and Polotsk. 
Trade agreements have become a channel for translating Western European le-
gal practices into Eastern Europe. Universities have become important centers of 
legal culture. In Eastern Europe, universities were opened in Krakow, Koenigs-
berg, and Vilna. 
Legal practices of collective relations in the economic activity of the popu-
lation of Eastern Europe were formed by the needs of regulation of issues relat-
ed to the transfer of ownership of personal items, hunting, fishing, as well as 
land ownership, and peasants. After the Mongol invasion of the Principality of 
Eastern Europe, the traditional trade routes to the East were destroyed. Trade, 
which nourished the Belarusian economy, was concentrated in the Baltic Sea re-
gion. She was promoted by the colonization of the coast by German immigrants 
under the auspices of the Crusades. 
Commodity flows from Belarus were directed along the Western Dvina 
towards Riga. Within the Belorussian cities, trading districts of German mer-
chants with associated infrastructure arose. The community was dominated by 
Magdeburg Law. Their dominant role was fixed in the form of agreements with 
the veche and princely authorities of Polotsk, Vitebsk and Smolensk. This writ-
ten law became the subject of study by E.F. Kara. Based on the analysis of these 
documents, he concluded that the main phonetic and lexical features of the legal 
acts of the twelfth century were formed. The presence of a single legal space is 
one of the important indicators of a single space of the economy, the formation 
of integrated legal practices of collective relations. 
In the temporary boundaries of the traditional society of Eastern Europe, 
legal practices of popular law, princely power, and city self-government took 
place. A variety of forms of secular law was supplemented by the canonical law 
of the Catholic, Protestant and Orthodox Christian denominations. The influence 
of the Hansa led to the further development of the institution of privileges. Cit-
ies, on the basis of the practice of Magdeburg Law, received the status of self-
governing territorial entities with certain business opportunities. In the country-
side, the norms of the Russian Truth were in effect. With the formation of the 
infrastructure of the institution of private property in agriculture, the need arose 
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to introduce it into written law. This was important for the owners of large 
commodity farms represented by the families of magnates, as well as for the 
land-poor owners represented by the nobility. 
In the XIV-XVI centuries, this issue acquired great importance. Based on 
the philosophy of natural law, L. Sapega implemented the methodology of a sys-
tematic approach in the field of law. Its practical expression was the Statute of 
the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in several editions. It was a convergence of the 
collective legal relations of the city and the countryside. This was especially im-
portant for privately owned cities, such as Nesvizh. As a result, the law began to 
play an important role, which determined the dominance of the constitutional 
economy model in economic activity. 
After the collapse of the Hansa, trading in the Baltic Sea region was con-
trolled by merchants from Holland. Their interests in trade with Eastern Europe 
focused on the transshipment opportunities of Danzig, where grain and other 
products of agricultural and forestry activities were delivered. The legal acts fol-
lowed the succession methodology. The best achievements of European law 
were recorded. Outstanding representatives of the Renaissance and Reformation 
contributed to the development of legal documents. Among them, F. Skorin, N. 
Gusovsky, S. Budny, A. Volan, M. Litvin, L. Sapega. As amended in 1588, the 
Statute of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania had a number of advantages due to the 
fact that the experience of developing the Statute in the revisions of 1529, 1566 
was taken into account. This is a comprehensive systemic document in which 
the legal subjects necessary for the economy, civil society, and government 
structures are integrated. 
The dominant of natural law turned out to be important for Belarus in the 
conditions of active contact in the space of its spiritual culture of various reli-
gious traditions. Belarusian society adhered to the framework of Christianity, 
Orthodoxy and Catholicism. Together with the Tatar communities, Islam began 
to be cultivated in Belarusian cities. Mosques became its symbol in the city. 
Following the example of European cities, Belarusian cities began to de-
velop on the basis of Magdeburg Law. A special world of the Belarusian econ-
omy was formed by agriculture. On the basis of the concentration of ownership 
of land, large commodity farms arose. The owners of these farms housed resi-
dences in the small cities they owned. The lands within Belarus and Lithuania 
were owned by the Radziwills, Guts, Oginsky, Sapieha, Tyzengauz, Tyszkie-
wicz and Chapsky. They lived in the palace and park complexes. For their con-
struction, they invited architects from Italy, Germany. Landowners with signifi-
cant financial resources patronized religious movements, education, determined 
the policy of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. 
Natives of Belarus while in Italy in parallel with the university education 
system used studia humanitatis. These studies involved independent work on the 
manuscripts of ancient authors written in Latin and Greek. In this context, an 
important role was given to fluency in the Latin and Greek languages and texts 
written in these languages. Representatives of studia humanitatis reinforced their 
89 
 
skills with appropriate public behavior designed to ensure social status and ma-
terial support for influential families of local aristocrats within Italian cities. 
The bulk of the population of Europe used the language volgare. As a re-
sult, intellectual humanism was not accessible to ordinary people. The Bible was 
also not very accessible, since only the upper strata of society spoke the Latin 
language. A similar linguistic situation existed in medieval England after the 
conquest of the Normans. Ordinary people used English, Latin and French. Eng-
land was the first to actualize the movement for translating the Bible into a lan-
guage that was used by the bulk of the population. In this language, national po-
etry was formed. 
The natives of Belarus F. Skorina, S. Budny, A. Volan, M. Smotrytsky, V. 
Tyapinsky, S. Sobol, P. Mstislavets followed this path in the 16th century. They 
translated the ideology of humanism into the Belarusian language. At the same 
time, they remained in the linguistic practices of multilingualism. They contin-
ued to publish texts in Latin, Polish, and Greek. In the Belarusian intellectual 
tradition, studia humanitatis, as in Holland, was not limited only to philology. 
They included law issues. Natural law prescribed to proceed from the diversity 
of forms of social and spiritual life and guaranteed this diversity through the 
principle of tolerance, which was relevant in the conditions of the Reformation. 
Intellectual migrations in the East European region in the XVIII-XIX cen-
turies were formed by the role of German philosophy in the region. 
Supporters of German classical philosophy in Belarus were T. Schenevsky 
and Y. Kragaevsky. Critical analysis of the work of supporters of German clas-
sical philosophy from the standpoint of the second scholasticism was carried out 
by I. Golovinsky and M. Yakubovich. In the subject field of their criticism were 
the philosophical works of F. Bochwitz. 
Physiocrat, a native of the Belarusian city of Novogrudok, S. Askerka was 
an adviser to King of Prussia Ferdinand II. Anthony Heinrich Radziwill became 
the author of the opera Faust. Goethe wrote the libretto for the opera. The Berlin 
branch of the Radziwills has become part of German society. The reverse pro-
cesses of the resettlement of representatives of German clans to Belarus also 
contributed to intellectual contacts in the East European cultural space. 
An example was given by the Tizengauz family. In the XVIII century, An-
thony Tizengauz, who held an important public office and managed the Grodno 
economy, invited the famous French scientist Jean Emmanuel Zhilibert to Grod-
no to create a botanical garden, pharmacies, a medical academy, and medical in-
stitutions in the city. The scientist arrived in 1775. For a short time in the city, 
he fulfilled a list of obligations to develop science and medical infrastructure. A 
medical academy functioned in the city, in which scientists from Europe taught. 
More than two thousand plants were planted in the botanical garden. The 
dismissal of A. Tizengauz's public office interrupted the scientific activity of 
J.E. Zhibiber in Grodno. In addition to the Tizengauz, representatives of the 
German clans Guttenov and Wendorff moved to Belarus. Gutten von Chapsky 
contributed to the development of Minsk and its environs. Wendorff was glori-
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fied by the researcher of the indigenous peoples of Western Siberia, Eva Wen-
dorff. After marriage, she became Eva Felinsky. 
Since the end of the 18th century, Belarus has been a part of the Russian 
Empire. As a result of this, the natives of Belarus began to receive education at 
the universities of Kazan and St. Petersburg. In the direction of these universi-
ties, they had the opportunity to study at German universities. One of these stu-
dents was L.I. Petrazhitsky. He is born in 1867 in the Vitebsk province. He stud-
ied at the gymnasium in Vitebsk. He continued his education at the Faculty of 
Law of Kiev Imperial University of St. Vladimir. Since 1890, he trained at the 
University of Heidelberg and at the Russian Institute of Roman law. In 1898, he 
was awarded the degree of Doctor of Roman Law. In 1898-1918 he headed the 
department of the encyclopedia of law at St. Petersburg University. 
From September 9, 1905 to September 25, 1906 he was dean of the law 
faculty of the university. He headed the Department of Sociology at the Univer-
sity of Warsaw. L.I. Petrazhitsky developed emotional psychology. He had to 
combine it with the right. This was not easy in the conditions of his methodolo-
gy of Roman law. 
The first independent work of L. Petrazhitsky, written in Germany under 
the title "Fruchtverteilung beim Wechsel der Nutzungsberechtigten" (Berlin, 
1892), was devoted to the doctrine of income from the standpoint of Roman law. 
On the basis of this work, in 1892 he defended a master's thesis at the University 
of Kiev, specializing in Roman law, entitled "On the Distribution of Incomes 
When Transferring the Right of Use under Roman law". In 1898, Mr. at St. Pe-
tersburg University defended his doctoral dissertation in the specialty of Roman 
law on the topic: "Rights of a bona fide owner on income from the point of view 
of dogma and civil law policy." The scientific interests of L. I. Petrazhitsky were 
related to the theory of law. He created a legal sociological school. His students 
subsequently became famous scientists in the field of sociology of law and gen-
eral sociology – P. Sorokin, N. Timashev, J. Gurvich, N. Kondratiev. But then 
his interests shifted to the field of psychological theory of law. 
Another native of Belarus, I. Domeiko, appeared in the space of European 
scientific communication. He was born near the Belarusian city of Novogrudok. 
Since 1812 he studied at a public relations school in Schuchin. In 1816 he en-
tered the Department of Physics and Mathematics of Vilnius University. 14 
years of age made him one of the youngest university students. Studying at the 
university was completed in 1820. In 1822, he was awarded the master's degree 
in philosophy. Later he devoted his life to politics. But he was forced to leave 
her. In 1832 he went to Saxony. He traveled to Switzerland. I was in Freiburg. 
Then he went to Paris. He attended lectures at the University of Sorbonne and 
the French College, studied at the Botanical Garden, participated in geological 
excursions. In 1834 he entered the Mining School - Ecole des Mines. He com-
piled a geographical, geological and economic map of the former lands of the 
Commonwealth and wrote extensive comments on it (the map and comments 
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were not published; materials were used in other publications). He accepted the 
invitation of the La Serena Mining School in Coquimbo in northern Chile. 
Until 1846, he taught at the La Serena Mining School in Coquimbo. He 
conducted various studies, completed mineralogical collections, a scientific li-
brary, and a zoological collection. According to the method developed by 
Domeyko, knowledge was fixed by practical exercises in chemistry, physics, 
and geology. In 1845 he published a book in Spanish with a description of life, 
culture, and the language of the Araucan Indians, translated into several lan-
guages. He organized a meteorological service in Santiago de Chile. He contin-
ued to engage in mineralogical research, studied a meteorite discovered in the 
Atacama Desert, and studied the natives of South America. He wrote scientific 
works mainly in French and Spanish. Several editions of his textbook and at the 
same time the scientific work “Fundamentals of Mineralogy” - Elementos de 
mineralojia, with several applications. He maintained ties with Eastern Europe, 
sending his works to the universities of Warsaw and Krakow. He was a member 
of European scientific societies. 
In the summer of 1884 he arrived in Bordeaux with his sons. In Paris, he 
met with friends of his youth Vladislav Laskovich and Jozef Bogdan Zalesky, 
visited the family of Vladislav Mitskevich, the son of the famous poet. In Kra-
kow, he was enthusiastically received by the scientific community. In Warsaw, 
met with Odynets, visited Vilna, at home in Medvedka, in the World and Novo-
grudok. In the fall he returned to Paris. In 1885 he traveled to Rome. I visited 
Naples. With research purposes climbed Mount Vesuvius. Then he again visited 
Krakow, from where he went with Peter Semenenko on a pilgrimage journey 
through the Holy Land. Returning to Paris, he soon returned to his homeland 
and spent there more than two years, only occasionally leaving for a short while. 
Narkevich-Iodko Yakov (Yakub) Ottonovich - Belarusian naturalist in 
medicine, inventor of electrography and wireless transmission of electrical sig-
nals, was born on December 27, 1847 in the family of a landowner in the estate 
of Ottonovo, Igumen district of Minsk province. He graduated from the Minsk 
gymnasium. He studied in Vienna, Paris and Florence. Having received serious 
training in physics, biology, medicine, Y. O. Narkevich-Iodko returned to his 
homeland. In 1872, he conducted scientific experiments in a laboratory equipped 
at the Nadneman estate (80 km southwest of Minsk). 
Designed by Y.O. Narkevichem-Iodko visual observation method, or re-
cording on a photographic material the glow of a gas discharge that occurs near 
the surface of the investigated object when the latter was placed in a high-
voltage electric field, after 50 years experienced a rebirth and is known in many 
countries under the name “Kirlian effect” (the term also applies "Bioelectrogra-
phy"). Narkevich-Iodko opens a sanatorium on the estate, offering those who 
wish to improve their health with the help of sun and air baths, gymnastics, min-
eral water from a well opened here, as well as the freshest koumiss. To produce 
the latter, he specially brought from Bashkiria a herd of thoroughbred horses and 
even specialists in the preparation of a healing drink. The kind-hearted gentle-
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man generously distributes bottles with koumiss to the surrounding peasants - 
right from the window of the entrance gate (gate) to the palace. In the pictur-
esque Nadnemansky sanatorium, patients were offered more radical methods of 
treatment - electromassage and electrotherapy. Many discharges helped. At the 
Roman Institute of Physiotherapy, the treatment procedures borrowed from J. 
Iodka were called the “Iodka System”. He was a corresponding member of the 
Paris Medical, Physical, Astronomical, magnetic societies and electrotherapy 
societies; member of the Italian Medical Psychological Society. 
At the end of the 19th century, Europe approached a new cultural quality in 
the form of Art Nouveau. The beginning of this era was formulated by F. Nie-
tzsche under the name "revaluation of values." Art Nouveau adhered to a bour-
geois lifestyle. He combined secularization, imperialism with original everyday 
solutions in the field of architecture, fine art. Bourgeois prosperity was created 
in an atmosphere of crisis in European culture. The culture of aristocrats and es-
tates was a thing of the past. An increasingly important role in the social life of 
Europe was played by the crowd, whose energy the political elites directed to 
the fronts of the First World War. 
The intelligent part of Europe felt the atmosphere of the crisis of the old 
continent. She tried to explain this phenomenon by analyzing the features of an-
cient tradition and subsequent historical eras (E. Husserl, V. Dilthey, K. Jaspers 
and O. Spengler). It was a rational approach. But there were those who turned to 
irrational principles. The works of A. Schopenhauer, F. Nietzsche, and Z. Freud 
became relevant. Biologism and physiologism were not acceptable to everyone. 
The European aristocracy hoped that the crisis part of society would remain 
on the fronts of the First World War. Cozy salons cultivated patriotism, an aris-
tocratic secular lifestyle, collecting and existentialism. 
The crisis of the old continent brought an era of technological progress. Fu-
turists admired changes, including military equipment. They went to the fronts 
of the First World War, where they died. 
Against the background of such a rational absurdity, the search for other 
principles of European consciousness intensified. As part of these searches, a 
project of intuitionism was implemented. In France, A. Bergson became its au-
thor. Of the natives of Belarus, N. Lossky developed intuitionism, after the 1917 
revolution he migrated to the Czech Republic. Another native of Belarus, N. 
Minsky, developed an applied area of a new philosophy called meonism. It has 
become the methodology of East European symbolism. 
A. Bergson affirms life as an initial reality, which, being in integrity differs 
from matter and spirit. Matter and spirit are products of its decay. The basic 
concepts by which the philosopher determines the essence of life demonstrate 
“duration”, “creative evolution” and “life impulse”. Life cannot be reflected by 
intelligence. Intelligence is capable of creating general concepts. He is the activ-
ity of reason. Reality can be reproduced in organics and universality only by re-
constructing it. This is only possible by intuition. 
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She directs attention to the primary reality of her own consciousness. Only 
self-observation is subject to continuous variability of states, duration. On these 
premises, A. Bergson created the doctrine of the evolution of the organic world, 
drawn by a stream of creative tension. Man is at the center of creative evolution. 
The ability to realize its inner power is the destiny of the elect, a divine gift. This 
explains the elitism of culture. There are proportionally two types of sociality 
and morality - closed and open types. Closed morality caters to the demands of 
social instinct when a person is sacrificed to a collective. In open morality, the 
priority is the manifestation of individuality, the creation of moral, religious and 
aesthetic values. 
Henri Bergson understands being as a creative force, Language and other 
systems of symbols, being completely utilitarian, mechanize our life, hiding 
from reality a man. Intuition is characterized by detachment from practical inter-
est. Her aesthetic character and duration are pronounced in it. Art does not abide 
in static material carriers, but lives in human experience. Art is art when it is 
perceived by someone. The perception of art is intuitive, which allows you to 
distance yourself from the conceptual fragmentation inherent in the activities of 
the intellect. 
N. Lossky was born in Vitebsk province. He studied at the Vitebsk classi-
cal gymnasium. He was expelled in 1887 for promoting atheism and socialist 
teachings. He left for Switzerland, where he attended lectures at the Faculty of 
Philosophy of the University of Bern (1888-1889). After returning to Russia, he 
studied at St. Petersburg University. He was left at the university to prepare for a 
professorship in the department of philosophy. In the years 1895-1899 was a 
teacher at the Prince Oldenburg Women's College. Since 1898 he taught at the 
gymnasium M.N. Stoyunina. 
In 1903, he received a master’s degree in philosophy for his dissertation 
“Basic doctrines of psychology in terms of voluntarism”; Doctor of Philosophy 
degree - in 1907 for the dissertation “Justification of Intuitionism”. In 1922, he 
was expelled from Soviet Russia as part of a large group of intelligentsia that did 
not accept Marxist ideology. 
Until 1942, at the invitation of the President of Czechoslovakia, he lived in 
Prague. He was a professor at the Russian National University. Since 1942 he 
was a professor of philosophy in Bratislava in Slovakia. Since 1945, he lectured 
on philosophy at the St. Sergius Theological Institute in Paris. Since 1947 he 
lived in the USA. He taught in Yonkers, New York, at St. Vladimir Theological 
Academy. Last years he lived in Paris. 
N. Lossky is one of the researchers of the works of F. Dostoevsky. He 
wrote a work on the history of Russian philosophy, which became one of the 
best publications. N. Lossky was part of religious Russian philosophy. In this 
context, his biography became the subject of study. The philosophical system he 
developed is integral. The key role in it is played by intuitionism. The university 
science of St. Petersburg played an important role in this emphasis. 
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Under the influence of Russian religious philosophy of Vladimir Solovyov 
and modern aesthetics, a native of Belarus Nikolai Maksimovich Minsky was 
found. He came from a poor Jewish family. He studied at the gymnasium in 
Minsk. He continued his studies at the Law Faculty of St. Petersburg University. 
At the end, he chose a literary career. In his student years he began to print poet-
ry in periodicals. 
It went through evolution to the mystical lyrics of Vladimir Solovyov. He 
was fascinated by populist ideas; The first fame was in 1879 as the author of the 
drama poem Last Confession, published in the underground newspaper, which 
inspired I. Repin to create the painting Refusal of Confession before Execution. 
In the mid XIX century underwent an ideological turning point and became one 
of the first preachers of the new mystical art. 
The main philosophical treatise of N. Minsky is “In the light of conscience. 
Thoughts and dreams about the purpose of life” (1890) had a great socio-cultural 
resonance. He became one of the first ideological declarations of Russian sym-
bolism. Speaking about the crisis of modern culture caused by the loss of a sense 
of meaningful existence, N. Minsky developed a new philosophy of meonism. It 
brought together the rational and irrational, mystical experience of the modern 
soul. His religious and philosophical poems “The Light of Truth” (1892) and 
“City of Death” (1894) continued with artistic means the ideas stated in the the-
oretical composition. They were perceived by contemporaries (in particular, V. 
Bryusov) as a new word of decadent art. 
In the 1890s - early 1900s. N. Minsky was one of the main authors of the 
magazines "Northern Herald" and "New Way". In 1905, shocked by political 
events, N. Minsky again made a sharp turn in his convictions regarding the place 
of literature in society. Dreaming of the union of the intelligentsia and the peo-
ple, N. Minsky became a supporter of social democracy. He wrote the Anthem 
of the workers - "Workers of all countries, unite!" Due to political persecution, 
N. Minsky left for Paris for casual literary earnings. He wrote plays based on the 
philosophy of God-seeking. 
After the amnesty of 1913 (in honor of the 300th anniversary of the Roma-
nov dynasty) N. Minsky returned to Russia, but did not stay there long and again 
went abroad. He was a war correspondent in France. After 1917, he lived in Ber-
lin, served in the Soviet embassy in London. 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, Belarus was influenced by trans-
formations in the visual arts and architecture. The main reason for the transfor-
mations in the visual arts was the search for new forms of self-preservation and 
self-expression of artistic creativity against the background of the development 
of photography and visual technologies. There has been a tendency to move 
away from classical realism with its characteristic photographic reality. It was 
necessary to find new ways of dialogue between the artist and the viewer. 
Such searches were conducted within the framework of bourgeois and so-
cialist modernism. Organizationally, these searches focused in Paris. Institutions 
of aesthetics institutionalized here began to spread to the European periphery. 
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There was a huge oncoming movement from local art schools and artists. Bela-
rus was no exception. In the country, art schools functioned in Minsk, Vitebsk. 
Graduates of these schools received higher art education in St. Petersburg. One 
of the elements of their education was creative trips to Paris. 
In the triangle Belarus-St. Petersburg-Paris, the work of L. Bakst from 
Grodno, M. Chagall from Vitebsk was formed. Passing St. Petersburg, H. Sutin 
went from Minsk to Paris. Most attention in modern Belarus has received M. 
Chagall. In 1997, the memorial museum of Marc Chagall was opened in the 
house on Pokrovskaya st. in which the artist spent his childhood and youth. Its 
exposition contains household items from the turn of the XIX-XX centuries, ar-
chival documents, the first artwork, personal belongings of the artist and his 
family. Ancient exhibits for the collection were selected using a series of draw-
ings, which M. Chagall created from memory, capturing the interiors of the pa-
rental home.  
On the left bank of the Western Dvina is the second museum building - the 
Art Center of Marc Chagall. Here is one of the largest collections of M. Chagall 
in the world, combining more than 300 original graphic works and reproductions 
of his famous paintings. The art center of Marc Chagall opened in 1992 in the 
building of the 19th century, which is depicted on the world-famous canvas 
“Above the City”. The first exhibits in the collection were works donated by the 
“Circle of Assistance to the Chagall House-Museum in Vitebsk” (Ninbur, Ger-
many). The museum has a rich collection of graphic works by the artist, which 
includes lithographs, woodcuts, as well as 3 colored aquatints donated in 1994 
by the artist’s daughter Ida Chagall, and 96 etchings representing a series of 
book illustrations transmitted by the granddaughters of the artist Meret and Bel-
la. These are magnificent illustrations by M. Chagall to literary works, including 
a series of sketches for the poem by N. Gogol “Dead Souls” (1923-1925), a se-
ries of color lithographs entitled “The Bible” (1956 and 1960) and “12 tribes of 
Israel "(1960). 
A collection of printed graphics of the outstanding representatives of the 
European avant-garde is stored - Juan Miro, Pablo Picasso, Henri Matisse, Fer-
nand Leger. The building of the Art Center houses a scientific library where you 
can find books about the life and work of M. Chagall. The opening took place in 
2002 in honor of the 115th anniversary of the artist and was made possible 
thanks to Dr. Heinrich Mandel (Irrell, Germany). The library collection contains 
more than 3,500 books in English, German, French and Russian. 
 
19. Philosophical traditions of the Russia 
 
Although one can find scattered remarks of a philosophical nature in Rus-
sian writings before the mid-eighteenth century, these are at best of marginal in-
terest to the professionally trained philosopher. For the most part, these remarks 
were not intended to stand as rational arguments in support of a position. Even 
in the ecclesiastic academies, the thin scholastic veneer of the accepted texts was 
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merely a traditional schematic device, a relic from the time when the only ap-
propriate texts available were Western. For whatever reason, only with the open-
ing of the nation's first university in Moscow in 1755 do we see the emergence 
of something resembling philosophy, as we use that term today. Even then, 
however, the floodgates did not burst wide open. The first occupant of the chair 
of philosophy, N. Popovsky (1730-1760), was more suited to the teaching of po-
etry and rhetoric, to which chair he was shunted after one brief year. 
Sensing the dearth of adequately trained native personnel, the government 
invited two Germans to the university, thus initiating a practice that would con-
tinue well into the next century. The story of the first ethnic Russian to hold the 
professorship in philosophy for any significant length of time is itself indicative 
of the precarious existence of philosophy in Russia for much of its history. Hav-
ing already obtained a magister's degree in 1760 with a thesis entitled «A Trea-
tise on the Immortality of the Human Soul», Dmitry Anichkov (1733-1788) 
submitted in 1769 a dissertation on natural religion. Anichkov's dissertation was 
found to contain atheistic opinions and was subjected to a lengthy 18-year inves-
tigation. Legend has it that the dissertation was publicly burned, although there 
is no firm evidence for this. As was common at the time, Anichkov used Wolffi-
an philosophy manuals and during his first years taught in Latin. 
Another notable figure at this time was S. Desnitsky (1740-1789), who 
taught jurisprudence at Moscow University. Desnitsky attended university in 
Glasgow, where he studied under Adam Smith (1723-1790) and became familiar 
with the works of David Hume (1711-1776). The influence of Smith and British 
thought in general is evident in memoranda from February 1768 that Desnitsky 
wrote on government and public finance. Some of these ideas, in turn, appeared 
virtually verbatim in a portion of Catherine the Great's famous Nakaz, or In-
struction, published in April of that year. 
Also in 1768 appeared Kozelsky's «Philosophical Propositions», an unorig-
inal but noteworthy collection of numbered statements on a host of topics, not 
all of which were philosophical in a technical, narrow sense. By his own admis-
sion, the material dealing with theoretical philosophy was drawn from the 
Wolffians, primarily Baumeister, and that dealing with moral philosophy from 
the French Enlightenment thinkers, primarily Rousseau, Montesquieu, and Hel-
vetius. The most interesting feature of the treatise is its acceptance of a social 
contract, of an eight-hour workday, the explicit rejection of great disparities of 
wealth and its silence on religion as a source of morality. Nevertheless, in his 
theoretical philosophy, Kozelsky (1728-1795) rejected atomism and the Newto-
nian conception of the possibility of empty space. 
During Catherine's reign, plans were made to establish several universities 
in addition to that in Moscow. Of course, nothing came of these. Moscow Uni-
versity itself had a difficult time attracting a sufficient number of students, most 
of whom, came from poorer families. Undoubtedly, given the state of the Rus-
sian economy and society, the virtually ubiquitous attitude was that the study of 
philosophy was a sheer luxury with no utilitarian value. In terms of general edu-
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cation, the government evidently concluded that sending students abroad offered 
a better investment than spending large sums at home where the infrastructure 
needed much work and time to develop. Unfortunately, although there were 
some who returned to Russia and played a role in the intellectual life of the 
country, many more failed to complete their studies for a variety of reasons, in-
cluding falling into debt.  
Progress, however, skipped a beat in 1796 when Catherine's son and suc-
cessor, Paul, ordered the recall of all Russian students studying abroad. Despite 
its relatively small number of educational institutions, Russia felt a need to in-
vite foreign scholars to help staff these establishments. One of the scholars, J. 
Schaden (1731-1797), ran a private boarding school in Moscow in addition to 
teaching philosophy at the university. The most notorious incident from these 
early years, however, involves the German Ludwig Mellman, who in the 1790s 
introduced Kant's thought into Russia. Mellman's advocacy found little sympa-
thy even among his colleagues at Moscow University, and in a report to the Tsar 
the public prosecutor charged Mellman with "mental illness." Not only was 
Mellman dismissed from his position, but he was forced to leave Russia as well. 
Under the initiative of the new Tsar, Alexander I, two new universities 
were opened in 1804. With them, the need for adequately trained professors 
again arose. Once more the government turned to Germany, and, with the dislo-
cations caused by the Napoleonic Wars, Russia stood in an excellent position to 
reap an intellectual harvest. Unfortunately, many of these invited scholars left 
little lasting impact on Russian thought. For example, one of the most outstand-
ing, Johann Buhle (1763-1821), had already written a number of works on the 
history of philosophy before taking up residence in Moscow. Yet, once in Rus-
sia, his literary output plummeted, and his ignorance of the local language cer-
tainly did nothing to extend his influence. 
Nonetheless, the sudden influx of German scholars, many of whom were 
intimately familiar with the latest philosophical developments, acted as an intel-
lectual tonic on others. The arrival of the Swiss physicist Franz Bronner (1758-
1850) at the new University of Kazan may have introduced Kant's epistemology 
to the young future mathematician Lobachevsky. The Serb physicist, A. Stoiko-
vich (1773-1832), who taught at Kharkov University, prepared a text for class 
use in which the content was arranged in conformity with Kant's categories. One 
of the earliest Russian treatments of a philosophical topic, however, was A. 
Lubkin's two «Letters on Critical Philosophy» from 1805. Lubkin (1770/1-
1815), who at the time taught at the Petersburg Military Academy, criticized 
Kant's theory of space and time for its agnostic implications saying that we ob-
tain our concepts of space and time from experience.  
Likewise, in 1807 a professor of mathematics at Kharkov University, T. 
Osipovsky (1765-1832), delivered a subsequently published speech «On Space 
and Time», in which he questioned whether, given the various considerations, 
Kant's position was the only logical conclusion possible. Assuming 
the Leibnizian notion of a preestablished harmony, we can uphold all of Kant's 
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specific observations concerning space and time without concluding that they 
exist solely within our cognitive faculty. Osipovsky went on to make a number 
of other perceptive criticisms of Kant's position, though Kant's German critics 
already voiced many of these during his lifetime. 
In the realm of social and political philosophy, as understood today, the 
most interesting and arguably the most sophisticated document from the period 
of the Russian Enlightenment is A. Kunitsyn's «Natural Law». In his summary 
text consisting of 590 sections, Kunitsyn (1783-1840) clearly demonstrated the 
influence of Kant and Rousseau, holding that rational dictates concerning human 
conduct form moral imperatives, which we feel as obligations. Since each of us 
possesses reason, we must always be treated morally as ends, never as means 
toward an end. In subsequent paragraphs, Kunitsyn elaborated his conception of 
natural rights, including his belief that among these rights is freedom of thought 
and expression. His outspoken condemnation of serfdom, however, is not one 
that the Russian authorities could either have missed or passed over. Shortly af-
ter the text reached their attention, all attainable copies were confiscated, and 
Kunitsyn himself was dismissed from his teaching duties at St. Petersburg Uni-
versity in March 1821. 
Another scholar associated with St. Petersburg University was Aleksandr I. 
Galich (1783-1848). Sent to Germany for further education, he there became ac-
quainted with the work of Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling (1775-1854). 
With his return to Russia in 1813, he was appointed adjunct professor of philos-
ophy at the Pedagogical Institute in St. Petersburg; and in 1819, when the insti-
tute was transformed into a university. Galich was named to the chair of philos-
ophy. His teaching career, however, was short-lived, for in 1821 Galich was 
charged with atheism and revolutionary sympathies. Although stripped of teach-
ing duties, he continued to draw a full salary until 1837. Galich's importance 
lays not so much in his own quasi-Schellingian views as his pioneering treat-
ments of the history of philosophy, aesthetics and philosophical anthropology. 
His two-volume «History of Philosophical Systems» from 1818-19 con-
cluded with an exposition of Schelling's position and contained quite probably 
the first discussion in Russian of G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831) and, in particular, 
of his «Science of Logic». Galich's «An Attempt at a Science of the Beautiful» 
from 1825 is certainly among the first Russian treatises in aesthetics. For Galich, 
the beautiful is the sensuous manifestation of truth and as such is a sub-
discipline within philosophy. His 1834 work «А Picture of Man», marked the 
first Russian foray into philosophical anthropology. For Galich all scientific dis-
ciplines, including theology, are in need of an anthropological foundation; and, 
moreover, such a foundation must recognize the unity of the human aspects and 
functions, be they corporeal or spiritual. 
The increasing religious and political conservativism that marked Tsar Al-
exander's later years imposed onerous restrictions on the dissemination of phi-
losophy, both in the classroom and in print. By the time of the Tsar's death in 
1825, most reputable professors of philosophy had already been administratively 
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silenced or cowed into compliance. At the end of that year, the aborted coup 
known as the «Decembrist Uprising»—many of whose leaders had been ex-
posed to the infection of Western European thought—only hardened the basical-
ly anti-intellectual attitude of the new Tsar Nicholas. Shortly after I. Davydov 
(1792/4-1863), hardly either an original or a gifted thinker, had given his intro-
ductory lecture "On the Possibility of Philosophy as Science" in May 1826 as 
professor of philosophy at Moscow University, the chair was temporarily abol-
ished and Davydov shifted to teaching mathematics. 
Nevertheless, despite the oppressive atmosphere, some independent philos-
ophizing emerged during the Nicholas years. At first, Schelling's influence dom-
inated abstract discussions, particularly those concerning the natural sciences 
and their place with regard to the other academic disciplines. However, the two 
chief Schellingians of the era—D. Vellansky (1774-1847) and M. Pavlov (1793-
1840)—both valued German Romanticism, more for its sweeping conclusions 
than for either its arguments or its being the logical outcome of a philosophical 
development that had begun with Kant. Though both Vellansky and Pavlov 
penned a considerable number of works, none of them would find a place within 
today's philosophy curriculum.  
Slightly later, in the 1830s and '40s, the discussion turned to Hegel's sys-
tem, again with great enthusiasm but with little understanding either with what 
Hegel actually meant or with the philosophical backdrop of his writings. Not 
surprisingly, Hegel's own self-described voyage of discovery, 
the «Phenomenology of Spirit», remained an unknown text. Suffice it to say 
that, but for the dearth of original competent investigations at this time, the mere 
mention of the Stankevich and the Petrashevsky circles, the Slavophiles and the 
Westernizers, etc. in a history of philosophy text would be regarded a travesty. 
Nevertheless, amid the darkness of official obscurantism, there were a few brief 
glimmers of light. In his 1833 «Introduction to the Science of Philosophy», F. 
Sidonsky (1805-1873) treated philosophy as a rational discipline independent of 
theology.  
Although conterminous with theology, Sidonsky regarded philosophy as 
both a necessary and a natural searching of the human mind for answers that 
faith alone cannot adequately supply. By no means did he take this to mean 
that faith and reason conflict. Revelation provides the same truths, but the path 
taken, though dogmatic and therefore rationally unsatisfying, is considerably 
shorter. Much more could be said about Sidonsky's introductory text, but both it 
and its author were quickly consigned to the margins of history. Notwithstand-
ing his book's desired recognition in some secular circles, Sidonsky soon after 
its publication was shifted first from philosophy to the teaching of French and 
then simply dismissed from the St. Petersburg Ecclesiastic Academy in 1835. 
This time it was the clerical authorities who found his book, it was said, insuffi-
ciently rigorous from the official religious standpoint. Sidonsky spent the next 
30 years (until the re-introduction of philosophy in the universities) as a parish 
priest in the Russian capital. 
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The teaching of philosophy at this time was not eliminated from the eccle-
siastic academies; the separate institutions of higher education were parallel to 
the secular universities for those from a clerical background. Largely with good 
reason, the government felt secure about their political and intellectual passivity. 
Among the most noteworthy of the professors at an ecclesiastic academy during 
the Nicholaevan years was F. Golubinsky (1798-1854), who taught in Moscow. 
Generally recognized as the founder of the "Moscow School of Theistic Philos-
ophy," his historical importance lies solely in his unabashed subordination of 
philosophy to theology and epistemology to ontology.  
For Golubinsky, humans seek knowledge in an attempt to recover an origi-
nal diremption, a lost intimacy with the Infinite! Nevertheless, the idea of God is 
felt immediately within us. Owing to this immediacy, there is no need for and 
cannot be a proof of God's existence. Such was the tenor of "philosophical" 
thought in the religious institutions of the time. P. Jurkevich (1826-1874) stood 
with one foot in the Russian philosophical past and one in the future. Serving as 
the bridge between the eras, he largely defined the contours along which philo-
sophical discussions would be shaped for the next two generations. 
P. Lavrov (1823-1900), a teacher of mathematics at the Petersburg Military 
Academy, actively aspired to a university chair in philosophy (namely, the one 
in the capital when the position was restored in the early 1860s). However, the 
government apparently already suspected Lavrov of questionable allegiance and, 
despite a recommendation from a widely respected scholar (K. Kavelin), award-
ed the position instead to Sidonsky. 
In a series of lengthy essays written when he had university aspirations, 
Lavrov developed a position, which he termed "anthropologism," that opposed 
metaphysical speculation, including the then-fashionable materialism of left-
wing radicalism. Instead, he defended a simple epistemological phenomenalism 
that at many points bore a certain similarity to Kant's position, though without 
the latter's intricacies, nuances, and rigor. Essentially, Lavrov maintained that all 
claims regarding objects are translatable into statements about appearances or an 
aggregate of them. Additionally, he held that we have a collection of convictions 
concerning the external world, convictions whose basis lies in repeated experi-
ential encounters with similar appearances.  
The indubitability of consciousness and our irresistible conviction in the 
reality of the external world are fundamental and irreducible. The error of both 
materialism and idealism, fundamentally, is the mistaken attempt to collapse one 
into the other. Since both are fundamental, the attempt to prove either is ill-
conceived from the outset. Consistent with this skepticism, Lavrov argued that 
the study of "phenomena of consciousness," a "phenomenology of spirit," could 
be raised to a science only through introspection, a method he called "subjec-
tive." Likewise, the natural sciences, built on our firm belief in the external 
world, need little support from philosophy. To question the law of causality, for 
example, is, in effect, to undermine the scientific standpoint. 
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Parallel to the two principles of theoretical philosophy, Lavrov spoke of 
two principles underlying practical philosophy. The first is that the individual is 
consciously free in his worldly activity. Unlike for Kant, however, this principle 
is not a postulate but a phenomenal fact; it carries no theoretical implications. 
For Lavrov, the moral sphere is quite autonomous from the theoretical. The sec-
ond principle is that of "ideal creation." Just as in the theoretical sphere we set 
ourselves against a real world, so in the practical sphere we set ourselves against 
ideals.  
Just as the real world is the source of knowledge, the world of our ideals 
serves as the motivation for action. In turning our own image of ourselves into 
an ideal, we create an ideal of personal dignity. Initially, the human individual 
conceives dignity along egoistic lines. In time, however, the individual's interac-
tion, including competition, with others gives rise to his conception of them as 
having equal claims to dignity and to rights. In linking rights to human dignity, 
Lavrov thereby denied that animals have rights. 
Of a similar intellectual bent, N. Mikhailovsky (1842-1904) was even more 
of a popular writer than Lavrov. Nevertheless, Mikhailovsky's importance in the 
history of Russian philosophy lies in his defense of the role of subjectivity in 
human studies. Unlike the natural sciences, the aim of which is the discovery of 
objective laws, the human sciences, according to Mikhailovsky, must take into 
account the epistemologically irreducible fact of conscious, goal-oriented activi-
ty. While not disclaiming the importance of objective laws, both Lavrov and 
Mikhailovsky held that social scientists must introduce a subjective, moral eval-
uation into their analyses. Unlike natural scientists, social scientists recognize 
the malleability of the laws under their investigation. 
Comtean positivism, which for quite some years enjoyed considerable at-
tention in 19th century Russia, found its most resolute and philosophically nota-
ble defender in V. Lesevich (1837-1905). Finding that it lacked a scientific 
grounding, Lesevich believed that positivism needed an inquiry into the princi-
ples that guide the attainment of knowledge. Such an inquiry must take for 
granted some body of knowledge without simply identifying itself with it. To 
the now-classic Hegelian charge that such a procedure amounted to not ventur-
ing into the water before learning how to swim, Lesevich replied that what was 
sought was not, so to speak, how to swim but, rather, the conditions that make 
swimming possible. In this vein, he consciously turned to the Kantian model 
while remaining highly critical of any talk of the a priori. In the end, Lesevich 
drew heavily upon psychology and empiricism for establishing the conditions of 
knowledge, thus leaving himself open to the charge of psychologism and relativ-
ism. Undoubtedly, of the philosophical figures to emerge in the 1870s, indeed 
arguably in any decade the greatest was  V. Solovyov (1853-1900).  
In fact, if we view philosophy not as an abstract, independent inquiry but as 
a more or less sustained intellectual conversation, then we can precisely date the 
start of Russian secular philosophy: 24 November 1874, the day of Solovyov's 
defense of his magister's dissertation «The Crisis of Western Philosophy». For 
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only from that day forward do we find a sustained discussion within Russia of 
philosophical issues considered on their own terms, that is, without overt appeal 
to their extra-philosophical ramifications, such as their religious or political im-
plications. 
After completion and defense of his magister's dissertation, Solovyov 
penned a highly metaphysical treatise entitled «Philosophical Principles of Inte-
gral Knowledge», which he never completed. However, at approximately the 
same time, he also worked on what became his doctoral dissertation «Critique of 
Abstract Principles» - the very title suggesting a Kantian influence. Although 
originally intended to consist of three parts, one each covering ethics, episte-
mology, and aesthetics, the completed work omitted the latter. For more than a 
decade, Solovyov remained silent on philosophical questions, preferring instead 
to concentrate on topical issues. When his interest was rekindled in the 1890s in 
preparing a second edition of his Kritika of a fundamental shift in his views led 
him to recast their systemization in the form of an entirely new work «The Justi-
fication of the Good». Presumably, he intended to follow up his ethical investi-
gations with respective treatises on epistemology and aesthetics. Unfortunately, 
Solovyov died having completed only three brief chapters of the Theoretical 
Philosophy. 
Solovyov's most relentless philosophical critic was B. Chicherin (1828-
1904), certainly one of the most remarkable and versatile figures in Russian in-
tellectual history. Despite his sharp differences with Solovyov, Chicherin him-
self accepted a modified Hegelian standpoint in metaphysics. Although viewing 
all of existence as rational, the rational process embodied in existence unfolds 
dialectically. Chicherin, however, parted with the traditional triadic schematiza-
tion of the Hegelian dialectic, arguing that the first moment consists of an initial 
unity of the one and the many. The second and third moments, paths, or steps 
are antithetical and take various forms in different spheres, such as matter and 
reason or universal and particular. The final moment is a fusion of the two into a 
higher unity. 
In the social and ethical realm, Chicherin placed great emphasis on indi-
vidual human freedom. Social and political laws should strive for moral neutrali-
ty, permitting the flowering of individual self-determination. In this way, he re-
mained a staunch advocate of economic liberalism, seeing essentially no role for 
government intervention. The government itself had no right to use its powers 
either to aim at a moral ideal or to force its citizens to seek an ideal. On the other 
hand, the government should not use its powers to prevent the citizenry from the 
exercise of private morality. Despite receiving less treatment than the negative 
conception of freedom, Chicherin nevertheless upheld the idealist conception of 
positive freedom as the striving for moral perfection and, in this way, reaching 
the Absolute. 
Another figure to emerge in the late 1870s and 1880s was the neo-
Leibnizian A. Kozlov (1831- 1901), who taught at Kiev University and who 
called his highly developed metaphysical stance "panpsychism." As part of this 
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stance, he, in contrast to Hume, argued for the substantial unity of the Self or I, 
which makes experience possible. This unity he held to be an obvious fact. Ad-
ditionally, rejecting the independent existence of space and time, Kozlov held 
that they possessed being only in relation to thinking and sensing creatures. 
Like Augustine, however, Kozlov believed that God viewed time as a whole 
without our divisions into past, present, and future. Indeed, the very formulation 
of the problem presupposes a relation space. Lastly, unlike Kant, Kozlov 
thought all judgments are analytic. 
An unfortunately largely neglected figure to emerge in this period was M. 
Karinsky (1840- 1917), who taught philosophy at the St. Petersburg Ecclesiastic 
Academy. Unlike many of his contemporaries, Karinsky devoted much of his 
attention to logic and an analysis of arguments in Western philosophy, rather 
than metaphysical speculation. Unlike his contemporaries, Karinsky came to 
philosophy with an analytical bent rather than with a literary flair—a fact that 
made his writing style often decidedly torturous. True to those schooled in 
the Aristotleian tradition, Karinsky, like Brentano (to whom he has been com-
pared) held that German Idealism was essentially irrationalist. Arguing against 
Kant, Karinsky believed that our inner states are not merely phenomenal, that 
the reflective self is not an appearance. Inner experience, unlike outer, yields no 
distinction between reality and appearance. In his general epistemology, Ka-
rinsky argued that knowledge was built on judgments, which were legitimate 
conclusions from premises.  
Knowledge, however, could be traced back to a set of ultimate unprovable, 
yet reliable, truths, which he called "self-evident." Karinsky argued for a prag-
matic interpretation of realism, saying that something exists in another room un-
perceived by me means I would perceive it if I were to go into that room. Addi-
tionally, he accepted an analogical argument for the existence of other minds 
similar to that of John Stuart Mill and Bertrand Russell. 
In his two-volume magnum opus «The Positive Tasks of Philosophy», L. 
Lopatin (1855-1920), who taught at Moscow University, defended the possibil-
ity of metaphysical knowledge. He claimed that empirical knowledge is limited 
to appearances, whereas metaphysics yields knowledge of the true nature of 
things. Although Lopatin saw Hegel and Spinoza as the definitive expositors of 
rationalistic idealism, he rejected both for their very transformation of concrete 
relations into rational or logical ones. Nevertheless, Lopatin affirmed the role of 
reason particularly in philosophy in conscious opposition to, as he saw it, Solo-
vyov's ultimate surrender to religion. In the first volume, he attacked material-
ism as itself a metaphysical doctrine that elevates matter to the status of an abso-
lute that cannot explain the particular properties of individual things or the rela-
tion between things and consciousness. In his second volume, Lopatin 
distinguishes mechanical causality from "creative causality," according to which 
one phenomenon follows another, though with something new added to it.  
Despite his wealth of metaphysical speculation, quite foreign to most con-
temporary readers, Lopatin's observations on the self or ego derived from specu-
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lation that is not without some interest. Denying that the self has a purely empir-
ical nature, Lopatin emphasized that the undeniable reality of time demonstrated 
the non-temporality of the self, for temporality could only be understood by that 
which is outside time. Since the self is extra-temporal, it cannot be destroyed, 
for that is an event in time. Likewise, in opposition to Solovyov, Lopatin held 
that the substantiality of the self is immediately evident in consciousness. 
In the waning years of the 19th century, neo-Kantianism came to dominate 
German philosophy. Because of the increasing tendency to send young Russian 
graduate students to Germany for additional training, it should come as no sur-
prise that that movement gained a foothold in Russia too. In one of the very few 
Russian works devoted to philosophy of science A. Vvedensky (1856-1925) 
presented, in his lengthy dissertation, a highly idealistic Kantian interpretation of 
the concept of matter as understood in the physics of his day. He tried therein to 
defend and update Kant's own work as exemplified in the Metaphysical Founda-
tions of Natural Science. Vvedensky's book, however, attracted little attention 
and exerted even less influence.  
Much more widely recognized were his own attempts in subsequent years, 
while teaching at St. Petersburg University, to recast Kant's transcendental ideal-
ism in, what he called, "logicism." Without drawing any conclusions based upon 
the nature of space and time, Vvedensky believed it possible to prove the impos-
sibility of metaphysical knowledge and, as a corollary so to speak, that every-
thing we know, including our own self, is merely an appearance, not a thing in 
itself. Vvedensky was also willing to cede that the time and the space in which 
we experience everything in the world are also phenomenal. Although meta-
physical knowledge is impossible, metaphysical hypotheses, being likewise ir-
refutable, can be brought into a world-view based on faith. Particularly useful 
are those demanded by our moral tenets such as the existence of other minds. 
We have already noted the Christian Platonism of Jurkevich, and his stu-
dent Solovyov, who with his central concept of total-unity can, in turn, also be 
seen as a modern.  In the immediate decades preceding the Bolshevik Revolu-
tion of 1917, a veritable legion of philosophers worked in Solovyov's wide 
shadow. Among the most prominent of these was S. Trubetskoi (1862-1905). 
The Platonic strain of his thought is evident in the very topics Trubetskoi chose 
for his magister's and doctoral theses: «Metaphysics in Ancient Greece», 1890 
and «The History of the Doctrine of Logos», 1900, respectively. It is, however, 
in his programmatic essays "O prirode chelovecheskovo soznanija" ("The Na-
ture of Human Consciousness"), 1889-1891 and "Osnovanija idealizma" ("The 
Foundations of Idealism"), 1896 that Trubetskoi elaborated his position with re-
gard to modern philosophy.  
Holding that the basic problem of contemporary philosophy is whether 
human knowledge is of a personal nature, Trubetskoi maintained that modern 
Western philosophers relate personal knowledge to a personal consciousness. 
Human consciousness is not an individual consciousness, but, rather, an on-
going universal process. Likewise, this process is a manifestation not of a per-
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sonal mind but of a cosmic one. Personal consciousness, as he puts it, presup-
poses a collective consciousness, and the latter presupposes an absolute con-
sciousness. Kant's great error was in conceiving the transcendental conscious-
ness as subjective. In the second of the essays mentioned above, Trubetskoi 
claims that there are three means of knowing reality: empirically through the 
senses, rationally through thought, and directly through faith.  
For him, faith is what convinces us that there is an external world, a world 
independent of my subjective consciousness. It is faith that underlies our accept-
ing the information provided by our sense organs as reliable. Moreover, it is 
faith that leads me to think there are in the world other beings with a mental or-
ganization and capacity similar to mine. However, Trubetskoi rejects equating 
his notion of faith with the passive "intellectual intuition" of Schelling and Solo-
vyov. For Trubetskoi, faith is intimately connected with the will, which is the 
basis of my individuality. My discovery of the other is grounded in my desire to 
reach out beyond myself, that is, to love. 
Although generally characterized as a neo-Leibnizian, N. Lossky (1870-
1965) was also greatly influenced by a host of Russian thinkers including Solo-
vyov and Kozlov. In addition to his own views, Lossky, having studied at Bern 
and Goettingen among other places, is remembered for his pioneering studies of 
contemporary German philosophy. He referred to Edmund Husserl's «Logical 
Investigations» already as early as 1906, and in 1911 he gave a course on Hus-
serl's "intentionalism." Despite this early interest in strict epistemological prob-
lems, Lossky in general drew ever closer to the ontological concerns and posi-
tions of Russian Orthodoxy. He termed his epistemological views "intuitivism," 
believing that the cognitive subject apprehends the external world as it is in it-
self directly. Nevertheless, the object of cognition remains ontologically trans-
cendent, while epistemologically immanent.  
This direct penetration into reality is possible, Lossky tells us, because all 
worldly entities are interconnected into an "organic whole." Additionally, all 
sensory properties of an object (for example, its color, texture, temperature, and 
so on) are actual properties of the object, our sense stimulation serving merely to 
direct our mental attention to those properties. That different people see one ob-
ject in different ways is explained as a result of different ways individuals have 
of getting their attention directly towards one of the object's numerous proper-
ties. All entities, events, and relations that lack a temporal and spatial character 
possess "ideal being" and are the objects of "intellectual intuition." Yet, there is 
another, a third, realm of being that transcends the laws of logic (here we see the 
influence of Lossky's teacher, Vvedensky), which he calls "metalogical being" 
and is the object of mystical intuition. 
Another kindred spirit was S. Frank (1877-1950), who in his early adult 
years was involved with Marxism and political activities. His magister's the-
sis «The Object of Knowledge», 1915, is notable as much for its masterful han-
dling of current Western philosophy as for its overall metaphysical position. 
Demonstrating a grasp not only of German neo-Kantianism, Frank drew freely 
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from, among many others, Husserl, Henri-Louis Bergson, and Max Scheler; he 
may even have been the first in Russian to refer to Gottlob Frege, 
whose Foundations of Arithmetic Frank calls "one of the rare genuinely philo-
sophical works by a mathematician." Frank contends that all logically deter-
mined objects are possible thanks to a metalogical unity, which is itself not sub-
ject to the laws of logic. Likewise, all logical knowledge is possible thanks sole-
ly to an "intuition," an "integral intuition," of this unity.  
Such intuition is possible because all of us are part of this unity or Abso-
lute. In a subsequent book «The Unknowable», 1939, Frank further elaborated 
his view stating that mystical experience reveals the supra-logical sphere in 
which we are immersed but which cannot be conceptually described. Although 
there is a great deal more to Frank's thought, we see that we are quickly leaving 
behind the secular, philosophical sphere for the religious, if not mystical. 
No survey, however brief, of Russian thinkers under Solovyov's influence 
would be satisfactory without mention of the best known of these in the West, 
namely N. Berdjaev (1874-1948). Widely hailed as a Christian existentialist, he 
began his intellectual journey as a Marxist. However, by the time of his first 
publications he was attempting to unite a revolutionary political outlook with 
transcendental idealism, particularly a Kantian ethic. Within the next few years, 
Berdjaev's thought evolved quickly and decisively away from Marxism and 
away from critical idealism to an outright Orthodox Christian idealism.  
On the issue of free will versus determinism, Berdjaev moved from an ini-
tial acceptance of soft determinism to a resolute incompatibilist. Morality, he 
claimed, demanded his stand. Certainly, Berdjaev was among the first, if 
not the first, philosopher of his era to diminish the importance of epistemology 
in place of ontology. In time, however, he himself made clear that the pivot of 
his thought was not the concept of being as it would be for some others, and 
even less that of knowledge, but, rather, the concept of freedom. Acknowledging 
his debt to Kant, Berdjaev too saw science as providing knowledge of phenome-
nal reality but not of actuality, of things as they are in themselves.  
However applicable the categories of logic and physics may be to appear-
ances, they are assuredly inapplicable to the noumenal world and, in particular, 
to God. In this way Berdjaev does not object to the neo-Kantianism of Vveden-
sky, for whom the objectification of the world is a result of functioning of the 
human cognitive apparatus, but only that it does not go far enough. There is an-
other world or realm, namely one characterized by freedom. 
Just as all of the above figures drew inspiration from Christian neo-
Platonism, so too did they all feel the need to address the Kantian heritage. 
Lossky's dissertation  The Foundations of Intuitivism, for example, is an extend-
ed engagement with Kant's epistemology, Lossky himself having prepared a 
Russian translation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reasoncomparable in style and 
adequacy to Norman Kemp Smith's famous rendering into English.  
Trubetskoi called Kant the "Copernicus of modern philosophy," who "dis-
covered that there is an a priori precondition of all possible experience." Never-
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theless, among the philosophers of this era, not all saw transcendental idealism 
as a springboard to religious and mystical thought. A student of Vvedensky's, I. 
Lapshin (1870-1952) in his dissertation «The Laws of Thought and the Forms of 
Cognition», 1906, attempted to show that, contrary to Kant's stand, space and 
time were categories of cognition and that all thought, even logical, relies on a 
categorical synthesis. Consequently, the laws of logic are themselves synthetic, 
not analytic, as Kant had thought and are applicable only within the bounds of 
possible experience. 
G. Chelpanov (1863-1936), who taught at Moscow University, was another 
with a broadly conceived Kantian stripe. Remembered as much, if not more so, 
for his work in experimental psychology as in philosophy, Chelpanov, unlike 
many others, wished to retain the concept of the thing-in-itself, seeing it as that 
which ultimately "evokes" a particular representation of an object. Without it, 
contended Chelpanov, we are left (as in Kant) without an explanation of why we 
perceive this, and not that, particular object. In much the same manner, we must 
appeal to some transcendent space in order to account for why we see an object 
in this spot and not another. For these reasons, Chelpanov called his position 
"critical realism" as opposed to the more usual construal of Kantianism as "tran-
scendental idealism." In psychology, Chelpanov upheld the psychophysical par-
allelism of Wilhelm Wundt. 
As the years of the First World War approached, a new generation of 
scholars came to the fore who returned to Russia from graduate work in Germa-
ny broadly sympathetic to one or even an amalgam of the schools of neo-
Kantianism. Among these young scholars, the works of B. Kistjakovsky (1868-
1920) and P. Novgorodtsev (1866-1924) stand out as arguably the most accessi-
ble today for their analytic approach to questions of social-science methodology. 
During this period, Husserlian phenomenology was introduced into Russia 
from a number of sources, but its first and, in a sense, only major propagandist 
was G. Shpet (1879-1937), whom we have referred to earlier. In any case, be-
sides his historical studies Shpet did pioneering work in hermeneutics as early as 
1918. Additionally, in two memorable essays he respectively argued, along the 
lines of the early Husserl and the late Solovyov, against the Husserlian view of 
the transcendental ego and in the other traced the Husserlian notion of philoso-
phy as a rigorous science back to Parmenides. 
Regrettably, Shpet was permanently silenced during the Stalinist era, but A. 
Losev (1893-1988), whose early works fruitfully employed some early phenom-
enological techniques, survived and blossomed in its aftermath. Concentrating 
on ancient Greek thought, particularly aesthetics, his numerous publications 
have yet to be assimilated into world literature, although during later years his 
enormous contributions were recognized within his homeland and by others to 
whom they were linguistically accessible. It must be said, nonetheless, that Lo-
sev's personal pronouncements hark back to a neo-Platonism completely at odds 
with the modern temperament. 
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The best known dispute occurred between the "mechanists" and the "dia-
lecticians" or "Deborinists," after its principal advocate A. Deborin (1881-1963). 
Since a number of individuals composed both groups and the issues in dispute 
evolved over time, no simple statement of the respective stances can do com-
plete justice to either. Nevertheless, the mechanists essentially held that philoso-
phy as a separate discipline had no reason for being within the Soviet state. All 
philosophical problems could and would be resolved by the natural sciences. 
The hallowed dialectical method of Marxism was, in fact, just the scientific 
method.  
The Deborinists, on the other hand, defended the existence of philosophy as 
a separate discipline. Indeed, they viewed the natural sciences as built on a set of 
philosophical principles. Unlike the mechanists, they saw nature as fundamen-
tally dialectical, which could not be reduced to simpler mechanical terms. Even 
human history and society proceeded dialectically in taking leaps that resulted in 
qualitatively different states. The specifics of the controversy, which raged until 
1929, are of marginal philosophical importance now, but to some degree the 
basic issue of the relation of philosophy to the sciences, of the role of the former 
with regard to the latter, endures to this day. Regrettably, politics played as 
much of a role in the course of the dispute as abstract reasoning, and the out-
come was a simple matter of a political fiat with the Deborinists gaining a tem-
porary victory.  
Subsequent events over the next two decades, such as the defeat of the De-
borinists, have nothing to do with philosophy. What philosophy did continue to 
be pursued during these years within Russia was kept a personal secret, any dis-
closure of which was at the expense of one's life. To a certain degree, the issue 
of the role of philosophy arose again in the 1950s when the philosophical impli-
cations of relativity theory became a disputed subject. Again, the issue arose of 
whether philosophy or science had priority. This time, however, with atomic 
weapons securely in hand there could be no doubt as to the ultimate victor with 
little need for political intervention. 
I. Pavlov (1849-1936), already a star of Russian science at the time of the 
Revolution, was quickly seen as utilizing a method that subjected psychic activi-
ty to the objective methods of the natural sciences. The issue became, however, 
whether the use of objective methods would eliminate the need to invoke such 
traditional terms as consciousness. The central figure here was V. Bekhterev 
(1857-1927), who believed that since all mental processes eventually manifested 
themselves in objectively observable behavior, subjective terminology was su-
perfluous. Again, the discussion was silenced through political means once a 
victory was secured over the introspectionists. Bekhterev's behaviorism was it-
self found to be dangerously leftist. 
As noted above, during the 1930s and '40s, independent philosophizing vir-
tually ceased to exist, and what little was published is of no more than historical 
interest. Indicative of the condition of Russian thought at this time is the fact 
that when in 1946 the government decided to introduce logic into the curriculum 
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of secondary schools the only suitable text available was a slim book by 
Chelpanov dating from before the Revolution.  
After Joseph Stalin's death, a relative relaxation or "thaw" in the harsh in-
tellectual climate was permitted, of course within the strict bounds of the official 
state ideology. In addition to the re-surfacing of the old issue of the role of 
Marxism with respect to the natural sciences, Russian scholars sought a return to 
the traditional texts in hopes of understanding the original inspiration of the offi-
cial philosophy. Some, such as the young A. Zinoviev (1922-2006) sought an 
understanding of "dialectical logic" in terms of the operations, procedures and 
techniques employed in political economics. Others, for example, V. Tugarinov, 
drew heavily on Hegel's example in attempting to delineate a system of funda-
mental categories. 
After the formal recognition in the validity of formal logic, it received sig-
nificant attention in the ensuing years by Zinoviev, D. Gorsky, and E. Voishvil-
lo, among many others. Their works have deservedly received international at-
tention and made no use of the official ideology. What sense, if any, to make of 
"dialectical logic" was another matter that could not remain politically neutral. 
Until the last days of the Soviet period, there was no consensus as to what it is or 
its relation to formal logic.  
One of the most resolute defenders of dialectical logic was E. Ilyenkov, 
who has received attention even in the West. In epistemology too, surface 
agreement, demonstrated through use of an official vocabulary obscured (but did 
not quite hide) differences of opinion concerning precisely how to construe the 
official stand. It certainly now appears that little of enduring worth in this field 
was published during the Soviet years. However, some philosophers who were 
active at that time produced works that only recently have been published. Per-
haps the most striking example is M. Mamardashvili (1930-1990), who during 
his lifetime was noted for his deep interest in the history of philosophy and his 
anti-Hegelian stands. 
 
20. Ontology of philosophy 
 
As a first approximation, ontology is the study of what there is. Some con-
test this formulation of what ontology is, so it's only a first approximation. Many 
classical philosophical problems are problems in ontology: the question whether 
or not there is a god, or the problem of the existence of universals, etc. These are 
all problems in ontology in the sense that they deal with whether or not a certain 
thing, or more broadly entity, exists. But ontology is usually also taken to en-
compass problems about the most general features and relations of the entities 
which do exist. There are also a number of classic philosophical problems that 
are problems in ontology understood this way. For example, the problem of how 
a universal relates to a particular that has it (assuming there are universals and 
particulars), or the problem of how an event like John eating a cookie relates to 
the particulars John and the cookie, and the relation of eating, assuming there 
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are events, particulars and relations. These kinds of problems quickly turn into 
metaphysics more generally, which is the philosophical discipline that encom-
passes ontology as one of its parts. The borders here are a little fuzzy. But we 
have at least two parts to the overall philosophical project of ontology: first, say 
what there is, what exists, what the stuff is reality is made out off, secondly, say 
what the most general features and relations of these things are. 
This way of looking at ontology comes with two sets of problems which to 
the philosophical discipline of ontology being more complex than just answering 
the above questions. The first set of problems is that it isn't clear how to ap-
proach answering these questions. This leads to the debate about ontological 
commitment. The second set of problems is that it isn't so clear what these ques-
tions really are. This leads to the philosophical debate about meta-ontology. One 
of the troubles with ontology is that it not only isn't clear what there is, it also 
isn't so clear how to settle questions about what there is, at least not for the kinds 
of things that have traditionally been of special interest to philosophers: num-
bers, properties, God and etc.  
Ontology is thus a philosophical discipline that encompasses besides the 
study of what there is and the study of the general features of what there is also 
the study of what is involved in settling questions about what there is in general, 
especially for the philosophically tricky cases. How we can find out what there 
is isn't an easy question to answer. It seems simple enough for regular objects 
that we can perceive with our eyes, like my house keys, but how should we de-
cide it for such things as, say, numbers or properties? One first step to making 
progress on this question is to see if what we believe already rationally settles 
this question.  
That is to say, given that we have certain beliefs, do these beliefs already 
bring with them a rational commitment to an answer to such questions as ‘Are 
there numbers?’ If our beliefs bring with them a rational commitment to an an-
swer to an ontological question about the existence of certain entities then we 
can say that we are committed to the existence of these entities. What precisely 
is required for such a commitment to occur is subject to debate, a debate we will 
look at momentarily. To find out what one is committed to with a particular set 
of beliefs, or acceptance of a particular theory of the world, is part of the larger 
discipline of ontology. 
Besides it not being so clear what it is to commit yourself to an answer to 
an ontological question, it also isn't so clear what an ontological question really 
is, and thus what it is that ontology is supposed to accomplish. To figure this out 
is the task of meta-ontology, which strictly speaking is not part of ontology con-
strued narrowly, but the study of what ontology is. However, like most philo-
sophical disciplines, ontology more broadly construed contains its own meta-
study, and thus meta-ontology is part of ontology, more broadly construed. 
Nonetheless it is helpful to separate it out as a special part of ontology.  
Many of the philosophically most fundamental questions about ontology 
really are meta-ontological questions. Meta-ontology has not been too popular in 
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the last couple of decades, partly because one meta-ontological view, the one of-
ten associated with Quine, has been accepted as the correct one, but this ac-
ceptance has been challenged in recent years in a variety of ways. One motiva-
tion for the study of meta-ontology is simply the question of what question on-
tology aims to answer. Take the case of numbers, for example. What is the 
question that we should aim to answer in ontology if we want to find out if there 
are numbers, that is, if reality contains numbers besides whatever else it is made 
up from?  
This way an easy answer: ‘Are there numbers?’ But this question seems 
like an easy one to answer. An answer to it is implied, it seems, by trivial math-
ematics, say that the number 7 is less than the number 8. If the latter, then there 
is a number which is less than 8, namely 7, and thus there is at least one number. 
Can ontology be that easy? The study of meta-ontology will have to determine, 
amongst others, if ‘Are there numbers?’ really is the question that the discipline 
of ontology is supposed to answer, and more generally, what ontology is sup-
posed to do. We will pursue these questions below. As we will see, several phi-
losophers think that ontology is supposed to answer a different question than 
what there is, but they often disagree on what that question is. 
 
21. Philosophy of space and time 
 
Philosophy of space and time is the branch of philosophy concerned with 
the issues surrounding the ontology, epistemology, and character of space 
and time. While such ideas have been central to philosophy from its inception, 
the philosophy of space and time was both an inspiration for and a central aspect 
of early analytic philosophy. The subject focuses on a number of basic issues, 
including whether time and space exist independently of the mind, whether they 
exist independently of one another, what accounts for time's apparently unidirec-
tional flow, whether times other than the present moment exist, and questions 
about the nature of identity (particularly the nature of identity over time). 
Plato identified time with the period of motion of the heavenly bodies, and 
space as that in which things come to be. Aristotle, in Book IV of his «Physics», 
defined time as the number of changes with respect to before and after, and the 
place of an object as the innermost motionless boundary of that which surrounds 
it. In Book 11 of St. Augustine's «Confessions», he ruminates on the nature of 
time, asking, "What then is time? If no one asks me, I know: if I wish to explain 
it to one that asketh, I know not."  
He goes on to comment on the difficulty of thinking about time, pointing 
out the inaccuracy of common speech: "For but few things are there of which we 
speak properly; of most things we speak improperly, still the things intended are 
understood."  But Augustine presented the first philosophical argument for the 
reality of Creation (against Aristotle) in the context of his discussion of time, 
saying that knowledge of time depends on the knowledge of the movement of 
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things, and therefore time cannot be where there are no creatures to measure its 
passing. 
In contrast to ancient Greek philosophers who believed that the universe 
had an infinite past with no beginning, medieval philosophers and theologians 
developed the concept of the universe having a finite past with a beginning, now 
known as temporal finitism. A traditional realist position in ontology is that time 
and space have existence apart from the human mind. Idealists, by contrast, de-
ny or doubt the existence of objects independent of the mind. Some anti-realists, 
whose ontological position is that objects outside the mind do exist, nevertheless 
doubt the independent existence of time and space. 
In 1781, Immanuel Kant published the «Critique of Pure Reason», one of 
the most influential works in the history of the philosophy of space and time. He 
describes time as an a priori notion that, together with other a priori notions such 
as space, allows us to comprehend sense experience. Kant denies that either 
space or time are substance, entities in them selves, or learned by experience; he 
holds, rather, that both are elements of a systematic framework we use to struc-
ture our experience. Spatial measurements are used to quantify how far 
apart objects are, and temporal measurements are used to quantitatively compare 
the interval between (or duration of) events. Although space and time are held to 
be transcendentally ideal in this sense, they are also empirically real—that is, not 
mere illusions. 
Idealist writers, such as J. M. E. McTaggart in «The Unreality of Time», 
have argued that time is an illusion (see also the flow of time, below). The writ-
ers discussed here are for the most part realists in this regard; for in-
stance, Gottfried Leibniz held that his monads existed, at least independently of 
the mind of the observer. The great debate between defining notions of space 
and time as real objects themselves (absolute), or mere orderings upon actual 
objects (relational), began between physicists Isaac Newton (via his spokesman, 
Samuel Clarke) and Gottfried Leibniz in the papers of the Leibniz–Clarke corre-
spondence. Arguing against the absolutist position,  
Leibniz offers a number of thought experiments with the purpose of show-
ing that there is contradiction in assuming the existence of facts such as absolute 
location and velocity. These arguments trade heavily on two principles central to 
his philosophy: the principle of sufficient reason and the identity of indiscerni-
bles. The principle of sufficient reason holds that for every fact, there is a reason 
that is sufficient to explain what and why it is the way it is and not otherwise. 
The identity of indiscernibles states that if there is no way of telling two entities 
apart, then they are one and the same thing. 
The example Leibniz uses involves two proposed universes situated in ab-
solute space. The only discernible difference between them is that the latter is 
positioned five feet to the left of the first. The example is only possible if such a 
thing as absolute space exists. Such a situation, however, is not possible, accord-
ing to Leibniz, for if it were, a universe's position in absolute space would have 
no sufficient reason, as it might very well have been anywhere else. Therefore, it 
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contradicts the principle of sufficient reason and there could existes two distinct 
universes that were in all ways indiscernible, thus contradicting the identity of 
indiscernibles. 
Standing out in Clarke's (and Newton's) response to Leibniz's arguments is 
the bucket argument: Water in a bucket, hung from a rope and set to spin, will 
start with a flat surface. As the water begins to spin in the bucket, the surface of 
the water will become concave. If the bucket is stopped, the water will continue 
to spin, and while the spin continues, the surface will remain concave. The con-
cave surface is apparently not the result of the interaction of the bucket and the 
water, since the surface is flat when the bucket first starts to spin, it becomes 
concave as the water starts to spin, and it remains concave as the bucket stops. 
In this response, Clarke argues for the necessity of the existence of absolute 
space to account for phenomena like rotation and acceleration that cannot be ac-
counted for on a purely relationalist account. Clarke argues that since the curva-
ture of the water occurs in the rotating bucket as well as in the stationary bucket 
containing spinning water, it can only be explained by stating that the water is 
rotating in relation to the presence of some third thing—absolute space. 
Leibniz describes a space that exists only as a relation between objects, and 
which has no existence apart from the existence of those objects. Motion exists 
only as a relation between those objects. Newtonian space provided the absolute 
frame of reference within which objects can have motion. In Newton's system, 
the frame of reference exists independently of the objects contained within it. 
These objects can be described as moving in relation to space itself. For many 
centuries, the evidence of a concave water surface held authority. 
Another important figure in this debate is 19th-century physicist Ernst 
Mach. While he did not deny the existence of phenomena like that seen in the 
bucket argument, he still denied the absolutist conclusion by offering a different 
answer as to what the bucket was rotating in relation to: the fixed stars. 
Mach suggested that thought experiments like the bucket argument are 
problematic. If we were to imagine a universe that only contains a bucket, on 
Newton's account, this bucket could be set to spin relative to absolute space, and 
the water it contained would form the characteristic concave surface. But in the 
absence of anything else in the universe, it would be difficult to confirm that the 
bucket was indeed spinning. It seems equally possible that the surface of the wa-
ter in the bucket would remain flat. 
Mach argued that, in effect, the water experiment in an otherwise empty 
universe would remain flat. But if another object were introduced into this uni-
verse, perhaps a distant star, there would now be something relative to which the 
bucket could be seen as rotating. The water inside the bucket could possibly 
have a slight curve. To account for the curve that we observe, an increase in the 
number of objects in the universe also increases the curvature in the water. Mach 
argued that the momentum of an object, whether angular or linear, exists as a re-
sult of the sum of the effects of other objects in the universe (Mach's Principle). 
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Albert Einstein proposed that the laws of physics should be based on 
the principle of relativity. This principle holds that the rules of physics must be 
the same for all observers, regardless of the frame of reference that is used, and 
that light propagates at the same speed in all reference frames. This theory was 
motivated by Maxwell's equations, which show that electromagnetic waves 
propagate in a vacuum at the speed of light. However, Maxwell's equations give 
no indication of what this speed is relative to. Prior to Einstein, it was thought 
that this speed was relative to a fixed medium, called the luminiferous ether.  
In contrast, the theory of special relativity postulates that light propagates 
at the speed of light in all inertial frames, and examines the implications of this 
postulate. All attempts to measure any speed relative to this ether failed, which 
can be seen as a confirmation of Einstein's postulate that light propagates at the 
same speed in all reference frames. Special relativity is a formalization of the 
principle of relativity that does not contain a privileged inertial frame of refer-
ence, such as the luminiferous ether or absolute space, from which Einstein in-
ferred that no such frame exists. 
Einstein generalized relativity to frames of reference that were non-inertial. 
He achieved this by positing the Equivalence Principle, which states that the 
force felt by an observer in a given gravitational field and that felt by an observ-
er in an accelerating frame of reference are indistinguishable. This led to the 
conclusion that the mass of an object warps the geometry of the space-time sur-
rounding it, as described in Einstein's field equations. 
In classical physics, an inertial reference frame is one in which an object 
that experiences no forces does not accelerate. In general relativity, an inertial 
frame of reference is one that is following a geodesic of space-time. An object 
that moves against a geodesic experiences a force. An object in free fall does not 
experience a force, because it is following a geodesic. An object standing on the 
earth, however, will experience a force, as it is being held against the geodesic 
by the surface of the planet. In light of this, the bucket of water rotating in empty 
space will experience a force because it rotates with respect to the geodesic. The 
water will become concave, not because it is rotating with respect to the distant 
stars, but because it is rotating with respect to the geodesic. 
Einstein partially advocates Mach's principle in that distant stars explain 
inertia because they provide the gravitational field against which acceleration 
and inertia occur. But contrary to Leibniz's account, this warped space-time is as 
integral a part of an object as are its other defining characteristics, such as vol-
ume and mass. If one holds, contrary to idealist beliefs, that objects exist inde-
pendently of the mind, it seems that relativistics commits them to also hold that 
space and temporality have exactly the same type of independent existence. 
The position of conventionalism states that there is no fact of the matter as 
to the geometry of space and time, but that it is decided by convention. The first 
proponent of such a view, Henri Poincaré, reacting to the creation of the 
new non-Euclidean geometry, argued that which geometry applied to a space 
was decided by convention, since different geometries will describe a set of ob-
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jects equally well, based on considerations from his sphere-world. This view 
was developed and updated to include considerations from relativistic physics 
by Hans Reichenbach. Reichenbach's conventionalism, applying to space and 
time, focuses around the idea of coordinative definition. 
Coordinative definition has two major features. The first has to do with co-
ordinating units of length with certain physical objects. This is motivated by the 
fact that we can never directly apprehend length. Instead we must choose some 
physical object, say the Standard Metre at the Bureau International des Poids et 
Mesures (International Bureau of Weights and Measures), or the wavelength 
of cadmium to stand in as our unit of length. The second feature deals with sepa-
rated objects.  
Although we can, presumably, directly test the equality of length of two 
measuring rods when they are next to one another, we can not find out as much 
for two rods distant from one another. Even supposing that two rods, whenever 
brought near to one another are seen to be equal in length, we are not justified in 
stating that they are always equal in length. This impossibility undermines our 
ability to decide the equality of length of two distant objects. Sameness of 
length, to the contrary, must be set by definition. 
Such a use of coordinative definition is in effect, on Reichenbach's conven-
tionalism, in the General Theory of Relativity where light is assumed, i.e. not 
discovered, to mark out equal distances in equal times. After this setting of co-
ordinative definition, however, the geometry of spacetime is set. As in the abso-
lutism/relationalism debate, contemporary philosophy is still in disagreement as 
to the correctness of the conventionalist doctrine. While conventionalism still 
holds many proponents, cutting criticisms concerning the coherence of Reichen-
bach's doctrine of coordinative definition have led many to see the conventional-
ist view as untenable. 
 
22. Dialectical philosophical theory 
 
Dialectical materialism, a philosophical approach to reality derived from 
the teachings of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. For Marx and Engels, materi-
alism meant that the material world, perceptible to the senses, has objective real-
ity independent of mind or spirit. They did not deny the reality of mental or spir-
itual processes but affirmed that ideas could arise, therefore, only as products 
and reflections of material conditions. Marx and Engels understood materialism 
as the opposite of idealism, by which they meant any theory that treats matter as 
dependent on mind or spirit, or mind or spirit as capable of existing inde-
pendently of matter. For them, the materialist and idealist views were irreconcil-
ably opposed throughout the historical development of philosophy. They adopt-
ed a thoroughgoing materialist approach, holding that any attempt to combine or 
reconcile materialism with idealism must result in confusion and inconsistency. 
Marx’s and Engels’ conception of dialectics owes much to G.W.F. Hegel. 
In opposition to the metaphysical mode of thought, which viewed things 
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in abstraction, each by itself and as though endowed with fixed properties, He-
gelian dialectics considers things in their movements and changes, interrelations 
and interactions. Everything is in continual process of becoming and ceasing to 
be, in which nothing is permanent but everything changes and is eventually su-
perseded. All things contain contradictory sides or aspects, whose tension or 
conflict is the driving force of change and eventually transforms or dissolves 
them. But whereas Hegel saw change and development as the expression of the 
world spirit, or Idea, realizing itself in nature and in human society, for Marx 
and Engels change was inherent in the nature of the material world. They there-
fore held that one could not, as Hegel tried, deduce the actual course of events 
from any principles of dialectics; the principles must be inferred from the 
events. 
The theory of knowledge of Marx and Engels started from the material-
ist premise that all knowledge is derived from the senses. But against the mech-
anist view that derives knowledge exclusively from given sense impressions, 
they stressed the dialectical development of human knowledge, socially acquired 
in the course of practical activity. Individuals can gain knowledge of things only 
through their practical interaction with those things, framing their ideas corre-
sponding to their practice; and social practice alone provides the test of the cor-
respondence of idea with reality - i.e., of truth. This theory of knowledge is op-
posed equally to the subjective idealism according to which individuals can 
know only sensible appearances while things-in-themselves are elusive and to 
the objective idealism according to which individuals can know supersensible 
reality by pure intuition or thought, independent of sense. 
The concept of dialectical materialism - which is a theoretical basis for a 
method of reasoning - should not be confused with “historical materialism,” 
which is the Marxist interpretation of history in terms of the class struggle. 
There exists no systematic exposition of dialectical materialism by Marx and 
Engels, who stated their philosophical views mainly in the course of polemics. 
 
23. Principle and law of the dialectica 
 
Hegel and Marx developed a new form of thinking and Logic, which he 
called "speculative reason" (which includes the more famous concept of "dialec-
tic") to try to overcome what he saw as the limitations of both common sense 
and of traditional philosophy at grasping philosophical problems and the rela-
tion between thought and reality. His method was to begin with ultra-basic con-
cepts (like Being and Nothing), and to develop these through a long sequence of 
elaborations towards solutions that take the form of series of concepts.  
He employed the tried-and-tested process of dialectic (which dates back to 
Aristotle and involves resolving a thesis and its opposing antithesis into 
a synthesis), but asserted that this logical process was not just a matter 
of form as separate from content, but had applications and repercussions in 
the real world. He also took the concept of the dialectic one step further, arguing 
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that the new synthesis is not the final truth of the matter, but rather became 
the new thesis with its corresponding antithesis and synthesis. This process 
would continue effectively ad infitum, until reaching the ultimate synthesis, 
which is what Hegel called the Absolute Idea. 
Hegel's main philosophical project, then, was to take the contradictions and 
tensions he saw throughout modern philosophy, culture and society, and inter-
pret them as part of a comprehensive, evolving, rational unity that, in different 
contexts, he called "the absolute idea" or "absolute knowledge". He believed that 
everything was interrelated and that the separation of reality into discrete 
parts (as all philosophers since Aristotle had done) was wrong. He advocated a 
kind of historically-minded Absolute Idealism developed out of the Transcen-
dental Idealism of Immanuel Kant, in which the universe would realize 
its spiritual potential through the development of human society, and in which 
mind and nature can be seen as two abstractions of one indivisible whole Spirit. 
However, the traditional triadic dialectical interpretation of Hegel's ap-
proach (thesis - antithesis - synthesis) is perhaps too simplistic. From Hegel's 
point of view, analysis of any apparently simple identity or unity reveals under-
lying inner contradictions, and it is these contradictions that lead to the dissolu-
tion of the thing or idea in the simple form in which it presented itself, and its 
development into a higher-level, more complex thing or idea that more ade-
quately incorporates the contradictions. 
Hegel was the first major philosopher to regard history and the Philosophy 
of History as important. Hegel's Historicism is the position that all human socie-
ties (and all human activities such as science, art or philosophy) are defined by 
their history, and that their essence can be sought only through understanding 
that. According to Hegel, to understand why a person is the way he is, you must 
put that person in a society; and to understand that society, you must understand 
its history, and the forces that shaped it. He is famously quoted as claiming that 
"Philosophy is the history of philosophy". 
His system for understanding history, and the world itself, was developed 
from his famous dialectic teachings of thesis, antithesis and synthesis. He saw 
history as as a progression, always moving forward, never static, in which 
each successive movement emerges as a solution to the contradictions inherent 
in the preceding movement. He believed that every complex situation contains 
within itself conflicting elements, which work to destabilize the situation, lead-
ing it to breakdown into a new situation in which the conflicts are resolved. 
Thus, the history of any human endeavour not only builds upon, but also reacts 
against, what has gone before. This process, though, is an ongoing one, because 
the resulting synthesis has itself inherent contradictions which need to be re-
solved (so that the synthesis becomes the new thesis for another round of the di-
alectic). Crucially, however, Hegel believed that this dialectical process was not 
just random, but that it had a direction or a goal, and that goal was freedom (and 
our consciousness and awareness of freedom) and of the absolute knowledge of 
mind as the ultimate reality. 
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24. Philosophy of the nature 
 
Natural philosophy or philosophy of nature (from Latin philosophia natu-
ralis) was the philosophical study of nature and the physical universe that was 
dominant before the development of modern science. It is considered to be the 
precursor of natural science. 
From the ancient world, starting with Aristotle, to the 19th century, the 
term «natural philosophy» was the common term used to describe the practice of 
studying nature. It was in the 19th century that the concept of «science» received 
its modern shape with new titles emerging such as «biology» and «biologist», 
«physics» and «physicist» among other technical fields and titles; institutions 
and communities were founded, and unprecedented applications to and interac-
tions with other aspects of society and culture occurred. Isaac Newton's 
book «Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica» (1687), whose title trans-
lates to «Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy», reflects the then-
current use of the words «natural philosophy», akin to "systematic study of na-
ture". Even in the 19th century, a treatise by Lord Kelvin and Peter Guthrie Tait, 
which helped define much of modern physics, was titled «Treatise on Natural 
Philosophy» (1867). 
In the German tradition, Naturphilosophie (philosophy of nature) persisted 
into the 18th and 19th century as an attempt to achieve a speculative unity 
of nature and spirit. Some of the greatest names in German philosophy are asso-
ciated with this movement, including Goethe, Hegel and Schelling. Naturphilos-
ophie was associated with Romanticism and a view that regarded the natural 
world as a kind of giant organism, as opposed to the philosophical approach of 
figures such as John Locke and Isaac Newton who espoused a more mechanical 
view of the world, regarding it as being like a machine. 
The term natural philosophy preceded our current natural science (i.e. em-
pirical science). Empirical science historically developed out of philosophy or, 
more specifically, natural philosophy. Natural philosophy was distinguished 
from the other precursor of modern science, natural history, in that natural phi-
losophy involved reasoning and explanations about nature (and af-
ter Galileo, quantitative reasoning), whereas natural history was essential-
ly qualitative and descriptive. 
In the 14th and 15th centuries, natural philosophy was one of many branch-
es of philosophy, but was not a specialized field of study. The first person ap-
pointed as a specialist in Natural Philosophy per se was Jacopo Zabarella, at 
the University of Padua in 1577. 
Modern meanings of the terms science and scientists date only to the 19th 
century. Before that, science was a synonym for knowledge or study, in keeping 
with its Latin origin. The term gained its modern meaning when experimental 
science and the scientific method became a specialized branch of study apart 
from natural philosophy. 
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From the mid-19th century, when it became increasingly unusual for scien-
tists to contribute to both physics and chemistry, "natural philosophy" came to 
mean just physics, and the word is still used in that sense in degree titles at 
the University of Oxford. In general, chairs of Natural Philosophy established 
long ago at the oldest universities are nowadays occupied mainly by physics 
professors. Isaac Newton's book «Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathemati-
ca» (1687), whose title translates to "Mathematical Principles of Natural Philos-
ophy", reflects the then-current use of the words "natural philosophy", akin to 
"systematic study of nature". Even in the 19th century, a treatise by Lord Kel-
vin and Peter Guthrie Tait, which helped define much of modern physics, was 
titled «Treatise on Natural Philosophy» (1867). 
 
25. Philosophical conception of the natural science 
 
In Plato's earliest known dialogue, Charmides distinguishes be-
tween science or bodies of knowledge that produce a physical result, and those 
that do not. Natural philosophy has been categorized as a theoretical rather than 
a practical branch of philosophy (like ethics). Sciences that guide arts and draw 
on the philosophical knowledge of nature may produce practical results, but 
these subsidiary sciences (e.g., architecture or medicine) go beyond natural phi-
losophy. The study of natural philosophy seeks to explore the cosmos by any 
means necessary to understand the universe. Some ideas presuppose that change 
is a reality. Although this may seem obvious, there have been some philosophers 
who have denied the concept of metamorphosis, such as Plato's predeces-
sor Parmenides and later Greek philosopher Sextus Empiricus, and perhaps 
some Eastern philosophers. George Santayana, in his Scepticism and Animal 
Faith, attempted to show that the reality of change cannot be proven. If his rea-
soning is sound, it follows that to be a physicist, one must restrain one's skepti-
cism enough to trust one's senses, or else rely on anti-realism. 
René Descartes' metaphysical system of Cartesian Dualism describes two 
kinds of substance: matter and mind. According to this system, everything that is 
"matter" is deterministic and natural—and so belongs to natural philosophy—
and everything that is "mind" is volitional and non-natural, and falls outside the 
domain of philosophy of nature. 
Major branches of natural philosophy include astronomy and cosmology, 
the study of nature on the grand scale; etiology, the study of (intrinsic and some-
times extrinsic) causes; the study of chance, probability and randomness; the 
study of elements; the study of the infinite and the unlimited (virtual or actual); 
the study of matter; mechanics, the study of translation of motion and change; 
the study of nature or the various sources of actions; the study of natu-
ral qualities; the study of physical quantities; the study of relations between 
physical entities; and the philosophy of space and time.  
Humankind's mental engagement with nature certainly predates civilization 
and the record of history. Philosophical, and specifically non-religious thought 
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about the natural world, goes back to ancient Greece. These lines of thought be-
gan before Socrates, who turned from his philosophical studies from specula-
tions about nature to a consideration of man, viz. and political philosophy.  
The thought of early philosophers such Parmenides, Heraclitus, and 
Democritus centered on the natural world. In addition, three presocratic philoso-
phers who lived in the Ionian town of Miletus (hence the Milesian School of 
philosophy,) Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes, attempted to explain natu-
ral phenomena without recourse to creation myths involving the Greek gods. 
They were called the physikoi (natural philosophers,) or, as Aristotle referred to 
them, the physiologoi. Plato followed Socrates in concentrating on man. It was 
Plato's student, Aristotle, who, in basing his thought on the natural world, re-
turned empiricism to its primary place, while leaving room in the world for 
man. Martin Heidegger observes that Aristotle was the originator of conception 
of nature that prevailed in the middle Ages into the modern era: 
The Physics is a lecture in which he seeks to determine beings that arise on 
their own, τ φύσει ντα, with regard to their being. Aristotelian "physics" is dif-
ferent from what we mean today by this word, not only to the extent that it be-
longs to antiquity whereas the modern physical sciences belong to modernity, 
rather above all it is different by virtue of the fact that Aristotle's physics is phi-
losophy, whereas modern physics is a positive science that presupposes 
a philosophy. This book determines the warp and woof of the whole of Western 
thinking, even at that place where it, as modern thinking, appears to think at 
odds with ancient thinking. But opposition is invariably comprised of a decisive, 
and often even perilous, dependence. Without Aristotle's Physics there would 
have been no Galileo.  
The scientific method has ancient precedents and Galileo exemplifies a 
mathematical understanding of nature which is the hallmark of modern natural 
scientists. Galileo proposed that objects falling regardless of their mass would 
fall at the same rate, as long as the medium they fall in is identical. The 19th-
century distinction of a scientific enterprise apart from traditional natural philos-
ophy has its roots in prior centuries. Proposals for a more "inquisitive" and prac-
tical approach to the study of nature are notable in Francis Bacon, whose ardent 
convictions did much to popularize his insightful Baconian method. The late 
17th-century natural philosopher Robert Boyle wrote a seminal work on the dis-
tinction between physics and metaphysics called, A Free Enquiry into the Vul-
garly Received Notion of Nature, as well as The Skeptical Chymist, after which 
the modern science of chemistry is named, (as distinct from proto-
scientific studies of alchemy). These works of natural philosophy are representa-
tive of a departure from the medieval scholasticism taught in European universi-
ties, and anticipate in many ways, the developments which would lead to sci-
ence as practiced in the modern sense.  
As Bacon would say, vexing nature to reveal her secrets, (scientific exper-
imentation), rather than a mere reliance on largely historical, even anecdotal, ob-
servations of empirical phenomena, would come to be regarded as a defining 
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characteristic of modern science, if not the very key to its success. Boyle's biog-
raphers, in their emphasis that he laid the foundations of modern chemistry, ne-
glect how steadily he clung to the scholastic sciences in theory, practice and 
doctrine. However, he meticulously recorded observational detail on practical 
research, and subsequently advocated not only this practice, but its publication, 
both for successful and unsuccessful experiments, so as to validate individual 
claims by replication. 
 
26. Biosphere and Noosphere 
 
The development of civilization is impossible without rational interaction 
with nature, which develops and operates millions of years. The person receives 
from it all necessary for life: energy, food, materials, and, no less importantly, 
emotional and aesthetic enthusiasm. 
The focus of action on human nature determines not only positive impact 
but also leads to negative consequences. The man is so out of balance when nat-
ural the entire global ecosystem that it started to deteriorate, losing the ability to 
heal itsel. This effect will increase with the increasing globalization of the world 
economy. 
The environmental factor was actually limiting people's well-being: to 
know and this affects the health, increases the risk of genetic faults reduces life 
expectancy. According to the world health organization public health is 50% de-
pendent on lifestyle and 25% of the state of the environment. 
The main components of natural environment: atmosphere, hydrosphere, 
lithosphere, biosphere. Each of them has its constituent elements, structure and 
features. Three of them - the atmosphere, hydrosphere and lithosphere — edu-
cated lifeless substances and is aralon functioning of living matter-biota — the 
main component of the fourth component of the environment — biosphere. Let 
us consider each of them. A special place in the structure of the natural envi-
ronment is the biosphere. 
Biosphere (BIOS — life, sphere of activity) — the outer shell of the Earth 
within which life exists. The basic element of the biosphere is. Man is the high-
est development of living organisms on Earth, the subject of socio-historical ac-
tivity and culture. 
The trend of evolution of the biosphere is: a gradual increase in total bio-
mass and productivity; accumulation of the accumulated solar energy in the sur-
face shells of the planet; increase the capacity of the biosphere, which manifests 
itself in increasing life-forms; strengthening of some of the biogeochemical 
functions of the living and of waste products and the emergence of new func-
tions; the increasing role of living matter in geological, geochemical and physi-
cal geographical processes; the complexity of the structure of the biotic turno-
ver. You must add also the transforming influence of human activities, causing 
evolutionary replacement of certain Bioelements. Sometimes this substitution at 
the regional level is accompanied by a complete decline. Rapid withdrawal types 
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of ecosystem composition and affect the trend reverse to the above, — reduced 
biomass, productivity and information in the biosphere, changing the nature of 
the fixation of solar energy. Therefore, evolution can be seen not only by pro-
gressive but also regressive. 
The problem of man — biosphere has two main aspects: 
1. The feasibilityassociated with growing depletion of natural resources of 
the planet that poses a lot of problems scientists search for new energy sources 
and the like. 
2. Socio-ecologicalpollution of the environment and violation of the bio-
logical balance in the system man — biosphere. 
The socio-ecological process is directed, as all evolution, then in what di-
rection? This question is answered by the law formulated by V. Vernadsky: the 
biosphere will inevitably turn into a noosphere, i.e. the sphere where the human 
mind will play a dominant role in the development of the system "man — na-
ture". In other words, chaotic self-development based on the natural processes of 
self-regulation, will be replaced by a sound strategy based on forecasting and 
planning principles and regulation of the processes of natural development. 
The founders of this doctrine B. Le Roy, P. Teilhard de Chardin, Vernad-
sky, Florensky was invested in the concept of "human mind" and the divine (as-
cension to the divine mind) that followed from their worldview. In the above 
formulation of the law of the noosphere seems logical, since humanity as part of 
nature, becoming a devastating global "geological force" that can either com-
pletely destroy the biosphere, and thereby destroy themselves, or to preserve her 
own existence. But, in the figurative expression of Russian geologist M. Was-
souf, "the biosphere is both the people and the house, and we in him." 
A distinctive feature of the modern world is a constant increase of techno-
logical and anthropogenic loads on the biosphere. This is the reason for increas-
ing the size tehnosfera regions, which are home to most of the world's popula-
tion. These regions are characterized by a high level of concentration of indus-
trial objects and population density. 
On the planet formed regions where the level of pollution of the biosphere 
has reached alarming proportions. 
Scientific evidence suggests that changes in the biosphere. But they took 
place over a long enough periods. It is known that significant changes in envi-
ronmental conditions caused the disappearance of a number of types of organ-
isms, but it saw the acceleration of evolutionary Adaptations. This happened on 
the principle of catastrophic jolt, according to which disaster always causes sig-
nificant evolutionary change can be interpreted as a progressive phenomenon. 
The acceleration phase is altered by the stage of evolution, that is, the principle 
of continuity and discontinuity of development of the biosphere. 
In our time, anthropogenic impact on the biosphere occu intensively and 
regularly, and expect a new acceleration of evolutionary mutations, the conse-
quences of which we cannot even imagine. First of all there is a problem of 
awareness of mankind not only on the state of the biosphere, as well as its in-
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formation-management network. Awareness of the humanity of the crisis in the 
biosphere and response to the global environmental crisis, which has already be-
gun, is characterized by excessive slowness. And it threatens humanity's physi-
cal destruction. According to some estimates, we're 40-100 years old. 
 
27. Philosophical antropology 
 
Philosophical anthropology as a kind of thought, before it was founded as a 
distinct philosophical discipline in the 1920s, emerged as post-medieval thought 
striving for emancipation from Christian religion and Aristotelic tradition. The 
origin of this liberation, characteristic of modernity, has been the Cartesian 
skepticism formulated by Descartes in the first two of his «Meditations on First 
Philosophy». 
Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) taught the first lectures on anthropology in 
the European academic world. He specifically developed a conception 
of pragmatic anthropology, according to which the human being is studied as a 
free agent. At the same time, he conceived of his anthropology as an empirical, 
not a strictly philosophical discipline. Both his philosophical and his anthropo-
logical work has been one of the influences in the field during the 19th and 20th 
century. After Kant, Ludwig Feuerbach is sometimes considered the next most 
important influence and founder of anthropological philosophy.  
During the 19th century, an important contribution came from post-kantian 
German idealists like Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, as well fromSøren Kierke-
gaard. From the late 19th century till the early 20th century, influential contribu-
tors have been Friedrich Nietzsche, John Dewey and Rudolf Steiner. 
Since its development in the 1920s, in the milieu of Germany Weimar cul-
ture, philosophical anthropology has been turned into a philosophical discipline, 
competing with the other traditional sub-disciplines of epistemology, eth-
ics, metaphysics, aesthetics. It is the attempt to unify disparate ways of under-
standing behaviour of humans as both creatures of their social environments and 
creators of their own values. Although the majority of philosophers throughout 
the history of philosophy can be said to have a distinctive anthropology that un-
dergirds their thought, philosophical anthropology itself, as a specific disci-
pline in philosophy, arose within the later modern period as an outgrowth from 
developing methods in philosophy, such as phenomenology and existentialism. 
The former, which draws its energy from methodical reflection on human expe-
rience (first person perspective) as from the philosopher's own personal experi-
ence, naturally aided the emergence of philosophical explorations of human na-
ture and the human condition. 
Max Scheler, from 1900 till 1920 had been a follower of Husserl's phe-
nomenology, the hegemonic form of philosophy in Germany at the time. Scheler 
sought to apply Husserl's phenomenological approach to different topics. From 
1920 Scheler laid the foundation for philosophical anthropology as a philosophi-
cal discipline, competing with phenomenology and other philosophic disci-
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plines. Husserl and Martin Heidegger (1889–1976), were the two most authori-
tative philosophers in Germany at the time, and their criticism to philosophical 
anthropology and Scheler have had a major impact on the discipline. 
Scheler defined the human being not so much as a rational animal (as has 
traditionally been the case since Aristotle) but essentially as a loving being. He 
breaks down the traditional hylomorphic conception of the human person, and 
describes the personal being with a tripartite structure of lived body, soul, 
and spirit. Love and hatred are not psychological emotions, but spiritual, inten-
tional acts of the person, which he categorises as intentional feelings. Scheler 
based his philosophical anthropology in a Christian metaphysics of the spir-
it. Helmuth Plessner would later emancipate philosophical anthropology from 
Christianity. Helmuth Plessner and Arnold Gehlen have been influenced by 
Scheler, and they are the three major representatives of philosophical anthropol-
ogy as a movement. 
Ernst Cassirer, a neo-Kantian philosopher, has been the most influential 
source for the definition and development of the field from the 1940s till the 
1960s. Particularly influential has been Cassirer's description of man as 
a symbolic animal, which has been reprised in the 1960s by Gilbert Durand, 
scholar of symbolic anthropology and the imaginary. 
In 1953, future pope Karol Wojtyla based his dissertation thesis on Max 
Scheler, limiting himself to the works Scheler wrote before rejecting Catholi-
cism and the Judeo-Christian tradition in 1920. Wojtyla used Scheler as an ex-
ample that phenomenology could be reconciled with Catholicism. Some authors 
have argued that Wojtyla influenced philosophical anthropology.  
In the 20th century, other important contributors and influences to philo-
sophical anthropology have been Paul Häberlin (1878–1960), Martin Buber 
(1878–1965), E.R. Dodds (1893–1979), Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900–2002), Er-
ic Voegelin (1901–85), Hans Jonas (1903–93) Josef Pieper (1904–97), Hans-
Eduard Hengstenberg (1904–98), Jean-Paul Sartre(1905–80), Joseph Maréchal 
(1878–1944), Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908–61), Paul Ricoeur (1913–2005), 
René Girard (1923–2015), Alasdair MacIntyre (1929–), Pierre Bourdieu (1930–
2002), Hans Blumenberg, Jacques Derrida (1930–2004), Emerich Coreth (1919–
2006), Leonardo Polo (1926–2013). 
 
28. Nature and essence of the man 
 
Marx's concept of man is rooted in Hegel's thinking. Hegel begins with the 
insight that appearance and essence do not coincide. Or, to put it differently, it is 
the problem of the relationship between essence and existence. In the process of 
existence, the essence is realized, and at the same time, existing means a return 
to the essence. For Hegel, knowledge is not obtained in the position of the sub-
ject object split, in which the object is grasped as something separated from and 
opposed to the thinker. In order to know the world, man has to make the world 
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his own. This essence, the unity of being, the identity throughout change is, ac-
cording to Hegel.  
The culmination of all of Hegel's thinking is the concept of the potentiali-
ties inherent in a thing, of the dialectical process in which they manifest them-
selves, and the idea that this process is one of active movement of these potenti-
alities. This emphasis on the active process within man is already to be found in 
the ethical system of Spinoza. For Spinoza, all affects were to be divided into 
passive affects (passions), through which man suffers and does not have an ade-
quate idea of reality, and into active affects (actions) (generosity and fortitude) 
in which man is free and productive.  
Goethe, who like Hegel was influenced by Spinoza in many ways, devel-
oped the idea of man's productivity into a central point of his philosophical 
thinking. For him all decaying cultures are characterized by the tendency for 
pure subjectivity, while all progressive periods try to grasp the world as it is, by 
one's own subjectivity, but not separate from it. Goethe gave the most poetic and 
powerful expression to the idea of human productivity in his Faust. Neither pos-
session, nor power, nor sensuous satisfaction, Faust teaches, can fulfill man's de-
sire for meaning in his life; he remains in all this separate from the whole, hence 
unhappy. Only in being productively active can man make sense of his life, and 
while he thus enjoys life, he is not greedily holding on to it.  
He has given up the greed for having, and is fulfilled by being; he is filled 
because he is empty; he is much, because he has little.  Hegel gave the most sys-
tematic and profound expression to the idea of the productive man, of the indi-
vidual who is he, inasmuch as he is not passive-receptive, but actively related to 
the world; who is an individual only in this process of grasping the world pro-
ductively, and thus making it his own. For Hegel the development of all individ-
ual powers, capacities and potentialities is possible only by continuous action, 
never by sheer contemplation or receptivity. For Spinoza, Goethe, Hegel, as well 
as for Marx, man is alive only inasmuch as he is productive, inasmuch as he 
grasps the world outside of himself in the act of expressing his own specific hu-
man powers, and of grasping the world with these powers. 
Inasmuch as man is not productive, inasmuch as he is receptive and pas-
sive, he is nothing, he is dead. In this productive process, man realizes his own 
essence, he returns to his own essence, which in theological language is nothing 
other than his return to God. 
The concept of productivity as against that of receptivity can be understood 
more easily when we read how Marx applied it to the phenomenon of love. 
Marx expressed also very specifically the central significance of love between 
man and woman as the immediate relationship of human being to human being. 
It is of the utmost importance for the understanding of Marx's concept of activity 
to understand his idea about the relationship between subject and object. Man's 
senses, as far as they are crude animal senses, have only a restricted meaning.  
The senses which man has, so to speak, naturally, need to be formed by the 
objects outside of them. Any object can only be confirmation of one of my own 
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faculties. Subject and object cannot be separated.  What Marx means by "spe-
cies-character" is the essence of man; it is that which is universally human, and 
which is realized in the process of history by man through his productive activi-
ty. From this concept of human self-realization, Marx arrives at a new concept 
of wealth and poverty, which is different from wealth and poverty in political 
economy.  
 
29. Personality and society 
 
Society has several mechanisms for building us and our personality. The 
first mechanism is socialization. A second mechanism society has for building 
us is social control, which is used to re-build deviants or at least keep them from 
interfering with the normal operation of society. Social control ranges from gos-
sip and ridicule to imprisonment and execution. 
Society also has mechanisms for distributing valued resources. Through 
stratification society categorizes people and distributes valued resources to them 
based on the categories. Among the most important categories are class, race 
and gender. Our social class, race and gender affect how we are socialized, what 
type of social control we face, what opportunities we receive and what obstacles 
weface. 
Primary socialization theory as formulated by Oetting and his associates 
emphasizes the transmission of societal norms during childhood and adoles-
cence within society’s three major socializing agencies: family, school, and 
small, intimate peer groups. The norms thus transmitted may be pro-social or 
deviant, with pro-social norms more likely to be transmitted through strong 
bonds to healthy families or schools.  
Personality traits and other personal characteristics influence negative out-
comes only to the extent that they interfere with socialization.  Our research 
does not address primary socialization theory directly. We have studied social 
factors, personality factors, and various psychopathologies as etiological for de-
viance and substance abuse. Our research has supported the hypotheses of pri-
mary socialization theory. 
 
30. Philosophy of mind 
 
Philosophy of Mind is the branch of philosophy that studies the nature of 
the mind (mental events, mental functions, mental properties and consciousness) 
and its relationship to the physical body. It intersects to some extent with the 
fields of neurobiology, computer science and psychology. 
Within philosophy, the Philosophy of Mind is usually considered a part 
of Metaphysics, and has been particularly studied by schools of thought such 
as Analytic Philosophy, Phenomenology and Existentialism, although it has 
been discussed by philosophers from the earliest times. It has a potential influ-
ence on philosophical questions such as the nature of death, the nature of free 
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will, the nature of what a person is (and his or her identity and the self), and the 
nature of emotion, perceptionand memory. The central issue in Philosophy of 
Mind is the mind-body problem (the relationship of the mind to the body), and 
the challenge is to explain how a supposedly non-material mind can influence 
a material body and vice-versa. The two major schools of thought that attempt to 
resolve this problem are Dualism and Monism (see the sections below), 
with Pluralism as a small minority viewpoint. 
However, there are those (notably Ludwig Wittgenstein and his followers) 
who reject the problem as an illusory one which has arisen purely be-
cause mental and biological vocabulary are incompatible, and such illusory 
problems arise if one tries to describe the one in terms of the other's vocabulary, 
or if the mental vocabulary is used in the wrong contexts. 
Dualism is the position that mind and body are in some categorical 
way separate from each other, and that mental phenomena are, in some re-
spects, non-physical in nature. It can be traced back to Plato, Aristotle, and 
the Sankhya and Yoga schools of Hindu philosophy, but it was most precisely 
formulated by René Descartes in the 17th Century. Descartes was the first to 
clearly identify the mind with consciousness and self-awareness, and to distin-
guish this from the brain, which was the physical seat of intelligence. 
Dualism appeals to the common-sense intuition of the vast majority of non-
philosophically-trained people, and the mental and the physical do seem to most 
people to have quite different, and perhaps irreconcilable, properties. Mental 
events have a certain subjective quality to them (known as qualia or "the ways 
things seem to us"), whereas physical events do not. 
There are three main Dualist schools of thought: 
 Substance Dualism (or Cartesian Dualism) argues that the mind is 
an independently existing substance - the mental does not have extension in 
space, and the material cannot think. This is the type of Dualism most famously 
defended by Descartes, and it is compatible with most theologies which claim 
that immortal souls occupy an independent "realm" of existence distinct from 
that of the physical world. There are three main types of Substance Dualism: 
 Interactionism, which allows that mental causes (such as beliefs and de-
sires) can produce material effects, and vice-versa. Descartes believed that this 
interaction physically occurred in the pineal gland. 
 Occasionalism, asserts that a material basis of interaction between the ma-
terial and immaterial is impossible, and that the interactions were really caused 
by the intervention of God on each individual occasion. Nicholas Male-
branche was the major proponent of this view. 
 Parallelism (or Psychophysical Parallelism), holds that mental causes only 
have mental effects, and physical causes only have physical effects, but that God 
has created a pre-established harmony so that it seems as if physical and mental 
events (which are really monads, completely independent of each other) cause, 
and are caused by, one another. This unusual view was most prominently advo-
cated by Gottfried Leibniz. 
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 Property Dualism maintains that the mind is a group of independent prop-
erties that emerge from the brain, but that it is not a distinct substance. Thus, 
when matter is organized in the appropriate way (i.e. in the way that living hu-
man bodies are organized), mental properties emerge. 
 Epiphenomenalism, which asserts that mental events are causally in-
ert (i.e. have no physical consequences). Physical events can cause other physi-
cal events, and physical events can cause mental events, but mental events can-
not cause anything, since they are just causally inert by-products of physical 
events which occur in the brain (i.e. epiphenomena) of the physical world. This 
doctrine was first formulated by Thomas Henry Huxley in the 19th Century, alt-
hough based on Thomas Hobbes' much earlier Materialism theories. 
 Predicate Dualism argues that more than one predicate (how we describe 
the subject of a proposition) is required to make sense of the world, and that 
the psychological experiences we go through cannot be redescribed in terms of 
(or reduced to) physical predicates of natural languages. 
 Monism is the position that mind and body are not ontologically dis-
tinct kinds of entities. This view was first advocated in Western Philosophy by 
Parmenides in the 5th Century B.C. and was later espoused by Baruch Spinoza 
in the 17th Century and George Berkeley in the 18th Century. 
 There are three main Monist schools of thought: 
 Physicalism (also known as Materialistic Monism) argues that the mind is 
a purely physical construct (the only existing substance is physical), and will 
eventually be explained entirely by physical theory, as it continues to evolve. 
With the huge strides in science (especially in atomic theory, evolution, neuro-
science and computer technology) in the 20th Century, Physicalism of various 
types has become the dominant doctrine. There are two main types: 
 Reductive Physicalism, which asserts that all mental states and properties 
will eventually be explained by scientific accounts of physiological process-
es and states, has been the most popular form during the 20th Century. Behav-
iourism, which holds that mental states are just descriptions of observable be-
haviour. Type Identity Theory, which holds that various kinds of mental states 
are identical to certain kinds, or types, of physical states of the brain. Token 
Identity Theory, which holds that particular instances of mental states are identi-
cal to particular instances of physical states of the brain. Functionalism, which 
holds that mental states (beliefs, desires, being in pain, etc.) are constituted sole-
ly by their functional role and can be characterized in terms of non-mental func-
tional properties.  
 Non-Reductive Physicalism, which argues that, although the brain is all 
there is to the mind, the predicates and vocabulary used in mental descriptions 
and explanations cannot be reduced to the language and lower-level explana-
tions of physical science. Thus, mental states supervene (depend) on physical 
states, and there can be no change in the mental without some change in the 
physical, but they are not reducible to them. There are three main types: 
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 Anomalous Monism, which states that mental events are identical with 
physical events, but that the mental is anomalous i.e. these mental events are not 
regulated by strict physical laws. Emergentism, which involves a layered view 
of nature, with the layers arranged in terms of increasing complexity, each cor-
responding to its own special science. Eliminativism (or Eliminative Material-
ism), which holds that people's common-sense understanding of the mind ("folk 
psychology") is hopelessley flawed, and will eventually be replaced (eliminated) 
by an alternative, usually taken to be neuroscience. Idealism (or Mentalism or 
Immaterialism) maintains that the mind is all that exists (the only existing sub-
stance is mental), and that the external world is either mental itself, or 
an illusion created by the mind. According to idealism, then, the problem of the 
interaction between mind and body is not a problem at all. A pure form 
of idealism was espoused by Bishop George Berkeley, and variations were for-
mulated by various members of the German idealism school, includ-
ing Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. 
 Neutral Monism maintains that existence consists of one kind of primal 
substance (hence monism), which in itself is neither mental nor physical, but is 
capable of mental and physical aspects or attributes (it is sometimes described as 
a dual-aspect theory). Thus, there is some other, neutral substance (variously la-
belled as Substance, Nature or God), and that both matter and mind are proper-
ties of this other unknown substance. Such a position was adopted by Baruch 
Spinoza and also by Bertrand Russell for a time. 
 
31. Human mind and artificial intellect 
 
Whole brain emulation (WBE), mind upload or brain upload (sometimes 
called "mind copying" or "mind transfer") is the hypothetical process 
of scanning mental state (including long-term memory and "self") of a particular 
brain substrate and copying it to a computer. The computer could then run 
a simulation model of the brain's information processing, such that it responds in 
essentially the same way as the original brain (i.e., indistinguishable from the 
brain for all relevant purposes) and experiences having a conscious mind. 
Mind uploading may potentially be accomplished by either of two meth-
ods: Copy-and-Transfer or gradual replacement of neurons. In the case of the 
former method, mind uploading would be achieved by scanning and map-
ping the salient features of a biological brain, and then by copying, transferring, 
and storing that information state into a computer system or another computa-
tional device. The simulated mind could be within a virtual reality or simulated 
world, supported by an anatomic 3D body simulation model. Alternatively, the 
simulated mind could reside in a computer that is inside (or connected to) a (not 
necessarily humanoid) robot or a biological body in real life. 
Among some futurists and within the transhumanist movement, mind up-
loading is treated as an important proposed life extension technology. Some be-
lieve mind uploading is humanity's current best option for preserving the identi-
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ty of the species, as opposed to cryonics. Another aim of mind uploading is to 
provide a permanent backup to our mind-file, and a means for functional copies 
of human minds to survive a global disaster or interstellar space travels. Whole 
brain emulation is discussed by some futurists as a «logical endpoint» of the top-
ical computational neuroscience and neuroinformatics fields, both about brain 
simulation for medical research purposes. It is discussed in artificial intelli-
gence research publications as an approach to strong AI.  
Computer-based intelligence such as an upload could think much faster 
than a biological human even if it were no more intelligent. A large-scale society 
of uploads might, according to futurists, give rise to a technological singularity, 
meaning a sudden time constant decrease in the exponential development of 
technology. Mind uploading is a central conceptual feature of numerous science 
fiction novels and films. 
Substantial mainstream research in related areas is being conducted in ani-
mal brain mapping and simulation, development of faster super comput-
ers, virtual reality, brain–computer interfaces, connectomics and information ex-
traction from dynamically functioning brains. According to supporters, many of 
the tools and ideas needed to achieve mind uploading already exist or are cur-
rently under active development; however, they will admit that others are, as 
yet, very speculative, but still in the realm of engineering possibil-
ity. Neuroscientist Randal Koene has formed a nonprofit organization called 
Carbon Copies to promote mind uploading research. 
Information technology was created in the twentieth century on the basis of 
the paradigm of functionalism. According to this paradigm, the description of 
functional properties and relationships is logically independent of the descrip-
tion of physical properties and relationships. This means that the same functions 
can be reproduced on substrates with different properties. In this context of con-
sideration, human thinking is similar to mathematical calculation. It was only 
necessary to develop, within the framework of formal logic, the programming 
mechanisms necessary for the transformation of natural language statements into 
statements of an artificial language, one of the modifications of which is the lan-
guage of mathematical calculi.  
Mathematical logic coped with this task. Human thinking was formalized 
on the basis of a specific set of functions for processing information, storing and 
transmitting information. At this stage, algorithms were developed for solving 
specific computational problems related to statistics, costing, document man-
agement, design and construction. Human thinking was freed from routine 
arithmetic calculations similar to the function of a calculator. After the comput-
ers were combined into an information network, they began to perform the func-
tion of transmitting and receiving information (feedback). It turned out to be rel-
evant in the face of increased volumes of information necessary for decision-
making. It was the beginning of cybernetics. 
Information technology developers wanted to transfer more functions of 
human thinking to computer technologies. This means that in the description of 
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the function of thinking it was necessary to introduce features of human con-
sciousness. That was the beginning of the methodology of simulation modeling 
of information processing functions in the human mind. For this purpose, the 
categorial apparatus of cognitive science has been updated. He became the basis 
of the paradigm of cognitive sciences. The initial thesis of this paradigm is that 
people act on the basis of cognitive codes. Their behavior is a causal conse-
quence of operations performed on the basis of these codes. 
As a result of cognitive activity, a system of meanings (concepts fixed by 
the word) is created, which refers to the fact that the individual knows and 
thinks about the world. In a systematic form, these meanings are represented by 
a mentality, which is understood as a stable set of attitudes and predispositions 
of an individual or social group to perceive the world in a certain way. Mentality 
reflects the style of thinking, as well as mental attitude, national character, atti-
tudes, values, behavior, activities, mental processes. 
The subject of cognitive linguistics is the processes of perception, categori-
zation, classification and understanding of the world, the accumulation of 
knowledge, that part of the information that is reflected and fixed in the forms of 
language. Frames (stereotypical situations, scenarios), concepts (the totality of 
all meanings expressed by the means of the language), aestaltes (integral addi-
tional images of fragments of the world) became the instruments of operation. 
The language sign system plays a role in coding and transformation of infor-
mation.  
Categorization develops concepts in which the most relevant properties for 
everyday consciousness are concentrated. Generative (transformational) linguis-
tics of N. Chomsky has become one of the grounds for creating a new genera-
tion of computer programs that take into account the characteristics of subjective 
reality. Its essence is that transformational and structural rules, principles de-
scribe the creation and interiorization of language expressions. Using a finite set 
of grammar rules and concepts, people can create an unlimited number of sen-
tences. The ability to structure expressions is an inherent part of the genetic pro-
gram of humans. They are practically unaware of these structural principles. 
People only need to learn lexical units and morphemes in order to construct ex-
pressions. Understanding the language is not due to past experience of behavior, 
but to the mechanism of language acquisition (internal memory structure). 
J. Fodor developed the theory of human brain activity with the concept of 
modularity of consciousness. According to this approach, the human cognitive 
system consists of a central processor and modules. Central processors (conclu-
sions) have access to the entire cognitive system of a person. They form censor-
ship mechanisms. These mechanisms are culturally determined. Information that 
does not fit into cultural models does not reach the human mind, as it is cen-
sored. Censored (recognition, identity procedures) information is divided into 
modules (fragments). In the general semantic picture, it is collected only in the 
central processor. Information is structured to fit the cultural program. In the 
theory of artificial intelligence, connectionism began to dominate. 
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From the standpoint of connectionism, the mental activity of the brain is 
modeled through the distribution of activation signals between simple computa-
tional units (neurons), which it possible in conditions of fuzzy or insufficient da-
ta, contextually dependent concepts, and dynamic representations. Neurons can 
enter quantitatively measured states of activation and measure the weight of 
connections with each other, creating complex systems, configurations, de-
scribed by a mathematical apparatus. Each configuration described by a mathe-
matical vector is a representation of a mental state. A neural network, unlike 
computers of linear architecture, practically does not need preliminary pro-
gramming. She is capable of self-learning, as a result of which she performs the 
functions of generalization, classification, prediction, speech recognition, imag-
es, memory research, learning processes.  
In 2010, the Image Net database was developed. It contains 15 million im-
ages in 22 thousand categories. Based on such a database, a neural network is 
capable of making practically error-free decisions. Despite the successes in the 
field of artificial intelligence theory, computer programs in the field of cybernet-
ics only contribute to human decision making. He remains the main actor. There 
was a rejection of the thesis about the isomorphism of a computer program and 
human consciousness. As a result, cognitive sciences have focused on the con-
nection of the human psyche with the functions of his brain. Physicalism, psy-
chologism, and functionalism were combined. The result of concentration of ef-
forts was neuropsycholinguistics. 
A statement is formulated that organisms use internal representations (rep-
resentations) and perform computational operations on them. Cognition in this 
sense is the controlled manipulation of representations. 
The developers of the theory of behavioral economics and neuromarketing 
began to believe that the understanding of the situation and decision-making by 
individuals is formed by mechanisms of unconscious thinking. D. Kahneman be-
lieves that the role of rational judgment is overestimated. It focuses only a small 
part of the perceived information, reaching the stage of analysis. In many cases, 
a judgment on a positive outcome of a choice is made on the basis of a subjec-
tive opinion of its correctness, without taking into account real facts. Reflective 
thinking systems are knowledge-based. Impulsive thinking systems are based on 
off-the-shelf schemes. 
The unconscious thinking model is preferred because it is highly effective 
due to the low consumption of intellectual resources. No additional cognitive ef-
fort is required. Activation of ready-made patterns of social relations occurs 
without the participation of consciousness (automatic thinking). When there are 
many variables, the brain performs mental tasks better without the participation 
of consciousness. When there are few variables and the solution of the problem 
is reduced to the simplest logical operations, conscious thought works. As a re-
sult, unconscious thought is wider than conscious thought due to the limited ca-
pacity of working memory.  
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The neural system is a biological carrier and a causal generator of mental 
states. These conditions are identical to neural states. The spatial and environ-
mental organization of the human nervous system is ontologically integrated in-
to the brain and generates neural and mental states. A particular individual is a 
carrier of a mentalized brain. 
Formalization of decision-making processes is designed to ensure decision-
making, but not to replace them. First of all, it is supposed to support decision-
making based on poorly structured information; assessment of the situation and 
assessment of alternatives. A multi-criteria hierarchical assessment of the situa-
tion is implemented. The analysis of influences in the management of poorly 
structured situations is carried out. Provides intelligent support for management 
decisions involving intelligent. Methods of formation of enterprise development 
scenarios are used. Experts, analysts use ideas about the processes occurring in 
dynamic situations at the enterprise. They use scenarios for the development of 
the situation in the enterprise in rapidly changing conditions and correlations. 
The fourth industrial revolution formulated the trend of a digital society 
based on the network structures of artificial intelligence. One of the conditions 
of this trend is the compatibility of all participants in social communication. The 
infrastructure of crowd platforms has been created. It is a place of updating the 
creative resources of society. Project applicants through crowd platforms have 
the opportunity to dialogue with potential investors and donors. If in a timely 
manner the project is gaining the necessary financial support, then it becomes 
innovative. According to this technique, the commercial crowdfunding platform 
“Ulej” (Ulej.by) operates in Belarus. Information support for startups is provid-
ed by the BTW-Portal of the creative industry. He also provides information 
support for projects. 
One of the first issues of the creative industry in Belarus began to be con-
sidered by I. Matsevich. She traced the evolution of social communities in a new 
paradigm. The conceptual apparatus used was developed in English-language 
studies on the creative industry (“creative city” C. Landry), “cluster”). The sub-
ject of discussion was the importance of clusters in the field of creative economy 
for the development of social communities in the city. An important part of this 
process is the formation of the information environment of the cognitive econo-
my and the mechanisms of functioning of cyber-physical systems. Elements of 
the cognitive economy are “smart enterprise”, “smart city”.  
The basis of management practices is formed by methods and models of ar-
tificial intelligence, intelligent information systems, decision support systems, 
intelligent data processing. Intelligent production planning systems, dynamic 
expert systems for dispatching enterprise management, financial analysis and 
planning using neural networks and evolutionary algorithms, as well as intelli-
gent investment portfolio management and risk management systems are used. 
An important explanation is the nature of the evolution of organizations and so-
cial institutions under structural uncertainty. 
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The basis is an understanding of the mental activity of a person and a mod-
el from the field of cognitive sciences. An interdisciplinary concept of heterodox 
economic theory has been formed. This theory integrated the sections of cogni-
tive, experimental, and behavioral economies. Formed business analytics, data 
mining, text mining, web mining, business intelligence. Hybrid intelligent sys-
tems have been developed that analyze the consciousness and logic of an expert. 
They consist of cognitive and analytical levels. The cognitive level provides in-
formation for processing at the analytical level. 
Cognitive methods of analyzing the consciousness of social agents used, 
testing is carried out of the quality of decision logic for their brain activity, for 
parametric tuning of intelligent decision support systems. Methods of pairing 
forecast models and evaluating unstructured situations are used based on cogni-
tive modeling approaches. Models reproduce all stages of the decision support 
process - from analyzing the situation to choosing the best alternative. They are 
designed to support analysts in the face of uncertainty. The expert’s knowledge 
about the situation is modeled in the aspect of his ideas and preferences regard-
ing the control goal and the dynamic properties of the situation. The influence of 
emotions on decision making, learning processes, decision making in the ab-
sence of time is studied. According to the results of research, a whole group of 
cognitive distortions is classified. 
The human-machine system combines the functions of human decision 
making and artificial intelligence decision making. In the process of creating the 
conditions for supporting decision-making, computer systems for analyzing sit-
uations and the method of cognitive maps used in them play an important role. 
Experts and analysts use ideas about processes that occur in dynamic situations 
modeled by a cognitive map. The importance of a cognitive map of the envi-
ronment was noticed as early as 1948 by Tolman. In his opinion, it determines 
the response of the body to the environment.  
System reconstruction with elements of visual clarity achieved by using di-
agrams and drawings in mind maps contributes to a better presentation and as-
similation of knowledge (Tony Buzan). Concept Maps emphasize the im-
portance of previous experience in creating new concepts (Joseph D. Novak, 
David Ausubel). B. Kosko substantiated the methodology of fuzzy cognitive 
maps - mathematical models that describe a problem situation and complex 
weakly structured systems. These models allow you to study the evolution of the 
situation in terms of self-development, external influences. 
In the structure of the cognitive map, there are many concepts (vertices), as 
well as many relationships between concepts (arcs). Concepts are elements of 
the system under study. The same elements are the relationships between them. 
As a result, a structural diagram of causal relationships is created. A formalized 
modeling apparatus allows you to work with quantitative and qualitative data. 
The cognitive map contains the basic laws of the observed situation known 
to the subject in the form of an oriented sign graph. The vertices of the graph are 
factors, signs, characteristics of the situation. Arcs capture cause-effect relation-
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ships between vertices. Fuzzy flow control methods have been developed in ge-
ographic information systems. A sectoral approach to modeling processes in lo-
cal spaces of activity and management is used. Attention is paid to the analysis 
of complex control input factors, the potential strength of their influence, of their 
influence on the system parameters. Factors (domains) that have a large number 
of relationships with other factors are investigated. Factors are found that do not 
have relationships with other factors (orphan factors). Clusters (subsystems) are 
distinguished, as well as elements of the hierarchical organization of the cogni-
tive map. 
But not only knowledge and information provide effective decision mak-
ing. An important role is played by the subjective human factor. Therefore, the 
cognitive economy is the knowledge of how managers formulate goals, alterna-
tives, how they reflect. Based on this knowledge, neuromarketing strategies are 
built. 
 
32. Artificial intellect and virtual reality 
 
There is a long last tradition in Artificial Intelligence as use of Robots en-
dowing human peculiarities, from a cognitive and emotional point of view, and 
not only in shape. Today Artificial Intelligence is more oriented to several form 
of collective intelligence, also building robot simulators (hardware or software) 
to deeply understand collective behaviors in human beings and society as a 
whole.  
Modeling has also been crucial in the social sciences, to understand how 
complex systems can arise from simple rules. However, while engineers' simula-
tions can be performed in the physical world using robots, for social scientist 
this is impossible. For decades, researchers tried to improve simulations by en-
dowing artificial agents with simple and complex rules that emulated human be-
havior also by using artificial intelligence (AI). To include human beings and 
their real intelligence within artificial societies is now the big challenge.  
Hybrid (human-artificial) platform where experiments can be performed by 
simulated artificial worlds in the following manner: 1) agents' behaviors are reg-
ulated by the behaviors shown in Virtual Reality involving real human beings 
exposed to specific situations to simulate, and 2) technology transfers these rules 
into the artificial world. These form a closed-loop of real behaviors inserted into 
artificial agents, which can be used to study real society. 
Belarus High Technology Park is a special tax-free economic zone and a 
favorable legal regime for its resident companies. First companies were regis-
tered as HTP residents in 2006 and by April 2019 the number of HTP residents 
has grown to. Most HTP residents are foreign companies and joint ventures. 
HTP provides an extremely favorable atmosphere for innovative science tech-
nologies and IT progress. The resident companies are engaged in IT and related 
industries. HTP follows its mission to create business-friendly conditions for 
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high technology industry development in Belarus, paying special attention to the 
export-oriented programming industry. 
– World of Tanks game developer company was one of the first to become 
a HTP resident; – In 2018, the revenue exceeded USD $1,4 billion; – First legal-
ly licensed and legislated crypto exchange Currency.com is a HTP resident; – 
HTP residents are legally allowed to use ICO (initial coin offering); – Rakuten 
Viber is also a resident of HTP; – One of the HTP resident companies is owned 
by Facebook. 
The HTP mission is to create favorable conditions for the development of 
the export-oriented programming industry in Belarus, the development of other 
export industries based on new and high technologies, as well as to concentrate 
human, scientific, production and financial capacities to enhance the competi-
tiveness of the national economy. 
The organization is headed by the Director of the HTP Administration. 
There are two Boards in the Park structure - the Expert Board and the Superviso-
ry Board. The HTP Administration is subordinate to the President of the Repub-
lic of Belarus and reports to the Council of Ministers. It’s a legal entity at the na-
tional level and a nonprofit state institution. The HTP Administration’s activities 
involve creating conditions favorable for HTP residents, promoting domestic 
and foreign investments in information technologies and creating a modern in-
frastructure. 
The High-Tech Park is the organization in the country that has the right to 
provide tax benefits on a systematic basis. Resident companies enjoy important 
government support: they are exempted from most taxes, including value-added 
tax and income tax. Further, employees of the resident companies enjoy a 30% 
reduction in personal income tax compared with other sectors of the economy.  
Highly qualified specialists enhance the competitiveness of Belarus HTP in 
overseas markets. They participate in IT projects of any complexity, starting 
from systems analysis and consulting and finishing with the design and devel-
opment of complex systems. Belarusian specialists are being trained in prestig-
ious international educational centers, such as IBM, Microsoft, SAP, Lotus, Sun 
and Novell. Another advantage of Belarusian developers is that they also have 
deep knowledge in mathematics, physics and other sciences. 
HTP is actively engaged in supporting IT education and innovative entre-
preneurship. Today, HTP resident companies support about 80 joint laboratories 
in Belarusian technical universities. With the participation of HTP residents, the 
Educational Center of the Hi-Tech Park was established to provide re-education 
for adults who want to start a career in the IT industry, as well as training for 
employees of IT companies willing to improve their knowledge and skills. 1,629 
people received training there in 2016, with 340 of them getting jobs in HTP 
companies. I Teen Academy for kids aged 6–15 years old also operates within 
the Educational Center.  
In 2016, the HTP business incubator in Minsk hosted 55 events (confer-
ences, workshops, contests, hackathons, etc.) which attracted more than 9,000 
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participants (in 2015, there were 12 events and 2,000 participants). Here, startup 
companies rent offices at lower rates, receive advice on commercialization of 
their products and assistance in search for partners and investors. 
In summer 2017, a new revolutionary draft Decree regulating HTP activi-
ties has been submitted to state bodies for consideration. The Decree aims to 
create conditions that would facilitate the inflow of international investments, 
the opening of foreign representative offices and development centers. The De-
cree was initiated by the Director of the Belarus HTP Administration Vsevolod 
Yanchevsky who had been responsible for ensuring state policy in the spheres of 
information and high technologies since 2013. For the first time, prospects of the 
Decree were announced by him and Viktor Prokopenya during the visit of Bela-
rus President Alexander Lukashenko to several IT companies in Minsk on 
March 13, 2017. 
 In close cooperation with government authorities, a working group of the 
best specialists of the country worked on the project. It was led by the HTP Ad-
ministration to ensure an effective interaction between lawmakers and people 
working in the IT industry. The key person among lawmakers who imbued the 
Decree with regulatory innovations was a Belarusian lawyer Denis Aleinikov.  
This Decree opens HTP doors for product companies, investment funds, as 
well as foreign companies that monetize IT products through advertising and 
paid subscription. On top of that, the Decree introduces separate institutes of 
English law that will stimulate investment activities, sets legal basis for driver-
less car technology, lifts many restrictions regarding financial operations for IT 
companies, stimulates a breakthrough in IT education, as well as creates prereq-
uisites for new jobs and revenue growth. 
According to a presidential decree passed in December 2017, the High 
Technologies Park will become a sandbox for blockchain startups offering tax 
exemptions and relying on elements of English law in commercial matters. 
 
33. Collective and individual consciousness 
 
The collective consciousness informs our sense of belonging and identity, 
and our behavior. Founding sociologist Émile Durkheim developed this con-
cept to explain how unique individuals are bound together into collective units 
like social groups and societies. 
What is it that holds society together? This was the central question that 
preoccupied Durkheim as he wrote about the new industrial societies of the 19th 
century. By considering the documented habits, customs, and beliefs of tradi-
tional and primitive societies, and comparing those to what he saw around him 
in his own life, Durkheim crafted some of the most important theories in sociol-
ogy. He concluded that society exists because unique individuals feel a sense of 
solidarity with each other. This is why we can form collectives and work togeth-
er to achieve community and functional societies. The collective consciousness, 
or conscience collective as he wrote it in French, is the source of this solidarity. 
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Durkheim first introduced his theory of the collective consciousness in his 
1893 book «The Division of Labor in Society». Later, he would also rely on the 
concept in other books, including Rules of the Sociological Method, Suicide, 
and The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. 
In this text, he explains that the phenomenon is "the totality of beliefs and 
sentiments common to the average members of a society." Durkheim observed 
that in traditional or primitive societies, religious symbols, discourse, beliefs, 
and rituals fostered the collective consciousness. In such cases, where social 
groups were quite homogenous (not distinct by race or class, for example), the 
collective consciousness resulted in what Durkheim termed a "mechanical soli-
darity"—in effect an automatic binding together of people into a collective 
through their shared values, beliefs, and practices. 
Durkheim observed that in the modern, industrialized societies that charac-
terized Western Europe and the young United States when he wrote, which 
functioned via a division of labor, an "organic solidarity" emerged based on the 
mutual reliance individuals and groups had on others in order to allow for a so-
ciety to function.  
In cases such as these, religion still played an important role in producing 
collective consciousness among groups of people affiliated with various reli-
gions, but other social institutions and structures would also work to produce the 
collective consciousness necessary for this more complex form of solidarity, and 
rituals outside of religion would play important roles in reaffirming it. These 
other institutions include the state (which fosters patriotism and nationalism), 
news and popular media (which spreads all kinds of ideas and practices, from 
how to dress, to who to vote for, to how to date and be married), education, and 
the police and judiciary (which shape our notions of right and wrong, and direct 
our behavior through threat of or actual physical force), among others. 
Rituals that serve to reaffirm the collective conscious range from parades 
and holiday celebrations to sporting events, weddings, grooming ourselves ac-
cording to gender norms, and even shopping. 
Primitive or modern societies—collective consciousness is something 
"common to the whole of society," as Durkheim put it. It is not an individual 
condition or phenomenon, but a social one. As a social phenomenon, it is "dif-
fused across society as a whole," and "has a life of its own." It is through collec-
tive consciousness that values, beliefs, and traditions can be passed down 
through generations.  
Though individual people live and die, this collection of intangible things, 
including the social norms connected to them, are cemented in our social institu-
tions and thus exist independent of individual people. Most important to under-
stand is that collective consciousness is the result of social forces that are exter-
nal to the individual, that course through society. We, as individuals, internalize 
these and make the collective consciousness a reality by doing so, and we reaf-
firm and reproduce it by living in ways that reflect it. 
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34. Epistemology 
 
Epistemology is the study of knowledge (Greek episteme). Epistemologists 
study the putative sources of knowledge, including intuition, a priori reason, 
memory, perceptual knowledge, self-knowledge and testimony. They also ask: 
What is truth? Is knowledge justified true belief? Are any beliefs justified? Puta-
tive knowledge includes propositional knowledge (knowledge that something is 
the case), know-how (knowledge of how to do something) and acquaintance 
(familiarity with someone or something). Epistemologists examine these and ask 
whether knowledge is really possible. 
Skepticism is the position which doubts claims to knowledge. The regress 
argument, a fundamental problem in epistemology, occurs when, in order to 
completely prove any statement, its justification itself needs to be supported by 
another justification. This chain can go on forever, called infinitism, it can even-
tually rely on basic beliefs that are left unproven, called foundationalism, or it 
can go in a circle so that a statement is included in its own chain of justification, 
called coherentism. 
Rationalism is the emphasis on reasoning as a source of knowledge. It is 
associated with a priori knowledge, which is independent of experience, such as 
math and logical deduction. Empiricism is the emphasis on observational evi-
dence via sensory experience as the source of knowledge. 
Among the numerous topics within metaphysics and epistemology, broadly 
construed are: 
 Philosophy of language explores the nature, the origins and the use of 
language. 
 Philosophy of mind explores the nature of the mind and its relationship to 
the body. It is typified by disputes between dualism and materialism. In recent 
years this branch has become related to cognitive science. 
 Philosophy of religion explores questions that arise in connection with re-
ligions, including the soul, the afterlife, God, religious experience, analysis of 
religious vocabulary and texts and the relationship of religion and science. 
 Philosophy of human nature analyzes the unique characteristics of human 
beings, such as rationality, politics and culture. 
 Metaphilosophy explores the aims of philosophy, its boundaries and its 
methods. 
 
35. Theory of knowledge 
 
Epistemology, the study of the theory of knowledge, is among the most 
important areas of philosophy. 
The first problem encountered in epistemology is that of defining 
knowledge. Much of the time, philosophers use the tripartite theory of 
knowledge, which analyses knowledge as justified true belief, as a working 
model. The tripartite theory has, however, been refuted: Gettier cases show that 
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some justified true beliefs do not constitute knowledge. Rival analyses of 
knowledge have been proposed, but there is as yet no consensus on what 
knowledge is. This fundamental question of epistemology remains unsolved. 
Though philosophers are unable to provide a generally accepted analysis of 
knowledge, we all understand roughly what we are talking about when we use 
words such as “knowledge”. Thankfully, this means that it is possible to get on 
with epistemology, leaving unsolved the fundamental question as to what 
knowledge is. 
A second important issue in epistemology concerns the ultimate source of 
our knowledge. There are two traditions: empiricism, which holds that our 
knowledge is primarily based in experience, and rationalism, which holds that 
our knowledge is primarily based in reason. Although the modern scientific 
worldview borrows heavily from empiricism, there are reasons for thinking that 
a synthesis of the two traditions is more plausible than either of them individual-
ly. There are better and worse ways to form beliefs. In general terms, it is im-
portant to consider evidence when deciding what to believe, because by doing so 
we are more likely to form beliefs that are true. Precisely how this should work, 
when we are justified in believing something and when we are not, is another 
topic in the theory of knowledge. The three most prominent theories of epistem-
ic justification are foundationalism, coherentism, and reliabilism. 
Much of our knowledge, it seems, does come to us through our senses, 
through perception. Perception, though, is a complex process. The way that we 
experience the world may be determined in part by the world, but it is also de-
termined in part by us. We do not passively receive information through our 
senses; arguably, we contribute just as much to our experiences as do the objects 
that they are experiences of. How we are to understand the process of percep-
tion, and how this should effect our understanding of the world that we inhabit, 
is therefore vital for epistemology. 
The area of epistemology that has captured most imaginations is philosoph-
ical scepticism. Alongside the questions of what knowledge is and how we come 
to acquire it is the question whether we do in fact know anything at all. There is 
a long philosophical tradition that says that we do not, and the arguments in 
support of this position, though resisted by most, are remarkably difficult to re-
fute. The most persistent problem in the theory of knowledge is not what 
knowledge is or what it comes from, but whether there is any such thing at all. 
 
36. Cognitive psychology and logic 
 
Cognitive Psychology is a branch of psychology dealing with the 'cogni-
tive' aspects of mind: perception, attention, categorization, memory, learning, 
language use, reasoning, and decision-making. As a branch of psychology, cog-
nitive psychology typically focuses on the human mind. Unlike the psychologi-
cal behaviorists, cognitive psychologists want to know the underlying, 'internal' 
mechanisms that brings about these cognitie phenomena. Thus, cognitive psy-
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chologists are not just interested in cataloging human cognitive performance un-
der various conditions, but try to explain such cognitive performance by postu-
lating and testing models of these mechanisms. Cognitive psychology is there-
fore very much an empirical science. 
Philosophical logic deals with formal descriptions of ordinary, non-
specialist ("natural") language, that is strictly only about the arguments within 
philosophy's other branches. Most philosophers assume that the bulk of every-
day reasoning can be captured in logic if a method or methods to translate ordi-
nary language into that logic can be found. Philosophical logic is essentially a 
continuation of the traditional discipline called "logic" before the invention of 
mathematical logic. Philosophical logic has a much greater concern with the 
connection between natural language and logic. As a result, philosophical logi-
cians have contributed a great deal to the development of non-standard logics 
(e.g. free logics, tense logics) as well as various extensions of classical logic 
(e.g. modal logics) and non-standard semantics for such logics (e.g. Kripke's su-
pervaluationism in the semantics of logic). 
Logic and the philosophy of language are closely related. Philosophy of 
language has to do with the study of how our language engages and interacts 
with our thinking. Logic has an immediate impact on other areas of study. Stud-
ying logic and the relationship between logic and ordinary speech can help a 
person better structure his own arguments and critique the arguments of others. 
Many popular arguments are filled with errors because so many people are un-
trained in logic and unaware of how to formulate an argument correctly. 
At the origins of cognitive psychology was L. Vygotsky. He was born in 
the Belarusian city of Orsha. His main creative ideas in the field of psychology 
were formulated by him in the Belarusian city of Gomel, where he carried out 
pedagogical activities, combining it with reflexological research. 
The results of his research L.S. Vygotsky presented at the Second All-
Russian Congress on Psychoneurology. They emphasize the features of the 
study of the human psyche. The basis was taken on the aspect of the mood of 
students in graduation classes. This was an application for research in the field 
of developmental psychology, as well as for the problems of studying the crisis 
of identity caused by cultural factors of socialization of the individual. 
This position was close to A.R. Luria. He invited L.S. Vygotsky to Mos-
cow. In 1924, he became an employee of the Moscow Institute of Psychology. 
At the level of a systems approach L.S. Vygotsky formulated the thesis of 
human behavior according to the criterion of reaction based on speech (verbal 
communication, dialogue). With this approach, language and art as cultural 
forms are taken into account. To strengthen the theoretical research resources 
L.S. Vygotsky studied the work of representatives of behaviorism, gestalt psy-
chology, psychoanalysis. He remained true to his original position in psychology 
and pedagogy. Confirmation was the work "The meaning of the psychological 
crisis." Strengthening the cultural dominant in the analysis of mental processes 
was expressed in the concept of a sign. As a result, the communication model 
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was transformed into a paradigm of understanding communication. In the pro-
cess of this communication, a special role is given to the sign in the dialogue. 
The sign stimulates dialogue and forms the basis of feedback in the form of ver-
bal communication. 
In the process of operating the sign system, the primary mental processes of 
memory, attention, thinking are transformed into sociocultural processes. The 
theory was accompanied by defectological and pedological studies. S.V. Vygot-
sky wrote unique works on the developmental psychology of personality devel-
opment in the space of cultural forms. Empirical applied research has contribut-
ed to the expansion of the conceptual interpretation of the paradigm of under-
standing communication. The scientist began to consider the sign in connection 
with meaning and dialogue, training and education. 
The results of fundamental generalizations were presented in the work 
“Thinking and Speech”. Training and education (socialization) L.S. Vygotsky 
associated with a strategy for the long-term development of thinking and the 
psyche of personality. Therefore, teaching methods should be emphasized not 
only on the present and past of culture, but also on factors leading the reflection 
of reality, knowledge, creating the prospect of creativity, self-realization and 
self-identification of a person in specific research and design niches of the fu-
ture. The subject of study was the evolution of the meanings of signs in the cul-
tural context of modernization. Thus, the zone of the actual development of the 
personality was in contact with the potential of its future formation in the con-
text of a specific cultural order. 
The diversity of interests of L.S. Vygotsky, his proximity to the themes of 
the culture of the Silver Age, determined his scientific research in the field of 
creative psychology and the sphere of art. In this area, the main components of 
the psychology of understanding related to experience, emotions, and innovation 
are realized. 
L.S. Vygotsky sought to study the features of understanding didactic com-
munication of a teacher with different age categories of the population. He at-
tached a special role to childhood, within the boundaries of which the person as-
signs the main array of cultural values, creative resources forming his resource. 
From this follows the fundamental conclusion about the crucial role of the edu-
cation system in the socialization of the individual. J. Piaget supplemented the 
paradigm of understanding communication with an aspect of the individual’s in-
ternal resources contained in the resource of logical operations of thinking. 
F.E. Vasilyuk proposed and implemented a project of psychology in the 
context of the philosophy of practice of L.S. Vygotsky and the philosophy of di-
alogue MM Bakhtin. F.E. Vasilyuk developed methodological criteria for under-
standing, psychotechnical knowledge, dialogical attitudes and experiences. To-
gether, they form the content of the psychotechnical theory. 
The didactic function of understanding lies in a dialogical setting. The goal 
is to clear the space of dialogue and realize the possibility of freedom of speech, 
experience, self-expression. With this approach, it is not the statistical volume of 
143 
 
information that is important, but the formation of the skills of appropriating 
cultural resources in the aspect of individual experience, development episte-
mology. Nurturing a culture of experience is a condition of being able to over-
come critical life situations. 
Thus, the art of the Silver Age era influenced one of the prominent repre-
sentatives of the psychological science of the native of the Belarusian city of 
Orsha L.S. Vygotsky. He formulated a thesis on human behavior according to 
the criterion of reaction based on speech (verbal communication, dialogue). 
With this approach, language and art as cultural forms are taken into account. To 
strengthen the theoretical research resources L.S. Vygotsky studied the work of 
representatives of behaviorism, gestaltpsychology and psychoanalysis. He re-
mained true to his original position in psychology and pedagogy. In the process 
of operating the sign system, the primary mental processes of memory, attention 
and thinking are transformed into sociocultural processes. 
The theory was accompanied by defectological and pedological studies. 
S.V. Vygotsky wrote unique works on the developmental psychology of person-
ality development in the space of cultural forms. The teaching methods, in his 
opinion, should be focused not only on the present and past of culture, but also 
on factors leading the reflection of reality, knowledge, creating the prospect of 
creativity, self-realization and self-identification of a person in specific research 
and design niches of the future. 
The special role of L.S. Vygotsky assigned to childhood, within the bound-
aries of which the individual appropriates the main array of cultural values that 
form his creative resources. L. Vygotsky analyzed a number of philosophical 
and psychological concepts, showing the inappropriateness of reducing the 
higher forms of human behavior to the lower elements of his behavior. Human 
speech thinking is localized, in his opinion, in the form of structural units of 
brain activity. The material of child psychology, defectology and psychiatry led 
him to conclude that human consciousness is a dynamic semantic system in the 
unity of affective, volitional and intellectual processes. 
The result of the research was the cultural-historical theory of conscious-
ness. In the light of the paradigm of sciences related to the theory of artificial in-
telligence, the thesis of L. Vygotsky on consciousness as higher psychophysio-
logical processes, phenomena, functions, systems of functions, forms of behav-
ior is relevant. 
The hypothesis put forward by L. Vygotsky, gave a new solution to the 
problem of the ratio of lower (elementary) and higher psychological functions. 
The difference between them is the level of randomness. Natural psychological 
processes are not subject to regulation by humans. People can consciously con-
trol higher psychological functions. Conscious regulation is associated with the 
mediated nature of higher psychological functions. Between the acting stimulus 
and the human reaction (both behavioral and mental), an additional connection 
arises through the mediating link of the stimulus-means, through the sign. 
144 
 
In the cultural space of signs, the functions of socializing people and man-
aging their own behavior are realized. The word is a means of arbitrary direction 
of attention, abstraction of properties and their synthesis into the meaning of the 
formation of concepts, arbitrary control of their own psychological operations. 
The manifestation and realization of the higher psychological functions of hu-
man consciousness is illustrated by the “situation of the Buridan donkey”. This 
is a problematic situation between two equal opportunities. She was interested in 
L. Vygotsky in terms of means that allow to solv the situation. 
Throwing lots, a person enters the situation, changing it, and finds in it new 
auxiliary incentives unrelated to it. The cast of lots becomes a means of trans-
forming and resolving the situation. The casting operation reveals a new and pe-
culiar structure. In this way, a person creates stimuli that determine his reac-
tions. He uses these incentives as a means of mastering the processes of his own 
behavior. The method of researching higher psychological functions is guided 
by the principle of manifestation of the great in the smallest. In this context, in 
addition to casting lots, L. Vygotsky analyzed the phenomena of tying a knot in 
memory and counting on fingers. 
L. Vygotsky pointed to the different genesis of the development of thinking 
and speech in phylogenesis. In his opinion, the relationship between them is not 
a constant. In phylogenesis, the pre-speech phase of intelligence is detected, as 
well as the pre-intellectual phase of the development of speech itself. In the pro-
cess of genetic development, thinking and speech intersect. After that, a person’s 
thinking becomes speech, and his speech becomes intellectual. Inner speech de-
velops through the accumulation of long-term functional and structural changes. 
It branches off from the child’s external speech, along with the differentiation of 
the social and egocentric function of speech. The speech functions acquired by 
the child become the main functions of his thinking. 
L. Vygotsky examined in detail the problem of the relationship between the 
role of socialization and learning in the development of the higher psychological 
functions of the child. He formulated the principle according to which the safety 
and timely maturation of brain structures is a necessary but insufficient condi-
tion for the development of higher psychological functions. The source for this 
development is a changing social environment. To describe it, L. Vygotsky in-
troduced the term social development situation. It is defined as a unique rela-
tionship specific to a given age between a child and the surrounding social reali-
ty. According to L. Vygotsky, he creates special forms of behavior and modifies 
the activity of a psychological function. The concept of the child’s cultural de-
velopment is explained to him as a process corresponding to individual devel-
opment. In the development of the child, the biological and cultural-historical 
types of socialization are repeated. These two types of development are in dia-
lectical unity. In this context, the zone of proximal development plays an im-
portant role.  
This is an area of ripening processes with which the child at this level of 
development cannot cope. He is able to solve them with the help of an adult. 
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The disciples of L. Vygotsky became A.N. Leontiev, A.R. Luria, A.V. Zapo-
rozhets, L.I. Bozhovich, P.Y. Halperin, D.B. Elkonin, P.I. Zinchenko, L.V. 
Zankov. In Europe and the USA, the work of the scientist has acquired funda-
mental significance. 
An additional factor in the popularity of the works of L. Vygotsky was a 
critical rethinking of his texts in different editions. The subject of criticism was 
the translation of his work into other languages. The subject of critical analysis 
was the authenticity of his texts published in the Soviet Union. Scientists from 
Europe, Asia and Latin America participate in this critical work. 
The work of L. Vygotsky was widely recognized in the United States. The 
first translations of his work into English were carried out in the 50-60s XX cen-
tury as part of articles on psychology. In 1962, the publishing house of the Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology published the book "Thinking and Speech". 
In 1978, a collection of works by L. Vygotsky “Mind in Society” was published. 
In the Dictionary of the American Association of Psychologists 2007, L. 
Vygotsky is described as an outstanding scientist. Researchers and educators in 
the United States discovered in the scientist's work the applied aspects of activi-
ty. The Harvard University Library has more than two thousand books and arti-
cles examining the scientist's ideas in the field of psychology, pedagogy, and 
applied linguistics. 
A comprehensive historical analysis and a complete bibliography of works 
on L. Vygotsky and his ideas are contained in the publication of R. Van der 
Veer and J. Walsiner, “Knowing Vygotsky: the search for synthesis”, as well as 
in the studies of G. Daniels “Introduction to Vygotsky’s theory” and Vygotsky 
and Pedagogy. Based on the works of L. Vygotsky, B. Usher and K. Gibbs de-
fend the idea of cultural development of a person in the relationship of physical 
development and cultural events. V. Tirumurti analyzes the idea of teaching stu-
dents through a cultural context in the study of foreign languages. 
D. Hang and M. Nichani use the theory of L. Vygotsky as the basis of ex-
perimental practice for the interaction of schools and districts, as well as for the 
development of curricula and the system of classes. J. Jaramiyo considers the 
sociocultural theory of L. Vygotsky as the basis for the development of training 
programs. E. Bodrova, K. Germerot and D. Leong are studying the possibilities 
of applying the scientist's ideas in the aspect of the development of game learn-
ing and the formation of self-regulation processes in childhood. 
The sociological and psychological theory of social constructivism is asso-
ciated with the name of L. Vygotsky. The involvement of the individual in so-
cial relations takes place simultaneously with the creation of the individual qual-
ities and characteristics of reality. Knowledge is a product of social and cultural 
construction. In the process of interaction of individuals, communication is the 
putting values and meanings of the elements of reality. The processes of training 
and education are the social activity of the individual. Social norms, the values 
of the elements of social reality are not comprehended in passive perception. 
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They are constructed in the process of social interaction. Social factors are con-
stituted in the situation and nature of their relationship. 
The role of social constructivism in the formation of social structures in the 
process of individual-personal learning, accompanying interpersonal interaction, 
is emphasized. 
Social constructivism is adapted to psychology, education, pedagogy and is 
used in theories of learning. It is one of the main theories of child development 
that arose on the basis of the concept of cognitive development of J. Piaget. G. 
Chiari and M. Nuzzo distinguish two types of constructivist theories: epistemo-
logical and hermeneutic constructivisms. Jonathan D. Raskin identifies three 
theories of constructivism: personal constructivism, also called the theory of 
personality construct, radical constructivism and social constructionism. 
Based on the paradigm of cognitive sciences, the works of L. Vygotsky re-
ceived a new direction of application related to the development of the theory of 
artificial intelligence. 
Sofya Aleksandrovna Yanovskaya was born in the Belarusian city of Pru-
zhany. Research S.A. Yanovskaya in the history of mathematics focused on the 
formation of mathematical science. 
The characteristic features of S.A. Yanovskaya in the history of mathemat-
ics was the depth of elaboration of initial historical materials, which required a 
lot of time, but S. A. Yanovskaya, who suffered from a serious illness, could not 
complete a number of scientific works. In particular, an important book on the 
work of R. Descartes "Geometry", conceived before the Great Patriotic War, 
was not completed. The result was only an article “On the role of mathematical 
rigor in the creative development of mathematics and specifically on Descartes' 
Geometry”. The paper considers the importance of rigorous mathematical and 
logical refinement of concepts for the development of mathematics and logic. 
S.A. Yanovskaya and M.Y. Vygodsky began to read the history of mathe-
matics at Moscow State University. The main emphasis was placed on the histo-
ry of the justification of mathematics, from the era of antiquity to the present. 
The questions of substantiation of the concepts of number, quantity, limit, infini-
tesimal quantity, differential and integral were considered. In 1933, S.A. 
Yanovskaya together with M.Y. Vygodsky organized a seminar on the history of 
mathematics at Moscow State University. One of the leaders of this seminar was 
her student A.P. Yushkevich. The seminar became a training center for domestic 
researchers in the field of the history of mathematics. 
S.A. Yanovskaya was actively engaged in mathematical logic. She taught 
this subject at the Faculty of Mechanics and Mathematics of Moscow Universi-
ty. The lecture course has been constantly improved. She prepared the article 
“Mathematical Logic” for the first edition of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia, 
which became the first review article on the subject in the USSR. S.A. 
Yanovskaya read two lecture courses in mathematical logic annually. Lecture 
courses were not repeated, because every year it included new material in the 
program and improved the presentation methodology. 
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S.A. Yanovskaya played an important role in the publication of logical and 
mathematical literature in the USSR, the formation of new scientific structures 
of a logical profile, the protection of mathematical logic from attacks by oppo-
nents who tried to ban mathematical logic by analogy with genetics and cyber-
netics. In 1943, S.A. Yanovskaya organized the first seminar in the USSR on 
mathematical logic at Moscow State University, which she led together with I.I. 
Zhegalkin and P.S. Novikov. 
S. A. Yanovskaya brought mathematical logic to the level of graduate 
school. The first postgraduate students in mathematical logic appeared at the 
Department of the History of Mathematics of Moscow State University. 
In 1947, a Russian translation of the book of D. Hilbert and W. Ackerman, 
Fundamentals of Theoretical Logic, was published. This was the first mono-
graph on mathematical logic published in our country. The editor of the transla-
tion of the book, the author of the introductory article and comments was S.A. 
Yanovskaya, on the initiative of which the book was published. In 1948, A. Tar-
ski's book, Introduction to the Logic and Methodology of the Deductive Scienc-
es, was published. In 1957, she initiated the publication of S. Kleene’s book, In-
troduction to Metamathematics. In 1960, with her support, the work of A. 
Church was published "Introduction to Mathematical Logic", and in 1961, do-
mestic scientists were able to get acquainted with the work of R.L. Goodstein 
"Mathematical Logic." Translations of books by A. Tarsky and R.L. Goodstein 
came out on the initiative, under the editorship and with the introduction by S.A. 
Yanovskaya, and translations of books by S. Klini and A. Church - on her initia-
tive and with her support. 
In 1948 in the collection "Mathematics in the USSR for Thirty Years" S.A. 
Yanovskaya which contained an analysis of the achievements of Russian logi-
cians and mathematicians. Her second review on this subject was published in 
1959 in the collection "Mathematics in the USSR for Forty Years." These re-
views played an important role in the development of logical research in the 
country. Their peculiarity was that questions of the theory of mathematical logic 
were considered in them together with questions of the history and methodology 
of this science, as in its early work “On the so-called definitions through abstrac-
tion” of 1935. 
S.A. attached great importance. Yanovskaya applied issues of mathematical 
logic and its applications in technology, cybernetics. Her first acquaintance with 
the applications of logic in technology occurred in the thirties of the twentieth 
century, when V.I. Shestakov, V.I. Glivenko, worked on his Ph.D. thesis on the 
application of Boolean algebra of logic for mathematical modeling of the statics 
of relay-contact circuits. In 1948, S.A. Yanovskaya defended the priority of V.I. 
Shestakova in the discovery of logical modeling of relay-contact circuits. Its au-
thority in the scientific world has led to the fact that this point of view has be-
come widespread in the USSR. 
In 1946, she acted as an official opponent in the doctoral dissertation of 
M.A. Gavrilova. This was the first doctoral dissertation in the USSR, devoted to 
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the logical modeling of relay-contact circuits. The principle and skill of the po-
lemicist, characteristic of S.A. Yanovskaya, saved the defense of the disserta-
tion, which was very important for the development of Soviet cybernetics. 
In 1957, in the report "On some features of mathematical logic and its rela-
tion to technical applications" at the All-Union Conference on the Theory of Re-
lay Devices S.A. Yanovskaya gave an analysis of the role of practice in the de-
velopment of mathematical logic. In 1960, under her editorship and with her in-
troduction, a book by A. Turing, “Can a machine think?” was published in a 
Russian translation. In the preface S.A. Yanovskaya analyzed from a philosoph-
ical perspective the problem of cybernetics about the conjugation of human and 
machine capabilities. In the works: “On the philosophical questions of mathe-
matical logic” and “Are the difficulties known as the Zeno apori overcome in 
modern science?», They talked about integrating science and technology into a 
single direction of design activity. 
Created by S.A. Yanovskaya's methodological direction of research in sci-
ence and technology accelerated the formation of the intellectual space of inter-
disciplinary philosophical reflection. 
In Belarus, became interested in this interdisciplinary aspect of the interac-
tion of the humanities and technical sciences V.V. Martynov. The subject of his 
research was the connection between technical phenomena integrated into the 
space of culture and their effective use in the processes of activity. 
One of these technical devices that attracted his attention was the computer. 
The scientist noted that the presence of this technical device in the space of cul-
ture did not lead to its multifunctional integration into the processes of activity. 
And he was right, because to this day the problem of creating effective intelli-
gent systems in the field of cybernetics, engineering, social communication re-
mains. These systems can make real a constructive dialogue between a person 
and a computer program in the mode of producing activity. 
Integrated man-machine systems in the field of control are especially rele-
vant, where in the decision-making process there are risks due to lack of infor-
mation. It is important for a person to deal with computer programs that have 
integrated functions of self-control and self-development based on the semantic 
resources provided by a person. In fact, we are talking about the phenomenon of 
the integrated responsibility of the designer, designer, programmer for the possi-
ble anthropogenic consequences of operating technical devices with an autono-
mous control status, providing passenger transportation services, providing in-
formation, and diagnosing diseases. Intelligent systems require functioning in 
the feedback mode based on constant contact with information and decision-
making algorithms that form the spectrum of sustainable activities of technical 
infrastructure and communications. 
V.V. Martynov realized his scientific interests in the field of linguistics. 
This interest was facilitated by studies at the philological faculty of Odessa Uni-
versity, the defense of a candidate dissertation at the University of Lviv on the 
topic of literary work of Y. Slovatsky. Unbeknownst to himself, the scientist 
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found himself in a space of intercultural themes. She became one of the main for 
him. The consolidation of its dominant occurred in studies of the Slavic-
Germanic lexical interactions of ancient times. Slavic and Germanic languages 
gave rise to the scientist to turn to the features of the Indo-European languages 
as such. 
The stay within Belarus motivated VV Martynova to the study of lexical 
and etymological features of the Belarusian language. The factor of linguistic 
diversity in the processes of verbal and non-verbal communication, discovered 
by him during the years of World War II while being in the fighting in Moldova, 
Yugoslavia, Austria, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, pointed out the relevance of 
research in the field of linguistic comparative studies. 
Language demarcations at the level of their historical origin and evolution 
are not entirely desirable, according to the scientist in the field of human-
machine dialogue. The machine needs to be offered a language that would allow 
it to avoid language demarcations, as well as limitations in the field of logical 
thinking. The scientist decided to convey to the machine a semantic basis suffi-
cient to represent knowledge and to construct it in the light of contexts formulat-
ed by the user. Linguistic diversity, in his opinion, contains a common semantic 
basis, which is clearly visible on the Indo-European group of languages. The 
same verb with small national pronunciation features means the same action. 
A common semiotic basis opened the way to solving the problem of artifi-
cial intelligence. V.V. Martynov had to turn to the methodology of transdiscipli-
nary research and determine the necessary minimum of scientific areas that con-
tributed to the implementation of his plan. He studied cybernetics, systems theo-
ry, semiotics, logic, mathematics. In the framework of the methodology, his 
interests focused on ways of building a knowledge system and its presentation, 
functioning in feedback mode. This knowledge has acquired instrumental status. 
According to the works of V.V. Martynov can trace the sequence of stages that 
led to the implementation of his plan. 
Work began at the intersection of cybernetics, semiotics and linguistics. 
The task was set of constructing an analogue of the semantic language in the 
theory of artificial intelligence. This language was endowed with two functions. 
It was about the language of the representation of knowledge and the language 
of the production of new knowledge. 
To implement the second function, it was necessary to formulate the axi-
oms of the transformation of knowledge. The main method for constructing 
cognitive systems was deduction and its axiomatic modification. The emphasis 
was placed on deductive semiotics and topological linguistics. Information was 
endowed with a semiotic basis in the form of a universal semiotic code, which 
allowed the machine to generate new knowledge and conduct a dialogue with 
the user. At the same time, stable decision-making structures (algorithms) were 
formed in the universal semantic code system. 
The efficiency of the algorithms was ensured by decision logic in the uni-
versal semantic code system. Logical analysis included a semantic classification 
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of nominative units. All efforts were aimed at increasing the efficiency of a 
computer program. The maximum return could give only the function of an in-
telligent system. 
The task was to develop a knowledge representation system capable of 
forming new concepts, building hypotheses about the causes and consequences 
of various situations. As a result, the scientist created a universal theory of cal-
culus of meaning. The theory prescribes the classification of the verbs "shares" 
in order to convey changes, evolution. The three-term structure is taken as a ba-
sis - the subject, the stock, the object. The logic of decision-making in the uni-
versal semantic code system is consonant with the generative grammar devel-
oped by N. Chomsky. 
As the technological component of artificial intelligence was realized, a 
situation of hybrid reality was discovered, in the space of which a person and a 
machine interact. The study of subjective (cultural-historical) aspects of the 
functioning of unconscious thinking and the provision of decision making in the 
face of uncertainty in behavioral practices determined by cognitive distortions 
became relevant. The cultural-historical theory of L. Vygotsky is again in de-
mand. 
The focus is on the issues of cultural-historical constructivism. It is charac-
teristic of neuroarchaeology, the theory of material involvement of L. Malafuris, 
expanded knowledge and predictive coding of E. Clark, the theory of culture as 
knowledge, rooted in the environment of D. Oiserman. 
Based on the concepts of “metaplasticity” and “material sign” L. Malafuris 
analyzes the co-evolution of the psyche and the material environment in the his-
tory of mankind. E. Clark proceeds from the fact that the cognitive system of 
man at all stages of the formation of mankind is open to the material world. D. 
Oiserman gives an original explanation of the dichotomy of individualistic 
(western) and collectivist (eastern) cultures that is widely discussed in modern 
cultural neuroscience. This is integration between relevant cognitive research 
and cultural-activity psychology. 
The bodily conditionality of cognition, its environmental rootedness (em-
bedded / located cognition), emotional and motivational regulation along with 
the processing of “emotional information” (emotional cognition), the distributed 
(“dialogical”) nature of cognition, are taken into account. its evolutionary roots 
and social and cultural determination. 
Supporters of L. Vygotsky insist that the explanation should be based on 
the direct interaction of the subject with the sociocultural environment, which is 
an integral part of the cognitive system. These ideas have been developed in 
modern cognitive design. D.Norman combining a representative and anti-
representation position is based on the concept of “affordance” (affordance) 
from environmental optics J.J. Gibson. In the development of methods for re-
cording brain activity, a shift in the interest of scientists in the brain substrate of 
bodily, social and cultural conditioning of cognition is observed. 
151 
 
L. Malafuris refers to the work of L. Vygotsky when considering neuroar-
chaeology. He belongs to a new formulation of the problem of mediation, based 
on the interpretation of the brain as a bio-artifact that creates a culture and is 
formed by it. Hence M. Cole's thesis that cultural anthropology should come to 
the fore in cognitive research. 
Representatives of cultural neuroscience are based on the idea of co-
evolution of genes and culture. It is stated in the theory of double inheritance by 
P. Richerson and R. Boyd. 
The theory of material involvement involves the conceptual apparatus of G. 
Gibson's activism. The sign structure is primary in relation to the speech appa-
ratus. This is the cognitive projection of the subject into the outside world, with 
the direct participation of which he solves cognitive and communicative tasks. 
Material signification has a formative effect on the brain. 
Anactivism as a philosophical and psychological direction feeds on radical 
constructivism and the theory of autopoiesis of W. Maturana and F. Varela. 
They put a sign of identity between knowledge and action. Any motor act in re-
lation to a material object performs a predictive function for a subsequent act in 
relation to this object. 
D. Oiserman calls his approach the theory of culture as cognition rooted in 
the environment (Culture as located cognition, CSC). Culture in this theory ap-
pears as a tool for solving universal human problems, a certain mindset, or 
“mentality” (mindset) and as a set of specific cultural practices that are charac-
teristic of a particular society at a certain point in time and in a certain place. 
Experimental data show that both individualistic and collectivistic charac-
teristics of cognition are potentially accessible to a representative of any culture 
and can be brought to life using special pre-adjustment procedures. But in dif-
ferent cultures, the evolutionary tasks of preserving a group and an individual 
are solved in different ways. Any situation and any environment form certain 
expectations (predictions) as to how events should develop further. If they de-
velop differently, cultural difficulties experienced by a person lead to the for-
mation of stable attitudes in behavior (cultural mindsets). 
Culture itself selects forms of behavior and cognition that are appropriate to 
it, using a metacognitive regulation mechanism based on feedback, which allows 
us to choose movement along the path of least resistance in the future. The lead-
ing role in individual socio-cultural development is played by metacognitive ex-
perience regarding how certain attitudes and behaviors are more easily and effi-
ciently implemented in culture. Initially, a representative of any culture has a 
complete, redundant set of cognitive features. 
E. Clark develops the constructivist principle of predictive coding. This 
principle allows us to come closer to explaining the inextricable link between 
perception and action. R. Millikan's studies are devoted to the study of the ob-
jective foundations of knowledge, the conditions of true knowledge, and the 
problem of representation. It includes the study of intentionality and the problem 
of the reference of various sign systems to the evolutionary (historical) and prac-
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tical context of their functioning. The idea was expressed in the concept of bi-
osemantics. As a condition for the reliability of knowledge (intentionality, repre-
sentation), their practical functionality is considered, which allows solving prob-
lems facing a living organism or the scientific community. The property of truth 
or falsehood does not belong to the cognitive or linguistic representation in 
question, but to the effectiveness or correspondence to the functions that they 
perform. 
Language as a cultural phenomenon, as not a cognitive competence, is sub-
ject not so much to formal rules as to the convenience and effectiveness of 
communication and coordination of actions. Stability in the language is not 
achieved through universal grammar, but through social conventions. As a re-
sult, the established elements of the language acquire new meanings or functions 
in different contexts. The distinction between semantics and pragmatics, the se-
mantic and pragmatic meanings of statements is mobile and defies a clear defini-
tion or set of linguistic rules. 
Knowledge, including the most fundamental ideas about social reality, 
forming the so-called common sense, occurs and is maintained through social 
interactions. In social interaction, people proceed from the premise of a similari-
ty of perceptions of reality and common sense. Their general ideas and under-
standing of the reality of everyday life are reproduced and fixed. Human typolo-
gies and value systems, social formations are perceived by people as an objec-
tive reality. 
One of the tasks is to study the processes by which a person forms, institu-
tionalizes, comprehends and integrates social phenomena into tradition and so-
cial values. In this context, we must distinguish between social constructionism 
and social constructivism. 
Social constructionism explores the dynamics of the phenomenon relative 
to the social context. Social constructivism studies the personality processes of 
the meaning of knowledge and experience in a social context. 
 
37. Conception of the truth 
 
There were a number of views of truth under discussion at that time, the 
most significant for the contemporary literature being the correspondence, co-
herence, and pragmatist theories of truth. 
These theories all attempt to directly answer the nature question: what is 
the nature of truth? They take this question at face value: there are truths, and 
the question to be answered concerns their nature. In answering this question, 
each theory makes the notion of truth part of a more thoroughgoing metaphysics 
or epistemology. Explaining the nature of truth becomes an application of some 
metaphysical system, and truth inherits significant metaphysical presuppositions 
along the way. 
The goal of this section is to characterize the ideas of the correspondence, 
coherence and pragmatist theories which animate the contemporary debate. In 
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some cases, the received forms of these theories depart from the views that were 
actually defended in the early 20th century. We thus dub them the ‘neo-classical 
theories’. Where appropriate, we pause to indicate how the neo-classical theories 
emerge from their ‘classical’ roots in the early 20th century. 
Perhaps the most important of the neo-classical theories for the contempo-
rary literature is the correspondence theory. Ideas that sound strikingly like a 
correspondence theory are no doubt very old. They might well be found in Aris-
totle or Aquinas. When we turn to the late 19th and early 20th centuries where 
we pick up the story of the neo-classical theories of truth, it is clear that ideas 
about correspondence were central to the discussions of the time. In spite of 
their importance, however, it is strikingly difficult to find an accurate citation in 
the early 20th century for the received neo-classical view. Furthermore, the way 
the correspondence theory actually emerged will provide some valuable refer-
ence points for the contemporary debate. For these reasons, we dwell on the ori-
gins of the correspondence theory in the late 19th and early 20th centuries at 
greater length than those of the other neo-classical views, before turning to its 
contemporary neo-classical form. 
The basic idea of the correspondence theory is that what we believe or say 
is true if it corresponds to the way things actually are – to the facts. This idea 
can be seen in various forms throughout the history of philosophy. Its modern 
history starts with the beginnings of analytic philosophy at the turn of the 20th 
century, particularly in the work of G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell. 
Let us pick up the thread of this story in the years between 1898 and about 
1910. These years are marked by Moore and Russell's rejection of idealism. Yet 
at this point, they do not hold a correspondence theory of truth. Indeed Moore 
(1899) sees the correspondence theory as a source of idealism, and rejects it. 
Russell follows Moore in this regard. In this period, Moore and Russell hold a 
version of the identity theory of truth. They say comparatively little about it, but 
it is stated briefly in Moore (1899; 1902) and Russell (1904). According to the 
identity theory, a true proposition is identical to a fact. Specifically, in Moore 
and Russell's hands, the theory begins with propositions, understood as the ob-
jects of beliefs and other propositional attitudes. Propositions are what are be-
lieved, and give the contents of beliefs. They are also, according to this theory, 
the primary bearers of truth. When a proposition is true, it is identical to a fact, 
and a belief in that proposition is correct.  
The identity theory Moore and Russell espoused takes truth to be a proper-
ty of propositions. Furthermore, taking up an idea familiar to readers of Moore, 
the property of truth is a simple unanalyzable property. Facts are understood as 
simply those propositions which are true. There are true propositions and false 
ones, and facts just are true propositions. There is thus no “difference between 
truth and the reality to which it is supposed to correspond” (Moore, 1902, p. 21). 
(For further discussion of the identity theory of truth, see Baldwin (1991), Can-
dlish (1999), Cartwright (1987), Dodd (2000), and the entry on the identity theo-
ry of truth.) 
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Moore and Russell came to reject the identity theory of truth in favor of a 
correspondence theory, sometime around 1910 (as we see in Moore, 1953, 
which reports lectures he gave in 1910–1911, and Russell, 1910b). They do so 
because they came to reject the existence of propositions. Why? Among reasons, 
they came to doubt that there could be any such things as false propositions, and 
then concluded that there are no such things as propositions at all. 
Why did Moore and Russell find false propositions problematic? A full an-
swer to this question is a point of scholarship that would take us too far afield. 
But very roughly, the identification of facts with true propositions left them un-
able to see what a false proposition could be other than something which is just 
like a fact, though false. If such things existed, we would have fact-like things in 
the world, which Moore and Russell now see as enough to make false proposi-
tions count as true. Hence, they cannot exist, and so there are no false proposi-
tions. As Russell (1956, p. 223) later says, propositions seem to be at best “curi-
ous shadowy things” in addition to facts. 
As Cartwright (1987) reminds us, it is useful to think of this argument in 
the context of Russell's slightly earlier views about propositions. As we see 
clearly in Russell (1903), for instance, he takes propositions to have constitu-
ents. But they are not mere collections of constituents, but a ‘unity’ which brings 
the constituents together. But what, we might ask, would be the ‘unity’ of a 
proposition t hat Samuel Ramey sings – with constituents Ramey and singing – 
except Ramey bearing the property of singing? If that is what the unity consists 
in, then we seem to have nothing other than the fact that Ramey sings. But then 
we could not have genuine false propositions without having false facts. 
Though initially the correspondence theory was seen by its developers as a 
competitor to the identity theory of truth, it was also understood as opposed to 
the coherence theory of truth. 
We will be much briefer with the historical origins of the coherence theory 
than we were with the correspondence theory. Like the correspondence theory, 
versions of the coherence theory can be seen throughout the history of philoso-
phy. Like the correspondence theory, it was important in the early 20th century 
British origins of analytic philosophy. Particularly, the coherence theory of truth 
is associated with the British idealists to whom Moore and Russell were react-
ing. Many idealists at that time did indeed hold coherence theories. Let us take 
as an example Joachim (1906). (This is the theory that Russell (1910a) attacks.) 
Joachim says that: Truth in its essential nature is that systematic coherence 
which is the character of a significant whole. We will not attempt a full exposi-
tion of Joachim's view, which would take us well beyond the discussion of truth 
into the details of British idealism. But a few remarks about his theory will help 
to give substance to the quoted passage. 
The coherence theory of truth enjoys two sorts of motivations. One is pri-
marily epistemological. Most coherence theorists also hold a coherence theory 
of knowledge; more specifically, a coherence theory of justification. According 
to this theory, to be justified is to be part of a coherent system of beliefs. An ar-
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gument for this is often based on the claim that only another belief could stand 
in a justification relation to a belief, allowing nothing but properties of systems 
of belief, including coherence, to be conditions for justification. Combining this 
with the thesis that a fully justified belief is true forms an argument for the co-
herence theory of truth. The steps in this argument may be questioned by a 
number of contemporary epistemological views. But the coherence theory also 
goes hand-in-hand with its own metaphysics as well. The coherence theory is 
typically associated with idealism. As we have already discussed, forms of it 
were held by British idealists such as Joachim, and later by Blanshard (in Amer-
ica). An idealist should see the last step in the justification argument as quite 
natural. More generally, an idealist will see little (if any) room between a system 
of beliefs and the world it is about, leaving the coherence theory of truth as an 
extremely natural option. 
It is possible to be an idealist without adopting a coherence theory. (For in-
stance, many scholars read Bradley as holding a version of the identity theory of 
truth. See Baldwin (1991) for some discussion.) However, it is hard to see much 
of a way to hold the coherence theory of truth without maintaining some form of 
idealism. If there is nothing to truth beyond what is to be found in an appropriate 
system of beliefs, then it would seem one's beliefs constitute the world in a way 
that amounts to idealism. The neo-classical correspondence theory seeks to cap-
ture the intuition that truth is a content-to-world relation. It captures this in the 
most straightforward way, by asking for an object in the world to pair up with a 
true proposition. The neo-classical coherence theory, in contrast, insists that 
truth is not a content-to-world relation at all; rather, it is a content-to-content, or 
belief-to-belief, relation. The coherence theory requires some metaphysics 
which can make the world somehow reflect this, and idealism appears to be it. 
A different perspective on truth was offered by the American pragmatists. 
As with the neo-classical correspondence and coherence theories, the pragmatist 
theories go with some typical slogans. For example, Peirce is usually understood 
as holding the view that: Truth is satisfactory to believe. James (e.g., 1907) un-
derstands this principle as telling us what practical value truth has. True beliefs 
are guaranteed not to conflict with subsequent experience. Likewise, Peirce's 
slogan tells us that true beliefs will remain settled at the end of prolonged in-
quiry. Peirce's slogan is perhaps most typically associated with pragmatist views 
of truth, so we might take it to be our canonical neo-classical theory. However, 
the contemporary literature does not seem to have firmly settled upon a received 
‘neo-classical’ pragmatist theory. 
 
38. Philosophy of science 
 
Philosophy of science is a sub-field of philosophy concerned with the 
foundations, methods, and implications of science. The central questions of this 
study concern what qualifies as science. This discipline overlaps with metaphys-
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ics, ontology, and epistemology, for example, when it explores the relationship 
between science and truth. 
There is no consensus among philosophers about many of the central prob-
lems concerned with the philosophy of science, including whether science can 
reveal the truth about unobservable things and whether scientific reasoning can 
be justified at all. In addition to these general questions about science as a 
whole, philosophers of science consider problems that apply to particular sci-
ences (such as biology or physics). Some philosophers of science also use con-
temporary results in science to reach conclusions about philosophy itself. 
While philosophical thought pertaining to science dates back at least to the 
time of Aristotle, philosophy of science emerged as a distinct discipline only in 
the middle of the 20th century in the wake of the logical positivism movement, 
which aimed to formulate criteria for ensuring all philosophical statements' 
meaningfulness and objectively assessing them. Thomas Kuhn's landmark 1962 
book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions was also formative, challenging 
the view of scientific progress as steady, cumulative acquisition of knowledge 
based on a fixed method of systematic experimentation and instead arguing that 
any progress is relative to a "paradigm," the set of questions, concepts, and prac-
tices that define a scientific discipline in a particular historical period.
 
Karl Pop-
per and Charles Sanders Pierce moved on from positivism to establish a modern 
set of standards for scientific methodology. 
Subsequently, the coherentist approach to science, in which a theory is val-
idated if it makes sense of observations as part of a coherent whole, became 
prominent due to W. V. Quine and others. Some thinkers such as Stephen Jay 
Gould seek to ground science in axiomatic assumptions, such as the uniformity 
of nature. A vocal minority of philosophers and Paul Feyerabend (1924–1994) 
in particular, argue that there is no such thing as the "scientific method", so all 
approaches to science should be allowed, including explicitly supernatural ones. 
Another approach to thinking about science involves studying how knowledge is 
created from a sociological perspective, an approach represented by scholars 
like David Bloor and Barry Barnes. Finally, a tradition in continental philoso-
phy approaches science from the perspective of a rigorous analysis of human 
experience. 
Philosophies of the particular sciences range from questions about the na-
ture of time raised by Einstein's general relativity, to the implications 
of economics for public policy. A central theme is whether one scientific disci-
pline can be reduced to the terms of another. That is, can chemistry be reduced 
to physics, or can sociology be reduced to individual psychology? The general 
questions of philosophy of science also arise with greater specificity in some 
particular sciences. For instance, the question of the validity of scientific reason-
ing is seen in a different guise in the foundations of statistics. The question of 
what counts as science and what should be excluded arises as a life-or-death 
matter in the philosophy of medicine. Additionally, the philosophies of biology, 
of psychology, and of the social sciences explore whether the scientific studies 
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of human nature can achieve objectivity or are inevitably shaped by values and 
by social relations. 
In Vitebsk, K. Malevich began a theoretical understanding of Suprematism. 
For two years Vitebsk was the cultural capital of Suprematism. Residential 
houses, shops, public canteens, coffee houses, libraries in the city were painted, 
decorated with Suprematist panels. Signs were decorated in a Suprematist style. 
Suprematist trams ran around the city - traveling exhibitions of Suprematist 
paintings, as well as Suprematist propaganda. At the demonstrations, the inhab-
itants of the city carried suprematist banners. Proletarian life was decorated with 
fabrics and utensils in the style of Suprematism. In Vitebsk, K. Malevich wrote 
the program book “The World as Objectivity”. 
Suprematism solves the problem of liberation from the objective world. 
Buddhism, Taoism, A. Schopenhauer, “Peace as a Will and Representation” by 
A. Schopenhauer, intuitionism of A. Bergson and B. Croce, phenomenology of 
E. Husserl and M. Heidegger became the philosophical sources of the suprema-
tist justification of the world without objects. 
Objectivity is the absence of objects in the mind of the artist who has com-
prehended being. In non-objectiveness, the creative process is a pure action in 
which the universal excitement of the world, excitement without a goal, in 
which there is no objective representation of time and space, is concentrated. 
The main principles of the creative process are motion and peace. There is only 
nothing. Malevich takes this view from the philosophy of Jacob Boehme. 
K. Malevich expressed in the language of painting a sense of infinity, space 
beyond zero. The shape has become a white Suprematism. At the 1920 exhibi-
tion, Malevich displayed blank canvases that follow black, color, and white su-
prematism. This is a real zero form, a real way out of painting as such. In the 
white, empty, cleaned and liberated space, nothing interfered with the movement 
of the ray of light in front of the eyes therefore white suprematism experiences 
the boundaries of the visual field, the possibilities of perceiving the eye, reflec-
tion and refraction of light by the eye as a pure sensation. 
K. Malevich invented space aeronautics to move in space. He discovered 
the supra-direct - an additional element of the dynamic order in suprematism. He 
opened the vacuum as a medium in which there is a weightless aerodynamic su-
prematism (airplanes, architectons and planets). Experiments with architects and 
planets mean the transition from artistic suprematist white infinity to the con-
struction of a white universe in space. The abstraction of flight and structure in 
space is realized. The spatial system is given in a vacuum. As a result, there is 
no gravity in the paintings. The viewer sees only the motion vector. 
In Vitebsk in the twenties of the twentieth century, M. Bakhtin's intellectual 
circle settled. On the example of K. Malevich, he highly appreciated the signifi-
cance of a creative act, emphasizing creative novelty, to which a step had to be 
taken. The mayor of the city, P. Medvedev, contributed to the existence of intel-
lectual and creative communities in Vitebsk. He played a prominent role in the 
cultural life of Vitebsk in those years as head of out-of-school education, a 
158 
 
teacher at the Pedagogical Institute. He was engaged in the formation in Vitebsk 
of a professional humanitarian and intellectual environment, collaborated with 
M. Chagall, Dobuzhinsky, K. Malevich, Malko, published the city magazine 
"Art". The Literary Studio worked. 
In 1918, the Vitebsk People's (Proletarian) University was opened, in 
which P. Medvedev taught a course of Russian literature and society of the nine-
teenth century, and "Proletarian University Notes" were published. A “Society 
of Free Aesthetics” and a seminar on sociology functioned at the university. 
At the initiative of P. Medvedev and S. Gruzenberg, M. Kagan, L. 
Pumpyansky, I. Sollertinsky, V. Voloshinov and M. Bakhtin were involved in 
teaching. Since 1920, M. Bakhtin lived in Vitebsk, where he taught at the Peda-
gogical Institute and the Conservatory, and gave public lectures on philosophy, 
aesthetics, and literature. In 1920-1924 he worked on philosophical treatises and 
the early edition of a book about F. Dostoevsky. In 1924 he left Vitebsk. 
The works of M. Bakhtin after his death became widely known in the West. 
At the University of Sheffield there is a Bakhtinsky center. In France, his works 
were promoted by T. Todorov and Y. Kristeva. In Japan, the world's first col-
lected works were published, as well as a large number of monographs and 
works on it were published. 
The interpretation of the ideas of theatricality, the metaphor “world - thea-
ter” was considered by M. Bakhtin on the basis of the concept of dialogue cul-
ture. This is shown to them by the example of the analysis of the works of F. 
Dostoevsky as polyphony. He interprets the being of concrete reality as an event 
that is inconceivable without an act and a person. Outside of concrete events, 
there are only empty possibilities and an unrooted being. Rationalism is a preju-
dice, and the discretion of the essence is possible only through intuition. 
M. Bakhtin developed a philosophical theory of a phenomenological type. 
A special place in it is the study of laughter culture on the example of carnival. 
Laughter and carnival showcase events. 
In the field of art, his intellectual interest was attracted by verbal creativity. 
According to M. Bakhtin, humanitarian thought is always aimed at working with 
other people's thoughts, dealing with the text in its various presentations. Behind 
each text is a language system consisting of the languages of many social 
groups. The researcher works with the text, intending to create his own text as-
sessment. The result is a dialogue between the author and the reader. The author 
assumes a reciprocal understanding. This expectation is due to the dialogical na-
ture of the text. 
Working with text involves a linguistic method, which is part of a compre-
hensive aesthetic analysis. The word is studied in linguistics based on a general 
aesthetic theory, epistemology and other philosophical disciplines. 
The emotional-volitional tension of the literary form testifies to the value 
value of art. The artist's artistic and value activity is aimed at transforming the 
material with the aim of transmitting certain content. The content of the work of 
art shows how individuation, concretization of the reality of knowledge and eth-
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ical action find a union in the form of an aesthetic object. The work captures re-
ality in aesthetic intuition. A special role belongs to the literary genre of the 
novel. This is a multi-style, controversial, dissonant phenomenon. It is repre-
sented by diverse stylistic unity, sometimes lying in different linguistic planes 
and subject to different stylistic laws. 
Diverse stylistic unity is combined in the novel into a harmonious art sys-
tem. They submit to the higher stylistic unity of the whole. It cannot be identi-
fied with any of the unities subordinate to it. 
The language of the novel is represented by a system of languages. A pre-
requisite for novel prose is the internal stratification of the language, social dis-
cord, and individual discord in it. The dialogical orientation of the word among 
the words of others creates new and significant artistic possibilities of the word, 
its prosaic artistry. 
M. Bakhtin compared the novel and the poetic word. It follows from this 
that the world of poetry is illuminated by a single and indisputable word. All 
conflicts, doubts and experiences do not pass into the final result of creative ac-
tivity. They remain at the stage of work with the material. The language of poet-
ic genres, approaching the stylistic limit, becomes authoritarian and conserva-
tive, hiding from non-literary social dialects. An indisputable basis for poetry is 
the direct intention of poetic creativity. 
The novel retains controversy and contributes to its deepening. The author 
plays on discrepancies and multilingualism, building his own style. At the same 
time, he maintains the unity of his creative personality and the unity of style. M. 
Bakhtin defined two stylistic lines of the European novel. One is a sophisticated 
novel. Its features are monolingual and one-style. Disagreement becomes its di-
alogizing background, thanks to which it is value-related to the language and 
world of the novel. Similar signs are possessed by a chivalrous prose novel. The 
pastoral and baroque novels also belong to the stylistic line of the sophisticated 
novel. 
Second-line novels introduce social discord into the composition. The nov-
el is subject to transformation through the processes of canonization and re-
accentuation. Provincial dialect or professional jargon can be legitimized by lit-
erature. It is not always clear whether the author considers a certain language lit-
erary or places a moment of discord in it. There is a change in the level of some 
roles. The character, who once occupied the second roles, may become the first 
person of the novel, invisibly to the reader. This happens as a result of a change 
of eras and a dialogue background. The theoretical conclusions of M. Bakhtin 
were fed by an analysis of the work of F. Dostoevsky. In the novels of the writ-
er, a dialogue structure is implemented. In the speeches of the heroes there is a 
deep and incomplete conflict with someone else's word. The novels of the writer 
are internally incomplete dialogues between the characters. They create a long-
term perspective for reflection. 
V. N. Ivanovsky proceeded from the criteria of science developed by repre-
sentatives of positivism. He believed that philosophy can meet the criteria of 
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scientific, despite the universality of its subject. This position was facilitated by 
translations of the scientific works of V. Wildelband, A. Stöckel, E. Cassirer, J. 
Mil, G. Rickert. For almost three years he was sent from the Ministry of Educa-
tion of the Russian Empire to the largest centers of educational activity in Eu-
rope. In England - Oxford, London, he was engaged in translations, participated 
in practical classes in psychology, listened to lectures on philosophy and peda-
gogy. In Germany - Berlin, he listened to the lectures of V. Dilthey, G. Simmel. 
In France in Paris, he attended the lectures of A. Bergson, T. Ribot, F. Bu-
isson. In July 1900, he made a presentation on philosophical terminology at the 
first International Congress of Philosophy in Paris. He was elected to the Bureau 
of Philosophical Congresses. At the Paris Russian School of Social Sciences, he 
lectured on the history of philosophy and theory of sciences. In 1921, the Bela-
rusian State University was opened in Minsk. 
VN Ivanovsky was invited to the post of professor. He was elected Deputy 
Rector for Academic Affairs and Chairman of the Board of the Scientific Socie-
ty of the University, which consisted of four sections: regional studies, technical 
and economic, physical and mathematical and social sciences. He wrote the 
monograph “Methodological Introduction to Science and Philosophy”, the arti-
cle “Associationism by A. Ben”. The ideas of V. Ivanovsky are in tune with the 
program for creating a scientific philosophy initiated by representatives of logi-
cal positivism. 
The multidimensional model of science developed by V. Ivanovsky in-
cludes social, psychological, logical and methodological, worldview aspects of 
science, a variety of types, methods and contents of different sciences, their de-
velopment in the space of culture. 
Science involves the requirements of proof, of truth. Truth is such because 
it is verified and proven. An important property of science is systematic - the 
ability to systematize disparate knowledge. Not all scientific results find practi-
cal application. This is the norm for her, since there is fundamental and applied 
research. V.N. Ivanovsky did not conceal his discrepancy with most representa-
tives of the materialist trend. The discrepancy was justified by the fact that he 
highlighted methodology and epistemology. 
In the second half of the twentieth century, V.S. Stepin took the path of the 
methodology and philosophy of science. Stepin taught at higher educational in-
stitutions of Minsk. His PhD thesis was devoted to the consideration of the phi-
losophy of the science of neopositivism . He postponed her defense for a while, 
arguing this decision by the need for a more in-depth study of the topic. He 
worked as a teacher. He did not go into conflict and remained within the bound-
aries of the research methodology. The subject of his study was the formation of 
scientific theory. 
Using the example of physics, the methods of constructing the theory were 
reconstructed and a tendency toward an increased role in the construction of the 
hypothetical-deductive method was discovered. The work received recognition. 
A scientific career followed. She expressed herself in the chair of the Depart-
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ment of Philosophy at Belarusian State University, which trained teachers in the 
philosophical sciences. During this period, V. Stepin formed close relations with 
the philosophical schools of Moscow. Against this background, he developed, 
adapted to the platform of Marxist philosophy in the USSR, the methodological 
concept of the structural organization and development of science as a research 
activity. In scientific studies, the levels of empirical, theoretical, metatheoretical 
systematization of scientific knowledge are highlighted.  
 
39. Structure of science 
 
The direct contribution of V. Stepin was the institutionalization of the met-
atheoretical level of systematization of scientific knowledge. The need for this 
block of methodological constructs in the structure of Marxist philosophy was 
largely motivated by the research of T. Kuhn, who proposed a mechanism for 
the functioning of science in the form of a change in research paradigms as a re-
sult of a conventional agreement between scientists. 
V. Stepin began to use the term “scientific picture of the world” instead of 
the term “paradigm”. In addition to the scientific picture of the world, in the 
metatheoretical foundations of science, ideals and norms of scientific activity, 
philosophical principles were highlighted. The change of scientific pictures of 
the world was explained not by the mechanisms of conventional agreements, but 
by the inability of a functioning scientific picture of the world to integrate dis-
coveries requiring fundamental understanding into their subject field. One of the 
barriers to such integration was called the stereotype of scientific rationality. 
Overcoming this barrier is accompanied by a change in the types of scientific 
rationality and the style of scientific thinking. 
According to V. Stepin, categorical structures of philosophy are borrowed 
from categorical structures of culture. At the level of philosophical reflection, 
these linguistic structures are interpreted in the context of a specific subject tra-
dition - antique, eastern, new European. 
Summing up the research work V. Stepin admitted that the origins of the 
philosophy of science are in positivism. He consistently characterized the four 
stages in the evolution of this intellectual tradition in the European region. The 
subject of discussion was positivism of O. Comte, G. Spencer, J.S. Mill, empir-
io-criticism of E. Mach, P. Avenarius, neo-positivism of B. Russell, A. Ufay-
thead, G. Frege, L. Wittgenstein, postpositivism of K. Popper, I. Lacatos, T. 
Kuhn, P. Feyerabend, J. Holton, M Polanyi, S. Tulmin. In this context, consider-
ation of the work of V. Stepin turned out to be consonant with post-positivism 
with his characteristic desire to engage in a historical analysis of science, its so-
cial status and the internal social mechanisms of organization characteristic of it. 
As a result, the philosophy of science in the works of V. Stepin was trans-
formed into the sociology of science, integrated with cultural studies. The cate-
gorical thinking structures of the West and the East began to be taken into ac-
count. The integrated idea of the intellectual culture of mankind has become as-
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sociated with the processes of evolution of civilization. The concept of anthro-
pogenic civilization is highlighted, within the subject boundaries of which the 
prospects of science are analyzed in the context of the global problems of man-
kind. 
 
40. Fundamental research 
 
Basic research, also called pure research or fundamental research, is scien-
tific research aimed to improve scientific theories for improved understanding or 
prediction of natural or other phenomena. Applied research, in turn, uses scien-
tific theories to develop technology or techniques to intervene and alter natural 
or other phenomena. Though often driven by curiosity, basic research fuels ap-
plied science's innovations. The two aims are often coordinated in research and 
development. 
Although many discoveries have been serendipitous, discovery science 
specifically seeks discoveries, and, along with theoretical science and experi-
mental science, is now to basic research and is sometimes expressly planned. 
Basic research advances fundamental knowledge about the world. It focuses 
on refuting or supporting theories that explain observed phenomena. Pure re-
search is the source of most new scientific ideas and ways of thinking about the 
world. It can be exploratory, descriptive, or explanatory; however, explanatory 
research is the most common.
  
Basic research generates new ideas, principles, and theories, which may not 
be immediately utilized but none theless form the basis of progress and devel-
opment in different fields. Today's computers, for example, could not exist 
without research in pure mathematics conducted over a century ago, for which 
there was no known practical application at the time. Basic research rarely helps 
practitioners directly with their everyday concerns; nevertheless, it stimulates 
new ways of thinking that have the potential to revolutionize and dramatically 
improve how practitioners deal with a problem in the future.  
In the United States, basic research is funded mainly by federal government 
and done mainly at universities and institutes. As government funding has di-
minished in the 2010s, however, private funding is increasingly important.  
Applied science focuses on the development of technology and techniques. 
In contrast, basic science develops scientific knowledge and predictions, princi-
pally in natural sciences but also in other empirical sciences, which are used as 
the scientific foundation for applied science. Basic science develops and estab-
lishes information to predict phenomena and perhaps to understand nature, 
whereas applied science uses portions of basic science to develop interven-
tions via technology or technique to alter events or outcomes. Applied and basic 
sciences can interface closely in research and development.  
The interface between basic research and applied research has been studied 
by the National Science Foundation. It conducted a study in which it traced the 
relationship between basic scientific research efforts and the development of 
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major innovations, such as oral contraceptives and videotape recorders). Their 
study found that basic research played a key role in the development in all of the 
innovations. The number of basic science research
 
that assisted in the production 
of a given innovation peaked between 20 and 30 years before the innovation it-
self.  
While most innovation takes the form of applied science and most innova-
tion occurs in the private sector, basic research is a necessary precursor to al-
most all applied science and associated instances of innovation. Roughly 76% of 
basic research is conducted by universities. A distinction can be made between 
basic science and disciplines such as medicine and technology. They can be 
grouped as STM (science, technology, and medicine; not to be confused with 
STEM [science, technology, engineering, and mathematics]) or STS (science, 
technology, and society). These groups are interrelated and influence each other, 
although they may differ in the specifics such as methods and standards.  
The Nobel Prize mixes basic with applied sciences for its award in Physi-
ology or Medicine. In contrast, the Royal Society of London awards distinguish 
natural science from applied science. 
 
41. Applied research 
 
Applied research is a form of systematic inquiry involving the practical ap-
plication of science. It accesses and uses some part of the research communities' 
(the academia's) accumulated theories, knowledge, methods, and techniques, for 
a specific, often state-, business-, or client-driven purpose. Applied research is 
contrasted with pure research (basic research) in discussion about research ide-
als, methodologies, programs, and projects. Applied research deals with solving 
practical problems and generally employs empirical methodologies.  
Because applied research resides in the messy real world, strict research 
protocols may need to be relaxed. For example, it may be impossible to use 
a random sample. Thus, transparency in the methodology is crucial. Implications 
for interpretation of results brought about by relaxing an otherwise strict canon 
of methodology should also be considered. Since Applied Research has a provi-
sional close to the problem and close to the data orientation it may also use a 
more provisional conceptual framework such as working hypothesis or pillar 
questions. The OECD's Frascati Manual describes Applied Research as one of 
the three forms of research, along with Basic research & Experimental Devel-
opment. 
Due to its practical focus, applied research information will be found in the 
literature associated with individual disciplines.  
The military is an organization that performs a lot of applied research. For 
example, they may want to know about the efficacy of soldier training, how well 
recruitment practices work, how best to deal with host nationals in times of war, 
how to use the internet to reduce home grown terrorists, and the effectiveness of 
operational styles. 
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42. Methodology of scientific research 
 
Methodology is the systematic, theoretical analysis of the methods applied 
to a field of study. It comprises the theoretical analysis of the body of methods 
and principles associated with a branch of knowledge. Typically, it encompasses 
concepts such as paradigm, theoretical model, phases and quantitative or qualita-
tive techniques. 
A methodology does not set out to provide solutions - it is, therefore, not 
the same as a method. Instead, a methodology offers the theoretical underpin-
ning for understanding which method, set of methods, or best practices can be 
applied to specific case, for example, to calculate a specific result. 
It has been defined also as follows: 
1. the analysis of the principles of methods, rules, and postulates employed 
by a discipline;  
2. the systematic study of methods that are, can be, or have been applied 
within a discipline; 
3. the description of methods. 
The methodology is the general research strategy that outlines the way in 
which research is to be undertaken and, among other things, identifies the meth-
ods to be used in it. These methods, described in the methodology, define the 
means or modes of data collection or, sometimes, how a specific result is to be 
calculated. Methodology does not define specific methods, even though much 
attention is given to the nature and kinds of processes to be followed in a partic-
ular procedure or to attain an objective. 
When proper to a study of methodology, such processes constitute a con-
structive generic framework, and may therefore be broken down into sub-
processes, combined, or their sequence changed. A paradigm is similar to a 
methodology in that it is also a constructive framework. In theoretical work, the 
development of paradigms satisfies most or all of the criteria for methodolo-
gy. An algorithm, like a paradigm, is also a type of constructive framework, 
meaning that the construction is a logical, rather than a physical, array of con-
nected elements. 
Any description of a means of calculation of a specific result is always a 
description of a method and never a description of a methodology. It is thus im-
portant to avoid using methodology as a synonym for method or body of meth-
ods. Doing this shifts it away from its true epistemological meaning and reduces 
it to being the procedure itself, or the set of tools, or the instruments that should 
have been its outcome. A methodology is the design process for carrying out re-
search or the development of a procedure and is not in itself an instrument, or 
method, or procedure for doing things. 
Methodology and method are not interchangeable. In recent years however, 
there has been a tendency to use methodologyas a "pretentious substitute for the 
word method. Using methodology as a synonym for method or set of meth-
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ods leads to confusion and misinterpretation and undermines the proper analysis 
that should go into designing research. 
 
43. Science and innovation activities 
 
Innovation are all scientific, technological, organisational, financial and 
commercial steps which actually, or are intended to, lead to the implementation 
of innovations. Some innovation activities are themselves innovative others are 
not novel activities but are necessary for the implementation of innovations. In-
novation activities also include research and development (R & D) that is not 
directly related to the development of a specific innovation. 
A common feature of an innovation is that it must have been implemented. 
A new or improved product is implemented when it is introduced on the market. 
New processes, marketing methods or organisational methods are implemented 
when they are brought into actual use in the firm's operations. 
Innovation activities vary greatly in their nature from firm to firm. Some 
firms engage in well-defined innovation projects, such as the development and 
introduction of a new product, whereas others primarily make continuous im-
provements to their products, processes and operations. Both types of firms can 
be innovative: an innovation can consist of the implementation of a single sig-
nificant change, or of a series of smaller incremental changes that together con-
stitute a significant change.  
Innovation economics is a growing economic theory that emphasizes entre-
preneurship and innovation. Innovation economics is based on two fundamental 
tenets: that the central goal of economic policy should be to spur higher produc-
tivity through greater innovation, and that markets relying on inputresources and 
price signals alone will not always be as effective in spurring higher productivi-
ty, and thereby economic growth. This is in contrast to the two other conven-
tional economic doctrines, neoclassical economics and Keynesian economics.  
Joseph Schumpeter was one of the first and most important scholars who 
extensively has tackle the question of innovation in Economics. In contrast to 
his contemporary John Maynard Keynes, Schumpeter con-tended that evolving 
institutions, entrepreneurs, and technological change were at the heart of eco-
nomic growth, not independent forces that are largely unaffected by policy. He 
argued that "capitalism can only be understood as an evolutionary process of 
continuous innovation.  
But it is only within the last 15 years that a theory and narrative of econom-
ic growth focused on innovation that was grounded in Schum-peter‘s ideas has 
emerged. Innovation economics attempted to answer the fundamental problem 
in the puzzle of total factor productivity growth. Continual growth of output 
could no longer be explained only in increase of inputs used in the production 
process as understood in industrialization. Hence, innovation economics focused 
on a theory of economic creativity that would impact the theory of the firm and 
organ-ization decision-making. Hovering between heterodox economics that 
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emphasized the fragility of conventional assumptions and orthodox eco-nomics 
that ignored the fragility of such assumptions, innovation eco-nomics aims for 
joint didactics between the two. As such, it enlarges the Schumpeterian analyses 
of new technological system by incorporating new ideas of information and 
communication technology in the global economy.  
Indeed, a new theory and narrative of economic growth focused on innova-
tion has emerged in the last decade. Innovation economics emerges on the wage 
of other schools of thoughts in economics, includ-ing new institutional econom-
ics, new growth theory, endogenous growth theory, evolutionary economics, 
neo-Schumpeterian economics – provides an economic framework that explains 
and helps support growth in today‘s knowledge economy. Leading theorists of 
innovation economics include both formal economists, as well as management 
the-orists, technology policy experts, and others. These include Paul Romer, El-
hanan Helpman, W. Brian Arthur, Robert Axtell, Richard R. Nelson, Richard 
Lipsey, Michael Porter and Christopher Freeman.  
Innovation economists believe that what primarily drives economic growth 
in today‘s knowledge-based economy is not capitalaccumula-tion, as claimed by 
neoclassicalism asserts, but innovative capacity spurred by appropriable 
knowledge and technological externalities. Economic growth in innovation eco-
nomics is the end-product of knowledge; regimes and policies allowing for en-
trepreneurship and in-novation; technological spillovers and externalities be-
tween collabora-tive firms; and systems of innovation that create innovative en-
viron-ments.  
In 1970, economist Milton Friedman said in the New York Times that a 
business‘s sole purpose is to generate profits for their shareholders and compa-
nies that pursued other missions would be less competitive, resulting in fewer 
benefits to owners, employees, and society. Yet data over the past several dec-
ades shows that while profits matter, good firms supply far more, particularly in 
bringing innovation to the market. This fosters economic growth, employment 
gains, and other society-wide benefits. Business school professor David Ahl-
strom asserts: ―the main goal of business is to develop new and innovative 
goods and services that generate economic growth while delivering benefits to 
society.‖  In contrast to neoclassical economics, innovation economics offer dif-
fering perspectives on main focus, reasons for economic growth, and the as-
sumptions of context between economic actors:  
Despite the differences in economic thought, both perspectives are based 
on the same core premise: the foundation of all economic growth is the optimi-
zation of the utilization of factors and the measure of suc-cess is how well the 
factor utilization is optimized. Whatever the fac-tors, it nonetheless leads to the 
same situation of special endowments, varying relative prices, and production 
processes. So while the innovation economics can find fertile ground in main-
stream economics and rather than remain in diametric contention.  
The drive of bio-tech firms in Germany was due to the R&D subsidies to 
joint projects, network partners, and close cognitive distance of collaborative 
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partners within a cluster. These factors increased patent performance in the bio- 
tech industry. Their development of a National Innovation System through 
heavy investment of R&D expenditures and personnel, patents, and high-
tech/service exports strengthened their innovation capacity.  
By linking the science sector with the business sector, establishing incen-
tives for innovative activities, and balancing the import of technol-ogy and in-
digenous R&D effort, both countries experienced rap-id economic growth in re-
cent decades. Also, the Council of Foreign Re-lations asserted that since the end 
of the 1970s, the U.S. has gained a disproportionate share of the world‘s wealth 
through their aggressive pursuit of technological change, demonstrating that 
technological inno-vation is a central catalyst of steady economic performance.  
Concisely, evidence shows that innovation contributes to steady economic 
growth and rise in per capita income. However, some empirical studies investi-
gating the innovation-performance-link lead to rather mixed re-sults and indicate 
that the relationship be more subtle and complex than commonly assumed. In 
particular, the relationship between innovative-ness and performance seems to 
differ in intensity and significance across empirical contexts, environmental cir-
cumstances, and conceptual dimensions.  
All of the above has taken place in an era of data constraint, as iden-tified 
by Zvi Griliches twenty years ago. Because the primary domain of innovation is 
commerce the key data resides there; continually out of campus reach in reports 
hidden within factories, corporate offices and technical centers. This recusal still 
stymies progress today. Recent at-tempts at data transference have led, not least, 
to the positive link‘(above) being upgraded to exact algebra between R&D 
productivity and GDP allowing prediction from one to the other. This is pending 
further disclosure from commercial sources but several pertinent documents are 
already available.  
While innovation is important, it is not a happenstance occurrence as a nat-
ural harbor or natural resources are, but a deliberate, concerted ef-fort of mar-
kets, institutions, policymakers, and effect use of geographic space. In global 
economic restructuring, location has become a key ele-ment in establishing 
competitive advantage as regions focus on their unique assets to spur innovation. 
Even more, thriving metropolitan economies that carry multiple clusters essen-
tially fuel national econ-omiesthrough their pools of human capital, innovation, 
quality places, and infrastructure. Cities become ―innovative spaces and 
―cradles of creativity as drivers of innovation. They become essential to the 
system of innovation through the supply side: ready, available, abundant capital 
and labor; good infrastructure for productive activities, and diversified produc-
tion structures that spawn synergies and hence innovation. In ad-dition they 
grow due to the demand side: diverse population of varying occupations, ideas, 
skills; high and differentiated level of consumer de-mand; and constant recrea-
tion of urban order especially infrastructure of streets, water systems, energy, 
and transportation.  
168 
 
A startup company is an entrepreneurial venture which is typically a newly 
emerged, fast-growing business that aims to meet a marketplace need by devel-
oping a viable business model around innovative product, service, process or a 
platform. A startup is usually a company such as a small business, a partnership 
or an organization designed to effectively develop and validate a scalable busi-
ness model.  
Startup companies can come in all forms and sizes. Some of the crit-ical 
tasks are to build a co-founder team to secure key skills, know-how, financial 
resources, and other elements to conduct research on the target market. Typical-
ly, a startup will begin by building a first minimum via-ble product, a prototype, 
to validate, assess and develop the new ideas or business concepts. In addition, 
startups founders do research to deepen their understanding of the ideas, tech-
nologies or business concepts and their commercial potential. A Shareholders' 
agreement is often agreed early on to confirm the commitment, ownership and 
contributions of the founders and investors and to deal with the intellectual 
properties and assets that may be generated by the startup. Business models for 
startups are generally found via a "bottom-up" or "top-down" approach.  
A company may cease to be a startup as it passes various mile-stones, such 
as becoming publicly traded on the stock market in an Ini-tial Public Offering, 
or ceasing to exist as an independent entity via a merger or acquisition. Compa-
nies may also fail and cease to operate altogether, an outcome that is very likely 
for startups, given that they are developing disruptive innovations which may 
not function as expected and for which there may not be market demand, even 
when the product or service is finally developed. Given that startups operate in 
high-risk sectors, it can also be hard to attract investors to support the prod-
uct/service development or attract buyers.  
The size and maturity of the startup ecosystem where the startup is 
launched and where it grows have an effect on the volume and success of the 
startups. The startup ecosystem consists of the individuals; insti-tutions and or-
ganizations business incubators and business accelerators and top-performing 
entrepreneurial firms and startups. A region with all of these elements is consid-
ered to be a "strong" startup ecosystem. Some of the most famous startup eco-
systems are Silicon Valley in California, where major computer and Internet 
firms and top universities such as Stanford University create a stimulating 
startup environment, Boston and Berlin, home of WISTA, numerous creative 
industries, leading en-trepreneurs and startup firms.  
Investors are generally most attracted to those new companies distin-
guished by their strong co-founding team, a balanced "risk/reward" pro-file and 
"scalability". Attractive startups generally have lower "boot-strapping" costs, 
higher risk, and higher potential return on investment. Successful startups are 
typically more scalable than an established busi-ness, in the sense that the 
startup has the potential to grow rapidly with a limited investment of capital, la-
bor or land. Timing has often been the single most important factor for biggest 
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startup successes, while at the same time it's identified to be one of the hardest 
things to master by many serial entrepreneurs and investors.  
Startups have several options for funding. Venture capital firms and angel 
investors may help startup companies begin operations, exchang ing seed money 
for an equity stake in the firm. Venture capitalists and angel investors provide 
financing to a range of startups, with the expec-tation that a very small number 
of the startups will become viable and make money. In practice though, many 
startups are initially funded by the founders themselves using "bootstrapping", 
in which loans or mone-tary gifts from friends and family are combined with 
savings and credit card debt to finance the venture. Factoring is another option, 
though it is not unique to startups. Other funding opportunities include various 
forms of crowdfunding, for example equity crowdfunding, in which the startup 
seeks funding from a large number of individuals, typically by pitching their 
idea on the Internet.  
Startups usually need to form partnerships with other firms to enable their 
business model to operate. To become attractive to other business-es, startups 
need to align their internal features, such as management style and products with 
the market situation. In their 2013 study, Kask and Linton develop two ideal 
profiles, or also known as configurations or archetypes, for startups that are 
commercializing inventions. The in-heritor profile calls for a management style 
that is not too entrepreneuri-al and the startup should have an incremental inven-
tion.  
This profile is set out to be more successful in a market that has a dominant 
design. In contrast to this profile is the originator which has a management style 
that is highly entrepreneurial and in which a radical invention or a dis-ruptive 
innovation is being developed. This profile is set out to be more successful in a 
market that does not have a dominant design. New startups should align them-
selves to one of the profiles when commer-cializing an invention to be able to 
find and be attractive to a business partner. By finding a business partner a 
startup will have greater chances to become successful.  
Startup founders often have a more casual or offbeat attitude in their dress, 
office space and marketing, as compared to traditional corpora-tions. For exam-
ple, startup founders in the 2010s may wear hoodies, sneakers and other casual 
clothes to business meetings. Their offices may have recreational facilities in 
them, such as pool tables, ping pong tables and pinball machines, which are used 
to create a fun work envi-ronment, stimulate team development and team spirit, 
and encourage creativity. Some of the casual approaches, such as the use of 
"flat" or-ganizational structures, in which regular employees can talk with the 
founders and chief executive officers informally, are done to promote efficiency 
in the workplace, which is needed to get their business off the ground.  
Some startups do not use a strict command and con-trol hierarchical struc-
ture, with executives, managers, supervisors and employees. Some startups offer 
employees stock options, to increase their "buy in" from the start up (as these 
employees stand to gain if the company does well). This removal of stressors al-
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lows the workers and researchers in the startup to focus less on the work envi-
ronment around them, and more on achieving the task at hand, giving them the 
potential to achieve something great for their company. This culture today has 
evolved to include larger companies aiming at acquiring the bright minds driv-
ing startups.  
Google, among other com-panies, has made strides to make purchased 
startups and their workers feel at home in their offices, even letting them bring 
their dogs to work. The main goal behind all changes to the culture of the startup 
work-place, or a company hiring workers from a startup to do similar work is to 
make the people feel as comfortable in their new office as possible in order to 
optimize performance. Some companies even try to hide how large they are to 
capture a particular demographic, as is the case with Heineken recently.  
Co-founders are people involved in the initial launch of startup com-panies. 
Anyone can be a co-founder, and an existing company can also be a co-founder, 
but frequently co-founders are entrepreneurs, engi-neers, hackers, web develop-
ers, web designers and others involved in the ground level of a new, often high-
tech and venture. The language of securities regulation in the United States con-
siders co-founders to be "promoters" under Regulation D. The U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission definition of "Promoter" includes: Any person who, 
acting alone or in conjunction with one or more other persons, directly or indi-
rectly takes initiative in founding and organizing the business or enter-prise of 
an issuer; However not every promoter is a co-founder. In fact, there is no for-
mal, legal definition of what makes somebody a co-founder. The right to call 
oneself a co-founder can be established through an agreement with one's fellow 
co-founders or with permission of the board of directors, investors, or share-
holders of a startup compa-ny. When there is no definitive agreement, disputes 
about who the co-founders are can arise. 
Startup investing is the action of making an investment in an early-stage 
company. Beyond founders' own contributions, some startups raise additional 
investment at some or several stages of their growth. Not all startups trying to 
raise investments are successful in their fund-raising. The solicitation of funds 
became easier for startups as result of the JOBS Act. Prior to the advent of equi-
ty crowdfunding, a form of online investing that has been legalized in several 
nations, startups did not advertise themselves to the general public as investment 
opportuni-ties until and unless they first obtained approval from regulators for 
an initial public offering that typically involved a listing of the startup's securi-
ties on a stock exchange. Today, there are many alternative forms of IPO com-
monly employed by startups and startup promoters that do not include an ex-
change listing, so they may avoid certain regulatory compliance obligations, in-
cluding mandatory periodic disclosures of financial information and factual 
discussion of business conditions by management that investors and potential 
investors routinely receive from registered public companies.  
After the Great Depression, which was blamed in part on a rise in specula-
tive investments in unregulated small companies, startup invest-ing was primari-
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ly a word of mouth activity reserved for the friends and family of a startup's co-
founders, business angels and Venture Capital funds. In the United States this 
has been the case ever since the imple-mentation of the Securities Act of 1933. 
Many nations implemented similar legislation to prohibit general solicitation 
and general advertising of unregistered securities, including shares offered by 
startup compa-nies. In 2005, a new Accelerator investment model was intro-
duced by Y Combinator that combined fixed terms investment model with fixed 
pe-riod intense bootcamp style training program, to streamline the seed/early 
stage investment process with training to be more systematic.  
Following Y Combinator, many accelerators with similar models have 
emerged around the world. The accelerator model hav since be-come very 
common and widely spread and they are key organizations of any Startup eco-
system. Title II of the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, first implemented 
on September 23, 2013, granted startups in and startup co-founders or promoters 
in US the right to generally solicit and advertise publicly using any method of 
communication on the condition that only accredited investors are allowed to 
purchase the securities. However the regulations affecting equity crowdfunding 
in different countries vary a lot with different levels and models of freedom and 
re-strictions. In many countries there are no limitations restricting general public 
from investing to startups, while there can still be other types of restrictions in 
place, like limiting the amount that companies can seek from investors. Due to 
positive development and growth of crowdfund-ing, many countries are actively 
updating their regulation in regards to crowdfunding.  
When investing in a startup, there are different types of stages in which the 
investor can participate. The first round is called seed round. The seed round 
generally is when the startup is still in the very early phase of execution when 
their product is still in the prototype phase. At this level angel investors will be 
the ones participating. The next round is called Series A. At this point the com-
pany already has traction and may be making revenue. In Series A rounds ven-
ture capital firms will be participating alongside angels or super angel investors. 
The next rounds are Series B, C, and D. These three rounds are the ones leading 
towards the IPO. Venture capital firms and private equity firms will be partici-
pating.  
The first known investment-based crowdfunding platform for startups was 
launched in Feb. 2010 by Grow VC, followed by the first US based company 
ProFounder launching model for startups to raise investments directly on the 
site, but ProFounder later decided to shut down its business due regulatory rea-
sons preventing them from continu-ing, having launched their model for US 
markets prior to JOBS Act. With the positive progress of the JOBS Act for 
crowd investing in US., equity crowdfunding platforms like SeedInvest and Cir-
cleUp started to emerge in 2011 and platforms such as investiere, Companisto 
and Seedrs in Europe and OurCrowd in Israel. The idea of these platforms is to 
streamline the process and resolve the two main points that were tak-ing place in 
the market. The first problem was for startups to be able to access capital and to 
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decrease the amount of time that it takes to close a round of financing. The sec-
ond problem was intended to increase the amount of deal flow for the investor 
and to also centralize the process.  
Large or well-established companies often try to promote innovation by 
setting up "internal startups", new business divisions that operate at arm's length 
from the rest of the company. Examples include Bell Labs, a research unit with-
in Bell Corporationand Target Corporation and threedegrees, a product devel-
oped by an internal startup of Microsoft.  
Failed entrepreneurs, or restarters, who after some time restart in the same 
sector with more or less the same activities, have an increased chance of becom-
ing a better entrepreneur. However, some studies indi-cate that restarters are 
more heavily discouraged in Europe than in the US.  
If a company's value is based on its technology, it is often equally im-
portant for the business owners to obtain intellectual property protec-tion for 
their idea. The newsmagazine The Economist estimated that up to 75% of the 
value of US public companies is now based on their intellectual property. Often, 
100% of a small startup company's value is based on its intellectual property. As 
such, it is important for technology-oriented startup companies to develop a 
sound strategy for protecting their intellectual capital as early as possible.  
Startup compa-nies, particularly those associated with new technology, 
sometimes pro-duce huge returns to their creators and investors – a recent ex-
ample of such is Google, whose creators became billionaires through their stock 
ownership and options. However, the failure rate of startup companies is very 
high. One common reason for failure is that startup companies can run out of 
funding, without securing their next round of investment or before becoming 
profitable enough to pay their staff. Sometimes these com-panies are purchased 
by other companies, if they are deemed to be via-ble, but oftentimes they leave 
employees with very little recourse to re-coup lost income for worked time.  
Although there are startups created in all types of businesses, and all over 
the world, some locations and business sectors are particularly as-sociated with 
startup companies. The internet bubble of the late 1990s was associated with 
huge numbers of internet startup companies, some selling the technology to pro-
vide internet access, others using the inter-net to provide services. Most of this 
startup activity was located in the most well known startup ecosystem - Silicon 
Valley, an area of northern California renowned for the high level of startup 
company activity. Startup advocates are also trying to build a community of tech 
startups in New York City with organizations like NY Tech Meet Up and Built 
in NYC. In the early 2000s, the patent assets of failed startup companies are be-
ing purchased by what are derogatorily known as patent trolls, who then take the 
patents from the companies and assert those patents against companies that 
might be infringing the technology covered by the patent.  
A business incubator is a company that helps new and startup com-paniesto 
develo by providing services such as management training or office space. The 
National Business Incubation Association defines business incubators as a cata-
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lyst tool for either regional or national eco-nomic development. NBIA catego-
rizes their member incubators by the following five incubator types: academic 
institutions; non-profit devel-opment corporations; for-profit property develop-
ment ventures; venture capital firms, and combination of the above.  
Business incubators differ from research and technology parks in their ded-
ication to startup and early-stage companies. Research and technology parks, on 
the other hand, tend to be large-scale projects that house everything from corpo-
rate, government or university labs to very small companies. Most research and 
technology parks do not offer busi-ness assistance services, which are the hall-
mark of a business incubation program. However, many research and technolo-
gy parks house incuba-tion programs.  
Incubators also differ from the U.S. Small Business Administration's Small 
Business Development Centers in that they serve only selected clients. SBDCs 
are required by law to offer general business assistance to any company that 
contacts them for help. In addition, SBDCs work with any small business at any 
stage of development, not only startup companies. Many business incubation 
programs partner with their local SBDC to create a "one-stop shop" for entre-
preneurial support. Within European Union countries there are different EU and 
state funded pro-grams that offer support in form of consulting, mentoring, pro-
totype creation and other services and co-funding for them. TecHub is one of 
examples for IT companies and ideas.  
The formal concept of business incubation began in the USA in 1959 when 
Joseph Mancuso opened the Batavia Industrial Center in a Bata-via, New York, 
warehouse. Incubation expanded in the U.S. in the 1980s and spread to the UK 
and Europe through various related forms.  
The US- based International Business Innovation Association esti-mates 
that there are about 7,000 incubators worldwide. A study funded by the Europe-
an Commission in 2002 identified around 900 incubation environments in West-
ern Europe. As of October 2006, there were more than 1,400 incubators in North 
America, up from only 12 in 1980. Her Majesty's Treasury identified around 25 
incubation environments in the UK in 1997; by 2005, UKBI identified around 
270 incubation environ-ments across the country. In 2005 alone, North Ameri-
can incubation programs assisted more than 27,000 companies that provided 
employ-ment for more than 100,000 workers and generated annual revenues of 
$17 billion.  
Incubation activity has not been limited to developed countries; in-cubation 
environments are now being implemented in developing coun-tries and raising 
interest for financial support from organisations such as UNIDO and the World 
Bank. Since startup companies lack many resources, experience and net-works, 
incubators provide services which helps them get through initial hurdles in start-
ing up a business. These hurdles include space, funding, legal, accounting, com-
puter services and other prerequisites to running the business.  
Among the most common incubator services are:  
 Help with business basics  
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 Networking activities  
 Marketing assistance  
 Market Research  
 High-speed Internet access  
 Help with accounting/financial management  
 Access to bank loans, loan funds and guarantee programs  
 Help with presentation skills  
 Links to higher education resources  
 Links to strategic partners  
 Access to angel investors or venture capital  
 Comprehensive business training programs  
 Advisory boards and mentors  
 Management team identification  
 Help with business etiquette  
 Technology commercialization assistance  
 Help with regulatory compliance  
 Intellectual property management  
 
There are a number of business incubators that have focused on par-ticular 
industries or on a particular business model, earning them their own name. This 
list is incomplete; you can help by expanding it.  
 Virtual business incubator - online business incubator  
 Medical incubator - a business incubator focused on medical devices 
& biomaterials  
 Kitchen incubator - a business incubator focused on the food in-
dustry  
 Public incubator - a business incubator focused on the public good  
 Seed accelerator - a business incubator focused on early startups  
 Corporate accelerator - a program of a larger company that acts akin 
to a seed accerator  
 Startup studio - a business incubator with interacting portfolio com-
panies  
More than half of all business incubation programs are "mixed-use" pro-
jects, meaning they work with clients from a variety of industries. Technology 
incubators account for 39% of incubation programs.  
One example of a specialized type of incubator is a bioincubator. Bi-
oincubators specialize in supporting life science-based startup compa-nies. En-
trepreneurs with feasible projects in life sciences are selected and admitted for 
these programs.  
Unlike many business assistance programs, business incubators do not 
serve any and all companies. Entrepreneurs who wish to enter a business incuba-
tion program must apply for admission. Acceptance cri-teria vary from program 
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to program, but in general only those with fea-sible business ideas and a worka-
ble business plan are admitted. It is this factor that makes it difficult to compare 
the success rates of incubated companies against general business survival statis-
tics.  
Although most incubators offer their clients office space and shared admin-
istrative services, the heart of a true business incubation program are the ser-
vices it provides to startup companies. More than half of in-cubation programs 
surveyed by the National Business Incubation Asso-ciation in 2006 reported that 
they also served affiliate or virtual clients. These companies do not reside in the 
incubator facility. Affiliate clients may be home-based businesses or early-stage 
companies that have their own premises but can benefit from incubator services. 
Virtual clients may be too remote from an incubation facility to participate on 
site, and so receive counseling and other assistance electronically.  
The amount of time a company spends in an incubation program can vary 
widely depending on a number of factors, including the type of business and the 
entrepreneur's level of business expertise. Life science and other firms with long 
research and development cycles require more time in an incubation program 
than manufacturing or service companies that can immediately produce and 
bring a product or service to market. On average, incubator clients spend 33 
months in a program. Many in-cubation programs set graduation requirements 
by development bench-marks, such as company revenues or staffing levels, ra-
ther than time.  
Business incubation has been identified as a means of meeting a va-riety of 
economic and socioeconomic policy needs, which may include job creation, fos-
tering a community's entrepreneurial climate, technolo-gy commercialization, 
diversifying local economies, building or accel-erating growth of local industry 
clusters, business creation and retention, encouraging women or minority entre-
preneurship, identifying potential spin-in or spin-out business opportunities, or 
community revitalization.  
About one-third of business incubation programs are sponsored by eco-
nomic development organizations. Government entities account for 21% of pro-
gram sponsors. Another 20% are sponsored by academic in-stitutions, including 
two- and four-year colleges, universities, and tech-nical colleges. In many coun-
tries, incubation programs are funded by regional or national governments as 
part of an overall economic devel-opment strategy. In the United States, howev-
er, most incubation pro-grams are independent, community-based and resourced 
projects. The U.S. Economic Development Administration is a frequent source 
of funds for developing incubation programs, but once a program is open and 
operational it typically receives no federal funding; few states offer centralized 
incubator funding. Rents and/or client fees account for 59% of incubator reve-
nues, followed by service contracts or grants and cash operating subsidies.  
As part of a major effort to address the ongoing economic crisis of the US, 
legislation was introduced to "reconstitute Project Socrates". The updated ver-
sion of Socrates supports incubators by enabling users with technology-based 
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facts about the marketplace, competitor maneu-vers, potential partners, and 
technology paths to achieve competitive advantage. Michael Sekora, the original 
creator and director of Socrates says that a key purpose of Socrates is to assist 
government economic planners in addressing the economic and socioeconomic 
issues with unprecedented speed, efficiency and agility.  
Many for-profit or "private" incubation programs were launched in the late 
1990s by investors and other for-profit operators seeking to hatch businesses 
quickly and bring in big payoffs. At the time, NBIA estimated that nearly 30% 
of all incubation programs were for-profit ventures. In the wake of the dot-com 
bust, however, many of those pro-grams closed. In NBIA's 2002 State of the 
Business Incubation survey, only 16% of responding incubators were for-profit 
programs. By the 2006 SOI, just 6% of respondents were for-profit. Although 
some incu-bation programs (regardless of nonprofit or for-profit status) take eq-
uity in client companies, most do not. Only 25% of incubation programs re-port 
that they take equity in some or all of their clients. Incubators often aggregate 
themselves into networks which are used to share good prac-tices and new 
methodologies. Europe's European Business and Innova-tion Centre Network 
association federates more than 250 European Business and Innovation Centres 
throughout Europe. France has its own national network of technopoles, pre-
incubators, and EU|BICs, called RETIS Innovation. This network focuses on in-
ternationalizing startups.  
The Startup Federation is an international incubator network that in-cludes 
incubators such as Washington, D.C.'s 1776, New York City's General Assem-
bly, Boston's Cambridge Innovation Center, London's Warner Yard, Berlin's Be-
tahaus, Chicago's 1871, and others. The net-work allows collaboration between 
members of each incubator. Of 1000 incubators across Europe, 500 are situated 
in Germany. Many of them are organized federally within the ADT.  
Business plan is a formal statement of business goals, reasons they are at-
tainable, and plans for reaching them. It may also contain back-ground infor-
mation about the organization or team attempting to reach those goals. Business 
plans may target changes in perception and brand-ing by the customer, client, 
taxpayer, or larger community. When the existing business is to assume a major 
change or when planning a new venture, a 3 to 5 year business plan is required, 
since investors will look for their investment return in that timeframe. Business 
plans may be in-ternally or externally focused. Externally focused plans target 
goals that are important to external stakeholders, particularly financial stake-
hold-ers. They typically have detailed information about the organization or 
team attempting to reach the goals. With for-profit entities, external stakeholders 
include investors and customers. External stake-holders of non-profits include 
donors and the clients of the non-profit's services. For government agencies, ex-
ternal stakeholders include tax-payers, higher-level government agencies, and 
international lending bodies such as the International Monetary Fund, the World 
Bank, various economic agencies of the United Nations, and development 
banks.  
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Internally focused business plans target intermediate goals required to 
reach the external goals. They may cover the development of a new product, a 
new service, a new IT system, a restructuring of finance, the refurbishing of a 
factory or a restructuring of the organization. An inter-nal business plan is often 
developed in conjunction with a balanced scorecard or a list of critical success 
factors. This allows success of the plan to be measured using non-financial 
measures. Business plans that identify and target internal goals, but provide only 
general guidance on how they will be met are called strategic plans.  
Operational plans describe the goals of an internal organization, working 
group or department. Project plans, sometimes known as pro-ject frameworks, 
describe the goals of a particular project. They may also address the project's 
place within the organization's larger strategic goals.  
Business plans are decision-making tools. The content and format of the 
business plan is determined by the goals and audience. For example, a business 
plan for a non-profit might discuss the fit between the busi-ness plan and the or-
ganization‘s mission. Banks are quite concerned about defaults, so a business 
plan for a bank loan will build a convincing case for the organization‘s ability to 
repay the loan. Venture capitalists are primarily concerned about initial invest-
ment, feasibility, and exit valuation. A business plan for a project requiring equi-
ty financing will need to explain why current resources, upcoming growth op-
portunities, and sustainable competitive advantage will lead to a high exit valua-
tion.  
Preparing a business plan draws on a wide range of knowledge from many 
different business disciplines: finance, human resource manage-ment, intellectu-
al property management, supply chain management, op-erations management, 
and marketing, among others. It can be helpful to view the business plan as a 
collection of sub-plans, one for each of the main business disciplines. The for-
mat of a business plan depends on its presentation context. It is common for 
businesses, especially start-ups, to have three or four formats for the same busi-
ness plan.  
An "elevator pitch" is a short summary of the plan's executive sum-mary. 
This is often used as a teaser to awaken the interest of potential investors, cus-
tomers, or strategic partners. It is called an elevator pitch as it is supposed to be 
content that can be explained to someone else quickly in an elevator. The eleva-
tor pitch should be between 30 and 60 seconds. A pitch deck is a slide show and 
oral presentation that is meant to trigger discussion and interest potential inves-
tors in reading the writ-ten presentation. The content of the presentation is usual-
ly limited to the executive summary and a few key graphs showing financial 
trends and key decision making benchmarks. If a new product is being proposed 
and time permits, a demonstration of the product may be included.  
A written presentation for external stakeholders is a detailed, well written, 
and pleasingly formatted plan targeted at external stakeholders. An internal op-
erational plan is a detailed plan describing planning de-tails that are needed by 
management but may not be of interest to exter-nal stakeholders. Such plans 
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have a somewhat higher degree of candor and informality than the version tar-
geted at external stakeholders and others. Typical structure for a business plan 
for a start up venture  
 cover page and table of contents  
 executive summary  
 mission statement  
 business description  
 business environment analysis  
 SWOT analysis  
 industry background  
 competitor analysis  
 market analysis  
 marketing plan  
 operations plan  
 management summary  
 financial plan  
 attachments and milestones  
Typical questions addressed by a business plan for a start up venture  
 What problem does the company's product or service solve? What niche 
will it fill?  
 What is the company's solution to the problem?  
 Who are the company's customers, and how will the company market and 
sell its products to them?  
 What is the size of the market for this solution?  
 What is the business model for the business (how will it make money)?  
 Who are the competitors and how will the company maintain a competi-
tive advantage?  
 How does the company plan to manage its operations as it grows?  
 Who will run the company and what makes them qualified to do so?  
 What are the risks and threats confronting the business, and what can be 
done to mitigate them?  
 What are the company's capital and resource requirements?  
 What are the company's historical and projected financial state-ments?  
Cost and revenue estimates are central to any business plan for de-ciding 
the viability of the planned venture. But costs are often underes-timated and rev-
enues overestimated resulting in later cost overruns, rev-enue shortfalls, and 
possibly non-viability. During the dot-com bubble 1997-2001 this was a prob-
lem for many technology start-ups. Reference class forecastinghas been devel-
oped to reduce the risks of cost overruns and revenue shortfalls and thus gener-
ate more accurate business plans.  
An externally targeted business plan should list all legal concerns and fi-
nancial liabilities that might negatively affect investors. Depend-ing on the 
179 
 
amount of funds being raised and the audience to whom the plan is presented 
failure to do this may have severe legal consequences. Non disclosure agree-
ments with third parties, non - compet agreements, conflicts of interest, privacy 
concerns, and the protection of one's trade secrets may severely limit the audi-
ence to which one might show the business plan. Alternatively, they may require 
each party receiving the business plan to sign a contract accepting special claus-
es and conditions.  
This situation is complicated by the fact that many venture capitalists will 
refuse to sign an NDA before looking at a business plan, lest it put them in the 
untenable position of looking at two independently devel-oped look-alike busi-
ness plans, both claiming originality. In such situa-tions one may need to devel-
op two versions of the business plan: a stripped down plan that can be used to 
develop a relationship and a de-tail plan that is only shown when investors have 
sufficient interest and trust to sign an NDA.  
Traditionally business plans have been highly confidential and quite limited 
in audience. The business plan itself is generally regarded as secret. An open 
business plan is a business plan with unlimited audi-ence. The business plan is 
typically web published and made available to all. In the free software and open 
source business model, trade se-crets, copyright and patents can no longer be 
used as effective locking mechanisms to provide sustainable advantages to a 
particular business and therefore a secret business plan is less relevant in those 
models.  
 Education  
 Business plans are used in some primary and secondary programs to teach 
economic principles.  
 Wikiversity has a Lunar Boom Town project where students of all ages can 
collaborate with designing and revising business models and practice evalu-
ating them to learn practical business planning techniques and methodology  
 Fundraising  
 Fundraising is the primary purpose for many business plans, since they are 
related to the inherent probable success/failure of the company risk.  
 Angel investors  
 Business loans  
 Grants  
 Startup company funding  
 Venture capital  
 Internal use  
 Management by objectives is a process of agreeing upon objec-tives within 
an organization so that management and employees agree to the objectives 
and understand what they are in the organization.  
 Strategic planning is an organization's process of defining its strategy, or di-
rection, and making decisions on allocating its resources to pursue this strat-
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egy, including its capital and people. Business plans can help decision mak-
ers see how specific projects relate to the organi-zation's strategic plan.  
 Total quality management is a business management strategy aimed at em-
bedding awareness of quality in all organizational process-es. TQM has been 
widely used in manufacturing, education, call centers, government, and ser-
vice industries, as well as NASA space and science programs.  
The business goals may be defined both for non-profit or for-profit organi-
zations. For-profit business plans typically focus on financial goals, such as 
profit or creation of wealth. Non-profit, as well as gov-ernment agency business 
plans tend to focus on the "organizational mis-sion" which is the basis for their 
governmental status or their non-profit, tax-exempt status, respectively – alt-
hough non-profits may also focus on optimizing revenue. The primary differ-
ence between profit and non-profit organizations is that "for-profit" organiza-
tions look to maximize wealth versus non-profit organizations, which look to 
provide a greater good to society. In non-profit organizations, creative tensions 
may de-velop in the effort to balance mission with "margin".  
European Technology Platforms are industry-led stakeholder fora recog-
nised by the European Commission as key actors in driving inno-vation, 
knowledge transfer and European competitiveness. ETPs devel-op research and 
innovation agendas and roadmaps for action at EU and national level to be sup-
ported by both private and public funding. They mobilise stakeholders to deliver 
on agreed priorities and share infor-mation across the EU. By working effective-
ly together, they also help deliver solutions to major challenges of key concern 
to citizens such as the ageing society, the environment and food and energy se-
curity.  
ETPs are independent and self-financing entities. They conduct their activi-
ties in a transparent manner and are open to new members. ETPs have a strate-
gy, mobilisation and dissemination function. In order to fulfil their role, their 
main activities encompass:  
 developing industry-focused strategic research and innovation agendas in-
cluding technology roadmaps and implementation plans;  
 encouraging industry participation in Horizon 2020, the EU‘s framework 
programme for research and innovation, and cooperating with networks in 
Member States;  
 fostering networking opportunities with other ETPs and other partners along 
the value chain to address cross-sectoral challenges and promote the move 
towards more open models of innovation;  
 identifying opportunities for international cooperation;  
 actin as one of the channels of external advice for the pro-gramming and im-
plementation of Horizon 2020; notably, ETPs have been a key driving force 
behind the launch of high profile public-private partnerships under the pro-
gramme.  
Commission engagement with the ETPs takes a number of forms:  
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 provision of a central contact point with overall coordination re-sponsibility 
in DG Research and Innovation  
 a dedicated contact point for individual ETPs in the relevant Di-rectorate-
General  
 participation in ETP-organised events  
 consultation on implementation aspects of Horizon 2020  
 organisation of cross-ETP workshops  
The China–Belarus Great Stone Industrial Park offers easy access to Inter-
national Highways M1/E30 and M4, International Airport (included into the 
Park territory), International Railways and the capital of Belarus with its scien-
tific potential. Great Stone Industrial Park is designated for high-tech industrial 
and business activities, including research and development, manufacturing and 
assembly, warehousing and logistic facilities. 
The China–Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park has become the prototype of 
the Great Stone Industrial Park. In 2010, the Ministry of Economy of the Repub-
lic of Belarus and the «Chinese Engineering Corporation CAMC (CAMCE) » 
agreed to cooperate on the creation of China–Belarus Industrial Park in the terri-
tory of Belarus. In November 2011, it was also discussed at the meeting of the 
China-Belarus intergovernmental commission. For the initial creation of the 
park the following documents were signed: 
Decree of the President of the Republic of Belarus № 253 «On the China–
Belarus Great Stone Industrial Park», dated June 5, 2012 .  
On May 12, 2017 new Decree of the President of the Republic of Belarus 
"On the improvement of the special legal regime of the China-Belarus Great 
Stone Industrial Park" was signed. It created unique legal and regulatory envi-
ronment for Industrial Park residents and investors. 
Great Stone Industrial Park is a territorial unit of Belarus with the status of 
special economic zone and special regime for doing business. Park offers easy 
access to International Highways M1/E30 and M4, International Airport (in-
cluded into the Park territory), International Railways and the capital of Belarus 
with its labour and scientific potential. Great Stone Park is designated for high-
tech industrial and business activities, including research and development, 
manufacturing and assembly, warehousing and logistic facilities.  
Park is focused on innovative manufacture with high export potential. Cur-
rently, Park development is based on high-tech manufactures in the spheres of 
mechanical engineering, electronics & telecommunication, fine chemistry, bio-
technology, pharmaceuticals, new materials, logistics, e-commerce. The list is 
not limited. It is possible to say that any eco-friendly and innovative manufac-
ture is welcome to Great Stone Industrial Park. This area has a special legal re-
gime and incentives unique not only for Belarus, but also for EAEU. For in-
stance, company-resident is free from tax on profit for 10 years since first profit 
is generated. Then 50% discount from the existing rate for up to 2062. The com-
panies are free from land tax and real estate tax. Income tax for Park employees 
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is 9% compared to 13% for the rest of the country. An investor can get land 
plots on the Park territory for up to 99 years or take it into a private ownership.  
At the very beginning, logistics was Great Stone growth engine. The pro-
ject on the construction of logistic sub-park is implementing by the largest own-
er of ports and vessels in the world - China Merchants Group. Nevertheless, 
Great Stone is not only industrial and logistic area. It is going to be eco-city with 
comfortable living conditions for up to 150,000 citizens. Later on, kindergartens, 
schools, hospitals, shopping malls, sport and recreation centers will be built 
there. China–Belarus Industrial Park is the largest industrial park in Europe 
among the parks established by China. 
 
44. Social philosophy 
 
Social philosophy may be at the center of the broader interest in philoso-
phy. It is thus above all concerned with phenomena that can only be understood 
in the context of human social life: with the state, law, economy, religion – in 
short, with the entire material and intellectual culture of humanity. 
Understood in this way, social philosophy grew into a decisive philosophi-
cal task in the course of the development of classical German idealism. The 
most compelling aspects of the Hegelian system are the supreme achievements 
of that type of social philosophy. This is not to say that philosophy before Hegel 
had not been concerned with matters of social philosophy; to the contrary, 
Kant’s major works contain philosophical theories concerning the knowledge of 
law, of art, and of religion. But this social philosophy was rooted in the philoso-
phy of the isolated subject; those spheres of being were understood as projec-
tions of the autonomous person.  
Kant made the closed unity of the rational subject into the exclusive source 
of the constitutive principles of each cultural sphere; the essence and the organi-
zation of culture were to be made comprehensible solely on the basis of the dy-
namics of the individual, the fundamental modes of activity of the spontaneous 
ego. Even if the autonomous subject could hardly be equated with the empirical 
individual in Kant’s philosophy, one was nonetheless supposed to be able to in-
vestigate all possible culturally creative factors in the mind of each individual 
rational being.  
Overarching structures of being which could only belong to a supraindivid-
ual whole, which could only be discovered in the social totality, and to which we 
must subordinate ourselves, do not exist in this conception. To assert their exist-
ence would be considered dogmatic, and action oriented to them would be con-
sidered heteronomous. In the Metaphysical Principles of Virtue, Kant writes of 
the moral subject that a person “is subject to no laws other than those that it 
gives to itself (either alone or at least together with others).” 
For Hegel, the structure of objective Spirit, which realizes in history the 
cultural substance of absolute Spirit – that is, art, religion, philosophy – no long-
er derives from the critical analysis of the subject, but rather from universal dia-
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lectical logic. Its course and its works originate not from the free decisions of 
the subject, but from the spirit of the dominant nations as they succeed each oth-
er in the struggles of history.  
The destiny of the particular is fulfilled in the fate of the universal; the es-
sence or substantive form of the individual manifests itself not in its personal 
acts, but in the life of the whole to which it belongs. In its essential aspects, ide-
alism thus became social philosophy with Hegel: the philosophical understand-
ing of the collective whole in which we live – and which constitutes the founda-
tion for the creations of absolute culture – is now also the insight into the mean-
ing of our own existence according to its true value and content. 
From the cautious theory of Marburg neo-Kantianism that human beings 
are not mere individuals, but stand “in various pluralities in rank and file” and 
“first complete the circle of their being in the larger totality,” to the contempo-
rary philosophies according to which (as with Hegel) the meaning of human ex-
istence fulfills itself only in the supraindividual unities of history, whether these 
be class, state, or nation – from Hermann Cohen to Othmar Spann, philosophy in 
recent decades has brought forth the most variegated social-philosophical sys-
tems. The newer philosophical attempts to ground moral and legal philosophy 
anew, against positivism, are almost entirely at one in the effort to demonstrate – 
above the level of actual empirical events – the existence of a higher, autono-
mous realm of being, or at least a realm of value or normativity in which transi-
tory human beings have a share, but which is itself not reducible to mundane 
events. Thus these, too, lead to a new philosophy of objective Spirit.  
Now it is precisely in this dilemma of social philosophy – this inability to 
speak of its object, namely the cultural life of humanity, other than in ideologi-
cal, sectarian, and confessional terms, the inclination to see in the social theories 
of Auguste Comte, Karl Marx, Max Weber, and Max Scheler differences in arti-
cles of faith rather than differences in true, false, or at least problematic theories 
– it is in this dilemma that we find the difficulty that must be overcome. Of 
course, the simultaneous existence and validity of various concepts of reality is 
an indication of the contemporary intellectual situation as a whole. But this vari-
ety is rooted in different areas of knowledge and spheres of life, not in one and 
the same object domain.  
Thus, for instance, the constitutive categories of philology and of physics 
may diverge today so greatly that it appears difficult to bring them under one 
hat. But within physics itself, indeed within the sciences of inorganic nature as a 
whole, no such tendency exists to develop irreconcilable concepts of reality; the 
opposite is the case. Here, the corrective is supplied by concrete research on the 
object. 
One might be tempted to object that social philosophy is not an individual 
discipline, and that it is material sociology which must investigate the specific 
forms of sociation. This sort of sociology investigates the various concrete ways 
in which human beings live together, surveying all kinds of associations: from 
the family to economic groups and political associations to the state and humani-
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ty. Like political economy, such a sociology is capable of objective judgment, 
but it has nothing to say about the degree of reality or about the value of these 
phenomena. Such issues are rather matters for social philosophy, and in those 
fundamental questions with which it deals, there can be ultimate positions but no 
generally valid truths that are woven into broad and variegated investigations. 
This view is rooted in a no longer tenable concept of philosophy. However 
one may draw the boundary between social philosophy and the specialized dis-
cipline of sociology – and I believe a great deal of arbitrariness would be una-
voidable in any such attempt – one thing is certain. If social-philosophical 
thought concerning the relationship of individual and society, the meaning of 
culture, the foundation of the development of community, the overall structure 
of social life – in short, concerning the great and fundamental questions – is left 
behind as (so to speak) the dregs that remain in the reservoir of social-scientific 
problems after taking out those questions that can be advanced in concrete in-
vestigations, social philosophy may well perform social functions (such as that 
of transfiguring and mystifying reality), but its intellectual fruitfulness would 
have been forfeited.  
The relation between philosophical and corresponding specialized scientific 
disciplines cannot be conceived as though philosophy deals with the really deci-
sive problems – in the process constructing theories beyond the reach of the em-
pirical sciences, its own concepts of reality, and systems comprehending the to-
tality – while on the other side empirical research carries out its long, boring, in-
dividual studies that split up into a thousand partial questions, culminating in a 
chaos of countless enclaves of specialists.  
This conception – according to which the individual researcher must view 
philosophy as a perhaps pleasant but scientifically fruitless enterprise (because 
not subject to experimental control), while philosophers, by contrast, are eman-
cipated from the individual researcher because they think they cannot wait for 
the latter before announcing their wide-ranging conclusions – is currently being 
supplanted by the idea of a continuous, dialectical penetration and development 
of philosophical theory and specialized scientific praxis. 
 
45. Structure society 
 
Studies of social structure attempt to explain such matters as integration 
and trends in inequality. This approach, sometimes called formal sociology, 
does not refer directly to individual behaviour or interpersonal interaction. 
Therefore, the study of social structure is not considered a behavioral science; at 
this level, the analysis is too abstract. It is a step removed from the consideration 
of concrete human behaviour, even though the phenomena studied in social 
structure result from humans responding to each other and to their environments. 
Those who study social structure do, however, follow an empirical (observation-
al) approach to research, methodology, and epistemology. 
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Social structure is sometimes defined simply as patterned social relations—
those regular and repetitive aspects of the interactions between the members of a 
given social entity. Even on this descriptive level, the concept is highly abstract: 
it selects only certain elements from ongoing social activities. The larger the so-
cial entity considered, the more abstract the concept tends to be. For this reason, 
the social structure of a small group is generally more closely related to the daily 
activities of its individual members than is the social structure of a larger socie-
ty. In the study of larger social groups, the problem of selection is acute: much 
depends on what is included as components of the social structure. Various theo-
ries offer different solutions to this problem of determining the primary charac-
teristics of a social group. 
SIMILAR TOPICS 
 political system 
 social science 
 law 
 social change 
Before these different theoretical views can be discussed, however, some 
remarks must be made on the general aspects of the social structure of any socie-
ty. Social life is structured along the dimensions of time and space. Specific so-
cial activities take place at specific times, and time is divided into periods that 
are connected with the rhythms of social life—the routines of the day, the 
month, and the year. Specific social activities are also organized at specific plac-
es; particular places, for instance, are designated for such activities as working, 
worshiping, eating, and sleeping. Territorial boundaries delineate these places 
and are defined by rules of property that determine the use and possession of 
scarce goods. Additionally, in any society there is a more or less regular division 
of labour.  
Yet another universal structural characteristic of human societies is the 
regulation of violence. All violence is a potentially disruptive force; at the same 
time, it is a means of coercion and coordination of activities. Human beings 
have formed political units, such as nations, within which the use of violence is 
strictly regulated and which, at the same time, are organized for the use of vio-
lence against outside groups. 
Furthermore, in any society there are arrangements within the structure for 
sexual reproduction and the care and education of the young. These arrange-
ments take the form partly of kinship and marriage relations. Finally, systems of 
symbolic communication, particularly language, structure the interactions be-
tween the members of any society. 
 
46 Philosophy of economics 
 
Philosophy and economics, also philosophy of economics, studies topics 
such as rational choice, the appraisal of economic outcomes, institutions and 
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processes, and the ontology of economic phenomena and the possibilities of ac-
quiring knowledge of them. 
Although these inquiries overlap in many ways, it is useful to divide phi-
losophy of economics in this way into three subject matters which can be re-
garded respectively as branches of action theory, ethics (or normative social and 
political philosophy), and philosophy of science. Economic theories of rationali-
ty, welfare, and social choice defend substantive philosophical theses often in-
formed by relevant philosophical literature and of evident interest to those inter-
ested in action theory, philosophical psychology, and social and political philos-
ophy. Economics is of particular interest to those interested in epistemology and 
philosophy of science both because of its detailed peculiarities and because it 
possesses many of the overt features of the natural sciences, while its object 
consists of social phenomena. 
The question usually addressed in any subfield of philosophy (the philoso-
phy of X) is "what is X?" A philosophical approach to the question "what is 
economics?" is less likely to produce an answer than it is to produce a survey of 
the definitional and territorial difficulties and controversies. Similar considera-
tions apply as a prologue to further discussion of methodology in a subject.  
Definitions of economics have varied over time from the modern origins of 
the subject, reflecting programmatic concerns and distinctions of expositors. On-
tological questions continue with further "what is" questions addressed at fun-
damental economic phenomena, such as "what is (economic) value?" or "what is 
a market? While it is possible to respond to such questions with real verbal defi-
nitions, the philosophical value of posing such questions actually aims at shift-
ing entire perspectives as to the nature of the foundations of economics. In the 
rare cases that attempts at ontological shifts gain wide acceptance, their ripple 
effects can spread throughout the entire field of economics  
An epistemology deals with how we know things. In the philosophy of 
economics this means asking questions such as: what kind of a "truth claim" is 
made by economic theories – for example, are we claiming that the theories re-
late to reality or perceptions? How can or should we prove economic theories – 
for example, must every economic theory be empirically verifiable? How exact 
are economic theories and can they lay claim to the status of an exact science – 
for example, are economic predictions as reliable as predictions in the natural 
sciences, and why or why not? Another way of expressing this issue is to ask 
whether economic theories can state "laws". Philosophers of science and econ-
omists have explored these issues intensively since the work of Alexander Ros-
enberg and Daniel Hausman dating to 3 decades ago.  
Philosophical approaches in decision theory focus on foundational concepts 
in decision theory – for example, on the natures of choice or preference, ration-
ality, risk and uncertainty, economic agents. Game theory is shared between a 
number of disciplines, but especially mathematics, economics and philosophy. 
Game theory is still extensively discussed within the field of the philosophy of 
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economics. Game theory is closely related to and builds on decision theory and 
is likewise very strongly interdisciplinary.  
The ethics of economic systems deals with the issues such as how it is right 
(just, fair) to keep or distribute economic goods. Economic systems as a product 
of collective activity allow examination of their ethical consequences for all of 
their participants. Ethics and economics relate ethical studies to welfare eco-
nomics. It has been argued that a closer relation between welfare economics and 
modern ethical studies may enrich both areas, even including predictive and de-
scriptive economics as to rationality of behavior, given social interdependence. 
Ethics and justice overlap disciplines in different ways. Approaches are re-
garded as more philosophical when they study the fundamentals – for exam-
ple, John Rawls' A Theory of Justice (1971) and Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State 
and Utopia (1974). 'Justice' in economics is a subcategory of welfare econom-
ics with models frequently representing the ethical-social requirements of a giv-
en theory. "Practical" matters include such subjects as law and cost–benefit 
analysis. Utilitarianism, one of the ethical methodologies, has its origins inextri-
cably interwoven with the emergence of modern economic thought. Today utili-
tarianism has spread throughout applied ethics as one of a number of approach-
es.  
Non-utilitarian approaches in applied ethics are also now used when ques-
tioning the ethics of economic systems – e.g. rights-based (deontological) ap-
proaches. Many political ideologies have been an immediate outgrowth of re-
flection on the ethics of economic systems. Marx, for example, is generally re-
garded primarily as a philosopher, his most notable work being on the 
philosophy of economics. However, Marx's economic critique of capitalism did 
not depend on ethics, justice, or any form of morality, instead focusing on the 
inherent contradictions of capitalism through the lens of a process which is to-
day called dialectical materialism. 
The philosophy of economics defines itself as including the questioning of 
foundations or assumptions of economics. The foundations and assumption of 
economics have been questioned from the perspective of noteworthy but typical-
ly under-represented groups. These areas are therefore to be included within the 
philosophy of economics. Cross-cultural perspectives on economics: an example 
is the Buddhist-inspired Bhutanese "Gross National Happiness" concept (sug-
gested as a better development measure than GNI/GDP). Amartya Sen is a re-
nowned advocate for the integration of cross-cultural phenomena into economic 
thinking. Related area: economic anthropology. 
 
47. Philosophy of technology 
 
Environmental philosophy and philosophy of technology have taken diver-
gent paths despite their common interest in examining human modification of 
the natural world. Yet philosophers from each field have a lot to contribute to 
the other. Environmental issues inevitably involve technologies, and technolo-
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gies inevitably have environmental impacts. In this book, prominent scholars 
from both fields illuminate the intersections of environmental philosophy and 
philosophy of technology, offering the beginnings of a rich new hybrid dis-
course.  
All the contributors share the intuition that technology and the environment 
overlap in ways that are relevant in both philosophical and practical terms. They 
consider such issues as the limits of technological interventions in the natural 
world, whether a concern for the environment can be designed into things, how 
consumerism relates us to artifacts and environments, and how food and animal 
agriculture raise questions about both culture and nature. They discuss, among 
other topics, the pessimism and dystopianism shared by environmentalists, envi-
ronmental philosophers, and philosophers of technology; the ethics of geoengi-
neering and climate change; the biological analogy at the heart of industrial 
ecology; green products and sustainable design; and agriculture as a bridge be-
tween technology and the environment. 
An important role in preserving Belarusian science in the European intel-
lectual space was played by B. Kit (Keith). He was born on April 6, 1910 in St. 
Petersburg in the family of an employee of the Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs, 
a Belorussian by nationality. In 1918, together with his parents, he moved to 
Belarus, to his father’s homeland in the village of Ogorodniki. Now it has be-
come part of the urban village Korelichi, Grodno region. In 1924, B. Kit entered 
the 4th grade of a local Polish school, and in September 1926 - into the 6th 
grade of the Novogrudok Belarusian gymnasium, which he graduated in 1928. 
In September 1928, B. Keith was enrolled in the Faculty of Physics and 
Mathematics at Vilnius University. Stefan Batory. He graduated in 1933 with a 
master's degree in mathematics. While still in his 3rd year at the university, he 
began to teach mathematics at the Vilnius Belarusian Gymnasium. In 1939, B. 
Kit was appointed director of this gymnasium. 
After at the end of 1939 the territory of Vilnius moved to Lithuania, B. Kit 
returned to his native places. He made a lot of efforts, trying to resume the activ-
ity of the Novogrudok Belarusian gymnasium, which was closed in 1934 by the 
Polish authorities. He managed to resume the activities of the gymnasium, 
whose director B. Kit was appointed. Organizational abilities of B. Kita, ability 
to work with people were noticed and appreciated. He was appointed a school 
inspector of the Baranavichy district. During the year, with his direct participa-
tion, hundreds of elementary and several dozens of secondary schools were 
opened. At the same time, B. Keith taught mathematics at the Baranavichy Insti-
tute of Teachers. However, this fruitful work was interrupted by the Great Patri-
otic War that began in 1941. 
During the years of German occupation, B. Kit, despite all the difficulties 
and hardships, did not leave the educational field. At this time, he taught at a 
school in the village of Lebedevo near Molodechno, worked as the director of 
the teacher's seminary in Pastavy. On suspicion of having links with partisans, 
B. Keith was arrested by German punitive authorities (SD). He spent more than 
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a month in prison. From execution he was saved by former students. In 1943, he 
became the director of a trading school in Molodechno, permission to open 
which was obtained from the German authorities. Students in it received not on-
ly vocational training, but also knowledge on the history and culture of Belarus. 
B. Keith did everything possible to raise the status of the school and transform it 
into an administrative-commercial institution. The training was conducted under 
the institute program. 
In 1944, B. Keith and his family left for Germany, first to Bavaria in the 
city of Offenbach-Lindau, and then to Munich. The Ukrainian national gymna-
sium worked in Munich, where B. Keith taught mathematics for three years. At 
the same time, he studied at the medical faculty of the University of Munich 
in1945-1948. At the end of 1948, B. Keith arrived in the USA, in the South Riv-
er, where he got a job in a pharmaceutical company. In 1950, B. Keith moved to 
Los Angeles, where he worked as a chemist in various companies. 
For 25 years, B. Keith worked in the field of space research in the United 
States, as a mathematician and systems analyst, participated in the development 
of the most important programs for the development of intercontinental rocket 
systems. B. Keith worked at North American Aviation. The company created 
almost all of the most famous American space projects, from the first strategic 
intercontinental systems, such as Navaho, to the most outstanding Apollo project 
of the 20th century and Shuttle shuttle spacecraft. 
Since 1958, B. Keith worked in the US Department of the Air Force, in the 
cosmonautics department. He was entrusted with the duties of a state adviser, an 
expert in the development of international cosmonautics, mainly Soviet. In 
1964, the book “History and Current State of Soviet Astronautics”, written by B. 
Keith in collaboration with F. Ordway, was published. In 1960, the first text-
book on fuel for rocket systems appeared in the history of science, authored by 
B. Keith. The book quickly spread throughout the world and had many positive 
reviews. 
Since 1963, B. Keith worked in the cosmonautics department of the Inter-
national Telephone and Telegraph Corporation. This was the period of prepara-
tion for the flight of American astronauts to the moon. He became an adviser to 
the president of the company, made a significant contribution to the mathemati-
cal development of technical elements of communication with the Moon. Sub-
sequently, B. Keith worked at the National Bureau of Standardization, the US 
Department of Communications, where he studied the methods of increasing the 
efficiency of administrative activities using mathematics. Along with research, 
he taught mathematics at the University of Maryland at the evening faculty. 
In 1972, B. Keith moved to Germany, settled in Frankfurt. He worked as a 
professor of mathematics at the European Department of the University of Mar-
yland. During this period, B. Keith began work on his doctoral dissertation. Her 
theme is the life and work of one of the outstanding mathematicians of the 20th 
century, Anton Sigmund. In 1982, B. Keith was awarded the Ph.D. degree in 
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mathematics and the history of science at the academic council of the University 
of Regensburg. The dissertation came out as a separate book. 
Despite his preoccupation with teaching and preparing a dissertation, B. 
Keith published in the journals of America and Germany more than 30 scientific 
articles on various topics. Since 1958, he was a permanent delegate to all the In-
ternational Congresses on Astronautics, where he made presentations and re-
ports. Another prominent representative of Belarus in European science was Al-
exander Leonidovich Chizhevsky. He was born in the Grodno province in the 
family of a career artillery officer. In 1913 the family moved to Kaluga. Here he 
fell under the strong influence of astronomy. A. Chizhevsky shared his ideas of 
space biology, the probability of the influence of galactic fields, solar activity on 
the world of plants, animals, humans with K.E. Tsiolkovsky. 
The scientist began to study the riddle of the impact on living organisms of 
negatively charged air ions. He hypothesized the healing properties of negative-
ly charged oxygen ions. The laboratory became an experimental laboratory. Ac-
cording to the results of experiments, the idea of an apparatus for artificial 
aeroionification was born - saturation of air with negatively charged oxygen 
ions. In practice, it was embodied in a device called the “Chizhevsky chande-
lier”.  
Studying the influence of cosmic physical factors on processes in living na-
ture, A. Chizhevsky established a relationship between the cycles of solar activi-
ty and many phenomena in the biosphere. He showed that the physical fields of 
the Earth and its environment should be taken into account among the main rea-
sons affecting the state of the biosphere. In 1935, he discovered bacterial meta-
chromasia (the "Chizhevsky-Velhover effect"). It allows you to predict solar 
emissions that are dangerous to humans, both on Earth and in space. Years of 
imprisonment followed. According to article 58 of the Criminal Code of the 
RSFSR, he was sentenced to 8 years in prison. Then another 8 years of exile fol-
lowed. The camp administration of Karaganda allowed the scientist to conduct 
research. 
The result of the camp research was the monograph "Biophysical mecha-
nisms of the reaction of erythrocyte sedimentation." A. Chizhevsky for the first 
time experimentally established the fact of the opposite physiological effect of 
negative and positive ions in the air on living organisms. He discovered the 
pathological effect of deionized air and the stimulating effect on living organ-
isms of negative air ions. He applied artificial aeroionization in medicine, agri-
culture, animal husbandry. 
In the 90s in the twentieth century, many Belarusian scientists in the field 
of physics, chemistry and biology continued to participate in European research 
programs. Similar programs are available to students. Belarusian youth are edu-
cated in educational institutions of the European Union. 
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48. Philosophy of engineering activity 
 
The philosophy of engineering is an emerging discipline that considers 
what engineering is, what engineers do, and how their work affects society, and 
thus includes aspects of ethics and aesthetics, as well as the ontology, episte-
mology, etc. that might be studied in, for example, the philosophy of science. 
Engineering is the profession aimed at modifying the natural environment, 
through the design, manufacture and maintenance of artifacts and technological 
systems. It might then be contrasted with science, the aim of which is to under-
stand nature.  
Engineering at its core is about causing change, and therefore management 
of change is central to engineering practice. The philosophy of engineering is 
then the consideration of philosophical issues as they apply to engineering. Such 
issues might include the objectivity of experiments, the ethics of engineering ac-
tivity in the workplace and in society, the aesthetics of engineered artifacts, etc. 
While engineering seems historically to have meant devising, the distinc-
tion between art, craft and technology isn't clearcut. The Latin root ars, the Ger-
manic root kraft and the Greek root techne all originally meant the skill or abil-
ity to produce something, as opposed to, say, athletic ability. The something 
might be tangible, like a sculpture or a building, or less tangible, like a work 
of literature.  
Nowadays, art is commonly applied to the visual, performing or literary 
fields, especially the so-called fine arts ('the art of writing'), craft usually applies 
to the manual skill involved in the manufacture of an object, whether embroi-
dery or aircraft ('the craft of typesetting') and technology tends to mean the 
products and processes currently used in an industry ('the technology of print-
ing'). In contrast, engineering is the activity of effecting change through the de-
sign and manufacture of artifacts ('the engineering of print technology'). 
What distinguishes engineering design from artistic design is the require-
ment for the engineer to make quantitative predictions of the behavior and effect 
of the artifact prior to its manufacture. Such predictions may be more or less ac-
curate but usually includes the effects on individuals and/or society. In this 
sense, engineering can be considered a social as well a technological discipline 
and judged not just by whether its artifacts work, in a narrow sense, but also by 
how they influence and serve social values. What engineers do is subject to 
moral evaluation. 
Socio-technical systems, such as transport, utilities and their related infra-
structures comprise human elements as well as artifacts. Traditional mathemati-
cal and physical modeling techniques may not take adequate account of the ef-
fects of engineering on people, and culture. The Civil Engineering discipline 
makes elaborate attempts to ensure that a structure meets its specifications and 
other requirements prior to its actual construction. The methods employed are 
well known as Analysis and Design. Systems Modelling and Description makes 
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an effort to extract the generic unstated principles behind the engineering ap-
proach.  
The traditional engineering disciplines seem discrete but the engineering of 
artifact has implications that extend beyond such disciplines into areas that 
might include psychology, finance and sociology. The design of any artifact will 
then take account of the conditions under which it will be manufactured, the 
conditions under which it will be used, and the conditions under which it will be 
disposed. Engineers can consider such "life cycle" issues without losing the pre-
cision and rigor necessary to design functional systems. 
 
49. Convergence natural and technical science 
 
Earlier stages of technological convergence, starting from combining scien-
tific knowledge with the technical activities at the beginning of the industrial 
revolution, and ending with the most important technological convergence of the 
XX century - the emergence of information and communication networks - have 
created miracle expectations in the minds of scientists, a breakthrough that has 
incalculable social consequences.  
However, despite the widespread diffusion of the new technologies in hu-
man life and a significant increase of social wellbeing in the 20th century, its 
eco-factor is still determined by the boundaries of the application of the basic 
technologies. In other words, technological convergence hasn’t allowed over-
coming the limitations of nature yet other than reinforcing a devastating effect 
on the environment by the industry - the main achievement of modern Ecology. 
Under such conditions, social wellbeing, raised by industrial technologies on 
previously unattainable level, cannot be truly continuous, since it depends on the 
balance of nature-destructive and environment-saving technologies. As until 
now this balance is disturbed in favor of irreparable damage to the environment, 
the social wellbeing, even during the human’s life, cannot be continuous.  
One of the possible ways out of the "vicious circle" of technological, envi-
ronmental and social problems is the development of NBIC-convergence tech-
nologies. Material and Method Many scientists say that nature is "wrong" too 
often, so we could not unconditionally rely on it. Features of this approach can 
be found in technological convergence studies. For example, one of the reports 
of the US National Science Foundation was named "Converged technologies for 
improving human performance". Its authors suggested that the use of appropri-
ate technologies will contribute to the world peace and the development of fruit-
ful cooperation between people and machines, which will result in the reduction 
of environmental damage brining human wellbeing growth to a minimum. Nev-
ertheless, the impact of technological development on the continuous wellbeing 
of mankind is positively evaluated by not all scientists.  
So, after a successful start of the process of convergence, when Feynmanas 
early as in 1959 described possibility of manipulation of matter at the molecular 
level, and Swiss researchers Heinrich Rohrer and Gerd Binnig created a scan-
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ning tunneling microscope that could show individual atoms and move them, a 
number of authors stated the danger that the new technology could bring to the 
world. For example, Eric Drexler warned of the apocalyptic scenario of progress 
in nano-technology, thanks to which humans can lose ecological niche, and R. 
Smalley, John. Whitesides, R. Kurzweil initiated the discussion about the pro-
spects of the impact of new molecular electronics, nanobiology, algorithmiza-
tion of the human mind on ecology of the human environment.  
However, the significant number of scientists, mainly in the fields of hu-
manitarian knowledge was the proponents of the use of new technologies for the 
growth of social wellbeing. A number of researchers analyzing wellbeing em-
phasize the possibilities of new technologies in provision of individuals with 
wealth and maintenance of social and economic stability of society. Other au-
thors give priority to the perception by the individual, community, and even a 
certain nation of objective living conditions. 
 
50. Culture and civilization 
 
Firstly, civilization in theory is bigger than culture in which an entire civili-
zation can encompass one single unit of culture. Civilization is a bigger unit than 
culture because it is a complex aggregate of the society that dwells within a cer-
tain area, along with its forms of government, norms, and even culture. Thus, 
culture is just a spec or a portion of an entire civilization. For example, the 
Egyptian civilization has an Egyptian culture in the same way as the Greek civi-
lization has their Greek culture. A culture ordinarily exists within a civilization. 
In this regard, each civilization can contain not only one but several cultures. 
Comparing culture and civilization is like showing the difference between lan-
guage and the country to which it is being used. 
Culture can exist in itself whereas civilization cannot be called a civiliza-
tion if it does not possess a certain culture. It’s just like asking how a nation can 
exist on its own without the use of a medium of communication. Hence, a civili-
zation will become empty if it does not have its culture, no matter how little it is. 
 Culture refers to the cumulative deposit of knowledge, experience, be-
liefs, values, attitudes, meanings, hierarchies, religion, notions of time, roles, 
spatial relations, concepts of the universe, and material objects and possessions 
acquired by a group of people in the course of generations through individual 
and group striving. 
 Culture is the systems of knowledge shared by a relatively large group of 
people. 
 Culture is communication, communication is culture. 
 Culture in its broadest sense is cultivated behavior; that is the totality of a 
person's learned, accumulated experience which is socially transmitted, or more 
briefly, behavior through social learning. 
 A culture is a way of life of a group of people--the behaviors, beliefs, val-
ues, and symbols that they accept, generally without thinking about them, and 
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that are passed along by communication and imitation from one generation to 
the next. 
 Culture is symbolic communication. Some of its symbols include a 
group's skills, knowledge, attitudes, values, and motives. The meanings of the 
symbols are learned and deliberately perpetuated in a society through its institu-
tions. 
 Culture consists of patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for behavior ac-
quired and transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievement of 
human groups, including their embodiments in artifacts; the essential core of 
culture consists of traditional ideas and especially their attached values; culture 
systems may, on the one hand, be considered as products of action, on the other 
hand, as conditioning influences upon further action. 
 Culture is the sum of total of the learned behavior of a group of people 
that are generally considered to be the tradition of that people and are transmit-
ted from generation to generation. 
 Culture is a collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the 
members of one group or category of people from another. 
 The position that the ideas, meanings, beliefs and values people learn as 
members of society determines human nature. People are what they learn. Opti-
mistic version of cultural determinism, place no limits on the abilities of human 
beings to do or to be whatever they want. Some anthropologists suggest that 
there is no universal "right way" of being human. "Right way" is almost always 
"our way"; that "our way" in one society almost never corresponds to "our way" 
in any other society. Proper attitude of an informed human being could only be 
that of tolerance. 
 The optimistic version of this theory postulates that human nature being 
infinitely malleable human being can choose the ways of life they prefer. 
 The pessimistic version maintains that people are what they are condi-
tioned to be; this is something over which they have no control. Human beings 
are passive creatures and do whatever their culture tells them to do. This expla-
nation leads to behaviorism that locates the causes of human behavior in a realm 
that is totally beyond human control. 
 Different cultural groups think, feel, and act differently. There is no scien-
tific standard for considering one group as intrinsically superior or inferior to 
another. Studying differences in culture among groups and societies presupposes 
a position of cultural relativism. It does not imply normalcy for oneself, no for 
one's society. It, however, calls for judgment when dealing with groups or socie-
ties different from one's own. Information about the nature of cultural differ-
ences between societies, their roots, and their consequences should precede 
judgment and action. Negotiation is more likely to succeed when the parties 
concerned understand the reasons for the differences in viewpoints. 
 
195 
 
51. Philosophy of value 
 
The term “value theory” is used in at least three different ways in philosophy. In 
its broadest sense, “value theory” is a catch-all label used to encompass all 
branches of moral philosophy, social and political philosophy, aesthetics, and 
sometimes feminist philosophy and the philosophy of religion — whatever areas 
of philosophy are deemed to encompass some “evaluative” aspect.  
In its narrowest sense, “value theory” is used for a relatively narrow area of 
normative ethical theory particularly, but not exclusively, of concern to conse-
quentialists. In this narrow sense “value theory” is roughly synonymous with 
“axiology”. Axiology can be thought of as primarily concerned with classifying 
what things are good, and how good they are. For instance, a traditional question 
of axiology concerns whether the objects of value are subjective psychological 
states, or objective states of the world. 
But in a more useful sense, “value theory” designates the area of moral phi-
losophy that is concerned with theoretical questions about value and goodness of 
all varieties — the theory of value. The theory of value, so construed, encom-
passes axiology, but also includes many other questions about the nature of val-
ue and its relation to other moral categories. The division of moral theory into 
the theory of value, as contrasting with other areas of investigation, cross-cuts 
the traditional classification of moral theory into normative and metaethical in-
quiry, but is a worthy distinction in its own right; theoretical questions about 
value constitute a core domain of interest in moral theory, often cross the 
boundaries between the normative and the metaethical, and have a distinguished 
history of investigation.  
This article surveys a range of the questions which come up in the theory of 
value, and attempts to impose some structure on the terrain by including some 
observations about how they are related to one another. The theory of value be-
gins with a subject matter. It is hard to specify in some general way exactly what 
counts, but it certainly includes what we are talking about when we say any of 
the following sorts of things  
 
52. Ethics, Aestetics and philosophy of law 
 
Value theory (or axiology) is the major branch of philosophy that addresses 
topics such as goodness, beauty and justice. Value theory includes ethics, aes-
thetics, political philosophy, feminist philosophy, philosophy of law and more. 
Ethics, or "moral philosophy", studies and considers what is good and bad 
conduct, right and wrong values, and good and evil. Its primary investigations 
include how to live a good life and identifying standards of morality. It also in-
cludes meta-investigations about whether a best way to live or related standards 
exists. The main branches of ethics are normative ethics, meta-ethics and ap-
plied ethics. 
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A major point of debate revolves around consequentialism, where actions 
are judged by the potential results of the act, such as to maximize happiness, 
called utilitarianism, and deontology, where actions are judged by how they ad-
here to principles, irrespective of negative ends. 
Aesthetics is the "critical reflection on art, culture and nature." It addresses 
the nature of art, beauty and taste, enjoyment, emotional values, perception and 
with the creation and appreciation of beauty. It is more precisely defined as the 
study of sensory or sensori-emotional values, sometimes called judgments 
of sentiment and taste. It divides into art theory, literary theory, film theo-
ry and music theory. An example from art theory is to discern the set of princi-
ples underlying the work of a particular artist or artistic movement such as the 
Cubist aesthetic. The philosophy of film analyzes films and filmmakers for their 
philosophical content and explores film (images, cinema, etc.) as a medium for 
philosophical reflection and expressionPolitical philosophy is the study 
of government and the relationship of individuals (or families and clans) to 
communities including the state. It includes questions about justice, law, proper-
ty and the rights and obligations of the citizen. Politics and ethics are traditional-
ly linked subjects, as both discuss the question of how people should live to-
gether. Other branches of value theory: 
There are a variety of branches of value theory. 
 Philosophy of law (often called jurisprudence) explores the varying theo-
ries explaining the nature and interpretation of laws. 
 Philosophy of education analyzes the definition and content of education, 
as well as the goals and challenges of educators. 
 Feminist philosophy explores questions surrounding gender, sexuality and 
the body including the nature of feminism itself as a social and philosophical 
movement. 
 Philosophy of sport analyzes sports, games and other forms of play as so-
ciological and uniquely human activities. 
 
53. Philosophy of identity 
 
The identity theory of mind holds that states and processes of the mind are 
identical to states and processes of the brain. Strictly speaking, it need not hold 
that the mind is identical to the brain. Idiomatically we do use ‘She has a good 
mind’ and ‘She has a good brain’ interchangeably but we would hardly say ‘Her 
mind weighs fifty ounces’. Here I take identifying mind and brain as being a 
matter of identifying processes and perhaps states of the mind and brain. Con-
sider an experience of pain, or of seeing something, or of having a mental im-
age. The identity theory of mind is to the effect that these experiences just are 
brain processes, not merely correlated with brain processes. 
Some philosophers hold that though experiences are brain processes they 
nevertheless have fundamentally non-physical, psychical, properties, sometimes 
called ‘qualia’. Here I shall take the identity theory as denying the existence of 
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such irreducible non-physical properties. Some identity theorists give a behav-
iouristic analysis of mental states, such as beliefs and desires, but others, some-
times called ‘central state materialists’, say that mental states are actual brain 
states. Identity theorists often describe themselves as ‘materialists’ but ‘physi-
calists’ may be a better word. That is, one might be a materialist about mind but 
nevertheless hold that there are entities referred to in physics that are not happily 
described as ‘material’. 
In taking the identity theory (in its various forms) as a species of physical-
ism, I should say that this is an ontological, not a translational physicalism. It 
would be absurd to try to translate sentences containing the word ‘brain’ or the 
word ‘sensation’ into sentences about electrons, protons and so on. Nor can we 
so translate sentences containing the word ‘tree’. After all ‘tree’ is largely 
learned ostensively, and is not even part of botanical classification. If we were 
small enough a dandelion might count as a tree. Nevertheless a physicalist could 
say that trees are complicated physical mechanisms. The physicalist will deny 
strong emergence in the sense of some philosophers, such as Samuel Alexander 
and possibly C.D. Broad. The latter remarked (Broad 1937) that as far as was 
known at that time the properties of common salt cannot be deduced from the 
properties of sodium in isolation and of chlorine in isolation. Of course the phys-
icalist will not deny the harmless sense of "emergence" in which an apparatus is 
not just a jumble of its parts (Smart 1981). 
The identity theory as I understand it here goes back to U.T. Place and 
Herbert Feigl in the 1950s. Historically philosophers and scientists, for example 
Leucippus, Hobbes, La Mettrie, and d'Holbach, as well as Karl Vogt who, fol-
lowing Pierre-Jean-Georges Cabanis, made the preposterous remark (perhaps 
not meant to be taken too seriously) that the brain secretes thought as the liver 
secretes bile, have embraced materialism. However, here I shall date interest in 
the identity theory from the pioneering papers ‘Is Consciousness a Brain Pro-
cess?’ by U.T. Place (Place 1956) and H. Feigl ‘The "Mental" and the "Physi-
cal"’ (Feigl 1958). Nevertheless mention should be made of suggestions by Ru-
dolf Carnap (1932, p. 127), H. Reichenbach (1938) and M. Schlick (1935).  
Reichenbach said that mental events can be identified by the corresponding 
stimuli and responses much as the (possibly unknown) internal state of a photo-
electric cell can be identified by the stimulus (light falling on it) and response 
(electric current flowing) from it. In both cases the internal states can be physi-
cal states. However Carnap did regard the identity as a linguistic recommenda-
tion rather than as asserting a question of fact. See his ‘Herbert Feigl on Physi-
calism’ in Schilpp (1963), especially p. 886. The psychologist E.G. Boring 
(1933) may well have been the first to use the term ‘identity theory’ See Place 
(1990). 
Place's very original and pioneering paper was written after discussions at 
the University of Adelaide with J.J.C. Smart and C.B. Martin. For recollections 
of Martin's contributions to the discussion see Place (1989) ‘Low Claim Asser-
tions’ in Heil (1989). Smart at the time argued for a behaviourist position in 
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which mental events were elucidated purely in terms of hypothetical proposi-
tions about behaviour, as well as first person reports of experiences which Gil-
bert Ryle regarded as ‘avowals’.  
Avowals were thought of as mere pieces of behaviour, as if saying that one 
had a pain was just doing a sophisticated sort of wince. Smart saw Ryle's theory 
as friendly to physicalism though that was not part of Ryle's motivation. Smart 
hoped that the hypotheticals would ultimately be explained by neuroscience and 
cybernetics. Being unable to refute Place, and recognizing the unsatisfactoriness 
of Ryle's treatment of inner experience, to some extent recognized by Ryle him-
self (Ryle 1949, p. 240), Smart soon became converted to Place's view (Smart 
1959). In this he was also encouraged and influenced by Feigl's ‘"The Mental" 
and the "Physical" ’ (Feigl 1958, 1967).  
Feigl's wide ranging contribution covered many problems, including those 
connected with intentionality, and he introduced the useful term ‘nomological 
danglers’ for the dualists' supposed mental-physical correlations. They would 
dangle from the nomological net of physical science and should strike one as 
implausible excrescences on the fair face of science. Feigl (1967) contains a 
valuable ‘Postscript’. 
 
54. Philosophy of history. 
 
The concept of history plays a fundamental role in human thought. It in-
vokes notions of human agency, change, the role of material circumstances in 
human affairs, and the putative meaning of historical events. It raises the possi-
bility of “learning from history.” And it suggests the possibility of better under-
standing ourselves in the present, by understanding the forces, choices, and cir-
cumstances that brought us to our current situation. It is therefore unsurprising 
that philosophers have sometimes turned their attention to efforts to examine 
history itself and the nature of historical knowledge.  
These reflections can be grouped together into a body of work called “phi-
losophy of history.” This work is heterogeneous, comprising analyses and argu-
ments of idealists, positivists, logicians, theologians, and others, and moving 
back and forth over the divides between European and Anglo-American philos-
ophy, and between hermeneutics and positivism. 
Given the plurality of voices within the “philosophy of history,” it is im-
possible to give one definition of the field that suits all these approaches. In fact, 
it is misleading to imagine that we refer to a single philosophical tradition when 
we invoke the phrase, “philosophy of history,” because the strands of research 
characterized here rarely engage in dialogue with each other. Still, we can use-
fully think of philosophers' writings about history as clustering around several 
large questions, involving metaphysics, hermeneutics, epistemology, and histor-
icism: (1) What does history consist of—individual actions, social structures, pe-
riods and regions, civilizations, large causal processes, divine intervention? (2) 
Does history as a whole have meaning, structure, or direction, beyond the indi-
199 
 
vidual events and actions that make it up? (3) What is involved in our knowing, 
representing, and explaining history? (4) To what extent is human history consti-
tutive of the human present? 
What are the intellectual tasks that define the historian's work? In a sense, 
this question is best answered on the basis of a careful reading of some good his-
torians. But it will be useful to offer several simple answers to this foundational 
question as a sort of conceptual map of the nature of historical knowing. 
First, historians are interested in providing conceptualizations and factual 
descriptions of events and circumstances in the past. This effort is an answer to 
questions like these: “What happened? What was it like? What were some of the 
circumstances and happenings that took place during this period in the past?” 
Sometimes this means simply reconstructing a complicated story from scattered 
historical sources—for example, in constructing a narrative of the Spanish Civil 
War or attempting to sort out the series of events that culminated in the Detroit 
race riot / uprising of 1967. But sometimes it means engaging in substantial con-
ceptual work in order to arrive at a vocabulary in terms of which to characterize 
“what happened.” Concerning the disorders of 1967 in Detroit: was this a riot or 
an uprising? How did participants and contemporaries think about it? 
Second, historians often want to answer “why” questions: “Why did this 
event occur? What were the conditions and forces that brought it about?” This 
body of questions invites the historian to provide an explanation of the event or 
pattern he or she describes: the rise of fascism in Spain, the collapse of the Ot-
toman Empire, the great global financial crisis of 2008. And providing an expla-
nation requires, most basically, an account of the causal mechanisms, back-
ground circumstances, and human choices that brought the outcome about. We 
explain an historical outcome when we identify the social causes, forces, and ac-
tions that brought it about, or made it more likely. 
Third, and related to the previous point, historians are sometimes interested 
in answering a “how” question: “How did this outcome come to pass? What 
were the processes through which the outcome occurred?” How did the Prussian 
Army succeed in defeating the superior French Army in 1870? How did Truman 
manage to defeat Dewey in the 1948 US election? Here the pragmatic interest of 
the historian's account derives from the antecedent unlikelihood of the event in 
question: how was this outcome possible? This too is an explanation; but it is an 
answer to a “how possible” question rather than a “why necessary” question. 
Fourth, often historians are interested in piecing together the human mean-
ings and intentions that underlie a given complex series of historical actions. 
They want to help the reader make sense of the historical events and actions, in 
terms of the thoughts, motives, and states of mind of the participants. For exam-
ple: Why did Napoleon III carelessly provoke Prussia into war in 1870? Why 
has the Burmese junta dictatorship been so intransigent in its treatment of de-
mocracy activist Aung San Suu Kyi? Why did northern cities in the United 
States develop such profound patterns of racial segregation after World War II? 
Answers to questions like these require interpretation of actions, meanings, and 
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intentions—of individual actors and of cultures that characterize whole popula-
tions. This aspect of historical thinking is “hermeneutic,” interpretive, and eth-
nographic. 
And, of course, the historian faces an even more basic intellectual task: that 
of discovering and making sense of the archival information that exists about a 
given event or time in the past. Historical data do not speak for themselves; ar-
chives are incomplete, ambiguous, contradictory, and confusing. The historian 
needs to interpret individual pieces of evidence; and he or she needs to be able 
to somehow fit the mass of evidence into a coherent and truthful story. So com-
plex events like the Spanish Civil War present the historian with an ocean of his-
torical traces in repositories and archives all over the world; these collections 
sometimes reflect specific efforts at concealment by the powerful (for example, 
Franco's efforts to conceal all evidence of mass killings of Republicans after the 
end of fighting); and the historian's task is to find ways of using this body of ev-
idence to discern some of the truth about the past. 
In short, historians conceptualize, describe, contextualize, explain, and in-
terpret events and circumstances of the past. They sketch out ways of represent-
ing the complex activities and events of the past; they explain and interpret sig-
nificant outcomes; and they base their findings on evidence in the present that 
bears upon facts about the past. Their accounts need to be grounded on the evi-
dence of the available historical record; and their explanations and interpreta-
tions require that the historian arrive at hypotheses about social causes and cul-
tural meanings.  
Historians can turn to the best available theories in the social and behavior-
al sciences to arrive at theories about causal mechanisms and human behavior; 
so historical statements depend ultimately upon factual inquiry and theoretical 
reasoning. Ultimately, the historian's task is to shed light on the what, why, and 
how of the past, based on inferences from the evidence of the present. 
Two preliminary issues are relevant to almost all discussions of history and 
the philosophy of history. These are issues having to do with the constitution of 
history and the levels at which we choose to characterize historical events and 
processes. The first issue concerns the relationship between actors and causes in 
history: is history a sequence of causal relations, or is it the outcome of an inter-
locking series of human actions? The second issue concerns the question of 
scale of historical processes in space and time: how should historians seek to 
reconcile micro-, meso-, and macro-perspectives on history? Both issues can be 
illustrated in the history of France. Should we imagine that twentieth-century 
France is the end result of a number of major causes in its past—the collapse of 
the Roman order in the territory, the military successes of Charlemagne, the oc-
currence of the French Revolution, and defeat in the Franco-Prussian War?  
Or should we acknowledge that France at any point in time was the object 
of action and contest among individuals, groups, and organizations, and that the 
interplay of strategic actors is a more fertile way of thinking about French histo-
ry than the idea of a series of causal events? Scale is equally controversial. 
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Should we think of France as a single comprehensive region, or as the agglom-
eration of separate regions and cultures with their own historical dynamics (Al-
sace, Brittany and Burgundy)? Further, is it useful to consider the long expanse 
of human activity in the territory of what is now France, or are historians better 
advised to focus their attention on shorter periods of time? The following two 
sections will briefly consider these issues. 
 
55. East and West: dialog culture 
 
Cross-cultural studies usually involve (a) applying measures derived from 
Western cultural traditions and (b) comparing results from different nations 
within a priori Western theoretical frameworks. There is a danger, therefore, of 
twisting non-Western cultures to create psychological equivalence (Brislin, 
Lonner, & Thorndike, 1973). The word happiness did not appear in the Chinese 
language until recently. Fu, or fu-qi, is perhaps the closest equivalent of happi-
ness in Chinese ancient writings. However, its definition, which is extremely 
vague, usually means “anything positive and good in life.” Wu (1991) pointed 
out that longevity, prosperity, health, peace, virtue, and a comfortable death are 
among the best values in life (i.e., fu-qi).  
Thus, according to folklore, Chinese people’s conception of happiness 
roughly includes material abundance, physical health, a virtuous and peaceful 
life, and relief of anxiety about death. In the Book of Change, one of the oldest 
and most influential philosophical works in China, everything from the cosmos 
to human life is viewed as a neverending and cyclic process of change—
between good and bad, happiness and misery, well-being and ill-being. Accord-
ing to the ancient Yin–Yang theory, the universe consists of two basic opposing 
principles or natures, Yin and Yang.  
The change of relationships between those two forces formed all creations, 
which are still constantly changing. The ultimate aspiration of the Chinese con-
ception of well-being is a state of homeostasis in nature, human societies, and 
individual human beings, brought about by the harmonious relationships be-
tween Yin and Yang. The ancient Chinese thinking of Taoism echoed such a 
philosophy of submission to, rather than control over, over the environment. Lao 
Tzu warned against the endless striving for material accumulation and worldly 
hedonism and pointed out that good things are inevitably followed by bad 
things; similarly, misfortune is replaced by blessing. Instead, he preached the 
natural way of life, which is simple, spontaneous, tranquil, weak, and—most 
important—inactive (wu-wei)—that is, taking no action that is contrary to na-
ture. In other words, one should let nature take its own course.  
However, ancient Chinese philosophy is marked by dualism. Two systems 
represent the wisdom of the laboring masses and the wisdom of the educated 
elite (i.e., ethics for ordinary people vs. ethics for scholars). The aforementioned 
folk- Lu, Gilmour, & Kao 479 lore about fu, or fu-qi, exemplifies the former 
system (i.e., ethics for ordinary people), whereas the Taoism founded by Lao 
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Tzu belongs to the latter system (i.e., ethics for the educated elite), which as-
sumes a cultural and moral higher ground over the former.  
Adherents of Taoism regard goals and principles such as inactivity (wu-
wei) as ideals in human life that only a worthy few can achieve through endless 
introspection and self-cultivation. In contrast, ideals like fu, or fu-qi, are guide-
lines for the masses in everyday life. Because researchers of happiness aim to 
understand the subjective experiences of the general population, the wisdom of 
the masses and the ethics of ordinary people should be at the forefront, whereas 
the ethics of the elite and scholars should be regarded as background. The more 
worldly Confucian philosophy has teachings for both the scholars and lay people 
and, hence, is undoubtedly the dominant value system in Chinese societies.  
It has been the most powerful influence shaping the Chinese culture and the 
conceptions of Chinese people for thousands of years. Confucian philosophy 
presupposes that the life of each individual is only a link in that person’s family 
lineage and that each individual is a continuation of his or her ancestors. One 
can apply the same reasoning to the person’s offspring. Although such teaching 
does not necessarily take the form of belief in reincarnation, it puts the family or 
clan in the center of one’s entire life.  
Unlike Western cultures dominated by Christianity, Chinese culture does 
not proclaim the pursuit of salvation in the next life as the ultimate concern; ra-
ther, it advocates striving to expand and preserve the prosperity and vitality of 
one’s family: A person must work hard and be frugal to accumulate material re-
sources, to obtain respectable social status, to suppress selfish desires, to lead a 
virtuous life, and to fulfill social duties. Emphasizing the importance of social 
interaction, Wu (1992) asserted that one can achieve Confucian-style happiness 
through.  
Confucian philosophy stresses the collective welfare of the family or clan 
(extending to society and the entire human race) more than individual welfare; it 
emphasizes integration and harmony among man, society, and nature. Confu-
cianism thus provides the most comprehensive framework for understanding the 
Chinese conception of happiness. Yang and Cheng (1987) conceptualized the 
Confucian values preserved in Taiwan as four groups. Family variables include 
family and clan responsibilities and obedience to one’s elders. Group variables 
include acceptance of the hierarchical structure of society; trust in and obedience 
to authority; and a commitment to the solidarity, harmony, and norms of the 
group. Job-orientation variables include education, skills, hard work, and frugal-
ity.  
Disposition variables include austerity, calmness, humility, and self-
control. In a similar vein, a group of scholars (The Chinese Culture Connection, 
1987) developed the Chinese Value Survey (CVS), which consists of four di-
mensions of cultural values: social integration, human-heartedness, Confucian 
work dynamism, and moral discipline. These not only were akin to the Chinese 
culture but also proved valid in subsequent large-scale cross-cultural studies 
(Bond, 480 The Journal of Social Psychology 1988; The Chinese Culture Con-
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nection). People in non-Chinese societies also experienced those salient Chinese 
cultural values.  
Thus, conceiving and developing such an instrument outside a Western cul-
tural tradition has opened up new theoretical possibilities. At the very least, 
cross-cultural researchers can benefit substantially from the triangulation offered 
by the simultaneous use of instruments, perspectives, or both from different cul-
tures. As scholars have observed, the Chinese philosophies have a theme parallel 
to the underlying theme in Western philosophies. The major issues of concern 
for Western philosophers are “knowledge” and “truth,” whereas those for Chi-
nese philosophers are “action” and “practice” (Hwang, 1995). Chinese philoso-
phy is, in fact, a practical philosophy—the “philosophy of happiness”.  
Of course, happiness here does not mean narrow sensual hedonism; rather, 
it refers to a tranquil state of mind achieved through harmony with other people, 
with society, and with nature. As implied in the foregoing review of Chinese 
philosophical thought, philosophers of every school have prescribed and 
preached paths to happiness, although they have not clearly defined happiness. 
In short, the way to happiness is to practice various important cultural values 
advocated by the philosophers, especially by Confucian philosophers; practicing 
those values should, then, lead to happiness in life.  
Cultural values can be a major force in determining the conception of hap-
piness and, consequently, in constricting its subjective experiences. In a qualita-
tive study of sources of happiness among Chinese in Taiwan, researchers found 
evidence of the distinctive features of the Chinese conception of happiness de-
scribed earlier—in particular, harmony of interpersonal relationships, achieve-
ment at work, and contentment with life (Lu & Shih, 1997b). An alternative ap-
proach to the East–West connection (or disconnection) is to examine directly the 
relationships between cultural values and happiness in different nations. Existing 
cross-cultural comparisons suggest that individualism is the only persistent cor-
relate of SWB when other predictors are controlled (Diener, Diener, et al., 
1995).  
However, the measures of both cultural values and SWB were, once again, 
culture bound and Western; not surprisingly, therefore, Western happiness was 
correlated consistently with the Western value of individualism. To counter this 
cultural bias, one must incorporate Eastern as well as Western perspectives into 
cross-cultural studies.  
 
56. Globalization 
 
Globalization (or globalisation; see spelling differences) refers to the free 
movement of goods, capital, services, people, technology and information. It is 
the action or procedure of international integration of countries arising from the 
conversion of world views, products, ideas, and other aspects of culture.  
Advances in transportation (such as the steam locomotive, steamship, jet 
engine, and container ships) and in telecommunications infrastructure (including 
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the rise of the telegraph and its modern offspring, the Internet and mobile 
phones) have been major factors in globalization, generating further interde-
pendence of economic and cultural activities. Though many scholars place 
the origins of globalization in modern times, others trace its history long before 
the European Age of Discovery and voyages to the New World, some even to 
the third millennium BC Large-scale globalization began in the 1820s. In the 
late 19th century and early 20th century, the connectivity of the world's econo-
mies and cultures grew very quickly. The term globalization is recent, only es-
tablishing its current meaning in the 1970s. In 2000, the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) identified four basic aspects of globalition: trade and transactions, 
capital and investment movements, migration and movement of people, and the 
dissemination of knowledge.  
Further, environmental challenges such as global warming, cross-boundary 
water and air pollution, and overfishingm of the ocean are linked with globaliza-
tion. Globalizing processes affect and are affected by business and work organi-
zation, economics, socio-cultural resources, and the natural environment. Aca-
demic literature commonly subdivides globalization into three major areas: eco-
nomic globalization, cultural globalization, and political globalization.  
This caused shifts in population for third world countries, it took away their 
healthy men and unmarried women leaving wives, children, and the elderly to 
struggle which in return, lowered their health dramatically. The people that had 
left these countries also soon found out that the factory owners they started 
working for cut corners and worked the people extra hard, and did not care 
about health or safety. 
 
57. Philosophy of safety 
 
Philosophy is about the study of existence, beliefs and ideas. The word 
‘philosophy’ actually means the ‘love of wisdom’ and has been ascribed to the 
work of Pythagoras. The word ‘wisdom’ is not a word one hears very much in 
the safety industry that is far more consumed by absolutes, indoctrination and 
authoritarianism.  
The educator Sternberg (also author of the Triarchic Mind) wrote a great 
work on Wisdom, something that should be foundational for any safety person. 
So, if one is to develop a philosophy of safety one would develop a ‘love’ for 
wisdom in safety. The intent of the development of wisdom is the humanization 
and education of people, the opposite is the preoccupation of self, the foundation 
of narcissim. For the philosopher, the first step to wisdom is kno the reality of 
paradox. In this regard, the work of Raynor (The Strategy Paradox, Why Com-
mitting to Success Leads to failure) is an important read. 
For the safety person the challenge of paradox arises from the commitment 
to safety in the face of uncertainty, fallibility, change, randomness and risk. De-
spite the nonsense rhetoric of ‘all accidents are preventable’ and perfectionism 
in zero, a philosophy of safety must acknowledge the reality of randomness in 
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human living. So, the safety person must ‘commit’ (lock in trajectory) to a colli-
sion with uncertainty (the unknown). A commitment to something lessens the 
possibilities for adaptability, because if a commitment can be changed easily it 
wasn’t much of a commitment. Commitments rarely adapt until predictions 
prove incorrect and predictions are rarely verifiably correct. So here is the co-
nundrum or paradox, commitment tends to anchor people to securities in the 
face of what is unknown. In the light of this paradox, a safety person would do 
well to understand the nature of cognitive dissonance. 
In many organisations a philosophy of safety is declared in values state-
ments or a ‘safety philosophy’ statement. These are often little more than a wish 
list of populist statements that have no real connection to a foundational ethic or 
anthropomorphic understanding of personhood. There is generally no under-
standing that the illogical language ‘all accidents are preventable’ must lead to 
blaming and perfectionism. The anthropology of such language denies fallibility 
and the natural logic of learning. So, if such organisations really believe all ac-
cidents are preventable, will they bet on their predictions? What do they do 
when an accident occurs? 
The safety industry needs to talk much more about wisdom. The neglect of 
wisdom is also the neglect of adaptability. This is why the rigidity of binary op-
position is so dangerous. There is no wisdom in zero no wisdom in intolerance, 
no wisdom in no compromise and no learning in absolutes yet, this is the lan-
guage of so many companies about their safety philosophy. I read this week of 
one company bragging about being ‘beyond zero’ and yet sprouting words about 
no compromise and caring for people. 
So, if one wants to develop a philosophy of safety first, it must be person-
centred. Second, it must have a culture focused on the development of maturity 
rather than the semiotics of zero. Third, a philosophy of safety must be commit-
ted to the wisdom of adaptability (and resilience) and finally, understand that the 
paradox of safety is the beginning of wisdom. 
 
58. Multicultural philosophy 
 
Due to its lack of the status of a unitary state formation, Belarus has dele-
gated most of its creative resources to the European intellectual space. There 
was a situation when artists, scientists, philosophers are practically not associat-
ed with Belarus. They, who were born on the territory of Belarus, were regis-
tered as intellectual property by Russia, Israel, Poland, and Lithuania. Ethnic 
Belarusians themselves did not have time to create a database of intellectual re-
sources of their own country. They were dominated by the desire to create a na-
tion on the basis of economic, political criteria of independence. This desire was 
due to the fact that ethnic Belarusians and their country Belarus were in state 
formations of a federal and confederal composition. In such a situation, there 
was a competitive environment in the linguistic and cultural space. As a result, 
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the Belarusian language was supplanted into the ethnographic sphere by Polish, 
and then Russian. 
The carrier of the Belarusian language was the peasantry. It was it that gen-
erated the rural intelligentsia, which formed the new Belarusian culture of litera-
ture, the political movement for the creation of a national state. During the col-
lapse of the Russian Empire, national political organizations tried to proclaim an 
independent state - the Belarusian People’s Republic. But this state did not man-
age to receive international recognition. It did not manage to create an army. 
The Russian Communists (V. Lenin) proposed an alternative in the form of the 
BSSR, which became one of the republics of the USSR. Russian within Belarus 
remained the main language of communication. Along with it, the status of offi-
cial languages was Belorussian, Jewish and Polish. 
In the second half XX century the official languages are Russian and Bela-
rusian. After the collapse of the USSR, the independent Republic of Belarus was 
proclaimed, which initially focused on integration into the political space of Eu-
rope. However, then political forces focused on integration with the Russian 
Federation came to power. 
The Union State was created with a budget for joint economic projects. 
Due to intensive urbanization, the Belarusian language has almost completely 
lost its social base in the face of the peasantry. The Belarusian authorities have 
to constantly clarify the prospects for maintaining independence and sovereignty 
in the light of integration processes. A similar situation took place in the Com-
monwealth. The territorial part of this confederation was Belarus. Knowing this 
historical scenario of Belarus, A. Abdziralovich wrote at the beginning of the 
twentieth century a small volume of text, but a fundamental work. In it, he 
writes that Belarus will no longer be a territorial part of neighboring states - 
Lithuania, Poland and Russia. But such a position needs arguments in the form 
of an independent policy and economy. 
By the criterion of politics, the Republic of Belarus achieved results in the 
form of a peacekeeping mission on the boundary line of the conflict in Ukraine. 
Belarus, within the framework of the Norman Four format, provided the con-
flicting parties with a negotiation platform in Minsk. The renaissance process 
has begun in political relations with the states of the European Union. According 
to the criterion of economics, achievements are formed by the digital economy 
and technological modernization of production. But there remains a factor of 
strong dependence on the consumer market of the Russian Federation, on the 
prices of energy raw materials purchased in this state. 
Historically and geographically, Belarus is a European state, located in the 
zone of intersection of geopolitical interests of the West and Russia. These inter-
sections require jewelry policy, since none of the parties to the geopolitical con-
frontation will abandon the balance of interests between them. 
As a nation, Belarus generated outstanding representatives of European 
Western culture. They found their creative realization in the intellectual and cre-
ative space of Europe. In these conditions, it is important for the Republic of 
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Belarus to integrate into geobranding. Multiculturalism can become one of the 
resources. Significant growth trends play a special role in it. 
In Belarus, the first Tatar-Muslim communities appeared near Grodno. 
There was a settlement of Auls. This was the first Tatar aul. Then the Tatar 
communities formed in Lida, Lososno, Sandykovschizna, Novogrudok and 
Lovchitsy. Material traces of the ancient Tatar settlement were found in the vil-
lage of Ogorodniki, Korelichi district. Slonim, Lyakhovichi, Molodechno, 
Kletsk, Ivye after 1506 became places of compact settlement of Crimean Tatars. 
They began to live in many cities of Belarus. Among them are Nesvizh, Ivano-
vo, Osmolovo, Horde and Minsk. 
Belarusian Tatars created a description of their life within Belarus under 
the name «Risale-i-Tatar-i-leh» (“Risale-i-Tatar-iLech”). The treatise was writ-
ten for the vizier of the Ottoman Empire Suleiman in 1588. The author of the 
treatise is unknown. In the XIX century, the manuscript of the treatise was de-
livered from Istanbul to an orientalist of Tatar origin, a professor at St. Peters-
burg University, and a representative of the Belarusian gentry, Anton Osipovich 
Mukhlinsky. The manuscript was published in Vilna in 1858. A.O. Mukhlinsky 
made a translation of the manuscript from Turkish into Polish, supplemented by 
historical materials. The publication is called “Report (characterization) of the 
Lithuanian Tatars, given by one of these Tatars to Sultan Suleiman in 1558”. It 
was posted in the magazine Teka Wilenska, published in Vilna. 
In order to replenish the treasury of Belarusian cities, the ON authorities 
gave permission to move Jewish communities from Germany. The first written 
mention of Jews in the territory of modern Belarus is a letter of 1383 from 
Prince Vitovt to Brest Jews granting them special privileges. In the XIV and XV 
centuries, there was a massive migration of Jews from German cities to Poland 
and on. Communities that brought capital to Belarus, centuries-old habits of 
trading activity, a kagal system, German-Jewish dialect (Yiddish), religious tra-
ditions and the Talmudic education system moved to Belarus. 
Jews who settled in the spaces of Lithuania, Belarus, the western regions of 
modern Bryansk, Smolensk and southern regions of the Pskov region were 
called Litvaks by association with the borders of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. 
They differed from other Jewish ethnographic groups in their northeastern dia-
lect of Yiddish, special signs of life and customs. 
Over the centuries, the Jewish population in Belarus has changed, which 
was due to various migration factors. By the end of the 15th century, more than 
20 thousand Jews lived in Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania 
At the end of the 15th century, Jews lived in Brest, Grodno. In the XVI 
century, they settled in other settlements of Belarus - Bobruisk, Vitebsk, 
Glubokoe, Drogichin, Minsk, Mogilev, Polotsk, Pruzhany and Radoshkovichi. 
In the history of Jewish communities, the period of exile in 1495 and the 
return of the people in 1503 by the will of the Grand Duke of Lithuania and then 
King of Poland Alexander Jagiellon was difficult. Entangled in debt to Jewish 
creditors, he decided by his decree to expel the Jews. Those moved to neighbor-
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ing Poland. This action did not bring profit to the treasury. Eight years later, Al-
exander allowed the Jews to return to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and re-
turned their property. The Grand Duke and King of the Commonwealth, 
Zhigimont I Old, took the Jews under their protection. He strengthened their le-
gal status by legislative acts: freed them from the obligation to put out a thou-
sand horsemen for war, equalized them in taxation with the bourgeoisie, granted 
freedom of trade and craft, and protected the governor and elders who judged 
the Jews from "tyranny". Needing money for a war with Moscow, Zhigimont, in 
fiscal interests, centralized power over the Jews. In 1514, he appointed Michel 
Jezefovich, the customs foreman of all the Jews of the Grand Duchy of Lithua-
nia, as general foreman. 
Everyday life of the Jewish population of Belarus was traditional. Jews 
created communities on the basis of self-government. They had the right to elect 
rabbis and resolve litigations by Jewish courts on the basis of Jewish law. The 
highest body of Jewish self-government was the Vaadas - congresses of rabbis 
and kagal representatives. Vaadas existed until the middle of the 18th century. 
Jewish communities were united under the name "Lithuanian Vaad." The Brest 
rabbi Meir Val became the chairman (marshal) of the first congress in 1623 in 
Brest. In places of Belarus, Jews formed a local way of life. They spoke the 
Yiddish language that arose in Central and Eastern Europe in the X – XIV cen-
turies. He is the Hebrew language of the German group. It is a product of inter-
cultural interaction. 
In 1551, Jews in Belarus received the right to elect rabbis. Brest rabbi 
Mendel Frank was titled a royal official, and the Jew Shloimo Izrailovich was 
appointed deputy at the Vilnius Voivodeship. Noble Jews in official documents 
were usually titled Panas. Like the gentry, they carried sabers with them. 
An important place in the life of Belarusian Jews was occupied by syna-
gogues. Over several centuries, Belarus has become a major center for Jewish 
scholarship. In the XVI century, the first yeshivas appeared in Brest, Grodno 
and Minsk - religious educational institutions in which the Talmud was studied. 
A special role is played by growth trends in the importance of nostalgic 
tourism. Jews from all over the world began to come to Belarusian cities, where 
their relatives lived and where many of them became victims of the German oc-
cupation in 1941-1944. Among such places are Dyatlovo, Radun, Novogrudok 
and Shklov. 
Before the Second World War, there was a significant Jewish community 
in Dyatlovo. She was engaged in economic and educational activities. Such 
bright representatives of the spiritual culture of the Jewish people as Yaakov 
from Dubno and Khafets Khaim were born in the town. In 1942, the German oc-
cupation authorities shot 2,800 ethnic Jews. In 2006, a memorial to the victims 
of the Holocaust was erected at the site of the tragedy. 
A special role in the geobranding of small towns of Belarus was played by 
Hafets Khaim (Pupko). He was born in Dyatlovo, Grodno province in 1839. In 
1869, he created a yeshiva in Raduni called “Khafets Khaim”. Among the ye-
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shiva teachers, Rabbi Shimon Shkor and Rabbi Moshe Londinsky stood out. 
Hafets Chaim died in Radun in 1933. He wrote a number of works on spiritual 
topics. Hafets-Chaim books are respected in all Jewish communities in the 
world. They were reprinted many times in a different format. They are divided 
into annual study cycles by day of the week. New comments have been written 
to them. After a long break, pilgrims from all over the world rushed to Radun. 
Their number has grown so much that the trend has attracted the attention of 
large investors. One of the Israeli companies plans to invest about ten million 
dollars in the development of small town infrastructure. 
In addition to spiritual reasons, Radun attracts with the tragic history of the 
Great Patriotic War. In the local ghetto, German occupants shot about two thou-
sand Jews. Another place of nostalgic pilgrimage to their native places was No-
vogrudok. The local Jewish community fell victim to the Holocaust. A memorial 
was created at the site of the tragic event. It is dedicated to the victims of the 
Holocaust and Jewish resistance. It consists of the Museum of Jewish Re-
sistance, the Garden of Justice and Mercy, the Wall of Remembrance and con-
tinues to be built at the expense of local and foreign investors, including repre-
sentatives of large US businesses. 
For the construction of the Wall of Memory, the Kushner family founda-
tion, of which the president’s son-in-law Jared Kushner is a member, allocated 
36 thousand dollars. The family was prompted by a memory of their native plac-
es to take such a step. Among those who survived from the Novogrudok ghetto 
was Seidel Kushner and his daughters, Paradise and Leey. Seidel was nick-
named the Hatter. He sewed fur coats and hats. He lived in a stone house in the 
city center. He was considered a rich man. Raisa and her husband Josef Berko-
vich had a son, Charles Kushner. At the time of marriage, Joseph took his wife's 
last name. He became the father of Jared Kushner, the husband of the daughter 
of Donald Trump Ivanka. Charles Kushner has reached the status of a billionaire 
in income. The source of income was housing. Charles Kushner came to Nav-
ahrudak several times. His son - Jared is engaged in business in the real estate 
market of New York. Jared Kushner inherited the business from his father. He is 
the owner of the New York Observer. 
Shklov's geobranding is shaped by his historical role in the distribution of 
Haskala in Russia. In 1772, following the results of the first partition of the 
Commonwealth, Shklov was annexed to the Russian Empire and became part of 
the Mogilev province. In 1777, Catherine II presented Shklov to her favorite 
S.G. Zorichu. He settled in Shklov in 1778. In the city he founded a magnificent 
courtyard with a theater and a Noble School for the children of the local aristoc-
racy. About 10 industrial enterprises were built in the city. Shklov became both 
the center of rabbinical scholarship and the center for the dissemination of scien-
tific knowledge and ideas of Haskala in Russia. 
Famous students and followers of Eliyahu bin Shlomo Zalman lived in 
Shklov. Among them - Rabbi Benjamin bin Shlomo Zalman Zalman Riveles, 
who founded the Yeshiva in Shklov in 1772, as well as Rabbi Avraham bin 
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Shlomo Zalman, Rabbi Simha Bunem bin Baruch Bendet, Rabbi Menachem 
Mendl bin Baruch Bendet. They were called Shklov sages. In 1808–1809 The 
majority of Gaon’s students in Shklov, led by Rabbi Menachem Mendl and 
Rabbi Israel bin Shmuel of Shklov, organized the Prushim community in Safed 
and Jerusalem, the first of the Ashkenazi non-Hasidim communities. 
Shklovsky merchant and farmer I. Tseitlin established a home academy in 
his estate Ustye near the city of Cherikov. Many prominent scholars lived at his 
expense: Rabbi Eliezer of Slonim, Rabbi B. Riveles, Rabbi Nachum of House, 
author of the book “Tosefet Bikkurim”; Rabbi Baruch ben Yaakov Shik 
(Shklover), son of a local rabbi. He is author of essays on anatomy, astronomy, 
geometry, hygiene. He lived for some time in Berlin and London. In Berlin, he 
entered the circle of the Haskala theorists - M. Mendelssohn. 
The representative of Haskala, M. Satanover, wrote in Shklov his book 
“Heshbon ha-Nefesh” (in Russian translation - “Ethics”, 1811). Rabbi Yehuda 
Leib Margaliot lived in Shklov. He is the author of the ethical treatise Beth 
Middot (The Abode of Morality) and the essay on natural science Or Olam (The 
Eternal Light, 1785–1786). 
Yaakov Hirsch from Breslau proposed to the Russian government a project 
to improve primary Jewish education. 
Naftali Herz Schulman in 1803 tried to organize the publication of a Jewish 
newspaper in Hebrew in Shklov. In 1783, a Jewish printing house was opened in 
Shklov. Until 1835, more than 200 titles of books were published in Shklov. 
Famous philanthropists Michl Eisenstadt and Iom-Tov Lipman Zeltser lived in 
Shklov. During the Great Patriotic War, most of the Jews of Shklov, along with 
Jews from other nearby towns in the amount of about three thousand people, 
were shot by the Nazis in September 1941. 
Another city of Jewish scholarship was Ruzhany. A well-known yeshiva 
existed famous rabbis lived in the years 1855-1888. The rabbi was Mordecai 
Gimple Jaffe (years of life 1820–1891). 
In Ruzhany, the famous writer I.M. Pines, Prime Minister of the State of Is-
rael I. Shamir, Jewish writer and poet A. Lyuboshitsky. Near Ruzhani are Pru-
zhany. Yosef Dov-ber ha-Levi Soloveitchik was born here, one of the largest ha-
lakhists and Jewish thinkers of the 20th century. 
The Republic of Belarus pursues a policy of historical memory that is in 
tune with global trends in perpetuating the names of civilians. In these lists of 
names and surnames there are many those whose relatives live in dozens of 
countries of the modern world. Globalization and simplification of the visa re-
gime contribute to the formation of the international image of the Republic of 
Belarus as a state on the territory of which there are spiritual centers of many 
cultures. An image of the Belarusian nation is formed on a multi-ethnic histori-
cal basis. In this image there is no place for nationalism, chauvinism. 
A study of Belarusian intellectual history within the borders of the Europe-
an region showed the important role of regional factors in the formation of the 
educational space of a particular country. This is the undoubted merit of the lo-
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gistics of the Great Silk Road, Renaissance and Reformation. Migration flows 
were multidirectional. 
Within the territory of Belarus, many representatives of the Reformation, 
Counter-Reformation and European science were engaged in educational and 
educational activities. During the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, a sys-
tem of European education was created on the territory of Belarus. It included 
the level of the university (academy). Education was carried out on the basis of 
the multilingual culture of Greek, Latin, English, French, German and Polish. 
Graduates of educational institutions of Belarus did not encounter, as a re-
sult, language barriers. They continued their education at universities in Europe, 
and also took internships there. They moved freely within Europe. The favorite 
city of their residence and work was Paris. The historical period of the USSR 
did not isolate Belarus from Europe, since its western part was part of the Polish 
state until 1939. Even if the natives of Belarus could not leave the USSR, their 
intellectual works became the foundation of world science. An example was the 
scientific heritage of L. Vygotsky, M. Bakhtin, A. Chizhevsky. 
An important role in realizing the creative potential of Belarus was played 
by the historical permission to resettle Jewish communities from Germany with-
in Belarus and the subsequent Haskala, which opened up the possibility for Jew-
ish youth to integrate into the European culture of science and fine arts. Among 
the representatives of the Jewish youth of Belarus S. Maimon, B. Shik, L. Bakst, 
M. Chagall, H. Sutin, N. Minsky, L. Vygotsky. 
 
59. Futurology and philosophy 
 
Futurists or futurologists are scientists and social scientists whose specialty 
is futurology or the attempt to systematically explore predictions and possibili-
ties about the future and how they can emerge from the present, whether that of 
human society in particular or of life on Earth in general. 
The term "futurist" most commonly refers to people who attempt to predict 
the future (sometimes called trend analysis) such as authors, consultants, think-
ers, organizational leaders and others who engage in interdisciplinary and sys-
tems thinking to advise private and public organizations on such matters as di-
verse global trends, possible scenarios, emerging market opportunities and risk 
management. Futurist is not in the sense of the art movement futurism. The Ox-
ford English Dictionary identifies the earliest use of the term futurism in English 
as 1842, to refer, in a theological context, to the Christian eschatological tenden-
cy of that time.  
The next recorded use is the label adopted by the Italian and Russian futur-
ists, the artistic, literary and political movements of the 1920s and 1930s which 
sought to reject the past and fervently embrace speed, technology and, often vio-
lent, change. There are a number of organizations that specialize in this field in-
cluding the World Future Society. 
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Visionary writers such as Jules Verne, Edward Bellamy, and H. G. Wells 
were not in their day characterized as futurists. The term futurology in its con-
temporary sense was first coined in the mid-1940s by the German Professor Os-
sip K. Flechtheim, who proposed a new science of probability. Flechtheim ar-
gued that even if systematic forecasting did no more than unveil the subset of 
statistically highly probable processes of change and charted their advance it 
would still be of crucial social value. In the mid-1940s the first professional "fu-
turist" consulting institutions like RAND and SRI began to engage in long-range 
planning, systematic trend watching, scenario development, and visioning, at 
first under World War II military and government contract and, beginning in the 
1950s, for private institutions and corporations.  
The period from the late 1940s to the mid-1960s laid the conceptual and 
methodological foundations of the modern futures studies field. Bertrand de 
Jouvenel's The Art of Conjecture in 1969 the Future in 1964 are considered key 
early works, and the first U.S. university course devoted entirely to the future 
was taught by the late Alvin Toffler at the The New School in 1966.  
More generally, the label includes such disparate lay, professional, and ac-
ademic groups as visionaries, foresight consultants, corporate strategists, policy 
analysts, cultural critics, planners, marketers, forecasters, prediction market de-
velopers, roadmappers, operations researchers, investment managers, actuaries, 
and other risk analyzers, and future-oriented individuals educated in every aca-
demic discipline, including anthropology, complexity studies, computer science, 
economics, engineering, Urban design, evolutionary biology, history, manage-
ment, mathematics, philosophy, physical sciences, political science, psychology, 
sociology, systems theory, technology studies, trend analysis, and other disci-
plines. 
"Futures studies"—sometimes referred to as futurology, futures research, 
and foresight—can be summarized as being concerned with "three P's and a W", 
i.e. "possible, probable, and preferable" futures, plus "wildcards", which are 
low-probability, high-impact events, should they occur. Even with high-profile, 
probable events, such as the fall of telecommunications costs, the growth of the 
internet, or the aging demographics of particular countries, there is often signifi-
cant uncertainty in the rate or continuation of a trend. Thus, a key part of futures 
analysis is the managing of uncertainty and risk. Not all futurists engage in the 
practice of futurology as generally defined. Pre-conventional futurists (see be-
low) would generally not. And while religious futurists, astrologers, occultists, 
New Age divinists, etc. use methodologies that include study, none of their per-
sonal revelation or belief-based work would fall within a consensus definition of 
futurology as used in academics or by futures studies professionals. 
Several authors have become recognized as futurists. They research trends, 
particularly in technology, and write their observations, conclusions, and predic-
tions. In earlier eras, many futurists were at academic institutions. John McHale, 
author of The Future of the Future, published a 'Futures Directory', and directed 
a think tank called The Centre For Integrative Studies at a university. Futurists 
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have started consulting groups or earn money as speakers, with examples includ-
ing Alvin Toffler, John Naisbitt and Patrick Dixon. Frank Feather is a business 
speaker that presents himself as a pragmatic futurist. Some futurists have com-
monalities with science fiction, and some science-fiction writers, such as Arthur 
C. Clarke, are known as futurists. In the introduction to The Left Hand of Dark-
ness, Ursula K. Le Guin distinguished futurists from novelists, writing of the 
study as the business of prophets, clairvoyants, and futurists. In her words, "a 
novelist's business is lying". 
A survey found the following shared assumptions: 
1. We are in the midst of a historical transformation. Current times are not 
just part of normal history. 
2. Multiple perspectives are at heart of futures studies, including uncon-
ventional thinking, internal critique, and cross-cultural comparison. 
3. Consideration of alternatives. Futurists do not see themselves as value-
free forecasters, but instead aware of multiple possibilities. 
4. Participatory futures. Futurists generally see their role as liberating the 
future in each person, and creating enhanced public ownership of the future.  
5. Long-term policy transformation. While some are more policy-oriented 
than others, almost all believe that the work of futures studies is to shape public 
policy, so it consciously and explicitly takes into account the long term. 
6. Part of the process of creating alternative futures and of influencing 
public policy is internal transformation. At international meetings, structural and 
individual factors are considered equally important. 
7. Complexity. Futurists believe that a simple one-dimensional or single-
discipline orientation is not satisfactory. Trans-disciplinary approaches that take 
complexity seriously are necessary. Futurists are motivated by change. They are 
not content merely to describe or forecast. They desire an active role in world 
transformation. 
8. They are hopeful for a better future as a "strange attractor". 
9. Most believe they are pragmatists in this world, even as they imagine 
and work for another. Futurists have a long term perspective. 
10. Sustainable futures, understood as making decisions that do not reduce 
future options that include policies on nature, gender, and other accepted para-
digms. This applies to corporate futurists and other non-governmental organiza-
tions. Environmental sustainability is reconciled with the technological, spiritu-
al, and post-structural ideals. Sustainability is not a "back to nature" ideal, but 
rather inclusive of technology and culture. 
 
60. Philosophy o forecast 
 
The future is what will happen in the time after the present. Its arrival is 
considered inevitable due to the existence of time and the laws of physics. Due 
to the apparent nature of reality and the unavoidability of the future, everything 
that currently exists and will exist can be categorized as either permanent, mean-
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ing that it will exist forever, or temporary, meaning that it will end. The future 
and the concept of eternity have been major subjects of philosophy, religion, 
and science, and defining them non-controversially has consistently eluded the 
greatest of minds. In the Occidental view, which uses a linear conception of 
time, the future is the portion of the projected time line that is anticipated to oc-
cur.  
In special relativity, the future is considered absolute future, or the fu-
ture light cone. In the philosophy of time, presentism is the belief that only the 
present exists and the future and the past are unreal. Religions consider the fu-
ture when they address issues such as karma, life after death, and eschatolo-
gies that study what the end of time and the end of the world will be. Religious 
figures such as prophets and diviners have claimed to see into the future. Orga-
nized efforts to predict or forecast the future may have derived from observa-
tions by early men of heavenly objects. Future studies, or futurology, are the sci-
ence, art and practice of postulating possible futures. Modern practitioners stress 
the importance of alternative and plural futures, rather than one monolithic fu-
ture, and the limitations of prediction and probability, versus the creation of pos-
sible and preferable futures. 
The concept of the future has been explored extensively in cultural produc-
tion, including art movements and genres devoted entirely to its elucidation, 
such as the 20th century movement futurism. Forecasting is the process 
of estimating outcomes in uncontrolled situations. Forecasting is applied in 
many areas, such as weather forecasting, earthquake prediction, transport plan-
ning, and labour market planning. Due to the element of the unknown, risk and 
uncertainty are central to forecasting. 
Statistically based forecasting employs time series with cross-sectional or 
longitudinal data. Econometric forecasting methods use the assumption that it is 
possible to identify the underlying factors that might influence the variable that 
is being forecast. If the causes are understood, projections of the influencing var-
iables can be made and used in the forecast. Judgmental forecasting methods in-
corporate intuitive judgments, opinions and probability estimates, as in the case 
of the Delphi method, scenario building, and simulations. 
Prediction is similar to forecasting but is used more generally, for instance 
to also include baseless claims on the future. Organized efforts to predict the fu-
ture began with practices like astrology, haruspicy, and augury. These are all 
considered to be pseudoscience today, evolving from the human desire to know 
the future in advance. 
Modern efforts such as future studies attempt to predict technological and 
societal trends, while more ancient practices, such as weather forecasting, have 
benefited from scientific and causal modelling. Despite the development 
of cognitive instruments for the comprehension of future, the stochastic 
and chaotic nature of many natural and social processes has made precise fore-
casting of the future elusive. Future studies or futurology is the science, art and 
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practice of postulating possible, probable, and preferable futures and the 
worldviews and myths that underlie them.  
Futures is an interdisciplinary field, studying yesterday's and today's 
changes, and aggregating and analyzing both lay and professional strategies, and 
opinions with respect to tomorrow. It includes analyzing the sources, patterns, 
and causes of change and stability in the attempt to develop foresight and to map 
possible futures. Modern practitioners stress the importance of alternative and 
plural futures, rather than one monolithic future, and the limitations of predic-
tion and probability, versus the creation of possible and preferable futures. 
Three factors usually distinguish futures studies from the research conduct-
ed by other disciplines (although all disciplines overlap, to differing degrees). 
First, futures studies often examines not only possible but also probable, prefer-
able, and "wild card" futures. Second, futures studies typically attempts to gain a 
holistic or systemic view based on insights from a range of different disciplines.  
The future thus is not empty but fraught with hidden assumptions. Futures 
studit does not generally include the work of economists who forecast move-
ments of interest rates over the next business cycle, or of managers or investors 
with short-term time horizons. Most strategic planning, which develops opera-
tional plans for preferred futures with time horizons of one to three years, is also 
not considered futures. But plans and strategies with longer time horizons that 
specifically attempt to anticipate and be robust to possible future events are part 
of a major subdiscipline of futures studies called strategic foresight. The futures 
field also excludes those who make future predictions through professed super-
natural means. At the same time, it does seek to understand the models such 
groups use and the interpretations they give to these models. 
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